Filed 7/7/26 C.P. v. A.C. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
C.P., B345123
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. 17VEFL00020)
A.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Firdaus F. Dordi, Judge. Affirmed.
Family Violence Appellant Project, Elissa Gray, Arati
Vasan, Jennafer Dorfman Wagner; Debevoise & Plimpton,
Lindsay Cooper Hayman, Saurabh Prabhakar, Kaumron
Khorrami and Katherine L. Heath for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Mother A.C. (mother) appeals from a custody order
granting joint legal custody of the parties’ daughter K.C. (born
December 2013) to respondent C.P. (father).1 Mother argues the
trial court mischaracterized the record and erred in its
application of Family Code section 3044 (section 3044).2 We find
no error and affirm the order.
COMBINED FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mother and father’s relationship and father’s abuse of
mother
Mother and father met when mother was 14 years old and
father was 18 years old. Mother moved in with father when she
was 15 years old and became pregnant with K.C. Father
emotionally abused mother and forced her to marry him at age
17. Father also physically abused mother. He would slap her,
punch her in the face, bite her, strangle her, and yell at her,
calling her “‘loose,’ ‘whore,’ ‘whale’ and other cruel names.”
Father also isolated mother from friends and family, restricting
her access to social media and prohibiting her from having her
own phone. Mother alleged when she was 16 years old, father
dragged her around the house by her hair, cut her skin, threw
Clorox at her, and lit matches on her after he caught her trying to
1 Father has not filed a respondent’s brief in this matter.
2 Section 3044, subdivision (a) creates a rebuttable
presumption, upon a finding that a party seeking custody of a
child has perpetrated domestic violence in the preceding five
years, “that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a
child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is
detrimental to the best interest of the child.” The presumption
may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ibid.)
2
call her mother on a public phone. She alleged father attempted
to strangle her with a vacuum cord and caused a hemorrhage in
her left eye. She ended up hospitalized and had to have
emergency surgery to remove an infarcted inguinal ganglion cyst
due to the physical trauma father imposed on her. Father also
drove recklessly with mother in the car for the purpose of scaring
her. Mother’s parents made multiple reports in Mexico but there
was little they could do because mother kept returning to father
due to fear of retaliation.
Mother alleged father’s mother forced her to take fertility
medication when she was 16 years old because father believed it
would be easier for him to come to the United States if they had a
child.
After they came to the United States, father continued
abusing mother, isolating her from her friends and family. A few
days after K.C. was born, father punched mother in the face and
bit her chest. He went to jail, but mother’s parents bailed him
out because he was threatening to kidnap K.C. DCFS became
involved and mother was given protection via a restraining order.
In August 2015, mother separated from father. However,
mother testified father continued abusing her. Mother saw
father following her “almost every single week.”
Father denied abusing mother. He testified he never
physically injured her. Father also denied stalking mother.
Father acknowledged mother made many police reports against
him, and he had “two or three” criminal convictions “due to the
restraining order.”
Family law, criminal and dependency proceedings
In 2015, father was criminally charged with domestic
violence, and mother was issued a criminal protective order
3
(CPO). Father was convicted of violating the protective order. In
2016, father was again charged with domestic violence. The Los
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) became involved with the family and dependency
proceedings commenced. A dependency court exit order issued in
2017 granted mother sole custody of K.C. with supervised
visitation for father, two times per week for two hours.
Father filed for dissolution in 2017. In September 2017,
mother was granted another CPO against father. The October
2018 judgment of dissolution maintained the custody and
visitation orders from dependency court.
In October 2018, father filed a request for order seeking
joint legal custody with primary physical custody to mother. In
December 2018, father was convicted of violating the CPO
protecting mother.
From 2019 to 2022, father filed four requests for orders
modifying custody and visitation. Father claimed mother did not
comply with the visitation orders and denied him his visitation
rights. Father attached certificates showing he had completed a
parenting/child abuse program and 52 sessions of a domestic
violence program. The completion certificate for the
parenting/child abuse program noted father’s “progress was
successful” in the group, and that he “expanded his repertoire of
positive parenting practices, healthy parent-child bonding,
understanding of child development knowledge and appropriate
child behavior management skills.” The domestic violence
completion form noted father responded well to the subjects
taught including the “causes, consequences, dynamics of domestic
violence and the required communication skills necessary to
resolve conflicts.” Above all, father “understood and
4
acknowledged his responsibilities in regard to past marital
conflicts.”
Mother disputed father’s characterization of the events
causing father to miss visits with K.C., explaining father
“disappeared after the [March 2017] custody order” because he
did not want mother’s mother acting as monitor and chose not to
exercise his rights to visit K.C. Mother asserted K.C. would
“scream and cry” when she had to visit with father and bit her
nails until they bled. K.C. told her therapist she hated father.
The trial court first modified the custody order in 2019
after a hearing at which father was represented by counsel and
mother was not present. Although father filed a proof of service,
mother claimed she was never served and did not know about
father’s request for modification. The trial court gave father joint
legal custody and unsupervised visitation.
Father filed another request in 2020. After a hearing at
which both parties were present, the court maintained the joint
legal custody order but gave mother tie-breaking authority.
Father filed another request in 2021 asserting mother was
not complying with the joint legal custody and visitation orders
and not being fully responsible with their daughter’s needs.
Father referenced K.C.’s schoolwork and attendance and accused
mother of not regularly taking K.C. to the dentist.3 Following
3 Mother later denied these allegations, saying father was
not involved until he saw that his legal custody was threatened
by his actions. She also alleged when father is involved, he was
extremely uncooperative and controlling when it came to making
decisions regarding K.C. Mother also denied neglecting K.C.’s
educational and health needs, providing K.C.’s dental records and
context about her education.
5
mediation was an order for joint legal custody with tie-breaking
authority to mother, with visitation to father twice a week in the
evenings as well as alternating weekends.
Proceedings concerning mental health
Mother began seeking mental health assistance for K.C. in
2022 after K.C. asked for help with “bad thoughts and feelings.”
K.C. met with therapists, counselors, and school psychologists
and was given a low-dose psychiatric prescription medication for
her symptoms. Mother asserted K.C. would scream and cry when
she had to go with father and would bite her nails until they bled.
In September 2022, father filed a request for the trial court
to order mother to stop giving K.C. her psychiatric medication
and to give him final decisionmaking authority. Mother filed a
response explaining why K.C. was prescribed medication, how it
had been improving K.C.’s mood and behavior, and how she
attempted to engage father in the treatment process. Mother
further alleged father exploited joint legal custody to exert
control over her, for example by only agreeing to provide financial
support for K.C.’s therapy expenses if mother agreed to “side
deals” beyond the court’s orders such as trips to Mexico or late
night concerts with K.C.
In November 2022, mother filed a request for sole legal
custody and to limit father’s visits to alternating weekends with
no overnight visits. Mother attached text messages in which
father said he was not allowing K.C. to play hockey during visits
because mother would not allow him to take K.C. to Mexico, and
another where father threatened to make police reports and go to
court if mother continued to give K.C. her medication.
Two weeks later, mother filed a request for emergency
order after K.C. told father she did not want to go to Mexico and
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father “locked her in his car until she agreed to go.” Mother took
K.C. to urgent care the following day after K.C. had an anxiety
attack and threatened to hurt herself if she had to go to Mexico.
In February 2023, at a hearing with both parties
represented by counsel, the trial court denied mother’s request
for modification, but the parties stipulated to continued
medication and therapy for K.C. Mother was to provide father
with basic information and progress resulting from K.C.’s
continued therapy. The court temporarily revoked father’s
permission to travel internationally with K.C. until she no longer
had anxiety surrounding travel.
In March 2023, K.C. had a panic attack at school before a
visit with father, and the school told mother K.C. had been
picking her skin intensely and had abdominal pain. Mother
brought K.C. to urgent care where K.C. stated she had lots of
anxiety before going with her father, including rapid breathing
and abdominal pain. K.C. was diagnosed with a panic disorder
and excoriation (skin-picking) disorder.
In April 2023, mother took K.C. to the emergency room
because K.C. had an episode of vomiting and diarrhea before a
visit with father.
June 2023 request for modification and DCFS
investigation
In June 2023, mother filed a request for suspended
visitation and sole legal custody to continue K.C.’s psychological
and psychiatric treatment without opposition. Mother explained
a DCFS investigation was opened following a referral from K.C.’s
therapist. K.C. informed the therapist on several occasions
father became angry and drove the car with her inside at speeds
of over 150 miles per hour to scare her into complying with his
7
demands. K.C. would cry, beg father to stop, and reported she
threw up and urinated on herself out of fear while father drove at
dangerous speeds. Father denied driving recklessly with K.C. in
the car.
The court suspended father’s visitation with K.C. pending
the next hearing and the conclusion of the DCFS investigation.
Later that month, father filed a declaration opposing mother’s
request and asserting she was inventing false claims to keep him
away from K.C.’s school and doctors. Father also claimed mother
was trying to stop father from taking K.C. on their planned
vacation to Lake Tahoe. Father filed a request for sole legal and
physical custody of K.C. with supervised visitation to mother,
alleging mother had harmed K.C. by making her emotional state
worse and being negligent with her hygiene, food and medication.
Mother filed a reply stating K.C.’s anxiety symptoms had
improved tremendously since visits with father were suspended.
Mother disputed father’s accusations of neglect and withholding
information. Mother requested father have supervised visits
every other Sunday.
At a June 2023 hearing, the court noted the DCFS
investigation was complete and the result was inconclusive. The
court temporarily modified father’s visits to professionally
supervised visits every Sunday from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. The
court appointed counsel for K.C.
At an October 2023 hearing, the court modified father’s
visitation, ordering father’s visits could be monitored by
nonprofessional monitors and increasing the visits to five hours
every Sunday. Mother was ordered to provide father information
and make sure father had equal access to K.C.’s school, health,
and education records.
8
November 2023 request for domestic violence restraining
order (DVRO)
On November 29, 2023, mother filed a DVRO request
against father. Mother alleged father had abused her in late
April 2023. She also alleged father had been abusive in front of
K.C., mother’s younger children and her current husband.
Mother sought protection for herself, her husband, K.C., and
mother’s two younger children, one aged 2 years and one 4
months. Mother requested father be required to attend a 52-
week batterer intervention program. Mother asked for a five-
year restraining order.
In her declaration attached to the DVRO request, mother
alleged throughout their marriage, father physically and verbally
abused her, and was arrested for domestic violence in 2014,
resulting in a 10-year CPO.
As to the most recent abuse, mother alleged on
November 26, 2023, her family took K.C. out to breakfast about
one hour before a scheduled visit with father. While eating,
mother noticed father driving around the restaurant. He drove
by, made a U-turn and slowly circled the building two more
times. Mother was scared and believed father was trying to
intimidate and harass her.
On November 11, 2023, mother and her current husband
were waiting for father to return K.C. after a visit. Father’s car
sped up and stopped in front of where mother and her current
husband were sitting and stayed parked there. After looking
directly at mother, father sped off very quickly. Mother believed
father did this to intimidate and scare her.
On April 1, 2023, father attended K.C.’s hockey game at the
Toyota Sports Center. After the game, father yelled at K.C. to go
9
with him. K.C. cried and told him she did not want to go. K.C.
was standing next to mother at the time, who was six months
pregnant and holding her two-year-old son. Father was visibly
upset by K.C.’s refusal to go with him. He rushed towards them
and shoved and elbowed mother. K.C. had witnessed father
shove and elbow mother and was crying. Father left the building,
went outside and called police. When the police arrived, father
told police the CPO had expired. They told mother there was no
active restraining order against father, and there was nothing
they could do.
In late April 2023, father again attended K.C.’s hockey
game and became aggressive towards mother when K.C. refused
to go with father. After the game, the parents and K.C.’s
teammates were walking to the locker to remove their hockey
gear. Father yelled to K.C., “come here for a second” and K.C.
said “No.” Father then “violently rushed” into the locker room.
Mother was frightened. Father yelled at K.C., “You better choose
another sport,” and eventually “stormed” out of the locker room.
Mother asserted K.C. and her teammates were crying, and
mother was afraid he would attack her again.
Mother asserted generally that father continued to harass
her and intimidate her in front of her children. She did not feel
safe because father knew where they lived. Mother had a video
of father showing up at their house uninvited and cursing at
mother and her current husband.
On November 30, 2023, the trial court granted a temporary
restraining order protecting mother, her husband, K.C., and
mother’s two younger children. The order gave mother sole legal
and physical custody with professionally supervised visitation for
father with K.C. once a week for three hours, with the monitor
10
paid by father. The order was set to expire at the end of the
hearing set for December 22, 2023.
In December 2023, father filed a response, disputing
mother’s accusations and requesting joint legal and physical
custody with increased visitation and permission to travel
without mother’s consent. As to the allegation that father drove
around the restaurant, father said he had reason to be in the
area because it was close to their place to exchange the child, and
he did not know the family was having breakfast at the
restaurant he was accused of circling.
Father denied speeding up and parking near mother and
her husband on November 11, 2023, asserting he knows mother
is “looking for motives to get [him] into trouble,” and therefore he
stays as far away as possible and waits for instructions from the
monitor.
Father said only one incident occurred in April 2023, not
two. Father admitted to being present at K.C.’s game, but
asserted it was his weekend to have K.C. He stated mother
wrongly did not allow K.C. to go with him, so he called police to
get mother to comply with the visitation orders in place at the
time.
As to the general allegations of harassment, father stated
mother was the one harassing him with the accusations and
requests to stop father’s visitation. Father said mother had
consistently failed to comply with court orders. Father suggested
mother had filed the current request because the holidays were
approaching and mother intended to block his holiday time with
K.C.
On January 19, 2024, the court heard mother’s DVRO
request. The court heard testimony from mother, maternal
11
grandmother, and father regarding the incidents alleged in
mother’s DVRO request. Mother testified, among other things,
father had recently threatened to kill her.4
The court made the following findings: mother had
established a threat, although there was no date or time alleged.
The court found there was no refutation of that testimony, so it
was established.
With respect to the April 1 incident at the hockey rink, the
court found maternal grandmother’s testimony corroborated
mother’s testimony and found the allegation credible.
The court found mother had not carried her burden of proof
as to the November 11, 2023 incident, nor as to the November 26,
2023 incident, as there was no evidence father knew mother and
K.C. were at the restaurant.
The court concluded, “I am inclined to issue the restraining
order. Again, you know, to the extent that the physical abuse
occurred and given that there’s been a long history of physical
abuse, I am going to issue a three-year—not a five-year—
restraining order subject to renewal.” The court ordered the
protected parties to be mother, her husband, K.C., and mother’s
younger children. The current orders regarding father’s custody
and visitation were to remain in effect. The court noted, “the
presumption in place or the rebuttal of presumption of Family
Code section 3044 will be in effect.” A hearing date was set for
custody issues.
4 The court noted mother’s claim that a threat occurred
sometime in the past year was not mentioned in mother’s
declaration in support of the DVRO. The court noted it offered a
continuance and was “mindful” of this omission from mother’s
declaration.
12
March 2024 custody hearing
In advance of the March 2024 custody review hearing,
mother filed a declaration requesting the current orders remain
in place: K.C. was to remain a protected party under the DVRO,
mother would maintain sole legal and physical custody of K.C.,
and father would maintain professionally monitored visits with
K.C. Mother asserted father remained difficult to communicate
with and uncooperative, continuing to manipulate every situation
with threats to take mother back to court or offering to cooperate
only if mother agreed to allow him to take K.C. to Mexico.
Father filed a supplemental brief and supporting
declaration requesting the court restore the November 2021
orders of primary physical custody to mother, joint legal custody,
and unsupervised visitation to father every first, third and fifth
weekend and Monday and Thursday evenings. Father accused
mother of trying to prevent him from having a relationship with
K.C. and coaching K.C. Father attached a certificate of
completion of a six-hour anger management course on March 1,
2024, and a parenting course in 2021.
Later, father filed an amended supplemental brief, arguing
K.C. was exhibiting signs of extreme stress from the ongoing
litigation and that mother was preventing him from having a
relationship with K.C. because she was coaching and
manipulating the child. Father stated mother’s claims to DCFS
were “not only unsubstantiated but also suspicious” and claimed
K.C.’s school counselor noted K.C. had not reported being scared
of father. (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) Mother later
denied these accusations and wrote K.C.’s school counselor said
the statements father attributed to her were completely incorrect.
13
Father argued he could rebut the section 3044
presumption. He stated he had tried to move on with his life, but
mother was using the domestic violence laws to prevent him from
raising his child.
At the hearing on March 12, 2024, the court focused on
visitation issues. The minor’s counsel indicated K.C. preferred to
maintain a monitor for visits at least until the next hearing.
Minor’s counsel stated, “[K.C.] still speaks about certain events
that make[] her feel uncomfortable with dad and not safe in dad’s
care.” Minor’s counsel agreed a nonprofessional monitor would
be fine.
The parties agreed to a schedule of visits for father on
Wednesdays and Sundays for three hours, with nonprofessional
monitoring permitted to be done by friends of father.
Briefing for section 3044 hearing
Father filed a brief regarding child custody and visitation
on April 2, 2024. Father was seeking joint legal custody with tie-
breaking authority to mother, primary physical custody to
mother, and unmonitored visitation to father every first, third
and fifth weekend and Mondays and Thursdays after school.
Father repeated his assertions that mother was preventing him
from having a full relationship with K.C. Father cited pages from
the DCFS investigative report in which the DCFS investigator
wrote:
“School counselor … states mother has provided reports
that the child is scared of father. The child has not reported
being scared of father to the office or the teacher. [Counselor]
stated having concerns with mother. Her sense of reality is not
what’s happening. Mother’s concerns about [K.C.] have been
very extreme and not always accurate. Her communication is not
14
consistent and then we hear about her when there is a problem.
Believe mother is not emotionally stable and may be feeding that
to the child.”
“The child only confirmed the allegations when asked
directly, however stated that she does not have a good memory
and that she only knows that this happened because her mother
told her it happened. The child then clarified that she did not
remember any of the allegations actually occurring.”
Father argued he could overcome the presumption of
section 3044 by a preponderance of the evidence.
Mother filed a responsive declaration, stating the recent
increase in visitation with father, along with the removal of a
professional monitor, had a detrimental impact on K.C.’s
academic performance and overall well-being. Mother attached
an e-mail from K.C.’s teacher supporting her assertions that
K.C.’s homework and behavior at school had worsened recently.
Mother also asserted father had missed seven out of the 13
scheduled visits in the prior 13 weeks, creating instability for
K.C. Father had committed “proximity violations,” which mother
had reported to police. Mother continued to allege father
engaged in “coercion, manipulation and violations of court
ordered boundaries.”
Father denied the allegation he had missed visitation half
the time, asserted mother manipulated K.C.’s teacher and falsely
attributed the child’s behavior problems to him. Father filed a
supplemental brief alleging mother recently “sabotaged” one of
his visits with K.C. by calling the police for no valid reason.
Father included reports from the nonprofessional monitors saying
the visits were going well, father and K.C. have a good
relationship, and accusing mother of showing up late to visits,
15
dressing K.C. inappropriately, and lying to police about the
DVRO.
Mother filed a reply explaining she had to call the police
several times because father was violating the visitation order by
parking less than 40 yards away and watching the exchanges.
The order required father to leave the premises five minutes
before the exchange and always be 100 yards away from mother.
Mother claimed since father had been absent with no visitation,
K.C.’s anxiety had noticeably decreased.
August and September 2024 section 3044 hearings
The first day of hearings on section 3044 was August 28,
2024. Father was represented by counsel, and mother appeared
representing herself. Mother, Los Angeles Police Department
Sergeant Christopher Jordan, DCFS social worker Nora Corona,
and father’s friend and nonprofessional visitation monitor Milton
Reyes testified.
Sergeant Jordan testified he was on the scene for an
alleged restraining order violation in April 2024. When he
approached the scene, some officers were discussing the
paperwork they had been provided. There was confusion
regarding the DVRO. At that time, it was determined father was
not in violation of the DVRO. Sergeant Jordan recalled advising
both parties to get a clearer understanding of what was supposed
to happen during the exchange of the child.
Mother said Corona participated in a DCFS investigation
during the summer of 2023 involving allegations father drove
recklessly with K.C. in the car. She testified she never coached or
prepared K.C. regarding what to say to Corona.
Corona worked with DCFS for 18 years as a social worker.
She investigated 2023 allegations that father was driving in a
16
reckless manner while K.C. was in his car. When she
interviewed K.C. about the incident, K.C. was “prepared.” She
had a list of things to report that were written out on a piece of
paper. K.C. seemed eager to speak and began the conversation
telling Corona that her father had left her at the age of one.
When Corona first met with K.C. at home, K.C. appeared to want
to tell Corona things without Corona questioning her. K.C.
appeared distracted at home by her pets and seemed to go
straight into talking about what her father did to her mother
without allowing Corona an opportunity to question her. Corona
decided to meet with the child at school. Corona had the sense
K.C. had been coached.
Corona had an opportunity to speak with another DCFS
investigator who had investigated allegations that father
inappropriately touched or kissed K.C. in 2022. That investigator
also raised concerns about K.C. being coached. Corona also spoke
with K.C.’s school principal, who expressed suspicions about
mother and some of the allegations she had raised. Corona did
not find mother to be credible during the 2023 investigation.
Reyes was a friend of father who had started monitoring
father’s visits with K.C. a few months prior to the hearing. He
testified father would park at the Rite Aid and Reyes would walk
the 100 yards or so to pick up K.C. at the Starbucks to bring her
back for her visit with father. Mother was aware that father and
Reyes were parking at the Rite Aid. Mother moved from parking
at the Starbucks to parking closer to the Rite Aid. Reyes claimed
“[i]t was a pattern.” Reyes testified K.C. did not appear clean or
well taken care of prior to the visits. Reyes testified as the visits
went on, K.C. became happier.
17
Reyes testified to an incident when they had parked even
farther away than usual, but mother walked alone close by to
where they parked. Father said to Reyes, “oh, my God, I know
she’s going to say something.” Reyes expressed disbelief, as they
could not control where mother walked. On the way home, they
received a call from a police officer telling father he had violated
the restraining order. Reyes spoke to the police officer and told
him they just happened to pass by the area where mother was
walking, and mother claimed it was a violation of the restraining
order. Reyes testified mother’s claim father violated the
restraining order was a “complete lie,” and offered to testify.
The second day of the hearing was September 24, 2024.
Reyes was recalled to the witness stand and testified he made
sure they were always in compliance with the distance
restrictions between father and mother during exchanges.
Suzanne Vasquez, another visitation monitor, testified she
received her certificate as a child visitation monitor in 2018. She
began monitoring for father’s visits with K.C. in approximately
2018. She would arrive for visits with father, and they would
park in the parking lot next to the Starbucks, where the
exchange would take place. Vasquez confirmed K.C. was not well
groomed for the visits. On one occasion in April 2024, Vasquez
was waiting inside the Starbucks for the arrival of mother and
K.C. for the exchange. She waited 10 minutes then texted father
to say they had not arrived. Father texted back, “Oh, I think she
called the cops.” Two police cars had arrived. Vasquez explained
she was the monitor, and she had been waiting in Starbucks for
K.C. The police informed her that mother had called and
reported a violation of the restraining order. Vasquez told the
police they had been doing the exact same routine for two to three
18
weeks, and they had always parked in the same place and it’s
never been an issue. She explained father had been appropriate
and always waited in his car while Vasquez and mother were
exchanging K.C. The police pulled father out of the car and
handcuffed him, but after reviewing the paperwork they pulled
out of father’s dashboard, the police indicated they did not see an
issue but had to investigate.
Vasquez testified when K.C. is with father, she starts to
open up to him and is usually very happy. Vasquez had never
witnessed anything inappropriate during a visit.
Mother testified K.C.’s mental health had improved
tremendously and that K.C. only had panic and anxiety attacks
when she was on her way to a visit with father.
Father testified he voluntarily completed an anger
management course and completed a parenting course in 2021.
Father believed the courses had given him better tools on how to
manage the things going on in the case. Father testified to being
notified in 2023 that K.C. had a significant number of absences
and tardies from school. He testified he was willing to coparent
with mother and felt it was best for K.C. to have both parents.
Minor’s counsel questioned father about a potential
upcoming vacation, asking if he thought it would be in K.C.’s best
interest to be taken out of school for father’s vacation. Father
responded, “No.”
After hearing argument from the parties, minor’s counsel
strongly believed father needed to be included in K.C.’s therapy
sessions. Minor’s counsel requested a court order for that.
Minor’s counsel also wanted to see father incorporated more into
K.C.’s schooling. Minor’s counsel did not believe overnight visits
were in K.C.’s best interests at the time. Counsel said, “I think it
19
would be a very big jump, but I would like to see weekly
visitation so that we can get gradually to a … longer duration.”
Minor’s counsel wanted to keep the Sunday visits but add an
after school visit as well, saying, “there’s little activities that I
think [father] would benefit from with K.C., [l]ike going to the
library and maybe doing homework. Just start establishing those
routines. I think it would be beneficial for both of them.”
Trial court decision
After considering the briefing and two days of contested
testimony, the trial court ruled father had overcome the
presumption set forth in section 3044 and awarded joint legal
custody and unsupervised visitation to father. On its own
motion, the trial court removed K.C. as a protected party on
mother’s DVRO, concluding father is not a threat to K.C. The
court extended father’s visits from 2:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. on
Sundays and added 3:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. on Wednesdays.
The court commenced its comments by noting “[t]he court
has to consider first the best interest of the child. The preference
for frequent and continuing contact, again, for the noncustodial
parent may not be used to rebut the presumption.” The court
noted it was mindful of these requirements.
The court then went through the factors it was required to
consider, listed in section 3044. The court noted there was no
required drug, alcohol, or batterer’s treatment programs (BIP
programs) required, so it found those factors “inapplicable.” The
court noted father had completed a parenting class as well as an
anger management class.
The factors related to probation or parole were not
applicable, as there was no evidence presented as to these factors
throughout the proceeding.
20
One of the factors concerned whether the parent was
restrained by a protective order and whether he had complied
with the conditions. The court found no violation of the
restraining order occurred. The court found mother failed to
demonstrate a violation “based on not only [father’s] testimony
but also the testimony of the two witnesses that were the
monitors with respect to when the alleged conduct took place.”
With respect to the factor asking whether the parent had
committed further acts of domestic violence, the court found
father had not. The court found the factor related to firearms
irrelevant.
The court concluded, “With respect to the best interest of
the minor child until this DVRO was issued the parents were
exercising significant control, [father] along with [mother]. These
orders were made in large part due to the [DVRO] and as the
court recalls and as [father’s counsel] said this was a very close
call to begin with respect to the DV in this case.” “So at this time,
the court finds that the 3044 factors have been substantially
rebutted.” The court continued, “[father] has demonstrated that
he wishes to be a part of [K.C.]’s life. He’s done so over the course
of the case for almost eight years now. And at this point the
court finds that his desire to want to parent and to parent well
for [K.C.] has been consistent. And that it would be in [K.C.]’s
best interest for him to have a stake and a say in what happens.”
The court restored the parties to joint legal custody with
mother having tie-breaking authority. The court warned both
mother and father to communicate and cooperate.
Addressing mother directly, the court stated, “you keep
saying, you know, [K.C.] is your most important concern in this
context. This is a chance to allow this relationship to blossom
21
because it was there before. To the extent that you believe that
there was anxiety and other things that never been
demonstrated. [Sic.] If it wasn’t for the restraining order, we’d
be in a completely different place.”
Mother corrected the court, saying, “No, Your Honor. I’d
like to clarify that June of last year that was when the visits were
modified because it was an ex parte because she told Rene that
he was driving at a very fast rate of speed.” The court stated,
“And we dealt with that aspect of that.… But again to the extent
that the visits being what they are now, given the efforts and
changes that we’ve seen now the hope is that you will both co-
parent and listen to each other in this process of actually co-
parenting.”
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law and standard of review
Section 3044, subdivision (a) provides, “[u]pon a finding by
the court that a party seeking custody of a child has perpetrated
domestic violence within the previous five years against the other
party seeking custody of the child, … there is a rebuttable
presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal
custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic
violence is detrimental to the best interest of the child.” The
presumption “may only be rebutted by a preponderance of the
evidence.” (Ibid.)
In order to find that the presumption in section 3044,
subdivision (a) is overcome, the court must carry out two
analyses. First, the court “shall” find the following is satisfied:
“The perpetrator of domestic violence has demonstrated that
giving sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to the
22
perpetrator is in the best interest of the child.” (§ 3044, subd.
(b)(1).) This provision specifies: “In determining the best interest
of the child, the preference for frequent and continuing contact
with both parents, as set forth in subdivision (b) of Section 3020,
or with the noncustodial parent, as set forth in paragraph (1) of
subdivision (a) of Section 3040, may not be used to rebut the
presumption, in whole or in part.” (Ibid.)
Next the court “shall find that the factors in paragraph (2),
on balance, support the legislative findings in Section 3020.”5
(§ 3044, subd. (b).) Paragraph (2) lists seven factors, including
whether the perpetrator of domestic violence has successfully
completed a BIP program; whether the perpetrator had
successfully completed a parenting class; whether the perpetrator
is restrained by a protective order or restraining order, and has
not complied with its terms and conditions; and whether the
perpetrator had committed further acts of domestic violence,
among other factors. (§ 3044, subds. (b)(2)(A), (C), (E), & (F).)
If the court determines the presumption has been
overcome, “the court must make ‘specific findings’ in writing or on
the record ‘on each of the factors in subdivision (b).’” (In re
Marriage of Willis & Costa-Willis (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 595,
602.)
“We review custody and visitation orders for an abuse of
discretion, and apply the substantial evidence standard to the
5 Family Code section 3020, subdivision (a) declares the
public policy of this state “to ensure that the health, safety, and
welfare of children shall be the court’s primary concern in
determining the best interests of children when making any
orders regarding the physical or legal custody or visitation of
children.”
23
court’s factual findings.” (In re Marriage of Fajota (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497.) “A court abuses its discretion in making
a child custody order if there is no reasonable basis on which it
could conclude that its decision advanced the best interests of the
child.” (Ibid.) “A court also abuses its discretion if it applies
improper criteria or makes incorrect legal assumptions.” (Ibid.)
“Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in
exercising its discretion is a question of law subject to de novo
review.” (In re Marriage of Willis & Costa-Willis, supra, 93
Cal.App.5th at p. 601.)
II. The court’s characterization of the DVRO
Mother’s first argument is the trial court mischaracterized
the DVRO by referring to it as a “close call,” and this
mischaracterization improperly influenced the court’s section
3044 analysis. Mother cites legislative history suggesting the
Legislature’s understanding that an abusive parent’s desire to
control results in the abusive parent being “more likely to fight
for custody” and “often us[ing] the legal system” to pursue new
tactics of abuse. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Assem.
Bill No. 840 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 22, 1999, at p. 4.)
Further, mother notes the Legislature observed the “greatest
period of risk for domestic violence is after a separation, which is
also the period when child custody is litigated.” (Id. at p. 5.) Yet
“extensive research … demonstrates that domestic violence is
routinely ignored, or given insufficient weight” by courts when
considering child custody. (Id. at p. 7.) Mother argues the trial
court’s characterization of the DVRO as a close call fails to give
adequate weight to the Legislature’s findings and is not
supported by the record.
24
The section 3044 presumption applies in custody
proceedings regardless of the severity of the underlying abuse.
Despite its characterization of the January 2024 DVRO as a
“close call,” the trial court properly applied and analyzed section
3044 in the subsequent custody proceeding. Thus, we find
mother’s argument misplaced. Nevertheless, we address it.
A. Relevant factual background
1. The DVRO hearing
The trial court issued the relevant DVRO in January 2024.
Although mother alleged five incidents of recent abuse or
harassment, the trial court found only two credible. First, the
court found mother established a recent threat, because there
was no refutation of that testimony. Further, the trial court
found mother established an incident on April 1, 2023, during
which father rushed towards mother, who was pregnant at the
time, and shoved and elbowed her. However, the court expressed
some doubts on the record concerning mother’s allegations.
Specifically, the court noted:
“With respect to the April incidents, April 1st and the other
potential incident … I have some problems with that. You know,
even [maternal grandmother’s] testimony was that there were a
lot of people around. I presume the police did their investigation.
[Father] testified that the police did question him about that
issue, which means that it’s not being made up after the fact, it
was raised at the time. [¶] To the extent that it was, I did find
[maternal grandmother’s] testimony to be credible with respect to
that incident. I do find that that would be a basis for a
restraining order.”
The court again expressed concerns later in the hearing,
stating:
25
“On the other two issues, … I do have some concerns
because there were other people there. And I presume the police
would have investigated and done all of that. But … that’s
outside of the evidence that I have. I do have the evidence of a
witness that saw it occur, that indicated the reaction which she
had in addition to [mother’s], and that would be sufficient. [¶]
With respect to the threat allegation, again, it’s unrefuted at this
time, so I do find that that’s been demonstrated.”
When issuing the DVRO, the trial court indicated it was
taking into consideration the parties’ “long history of physical
abuse.”6 However, the court made it clear it did not find mother
to be entirely credible, finding she established only one unrefuted
claim and one claim supported by a third party witness. The
court issued a “three-year—not a five-year—restraining order
subject to renewal.”
2. The section 3044 hearing
The judge that heard the DVRO in January 2024 also
heard the section 3044 matter in August and September 2024.
When issuing its decision, the court noted “until this [DVRO] was
issued the parents were exercising significant control, [father]
along with [mother.]” The current custody orders “were made in
large part due to the [DVRO] and as the court recalls and as
[father’s counsel] said this was a very close call to begin with
respect to the DV in this case.” The court then found the section
3044 presumption was “substantially rebutted.”
6 Section 3044 only applies when the party seeking custody
of the child has perpetrated abuse “within the previous five
years.” (§ 3044, subd. (a).) Thus, in issuing the DVRO, to the
extent the trial court relied on a history of abuse more than five
years prior, it was not relevant to the section 3044 analysis.
26
B. The record supports the trial court’s
characterization of the DVRO
The trial court’s characterization of the DVRO as a “very
close call” is a factual determination we review for substantial
evidence. (In re Marriage of Fajota, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1497.)
The record reveals the trial court had hesitation about
issuing the DVRO due to mother’s failure of proof. The court
made its findings on the record and consistently expressed
concerns about mother’s allegations as it did so.
The court first addressed the “threat sometime this year.”
The court noted it was “mindful” of the fact that this allegation
was not mentioned in mother’s declaration in support of the
DVRO. The court also noted, “There was no date or time, but
there was no specification that that comment had never been
made.” Because mother’s testimony was not refuted, the court
found the threat had been established.
As to the April 1st incident at the hockey rink, the court
“[had] some problems with that.” The court noted everyone
testified there were many people around, including the police,
who questioned father and “presume[ably] … did their
investigation.” Despite the court’s doubts, it found maternal
grandmother’s testimony to be credible with respect to that
incident. The court thus found the April 1 incident to be “a basis
for a restraining order.”7
7 Father testified there was only one incident at the hockey
rink in April 2023, not two, as mother had asserted. Father
testified “[s]he’s turning one incident into two because this was
only—this only happened one time, when we made the call to the
police.” The court apparently credited father’s testimony, stating,
27
With respect to the remaining incidents, the court found
mother had not met her burden. As to the November 11, 2023
incident in which father allegedly sped up and stopped in front of
where mother was sitting, the court found mother had not
presented satisfactory evidence.
As to the allegation he circled a restaurant where mother
and her family were eating, the court found “[t]here’s nothing to
demonstrate that he knew you were at [the restaurant].” The
court noted it understood the sight of father’s car could make
mother feel fearful, but “there’s nothing to indicate that he was
aware of it at a football field’s length at a place that’s close to
where he’s supposed to be for an exchange that’s supposed to take
place.”
By the end of the DVRO hearing, mother had failed to carry
her burden on many of her claims. She lacked credibility because
she did not present the best evidence she could to support her
claims. The court noted, “if weaker, less satisfactory evidence is
presented … where more substantial or stronger evidence can be
presented, the court should view it with distrust. And I do in this
context ….” Even where the court found mother had carried her
burden, the court noted, “I do have some concerns because there
were other people there. And I presume the police would have
investigated and done all of that.” However, the court issued the
restraining order “to the extent the physical abuse occurred and
given that there’s been a long history of physical abuse.”
“With respect to the April incidents, April 1st and the other
potential incident [father] said occurred on the same date—I have
some problems with that.” The court proceeded to then discuss
the April 2023 incidents as a single incident, leading to an
implied finding that only one incident occurred in April 2023.
28
We find the evidence described above and discussed by the
court at length supports the court’s characterization of the
January 2024 DVRO as a “close call.”
However, as noted above, even if the court
mischaracterized the underlying DVRO as a “close call,” the
mischaracterization is irrelevant because section 3044 applies
regardless of the severity of the underlying abuse, and the trial
court properly applied the statute.
III. Application of section 3044
The presumption of section 3044, subdivision (a) is
triggered “[u]pon a finding by the court that a party seeking
custody of a child has perpetrated domestic violence within the
previous five years.” Here, the trial court acknowledged such
abuse had occurred and carried out a detailed analysis of the
section 3044 factors. However, mother argues the trial court
focused its attention on the existence of the DVRO and
minimized the underlying abuse. Thus, mother contends, the
trial court rested its ultimate holding on an erroneous
understanding of section 3044.
The record reveals otherwise. First, in issuing the DVRO
in January 2024, the court noted, “given that there’s been a
finding of abuse, the … presumption of Family Code section 3044
will be in effect.” Again, at the September 2024 custody hearing,
the court noted “with respect to 3044 the court has to make an
inquiry …. [E]verybody accepts the presumption applies until it’s
overcome once there has been abuse demonstrated. The court
has to consider first the best interest of the child. The preference
for frequent and continuing contact … for the noncustodial
parent may not be used to rebut the presumption.” The court
then proceeded to consider each factor set forth in section 3044,
29
subdivision (b), concluding “the 3044 factors have been
substantially rebutted.”
Ellis v. Lyons (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 404 is distinguishable.
In Ellis, the trial court failed to apply the section 3044
presumption in custody proceedings where a Massachusetts court
had entered a protective order protecting the child against the
father. Here, in contrast, the trial court properly applied section
3044 and provided a thorough analysis. In S.Y. v. Superior Court
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 324, 338–339 (S.Y.), the court found the
trial court erred in considering a superfluous factor (English
fluency) when making its section 3044 analysis, but that such
error was harmless. The court found “English fluency was not a
primary factor in the trial court’s determination that [the father]
had rebutted the presumption of detriment.” (S.Y., at p. 340.)
The case is not relevant, as there is no contention that the trial
court considered any such superfluous factors in this case.
There is no indication in the record that the court
considered any improper factors or ignored or minimized the acts
of abuse father had engaged in prior to the issuance of the DVRO.
Mother’s claim that the trial court engaged in an improper
analysis is not well taken.
Mother further argues the trial court ignored father’s lack
of reform and accountability regarding the history of abuse in its
section 3044 analysis. Mother points out father continued to fail
to take accountability or demonstrate remorse for his abuse.
Instead, he accused mother of engaging in a plot to ruin his
chances of parenting.
While section 3044 allows the trial court to consider the
perpetrator’s successful completion of a BIP program and a
parenting class, it does not specifically require the court to
30
consider the abuser’s accountability or remorse. However, we
note there was testimony from father that he voluntarily
completed an anger management course and completed a
parenting course in 2021. Father testified he believed the
courses had given him better tools for managing the things going
on in the custody case. The trial court was able to observe
father’s demeanor and attitude in the courtroom and presumably
found father credible when discussing what he had learned from
the courses. Section 3044 does not require the trial court to
expressly put findings regarding accountability on the record.
Thus, we decline to find the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to expressly discuss father’s accountability or remorse.
IV. BIP factor
Mother next argues the trial court erred by finding the BIP
factor inapplicable and by crediting unsuccessful and unrelated
courses as weighing in favor of rebuttal.8
When considering the BIP factor at the hearing, the trial
court found it “inapplicable,” because it was not “sought” and not
“required.” Mother points out this was factually inaccurate, as
mother did request that father be required to complete a BIP in
her written DVRO request. However, mother concedes a BIP
order was not included in the DVRO, and mother’s counsel did
not object or remind the court of mother’s request at the DVRO
hearing. Mother argues this does not constitute forfeiture of the
trial court’s obligation to consider this factor in its section 3044
analysis.
8 Section 3044, subdivision (b)(2)(A), requires the court to
consider whether “[t]he perpetrator has successfully completed a
[BIP] that meets the criteria outlined in subdivision (c) of Section
1203.097 of the Penal Code.”
31
The BIP factor is one of seven factors the court must
consider during the section 3044 analysis. The court need not
find that the abuser has satisfied every factor. Instead, the court
must perform a weighing of the factors, and conclude that, “on
balance,” such factors support its decision that the presumption
has been overcome. (§ 3044, subd. (b).)
In this case, the trial court carried out its obligation to
consider the BIP factor. The court considered section 3044,
subdivision (b)(2)(A) and (B) together, stating, “With respect to
the additional factors the court has to ask itself whether or not he
has successfully completed the programming that the court has
indicated … 2A and A and B there has been no alcohol or drug
program. And there’s been no 52-week batterer intervention
program that’s been sought. So … those are inapplicable.”
The court went on to note, regarding section 3044,
subdivision (b)(2)(C), “he’s completed a parenting class,”
indicating the court found the class to be appropriate. The court
continued, “On his own he’s also completed an anger
management class. One that was not required of him ….”
Thus, the record shows the court considered the BIP factor.
While mother requested father be required to participate in a BIP
program, she did not raise this issue at the DVRO hearing, thus
the trial court did not err in stating that such a program was
neither sought nor required. No legal error occurred in the trial
court’s analysis. (See S.Y., supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 344 [“a
trial court must consider completion of a batterer’s treatment
program and parenting classes when determining if the section
3044 presumption has been rebutted, but neither attendance at
nor completion of those two classes are required by the statute”].)
32
Nor did an abuse of discretion occur when the trial court
deemed the factor inapplicable. As father had not been ordered
to complete a BIP program in connection with the DVRO, the
court could not have expected father to complete one. Further,
the court implicitly found that completion of a BIP was
unnecessary to prevent further abuse. Had the court felt such a
program was necessary, the court would have ordered one at the
DVRO hearing. No abuse of discretion occurred with respect to
the BIP factor.
Mother further argues the trial court abused its discretion
to the extent it considered a “short” anger management class as
weighing in favor of rebuttal of the section 3044 presumption.
Mother argues completion of the anger management program
was irrelevant to the analysis, as there was no evidence father’s
anger management program met “the criteria outlined in
subdivision (c) of Section 1203.097 of the Penal Code,” which is
required for a BIP program under section 3044, subdivision
(b)(2)(A).
The court did no such thing. The court found the BIP factor
inapplicable and moved on. The record shows the court raised
the anger management program when discussing section 3044,
subdivision (b)(2)(C), which asks whether the perpetrator has
completed a parenting class. While discussing this factor, the
court mentioned the anger management program. The court did
not use the anger management program as a substitute for the
BIP factor or any other factor listed in section 3044, subdivision
(b)(2). As mother concedes, anger management is relevant to
father’s ability to reform, and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in mentioning this class while discussing the factors.
33
Mother argues father’s completion of a BIP in 2017 should
not have been considered in the court’s analysis of the section
3044 factors. There is no suggestion in the record the court relied
on father’s completion of a BIP in 2017, as the court found the
factor inapplicable.
Mother makes numerous arguments criticizing the court’s
weighing of the BIP factor, arguing the court should have
weighed the facts differently. We decline to substitute mother’s
perspective for the court’s. Mother has failed to meet her burden
of showing an abuse of the trial court’s discretion under the facts
of this case.9
V. Preference for frequent and continuing contact
Mother argues the trial court improperly relied on the
legislative preference for frequent and continuing contact with
both parents to find father overcame the section 3044
presumption and grant joint legal custody. Reliance on the
preference for frequent and continuing contact is contrary to the
express language of the statute, which provides, “In determining
the best interest of the child, the preference for frequent and
continuing contact with both parents, as set forth in subdivision
(b) of Section 3020, or with the noncustodial parent, as set forth
in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 3040, may not be
used to rebut the presumption, in whole or in part.” (§ 3044,
subd. (b)(1).)
Mother acknowledges that, at the start of the hearing, the
trial court noted it was “mindful” that the “preference for
9 We decline to address mother’s argument that the trial
court’s “improper” weighing of the BIP factor was prejudicial, as
we have found no error occurred.
34
frequent and continuing contact, again, for the noncustodial
parent may not be used to rebut the presumption.” However,
mother argues the court’s statements surrounding the finding
that father had rebutted the section 3044 presumption
demonstrate the opposite.
Mother cites the following language: “So at this time, the
court finds that the section 3044 factors have been substantially
rebutted. [Father] has demonstrated that he wishes to be a part
of [K.C.’s] life. He’s done so over the course of this case for almost
eight years now. And at this point the court finds that his desire
to want to parent and to parent well for [K.C.] has been
consistent. And that it would be in [K.C.]’s best interest for him
to have a stake and say in what happens.”
Mother argues the trial court improperly focused on
father’s desires and actions rather than the impact of those
actions on his relationship with K.C.
We disagree with mother’s position that the court should
not have focused on father’s desires and actions. All of the
“[a]dditional factors” listed in section 3044, subdivision (b)(2)
focus on the abusive parent’s actions—whether he has completed
a BIP, whether he has completed drug and alcohol counseling,
whether he has completed a parenting class, whether he has
complied with the terms of any restraining orders or probation
orders in place.
When the court made the statement quoted above, the
court had just finished its analysis of the required factors set
forth in section 3044, subdivision (b). The entire focus of the
analysis was on how father had acted in recent months, and
whether, considering those factors, father had overcome the
presumption of section 3044. The factors were relevant to
35
whether father proved he could safely parent K.C. And contrary
to mother’s assertion, the trial court expressly connected father’s
actions to K.C.’s best interests, finding “it would be in [K.C.’s]
best interest for [father] to have a stake and a say in what
happens.” The court was not relying on the preference for
frequent and continuing contact with both parents. Instead, its
focus was K.C.’s best interest.10
In S.Y., supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at pages 337–338, the court
considered a parent’s argument that the trial court impermissibly
relied on the preference for frequent and continuing contact with
both parents in making its section 3044 determination. The S.Y.
court disagreed, stating, “The court did not mention the
presumption for frequent and continuing contact with both
parents as a basis for rebutting the presumption. The court’s
ruling was grounded on the specific facts of this case, not on the
general statutory preference for continuing contact.” (S.Y., at
p. 337.) The court noted, “[a]lthough the court could not rely on
the statutory preference for continuing contact with both parents,
the facts describing the nature and quality of the child’s
relationship with his parents were relevant to determining the
child’s best interest and if the abusive parent had rebutted the
presumption that his custody was detrimental to that interest.”
(Id. at p. 338.)
10 To the extent mother raises a substantial evidence
challenge to the court’s statement that “anxiety and other things
[had] never been demonstrated,” mother has forfeited the
argument by failing to comprehensively summarize the evidence
at the hearing on this point. (Symons Emergency Specialties v.
City of Riverside (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 583, 598.)
36
The S.Y. court relied on Keith R. v. Superior Court (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 1047, in which the court considered a similar
argument. The court noted, “It is true that Father, given the
findings accompanying the domestic violence order, cannot rely
on the statutory preference for ‘frequent and continuing contact’
with both parents. [Citations.] But while Father may have lost
his ability to cite this statute, Daughter certainly did not lose her
right to have a meaningful relationship with both parents. The
minor child’s best interests must remain at the forefront of the
family court’s considerations on custody in determining whether
the section 3044 presumption has been rebutted.” (Id. at
p. 1056.)
As demonstrated by these cases, the trial court need not
refrain from mentioning the parent-child relationship or the
abusive parent’s desire to parent when conducting a hearing
pursuant to section 3044. Here, the trial court expressly
acknowledged it was not permitted to rely on the preference for
frequent and continuing contact, stating: “The court has to
consider first the best interest of the child. The preference for
frequent and continuing contact … for the noncustodial parent
may not be used to rebut the presumption.” The court then
proceeded to analyze every “[a]dditional factor[]” set forth in
section 3044, subdivision (b)(2).) There is no indication in the
record the trial court improperly relied on the preference for
frequent and continuing contact. The court’s mention of father’s
demonstrated desire to parent, and the actions he had taken to
reform, along with father’s involvement being in K.C.’s best
interest, was not a violation of the statute.11
11 We note K.C. has not filed an appeal from the trial court’s
custody order. K.C.’s attorney specifically asked that father be
37
We decline to substitute mother’s perspective on K.C.’s best
interests for the court’s. (In re Marriage of Fajota, supra, 230
Cal.App.4th at p. 1497.) There is no suggestion in the record the
court improperly relied on a preference for joint custody. Instead,
the record shows a thorough, appropriate analysis of section
3044.12
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Each party is to bear his or her own
costs of appeal.
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
We concur:
RICHARDSON, J. HOFFSTADT, J.*
“incorporated more into schooling,” and asked for more visitation
between father and K.C. “so that we can get gradually to a more
longer duration.” In seeking more visitation for father, the
minor’s attorney noted, “I think it would be beneficial for the both
of them.”
12 Because we have found no error occurred, we decline to
address mother’s arguments regarding her position that the error
was not harmless.
* Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
38
