Filed 7/9/26 P. v. Jones CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B341942
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A578017)
v.
RONALD ANTHONY JONES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
County of Los Angeles, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Ronald Anthony Jones.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, and Blythe Leszkay,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
After his first murder conviction was vacated based on
race-based discrimination during jury selection, defendant
Ronald Jones was retried and again convicted of special
circumstance murder and other crimes. On appeal, he argues the
trial court erred by admitting his custodial statements and
denied him the relief required by the California Racial Justice
Act of 20201 (Pen. Code2, § 745; the Act) for the race-based
discrimination during jury selection that occurred in his first
trial. We affirm.
1 “In 2020, the California Legislature enacted the Racial
Justice Act [citation], which went into effect on January 1, 2021.
Its declared intent is ‘to eliminate racial bias from California’s
criminal justice system because racism in any form or amount, at
any stage of a criminal trial, is intolerable, inimical to a fair
criminal justice system, is a miscarriage of justice under Article
VI of the California Constitution, and violates the laws and
Constitution of the State of California. Implicit bias, although
often unintentional and unconscious, may inject racism and
unfairness into proceedings similar to intentional bias.’
[Citation].” (People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76, 109.)
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Arrest3
On October 18, 1988, defendant and George Marvin Trone,
Jr. (Trone) abducted Lois Haro from a shopping mall in
Pasadena. While driving around the area in Haro’s car, they
committed sexual offenses against her including three rapes and
forced oral copulation. Defendant then shot Haro in the head and
left her on the side of an isolated road. A police officer on patrol
discovered Haro later that evening and she died on the way to the
hospital.
Police apprehended defendant the morning after the crimes
after an officer observed him driving Haro’s car. Inside
defendant’s apartment, officers found Haro’s belongings,
including her pocketbook, wallet photograph insert, her
identification, and three keys. A live .38 caliber bullet was
recovered from inside a jacket hanging in defendant’s closet.4
Officers also found a pair of wet, rolled-up underwear in the sink
that appeared to have been washed; they were ultimately
determined to be unrelated to the case.
Investigators tested defendant’s hands for gunshot residue.
They noticed a spot on defendant’s pants that could have been
blood, so they booked him and took his pants for evidence.
During the booking process, a packet fell out of the crotch area of
3 The facts of the murder are taken from the testimony and
evidence introduced at the second trial.
4 The bullet fragments removed from Haro’s brain were
consistent with the bullet recovered from defendant’s jacket. The
gun was never recovered.
3
defendant’s underwear which contained Haro’s identification and
credit cards.5 Police recovered an automated teller machine
(ATM) receipt from Haro’s bank account and a key to her
husband’s truck from defendant’s pants pocket.
Police arrested defendant on Wednesday morning,
October 19, 1988 and he was arraigned two days later on Friday,
afternoon, October 21, 1988. During the two days he was in pre-
arraignment custody, he confessed to the crimes.
B. The Statements
1. First Day Statements
On the morning of defendant’s arrest, October 19,
Pasadena Police Department detectives Brian Schirka and Don
Gallon interviewed him at the station after he was advised of and
waived his Miranda6 rights. They recorded the interview with a
visible tape recorder. The initial interview, which lasted
approximately an hour, was interrupted when Gallon noticed a
spot of blood on defendant’s pants and decided to book him.
Prior to booking, defendant denied any involvement in the
crimes. He told the police that he was with Trone at the
Pasadena Mall between 8:10 and 8:45 p.m. the previous night,
but at home by 10:30 p.m. where he remained until the police
arrived in the morning. But when detectives disclosed that
witnesses saw defendant driving Haro’s car early that morning,
5 Defendant later said he found Haro’s credit cards in her
car.
6 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
4
defendant explained that a friend brought the car to his house
that morning and he took it for a brief drive. Gallon asked, “And
when did you take the license plate off?” Defendant denied
touching the license plate, but then asked “Can y’all prove I did
that?” Eventually, he admitted touching the plates, then said he
removed the rear plate because his friend asked him to do so.
After defendant was booked, Schirka and Gallon reminded
defendant of his Miranda rights and asked defendant if he was
still willing to talk to them. Defendant waived his rights and the
detectives resumed questioning. Before the break, Gallon told
defendant his hands had tested positive for gunshot residue.
Defendant explained that he had shot a BB gun earlier that
week. But after the break, he admitted Trone had a gun which
defendant handled earlier that day at defendant’s sister’s house.
Gallon next told defendant that investigators had used a
“mass spectrometer” which showed defendant had physical
contact with Haro.7 Defendant denied touching Haro and denied
having sex with anyone that night. Gallon claimed he knew
defendant killed Haro or was at least present; he encouraged
defendant to “look out for number one” and tell the police if he
was merely present for the murder. Gallon suggested defendant
might have made a mistake, and it would benefit him to admit it.
Defendant then admitted he was present but denied touching
Haro. He said, “[Trone] touched her, I touched him.”
7 This was a ruse. At the time of the interviews, detectives
did not yet know if Haro had been sexually assaulted. They told
defendant they had a light that could detect if a stain contained
biological fluid, which was true. DNA reference samples were
collected from Haro, defendant, and Trone, but at the time, DNA
typing was not yet available.
5
Defendant provided a new version of the night’s events in
which Trone was with Haro driving her car when they came to
the park and asked defendant if he wanted to go for a drive with
them. Defendant thought everything was “normal” because
Trone was a “gigolo” and Haro did not seem scared. Defendant
drove and Haro sat in the front seat. He did not know Trone had
a gun until Trone threatened Haro with it when she failed to
comply with his commands to get in the back seat with him.
Defendant said he pulled the car over on the freeway, and Haro
got in the backseat with Trone. Defendant resumed driving
while Trone forced Haro to orally copulate him and then raped
her twice. At that point in the interview, defendant denied
having sexual contact with Haro himself. Defendant said that
Trone killed Haro after he told defendant to pull over near a
bridge known as “suicide bridge” because Haro could identify
them. Defendant then dropped Trone off at the park and took
Haro’s car home.
Gallon thanked defendant for being honest, but falsely told
him that investigators had “physical evidence” suggesting
defendant touched Haro with his penis. In response, defendant
admitted touching Haro with his penis, but said he did not touch
her vaginal area because she had her hand in the way. When
asked if he ejaculated, he said, “No. No—not really,” but then
admitted “it just dripped.” Gallon pressed defendant to admit he
had inserted his penis inside Haro, and defendant agreed he had
inserted just “the tip.” But he claimed he withdrew before he was
going to ejaculate.
Detectives also confronted defendant with the ATM
transaction record they found in his pocket, which showed
someone used Haro’s ATM card to withdraw $40 at 9:48 p.m.
6
from her bank account. Defendant denied using Haro’s ATM card
and said he did not see Trone use it either. The detectives
repeatedly asked defendant about the wet underwear found in
his home, and he consistently denied knowing anything about it.
Toward the end of the morning interview, defendant asked
Schirka “how much time” a person convicted of murder serves.
Schirka replied that it depended on the degree. Gallon explained
detectives had “no say” in punishment, adding, “I can’t make any
promises to you” and “But as far as ... me getting you any
leniency or anything like that, I can’t do that, but I can tell them
you were truthful. And you and I both know that ... if you had a
choice between two people, you would rather talk to somebody
that was being truthful than to someone that was lying.”
At the end of the interview, Gallon asked, “[D]id we make
you any promises that we were gonna give you an easy time or
anything if you talk to us?” Defendant answered, “Nope. You
just promised that you’ll go over and talk to the District Attorney
about it.”
2. Second Day Statements
The next day, October 20, Gallon received word that
defendant wanted to talk to him, and they had another
conversation. Defendant told Gallon he was worried about the
positive result of the gunshot residue test and wanted to explain.
At that point, the detective repeated the Miranda advisement,
and defendant again waived his rights. Gallon transcribed
defendant’s statements as follows: “October 20, 1988 [¶] 1240
hrs[.] [¶] When [Trone] shot that lady I was close behind him
and at an angle near his right shoulder. So if the gun test is
positive for me, then the flash of the gun may have hit my hand[.]
7
[¶] Right after [Trone] fired the gun within a few seconds he
dropped the gun in the car and I picked it up right away and then
gave it back to him.” Defendant signed the statement, indicating
he agreed.
Around 7:50 p.m. that night, detectives Lionel Salgado and
Schirka interviewed defendant at the police station. The
interview was not recorded, but Schirka took notes. Schirka
renewed the Miranda advisement, and defendant waived his
rights. The detectives told defendant that they had just
interviewed Trone and confronted defendant with Trone’s
statements. They accused defendant of shooting Haro; he did not
respond. Then, defendant admitted he and Trone abducted Haro
from the Pasadena Mall parking lot near the escalators at JC
Penney. They robbed Haro of $12 in cash, a watch, and some
rings. Defendant claimed he did not get anything from the
robbery.8 Defendant said that he did not know where the gun
was, but guessed it might be at Trone’s girlfriend’s house.
Detectives who followed up on that information recovered Haro’s
watch from Trone’s girlfriend’s residence.
8 As previously noted, defendant was arrested in possession
of many of Haro’s belongings, including her pocketbook, her
wallet photograph insert, her identification, her credit card, her
car keys, and her car.
8
3. October 21 Car Ride Statements
The next morning, October 21, as detectives Salgado and
Richard Cassidy9 were transporting defendant to the hospital to
have his biological samples collected, defendant asked what he
was “going to get for this.” During the 10-minute drive from the
police station to the hospital, Salgado, who was in the back seat
with defendant, explained a judge and jury would “decide the
outcome of what he was going to get.” Salgado further explained
the job of a detective was “to figure out what happened and who
did what and what went on, and that … Schirka was in charge of
the investigation.” Defendant told Salgado that he remembered
him from the interview with Schirka the previous night. Salgado
then said he believed defendant shot Haro. Defendant replied, “‘I
guess I’ll tell you the truth then.’” He said he and Trone were
going “to get rid of her,” and initially it was Trone that got out of
the car with Haro. Trone told Haro to sit down and he pointed
the gun at her with the hammer cocked. Then defendant joined
Trone and told Haro to get on her stomach. Defendant put his
hand over the gun that Trone was holding, defendant’s “hand
slipped into the trigger and ... the gun went off.”
According to Cassidy, the atmosphere in the car was “very
low key, professional.” They did not raise their voices or pressure
defendant, and the conversation never became contested or
controversial. Salgado “had no intention” of interviewing
defendant that morning. He did not have a notepad or recording
device, so he took notes on an evidence envelope while he sat next
9 Detective Richard Cassidy was unavailable to testify at the
second trial. His testimony from the first trial was read into the
record.
9
to defendant in the back seat and defendant continued talking.
Salgado did not ask defendant any questions. He was aware that
defendant had been Mirandized several times before, including
the night prior when he interviewed defendant with Schirka.
4. October 21 Hospital Interview
When the detectives arrived at the hospital with defendant,
they took him to an interview room within the emergency
department. They renewed his Miranda advisement and he
waived his rights. He repeated the story he had told the
detectives in the car. Salgado told defendant he did not believe
Trone was near the gun when it went off. Defendant put his
head down and said, “‘Okay. I shot her.’”
Salgado stopped the conversation to borrow a tape recorder
from hospital staff. Once recording, Salgado again reminded
defendant of his Miranda rights and defendant waived them.
Defendant stated that Trone made Haro sit down, and defendant
“went over there by [Trone] and picked the gun [sic] and
[defendant] shot her.” Defendant clarified that he told Haro to
“‘lay on [her] stomach’” and “that’s when [he] took the gun” from
Trone. Salgado asked, “And what did you do?” Defendant again
said, “I shot her.” Defendant explained that Trone was worried
Haro would report them to the police and said they needed to get
rid of her. When Trone had the gun pointed at Haro, however, he
was listening to her talk and he acted like he did not want to pull
the trigger. Defendant “just went over there and like got [the
gun] from him and did it within two seconds and left.” Defendant
insisted he did not know what Trone did with the gun after the
10
shooting. Defendant confirmed that the detectives had not made
any promises to him or threats.
On the way back to the police station, defendant
“volunteered” to tell Trone that he had admitted shooting Haro
and to suggest that Trone tell the police where he put the gun.
Detectives brought Trone to defendant, and defendant said, “‘I
told them I shot the girl so tell them where the gun is at.’”
C. Procedural History
In an information filed on April 28, 1989, the Los Angeles
County District Attorney charged defendant with five counts.
Count 1 charged murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), with special
circumstances that the murder was committed during a robbery,
a kidnapping, a rape, and an oral copulation (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(17)). It was further alleged that defendant personally used a
firearm (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1); 12022.5), and that a principal
was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)). Count 2 charged
kidnapping to commit robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)), with an
allegation that a principal was armed (§ 12022, subd. (a)).
Count 3 charged second degree robbery (§ 211) with an allegation
that a principal was armed (§ 12022, subd. (a)). Count 4 charged
forcible rape in concert (§ 264.1) and count 5 charged forcible oral
copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)).
On April 11, 1991, a jury found defendant guilty of all
counts and found all the special circumstance and enhancement
allegations to be true. After a penalty phase trial, on May 7,
1991, the jury returned a verdict of death. The court sentenced
defendant to death on count 1. The court also imposed the high
term of five years for the firearm use enhancement plus one year
for the armed principal enhancement, which was stayed. On the
11
remaining counts, defendant was sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole on count 2, plus the high term of nine years
on count 4, plus the high term of eight years on count 5. A high-
term sentence of five years was imposed and stayed on count 3.
On direct appeal to the California Supreme Court,
defendant argued the trial court erred when it denied his motions
to set aside the information (§ 995) and to exclude the defendant’s
statements (Evid. Code, § 405) on the basis that his October 19
statement to Gallon was coerced by promises of leniency and the
use of deception, and the subsequent statements, as the product
of the first, were therefore also illegally obtained. (People v.
Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 297–299 (Jones I).) The Supreme
Court determined “the prosecution met its burden of proving that
there was nothing improper about the interrogations on the day
of defendant’s arrest” and “the initial interrogations did not
produce any involuntary incriminating statements.” (Id. at
pp. 298–299.)10 The Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s
conviction and death sentence on January 29, 1998.11 (Id. at
10 In his first direct appeal, defendant contended that his
October 20 and 21 statements should be excluded on the
additional grounds that they were procured after an
unreasonably delayed arraignment in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and the failure to readvise him of his rights under
Miranda. The Supreme Court deemed these supplemental
arguments forfeited by defendant’s failure to raise them in the
trial court. (Jones I, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 299, fn.1.) He raised
those arguments again before his retrial.
11 The court modified the sentence on count 2 to life with the
possibility of parole.
12
p. 319.) The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on
October 13, 1998, in Case No. 98-5094.
On September 30, 2021, the district court granted
defendant federal habeas relief on the ground that jury selection
“was incurably tainted by race-based discrimination.” The court
determined that the prosecutor’s use of four peremptory strikes
to remove all the Black prospective jurors violated defendant’s
equal protection rights under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S.
79 (Batson). Accordingly, it vacated the conviction and ordered
the prosecutor to either release or retry defendant.
On January 7, 2022, the District Attorney notified the Los
Angeles Superior Court trial court that he intended to retry the
defendant but would no longer pursue the death penalty.12
On September 18, 2024, just prior to retrial, defendant
moved to exclude his custodial statements. He renewed the
arguments rejected by the Supreme Court that his admissions
were involuntary because the first statements were “a direct
result of [the detective]’s promises of leniency and improper use
of deception,” his arraignment was unreasonably delayed, and
the police failed to renew his Miranda advisement before the
October 21 car ride to the hospital. He also argued that his last
confession at the hospital on October 21, although made after a
Miranda advisement, was wrongfully elicited by a two-step
interrogation technique prohibited by Missouri v. Seibert (2004)
542 U.S. 600.13
12 Defendant was retried on the original information.
13 In Missouri v. Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. 600, a plurality of
the court held that when an interrogating officer deliberately
withholds Miranda warnings, a midstream recitation after
13
The trial court first determined that under the doctrine of
the law of the case it was bound to follow the Supreme Court’s
1991 decision that all of the statements were voluntary and
admissible. “In the alternative,” the court said it would make an
independent “determination with regard to the voluntariness, not
just the first set of statements, but the second and third.”
The parties agreed that the motion to exclude the
statements would be based on the record of the previous trial in
lieu of live testimony. After hearing argument, the trial court
ruled the custodial statements were voluntary and admissible.
The court found that detectives advised defendant of his
constitutional rights under Miranda immediately before each of
his four custodial interrogations and defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his rights. With respect to the October 21
car ride, the court found an advisement was not necessary
because it was not an interrogation and, even if it were,
“defendant was advised of these [Miranda] warnings ... in fact,
just ten hours ... before, with the same detective.” The court
found no indication that defendant’s statements were not of his
free will and observed that “[defendant] didn’t come off as a naïve
follower. [Defendant] is actually articulate, he’s pretty smart,
and he was dodging and weaving throughout all of these
statements, to kind of anticipate different things that might come
up.”
The trial court rejected defendant’s two-step interrogation
argument outright because not only had defendant been advised
of his Miranda rights four times before defendant claimed he was
interrogation and an unwarned confession do not comply with
Miranda’s warning requirement. (Id. at p. 622 (conc. opn. of
Kennedy, J.).)
14
lured into making an unwarned statement, but “the defendant
was already talking. He was talking to everybody.” The court
also rejected defendant’s contention that his arraignment was
unreasonably delayed, stating first that the issue had already
been litigated and adding that because defendant was arraigned
within the two-day requirement of state law “[h]e was not denied
[due process].” Based on the foregoing, the court denied
defendant’s motion to exclude his custodial statements.
Before retrial began, defendant pled guilty “for tactical
reasons” to counts 2 through 5 (all charged crimes other than
murder), admitted the related firearm allegations, and admitted
that he was a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life when committing those crimes. On
October 1, 2024, a jury found defendant guilty of the remaining
charge of first degree murder. The jury found the special
circumstance allegations true and found that a principal was
armed with a firearm. The jury was unable to make a
unanimous finding on whether defendant personally used a
firearm.
The trial court sentenced defendant as follows: life without
the possibility of parole plus one year for the armed principal
enhancement on count 1; a consecutive term of life plus one year
for the armed principal allegation on count 2; two years and four
months, stayed, on count 3; a consecutive low term of five years
on count 4; and a consecutive two years on count 5.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
15
III. DISCUSSION
A. Admissibility of Defendant’s Custodial Statements
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by
denying his motion to exclude his custodial statements and
allowing the prosecutor to introduce them at trial. He argues
that: (1) the law of the case does not apply; (2) his October 19
statements were coerced by promises of leniency and the use of
deception; (3) his October 20 and 21 statements were coerced by
an unreasonable delay in arraignment; and (4) his October 21
statements are inadmissible because he was not readvised of his
Miranda rights before the car ride and his statement at the
hospital was elicited as a result of a prohibited two-step
interrogation.
1. The law of the case
The Attorney General argues that under the doctrine of the
law of the case, the Supreme Court’s previous ruling that
defendant’s statements were voluntary and admissible controls
the outcome. Defendant suggests the doctrine should not apply
when a conviction is vacated by a federal court granting habeas
relief, but admits he can find no authority to support that view.
At minimum, according to defendant, the law of the case doctrine
cannot apply to the arguments the Supreme Court deemed
forfeited, namely failure to re-Mirandize defendant and the
16
alleged delay in arraignment, because those issues were not
decided.14
“Under the law of the case doctrine, when an appellate
court ‘“states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to
the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case
and must be adhered to throughout [the case’s] subsequent
progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal
… .”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 246
(Barragan).) The doctrine “‘prevents the parties from seeking
appellate reconsideration of an already decided issue in the same
case absent some significant change in circumstances.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441 (Boyer).)
“‘Application of the rule is now subject to the qualifications that
“the point of law involved must have been necessary to the prior
decision, that the matter must have been actually presented and
determined by the court, and that application of the doctrine will
not result in an unjust decision.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1161 (Ramos).)15
14 In the interests of justice, defendant urges us not to apply
the doctrine because the Supreme Court’s review was nearly 30
years ago and standards of decency with respect to the
interrogation of young people have evolved in the intervening
period.
15 “An ‘unjust decision’ may result when ‘the controlling rules
of law have been altered or clarified by a decision intervening
between the first and second determinations of the appellate
courts. [Citations.]’ (DiGenova v. State Board of Education
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 167, 179–180; People v. Stanley[(1995)] 10
Cal.4th [764,] 787.)” (Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1161.)
17
Defendant has shown no basis to treat this case differently
because his conviction was overturned by a federal habeas court
rather than a state court. Whether a judgment of conviction is
reversed after direct appeal or vacated after a state or federal
petition for writ of habeas corpus, the case is returned to a
pretrial posture as if the defendant had never been tried and
convicted. (People v. Mack (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1014–
1015; People v. Cooper (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 500, 523.)
Accordingly, we conclude the law of the case doctrine does apply
to give binding effect to the Supreme Court’s ruling on the issue
of the voluntariness of defendant’s custodial statements.
In his direct appeal of the first conviction, defendant
challenged the first trial court’s rulings denying his motions to
suppress his confessions under sections 995 and 405. (Jones I,
supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 296.) The Supreme Court addressed the
admissibility of all five of the defendant’s statements and found
them all voluntary. (Id. at p. 299.) That is the law of the case
and must be adhered to “‘whether . . . right or wrong.’”
(Barragan, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 246.) Even if defendant has
new challenges to the voluntariness of the statements, the court
is bound by the law of the case, unless he presents new evidence
or there has been an intervening change in the law. (Id. at
pp. 246–247; Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 442; Ramos, supra, 15
Cal.4th at p. 1161.) Accordingly, based on the law of the case
doctrine, we reject defendant’s contentions that his statements
were not voluntary. Because, however, the Supreme Court
concluded that defendant had forfeited his argument that his
statements should be excluded because the police failed to re-
Mirandize him, and because of an alleged delay in his
arraignment and defendant raised these arguments in the trial
18
court in advance of his second trial, we will consider the merits of
his arguments below.
2. Failure to renew Miranda advisement
Defendant contends that his statements to Salgado on
October 21 were taken in violation of Miranda, supra, 384 U.S.
436 because (1) he was not advised of his rights before the 10-
minute car ride and (2) the confession made at the hospital after
Salgado did renew the advisement was the product of two-step
questioning prohibited in Missouri v. Seibert, supra, 542 U.S.
600.
As a threshold matter, “if ‘custodial interrogation’ is
lacking, Miranda rights are not implicated ... .” (People v. Mickey
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 648 (Mickey).) The trial court found that
the conversation in the police car was not an interrogation for
purposes of Miranda analysis, and we review that finding for
substantial evidence or clear error. (People v. Clark (1993) 5
Cal.4th 950, 985, disapproved on another ground in People v.
Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421.) As used in the context of
Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, interrogation includes any words
or actions on the part of the police that they should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect. (People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 985.) It does not
include all conversation between an officer and a suspect where a
defendant makes incriminating statements. (Mickey, supra, 54
Cal.3d at p. 648 [no interrogation when police responded to
defendant’s question regarding the burial of his victims, lost his
composure and made incriminating statements].)
19
Salgado and Cassidy were responsible for taking defendant
to the hospital to retrieve blood, saliva, and hair samples.
Salgado testified that he “had no intention” of interviewing
defendant, which testimony was corroborated by his lack of
notepad or recording device. Salgado did not ask defendant any
questions. When defendant started making admissions, Salgado
improvised by taking notes on the evidence envelope he had
brought for the biological samples. As Cassidy explained, the
atmosphere in the car was “very low key, professional.” The
detectives did not raise their voices or pressure defendant, and
the conversation never became contested or controversial.
Defendant initiated the conversation that morning by asking
about his possible punishment. Defendant’s unsolicited
admission was an unexpected response to Salgado answering his
question and then offering an opinion about defendant’s role in
the crime. Substantial evidence therefore supports the trial
court’s finding that defendant was not interrogated during the
car ride to the hospital.
In addition, we reject the assertion that the detectives were
required to readvise defendant of his Miranda rights for the car
ride. “[R]eadvisement is unnecessary where the subsequent
interrogation is ‘reasonably contemporaneous’ with the prior
knowing and intelligent waiver. [Citations.] The courts examine
the totality of the circumstances, including the amount of time
that has passed since the waiver, any change in the identity of
the interrogator or the location of the interview, any official
reminder of the prior advisement, the suspect’s sophistication or
past experience with law enforcement, and any indicia that he
subjectively understands and waives his rights.” (People v.
Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 170 (Mickle).)
20
Here, although the location of the conversation had
changed to the car, it was clear from the circumstances that
defendant was still in official custody. He was handcuffed in the
back of a police car and headed to the hospital to fulfill the
mandate of a search warrant. He could reasonably be expected to
know that any statements made at this time might be used
against him in the investigation and any subsequent trial. (See
Mickle, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 171.) Further, defendant
recognized Salgado from his earlier interactions with him and
Salgado was the same detective who, with Gallon, gave defendant
the Miranda advisement the night before. (See ibid.) Defendant
was advised of and waived his right to remain silent four times
within the previous 48 hours. (See ibid.) Under these
circumstances, the trial court’s conclusion that “defendant was
well aware with regard to his Miranda rights” was supported by
substantial evidence. The police therefore were not required to
renew the Miranda advisement prior to transporting defendant
to the hospital. (See id. at p. 170 [defendant’s statements in
fourth interview were voluntary where it was given 36 hours
after last warning by the same two detectives who had previously
admonished him]; People v. Thompson (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1966,
1972–1973 [nine-hour interval between advisement and
confession did not violate Miranda where the defendant
confessed to the same officer who had previously advised him of
his rights]; People v. Johnson (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 988, 997
[defendant’s statements were voluntary where he was given
multiple warnings during seven interviews over nine days].)
Defendant additionally argues that the police engaged in
an impermissible two-step interrogation on October 21, luring
defendant into an unwarned confession in the car before advising
21
him of his Miranda rights at the hospital and resoliciting an
admissible confession. We disagree. Defendant was advised of
and waived his constitutional rights to silence and counsel four
times before the car ride to the hospital on October 21.16 Because
a Miranda advisement was not required, we reject defendant’s
argument.
3. Unreasonably delayed arraignment
Although he was arraigned within the two days required by
statute17, defendant maintains that his confessions on October 21
were the product of an unreasonable delay in arraignment in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
“Persons in custody must be arraigned without
unnecessary delay. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 14; County of Riverside
v. McLaughlin (1991) 500 U.S. 44, 56–57 [probable cause
determination ordinarily should occur within 48 hours of a
warrantless arrest]; see §§ 825 [arraignment ordinarily should
occur within 48 hours, excluding Sundays and holidays], 859
[appearance before a magistrate should occur without
16 Defendant was first advised on the morning of his arrest
and reminded when questioning resumed after he was booked
that morning. The following day, defendant initiated a
conversation with Gallon, who readvised him around noon. At
7:51 p.m. that evening, defendant was interviewed by Salgado
and Schirka, who readvised defendant of his rights, marking the
fourth time in about 36 hours.
17 As noted, the police arrested defendant on Wednesday
morning, October 19, and defendant was arraigned on Friday
afternoon, October 21.
22
unreasonable delay after charge by written complaint]; People v.
Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 325.)” (People v. Williams (2010)
49 Cal.4th 405, 446 (Williams).) But to justify exclusion of a
statement based on delayed arraignment, a defendant “must
show that the delay produced his admissions or that there was an
essential connection between the illegal detention and admissions
of guilt.” (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 176 (Turner);
accord, People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 329–330
(Thompson).)
As the trial court found, defendant was arraigned within
two days of his arrest as required by section 825. Further,
nothing in the record suggests that a two-day delay was
unreasonable under the circumstances. The case against
defendant involved potential charges of murder, kidnapping,
rape, robbery, and the concomitant special circumstances. In
view of the complexity of the charging decisions involved,
including the discernment of two suspects’ levels of culpability,
the delay was not unreasonable. (See, e.g., People v. Bonillas
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 757, 787–788 [four days between arrest and
arraignment was not unreasonable where case involved potential
charges of murder and special circumstances and the charging
decisions involved were complex]; Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at
p. 175.)
In any event, even if defendant’s arraignment were
unreasonably delayed, defendant cannot demonstrate the
“‘“essential connection between the illegal detention and the
confession”’” because he initiated the incriminating statement he
made to Salgado in the police car on the way to the hospital on
the second court day after his arrest. (See Williams, supra, 49
Cal.4th at p. 446, quoting Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 330.)
23
B. Violation of the Act
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by
ruling that the appropriate remedy for violation of the Act was a
declaration that defendant was ineligible for the death penalty.
He argues the court’s remedy was insufficient as a matter of law
because ineligibility for the death penalty is a “categorical
prohibition” under subdivision (l) of the Act, not a remedial
option. As defendant reads the Act, the court was required to
impose an additional remedy against the prosecutor as a
sanction. (§ 745, subd. (l).)
As we describe above, the district court granted defendant
federal habeas relief on the ground that the prosecutor used
peremptory strikes to remove all the Black jurors. After his
return to superior court, defendant filed a motion claiming the
“government’s egregious conduct” in the first trial violated the
Act and seeking, as a remedy, reduction of his murder charge or
dismissal of the special circumstances or enhancements. The
prosecutor conceded the Act was violated in the first trial, but
argued the issue was moot because the federal court remedied
the violation when it vacated the conviction. On June 4, 2024,
the trial court ruled the appropriate remedy was ineligibility for
the death penalty under former section 745, subdivision (e)(3).18
The Attorney General argues that the Act does not
encompass racially discriminatory peremptory challenges
because its plain language does not include jury selection and the
legislative history reveals the Legislature’s express intent to
exclude bias directed at potential jurors from the scope of section
18 On August 16, 2024, the court denied the defense motion
for reconsideration.
24
745 and instead address it through a separate statutory scheme.
Defendant responds that the argument borders on “absurdity”
but offers no further explanation.
Even if we were to assume, without deciding, that the Act
applied to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, we
would reject defendant’s argument. According to defendant, the
trial court was required to impose a remedy for the prosecutor’s
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges during the first trial.
The federal district court, however, had already vacated the
conviction that resulted from the proceedings in the first trial,
the remedy set forth at section 745, subdivision (e)(2)(A), and
defendant was thereafter retried on the information. The
judgment on review in this appeal was based on the proceedings
in the retrial, about which defendant raises no challenge under
the Act. Thus, on this record, we conclude that defendant did not
state a prima facie claim for relief under the Act.
25
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
MOOR, J.
26
