Filed 7/6/26 In re L.G. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re L.G. et al., Persons B350199
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No.
25CCJP02094A-B)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
S.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Sumako McCallum, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Catherine L. W. Markel, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Eden Gharapet, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________________
In this juvenile dependency appeal, S.R. (mother)
challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings that she
failed to protect her two children from their father’s substance
abuse and domestic violence against her. The children’s father,
J.G. (father), entered a no contest plea to the jurisdictional
findings pertaining to his behavior. He did not appeal. While
mother’s appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated its
jurisdiction and entered a final custody order granting mother
and father joint legal and joint physical custody of the children
and primary custody to mother.
We conclude mother’s appeal is moot. We decline to
exercise our discretion to consider the merits of her appeal.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Mother and father have two children together, L.G.
(daughter) and D.G. (son) (collectively, children). When the
underlying proceedings began, daughter was 9 years old and son
was 7 years old. Both children are autistic and son also has been
diagnosed with attention deficit disorder. Father has two older
children from a different relationship (half siblings).
In May 2025, a domestic violence incident occurred between
mother and father. Law enforcement was called and a referral
2
was made to the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (Department). At the time, mother and father
were no longer in a relationship but shared a bedroom together
with the children in a home where paternal relatives and half
siblings also lived. Following the May 2025 domestic violence
incident, mother and the children moved out of the home. In July
2025, with the juvenile court’s authorization, the children were
detained from father. The children remained in mother’s custody
and care.
It is undisputed father had a history of substance abuse
(including methamphetamine), was a current abuser of
marijuana (which he used every day), and had a history of
domestic violence against mother and previous partners (for
which he had been arrested). It is similarly undisputed, despite
father’s drug use and domestic violence against her, mother
stayed with father for years, sometimes leaving him only to
return to him with the children. Nonetheless, there is no
indication the children had been physically harmed by father’s
domestic violence or drug use.
In July 2025, the Department filed a three-count Welfare
and Institutions Code section 300 petition on behalf of the
children (petition).1 The petition alleged under subdivisions (a)
and (b) of section 300 that the children were at risk of harm due
to father’s domestic violence against mother, father’s substance
abuse, and mother’s failure to protect the children from father’s
violent behavior and substance abuse. At the detention hearing,
the juvenile court detained the children from father and released
them to mother under Department supervision. The children
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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remained in mother’s custody and care for the duration of the
proceedings below. The court also granted mother’s request for a
temporary restraining order protecting her from father. Over the
Department’s objection, the court granted father unmonitored
visits.
Prior to adjudication, mother reported she had completed
an intake appointment for a domestic violence support group and
would be attending special needs parent training.
On September 11, 2025, the juvenile court held a combined
adjudication and disposition hearing. Father entered a no
contest plea to the petition as amended. Counsel for mother
asked the court to dismiss the allegations pertaining to mother’s
behavior. Counsel argued there was no current substantial risk
to the children as mother and father were abiding by the recent
restraining order and there had been no further incidents. The
court dismissed the subdivision (a) count (which alleged father’s
violent conduct toward mother endangered the children) and
found true, as amended, the two subdivision (b) counts pertaining
to father’s substance abuse and domestic violence against
mother, and mother’s failure to protect the children from father’s
substance abuse and domestic violence. The court stated, “This is
a close call in a lot of ways as mother at this time is taking
appropriate measures to protect the children.” Nonetheless,
noting mother took protective action after the court became
involved and the “seven-year at least history” of domestic
violence, the court believed “this is an ongoing situation” and
found true the failure to protect allegations as to mother.
As to disposition, counsel for mother stated, “[W]e are
submitting on domestic violence for victims. We are also
submitting on family preservation.” Counsel asked the court to
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strike from mother’s proposed case plan the requirement that she
enroll in a parenting program. The court agreed with mother.
The court ordered mother to enroll in a domestic violence support
group, to abide by any retraining orders, to cooperate with the
Regional Center, and to receive family preservation services.
Mother was not required to enroll in a parenting program.
Father was ordered to enroll in both a domestic violence program
for perpetrators and individual counseling, as well as to submit to
drug testing. The court removed the children from father and
continued their placement with mother under Department
supervision. Father was granted unmonitored visits with the
children. On the same date, the juvenile court issued a three-
year permanent restraining order protecting mother from father.
Mother appealed the court’s September 11, 2025
jurisdictional findings. Father did not appeal.
Many months later, on March 12, 2026, the juvenile court
terminated its jurisdiction, granted mother and father joint
physical and joint legal custody of the children, granted mother
primary custody of the children, and ordered counsel to submit a
final custody order for the court’s review and signature. The
court stayed termination of jurisdiction pending receipt of the
final custody order, which was received and filed on May 6,
2026.2
DISCUSSION
The Department argues mother’s appeal is not justiciable
because, in addition to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings
as to mother, the court also based jurisdiction on father’s conduct,
2 We previously granted the Department’s request for
judicial notice of the juvenile court’s March 12, 2026 and May 6,
2026 orders.
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which findings were not appealed. Thus, regardless of our
decision here, dependency jurisdiction would remain. Moreover,
as noted above, after mother filed her appeal, the juvenile court
terminated jurisdiction and entered a final custody order
granting mother and father joint physical and joint legal custody
of the children and granting mother primary custody. The
Department also argues we should not exercise our inherent
discretion to consider the merits of mother’s appeal.
Mother, on the other hand, argues her appeal is not moot
because her challenge to the jurisdictional findings also impacts
the validity of the court’s dispositional orders as to her.
Nonetheless, if her appeal is moot, mother urges us to exercise
our discretion to address the merits of her appeal.
We agree with the Department.
1. Mother’s appeal is moot.
“A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14
Cal.5th 266, 276.) Speculative future harm is insufficient to
overcome mootness. (Id. at pp. 278, 282.) In the dependency
context, we decide on a case-by-case basis whether an appeal has
been rendered moot by events occurring after the appeal was
filed. (Id. at p. 276.)
Here, there is no dispute the juvenile court correctly found
true the allegations as to father’s conduct and those findings have
not been challenged on appeal. Thus, as the Department points
out, even if we agreed with mother’s arguments on appeal,
dependency jurisdiction would remain. (In re X.S. (2010) 190
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Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161.) Moreover, the juvenile court has
terminated its jurisdiction and closed the case with a final
custody order. Mother is not harmed by the final custody order,
which grants her joint legal and physical custody as well as
primary custody. It is also worth noting the juvenile court never
removed the children from mother’s custody and care during the
entirety of the proceedings below.
Mother asserts the jurisdictional allegations pertaining to
her “go directly to the dispositional issues,” such that her appeal
is not moot. However, mother does not in fact directly challenge
the dispositional orders as to her or offer a sound argument why
we must reverse those orders. Rather, mother focuses on a
perceived unfairness between how she and father were treated as
a reason for discretionary review, which we discuss below.
In any event, even if we were to reverse the jurisdictional
findings pertaining to mother’s failure to protect, the juvenile
court could have made the same dispositional orders as to
mother. Once dependency jurisdiction has been established,
“there need not be a jurisdictional finding as to the particular
parent upon whom the court imposes a dispositional order.” (In
re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311.) Thus, even if we
reversed the challenged jurisdictional findings, mother makes no
argument (and we can think of none, especially given that the
juvenile court has since terminated its jurisdiction) why we also
should reverse the orders requiring mother to enroll in a domestic
violence support group for victims, to abide by restraining orders,
to cooperate with the Regional Center, and to receive family
preservation services. Because mother has not demonstrated “a
specific legal or practical consequence that would be avoided
upon reversal of the jurisdictional findings,” her appeal is moot.
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(In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 273.)
2. We decline discretionary consideration of mother’s
appeal.
Even when an appeal is moot, however, we may exercise
our inherent discretion to consider the merits of the dispute. (In
re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 282, 285.) In deciding whether to
exercise our inherent discretion, we may consider why the appeal
became moot, whether the challenged jurisdictional findings are
particularly egregious or pernicious, and whether the challenged
findings “ ‘could be prejudicial to the appellant or could
potentially impact the current or future dependency proceedings,’
or ‘ “could have other consequences for [the appellant], beyond
jurisdiction.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 285.) We are “guided by the
overarching goals of the dependency system: ‘to provide
maximum safety and protection for children’ with a ‘focus’ on ‘the
preservation of the family as well as the safety, protection, and
physical and emotional well-being of the child.’ ” (Id. at p. 286.)
We decline to exercise our discretion here. The challenged
jurisdictional findings are not particularly egregious or
pernicious. Although it is possible the challenged findings and
mother’s status as an “offending” parent might arise in future
dependency proceedings (if any such proceedings are brought),
both the Department and court will have access to our opinion as
well as the record below, all of which provide a fuller picture of
what transpired in this case.
Mother asserts “principles of fairness” “favor discretionary
review of this case.” She asserts, although she was the victim of
domestic violence, she was “treated different than the violent
perpetrator” and “her protective actions [went] unacknowledged
in any meaningful manner,” while father, the perpetrator who
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did not seem to find his behavior concerning, was granted
unmonitored visitation with the children. First, and importantly,
we commend mother for the actions she took to protect herself
and the children. By moving out of the room she and the children
shared with father, signing up for services, and abiding by the
restraining order, mother demonstrated a newfound and
praiseworthy willingness to separate from father. Nonetheless,
however, mother’s fairness argument on appeal is not entirely
accurate. For example, it does not account for the fact she
maintained custody of the children throughout the proceedings
below. Finally, if we exercised our discretion to consider the
merits of mother’s appeal, we would consider whether substantial
evidence supported the juvenile court’s failure-to-protect findings,
not whether father’s case plan was appropriate or fair.
Mother also contends that when, as here, the juvenile court
makes jurisdictional findings as to both parents but only one
parent challenges the findings pertaining to them, that parent is
“essentially barred from appealing any injustice or faulty ruling if
the Court of Appeal does not exercise its discretion to review the
case.” This is incorrect. In such circumstances, the appealing
parent’s challenge is not moot and will be considered when the
challenged findings have a tangible effect on the appealing
parent’s legal rights, such as restricting visitation or custody (In
re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276) or mandating inclusion in
California’s Child Abuse Central Index (In re S.R. (2025) 18
Cal.5th 1042, 1048), and the reviewing court can issue effective
relief. As explained above, however, this is not such a case.
In sum, we decline to exercise our discretion to consider the
merits of mother’s appeal.
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DISPOSITION
Mother’s appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
RICHARDSON, J.
GOORVITCH, J.
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