Filed 7/9/26 P. v. Smith CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B343809

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. GA011874)

STANLEY JAMES SMITH,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael Villalobos, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded with directions.

Nancy Haydt, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
 In 1993, defendant and appellant Stanley James Smith
(Smith)1 was convicted of kidnapping for extortion, second degree
robbery, and assault with great bodily injury. In 2025, while
Smith was serving a prison term of life without the possibility of
parole (LWOP) plus 11 years, the trial court recalled the sentence
under Penal Code section 1172.75.2 The court struck prior prison
term and prior serious felony enhancements and resentenced
Smith to serve LWOP plus 5 years.
Smith appeals from his resentencing. We remand with
instructions to recalculate Smith’s actual custody credits. We
otherwise affirm the trial court’s order.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts
“At approximately 10:45 p.m. on June 21, 1992,
Carolyn G[.] [(Carolyn)][3] returned home to her condominium
complex in Pasadena. She entered the lobby through a door
leading from the parking structure and walked toward the
elevator. Before the door closed completely behind her, [Smith]
burst through it and jumped on her, and started punching her in

1 In the appellate record, Smith is alternately referred to as
“Stanley James Smith,” “Stanley Brown,” “Stanley James Smith
Brown,” “Stanley Smith,” and “Stanley Smith Brown.” We use
the name that appears on the most recent abstract of judgment.
2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 Per California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4), we initially
refer to the victim by her first name and last initial, and
thereafter by her first name. No disrespect is intended.

2
the face. She began to scream loudly. Her glasses were knocked
to the ground, and her earrings and one shoe fell off. [Smith]
continued to beat her face and upper body, and she continued to
scream. Then, [Smith] began to choke [Carolyn] with such force
that she was unable to breathe. [Smith] said, ‘Shut up, Bitch.’
She stopped screaming. [Smith] grabbed her shirt, which tore,
opened the elevator and, with [Carolyn] on her hands and knees,
dragged her in. With both of them inside the elevator, [Smith]
closed the door and pushed the stop button.
“[Smith] continued to punch [Carolyn] in the face and
upper body. Then, he grabbed her purse and dumped the
contents onto the elevator floor. He scooped up the change which
had fallen out and put the coins in his pocket. He also took a
silver pen. He repeatedly asked [Carolyn], ‘What have you got in
here?’ After she told him that she did not have any money he
said, ‘Write a check, Bitch.’ She replied, ‘Okay. How much?’ He
answered, ‘$100.’ [Carolyn] wrote the check, during which time
[Smith] warned her not to get any blood on it. When she was
finished, he ripped the check out of her checkbook and shoved it
into his pocket.
“[Smith] asked [Carolyn] if she was able to withdraw
money from the bank. She said that she was unable to because
she did not have her automated teller machine card with her, and
she would not go anywhere with [Smith]. He became very angry,
so she gave him the key to her car and told him, ‘Just take my
car.’ He grabbed the key from her hand and asked where the car
was parked. She repeated that she was not going anywhere with
him. He shoved her into the corner of the elevator while pulling
her hair, forcing her to turn her back on him, which she did not
want to do. [Carolyn] continued to struggle against him and he

3
told her to keep her head down or he would ‘fuck [her] up.’ She
tried to look at him, and he hit her every time she tried.
“[Smith] released the stop button and the elevator door
partially opened. He put the stop button on again, and
repeatedly told her, ‘You’re coming with me.’ As [Smith] stepped
out, [Carolyn] released the stop button and the doors started to
close. He jumped back into the elevator and asked, ‘Why did you
do that, bitch?’ He lunged at [Carolyn], punched her in the jaw
and said, ‘I am going to really kick your ass now.’ She started
screaming again. He kept telling her that no one could hear her,
and he continued to shove her into the corner.
“[Smith] again released the stop button and the elevator
door opened. He stepped out and was immediately apprehended
by the police, who had been called by the neighbors.” (People v.
Smith Brown (Jan. 6, 1995, B079643) [nonpub. opn.], at pp. 3–5
(Smith Brown).)
II. Procedural History
A. Conviction and sentencing
In 1993, a jury found Smith guilty of kidnapping for
extortion (§ 209, subd. (a); count 1), second degree robbery (§ 211;
count 3), and assault with great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1);
count 4). The jury found true allegations that, as to count 1, the
victim suffered bodily harm (§ 209, subd. (a)) and, as to all
counts, Smith personally and intentionally inflicted great bodily
injury (§ 12022.7). The trial court found true allegations that
Smith had suffered two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667,
subd. (a)) and one prior prison term (former § 667.5, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced Smith to a total prison term of
LWOP plus 19 years.

4
 On direct appeal, this court stayed the eight-year term
imposed on count 3 pursuant to section 654 and found that Smith
was entitled to additional days of custody credit. (Smith Brown,
supra, B079643 at pp. 14–17.) The judgment was otherwise
affirmed. (Id. at p. 17.)
B. Section 1172.75 proceedings
In 2023, Smith was deemed eligible for resentencing under
section 1172.75. Smith requested that the trial court recall his
LWOP sentence and resentence him to the lesser offense of
section 209, subdivision (b)(1), which would offer the possibility of
parole, “in light of his age, age-related medical conditions, length
of time he has served, and exemplary prison performance.”
On January 29, 2025, the trial court struck the former
section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement and
one section 667, subdivision (a) prior serious felony enhancement.
The court stayed the upper term sentences on counts 3 and 4.
The court declined to reduce the LWOP sentence on count 1.
The trial court explained its reasoning as follows: “In
reviewing the case for resentencing, the number [one] thing that I
do is look at the facts and circumstances of the offense. This is
one of the most heinous cases that I’ve ever reviewed. [¶]
. . . Smith brutally beat this woman in the commission of a
robbery. . . . [¶] He went far beyond just taking the person’s
property. He had this poor woman who was dragged into the
elevator and just beaten to a pulp for no reason. . . . [H]e had her
under control. He took her purse. He could take her money and
stuff. There was no reason to beat her so viciously. [¶] . . . I read
where he was perhaps under the influence of cocaine at the time,
but still there’s something inhuman about somebody who acts
like that in committing a robbery and beating someone so

5
viciously for no purpose. It’s just unbelievable.” The court also
considered Smith’s criminal history, noting that he had “a prior
sex offense . . . another robbery which was consistent with what
his life was when he was out of custody.”
The trial court acknowledged that Smith was “probably a
different person now” after so many years in custody and
“applaud[ed] whatever efforts he’[d] made to change the person
he is[,] either doing programs or counseling and so forth.” “[T]his
crime was so heinous and vicious[,]” however, that there was “no
way [the court] would undo the jury’s verdict on count 1 and the
sentence of the court to [LWOP].”
The trial court resentenced Smith to a total term of LWOP
plus 5 years. Smith filed a timely notice of appeal from his
resentencing.
DISCUSSION
I. Standards of Review
We review the trial court’s sentencing decisions for an
abuse of discretion. (People v. Moseley (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
870, 874.) We interpret relevant statutes and review claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. (People v. Mayfield
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 199; People v. Terwilligar (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 585, 595.)
II. Relevant Law
A. Section 1172.75
Section 1172.75 renders “legally invalid” any former section
667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement imposed
before January 1, 2020, except for a prior conviction for a
sexually violent offense. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) A defendant who
qualifies for the recall of sentence under section 1172.75 is
entitled to “a full resentencing” at which the trial court may

6
reconsider all prior sentencing decisions. (People v. Monroe
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402 (Monroe).)
Section 1172.75 provides “specific instructions” for the trial
court to exercise its broad resentencing authority. (People v.
Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 966.) Among other things, the
court must “apply any . . . changes in law that reduce sentences
or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(2).) The court “may consider postconviction factors,
including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that
reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have
changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(3).)
B. Section 1385
Under section 1385, as amended by Senate Bill No. 81
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2022, a trial “court
shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice
to do so[.]” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) “In exercising its discretion” to
dismiss an enhancement, “the court shall consider and afford
great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove” the
presence of nine enumerated “mitigating circumstances . . . .
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances
weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless
the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Mitigating factors
include that (1) “[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single

7
case” (id., subd. (c)(2)(B)); (2) “[t]he application of an
enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years” (id.,
subd. (c)(2)(C)); (3) “[t]he current offense is connected to mental
illness” (id., subd. (c)(2)(D)); (4) “[t]he current offense is connected
to prior victimization or childhood trauma” (id., subd. (c)(2)(E));
and (5) “[t]he enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is
over five years old” (id., subd. (c)(2)(H)).
III. Reimposition of LWOP Sentence on Count 1
Smith contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to reduce his LWOP sentence on count 1 to life with the
possibility of parole. We disagree.
As required by section 1172.75, the trial court struck
Smith’s former section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term
enhancement. The court also, as required by section 1172.75,
conducted a full resentencing (see Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th
at p. 402), during which it exercised its discretion to strike one
section 667, subdivision (a) prior serious felony enhancement.
Although the court had the discretion under section 1385 to
strike the bodily harm allegation as to count 1, which would have
reduced the sentence to life with the possibility of parole, the
court declined to do so. (See § 209, subd. (a) [punishment for
kidnapping for extortion when the victim “suffers death or bodily
harm” is LWOP; otherwise, punishment is life in prison with the
possibility of parole]; People v. Marsh (1984) 36 Cal.3d 134, 144.)
The court’s exercise of its discretion was eminently reasonable
given the extreme violence and callousness exhibited by Smith
during the course of the underlying kidnapping.
Smith argues that the trial court failed to make an express
finding under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), that a lesser
sentence would endanger public safety. The court, however, was

8
under no obligation to make such a finding because its aggregate
sentence of LWOP plus 5 years was less than the LWOP-plus-11-
year sentence Smith had been serving. (See § 1172.75,
subd. (d)(1) [“Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in
a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of
the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser
sentence would endanger public safety”].)
Smith also argues that the trial court failed to consider or
afford great weight to the presence of mitigating circumstances
set forth in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), or more generally, his
“good conduct in prison.” Smith has failed to demonstrate an
abuse of discretion. (See People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th
367, 376 [“ ‘ “[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence
to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary” ’ ”].)
Because “all intendments and presumptions are indulged
in favor of [the] correctness” of the trial court’s order (In re
Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133), we presume
that the court was aware of the applicable law, gave great weight
to any relevant mitigating circumstance, and declined to dismiss
the enhancement due to countervailing factors. (See People v.
Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029 [at resentencing, a trial
court may reimpose a challenged enhancement upon “find[ing]
substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that . . .
‘neutralize . . . the great weight of the mitigating circumstance,
such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of
justice’ ”].)
The trial court not only recognized the “heinous” facts of
the crime, but it also considered Smith’s past convictions for

9
forcible oral copulation (former § 288a) and second degree
burglary (§ 459), “which was consistent with what his life was
when he was out of custody.” The court acknowledged and
“applaud[ed]” Smith’s rehabilitative efforts during his
incarceration, but it was ultimately unconvinced that the LWOP
sentence on count 1 should be disturbed. Under these
circumstances, we cannot conclude that this was an abuse of
discretion.
IV. Reimposition of Upper Terms on Counts 3 and 4
Smith contends that the trial court erred by reimposing
(albeit also staying) the upper terms on counts 3 and 4. We find
no error or abuse of the court’s discretion.
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), provides: “Unless the
court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not
impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are
circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term
of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have
been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” The unambiguous language of this provision “carves
out an exception to the general rule that all ameliorative changes
to the law must be applied at a section 1172.75 resentencing and
does not require aggravating factors to be found true beyond a
reasonable doubt if the upper term was previously imposed.”
(People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, 458
(Brannon-Thompson); see also People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th
1261, 1265 [when interpreting a statute, “[t]he plain meaning
controls if there is no ambiguity in the statutory language”].)
Because Smith was originally sentenced to the upper terms
on counts 3 and 4, the trial court could reimpose the upper terms

10
at resentencing without the relevant aggravating factors being
admitted or proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Mathis
(2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 374, review granted Aug. 13, 2025,
S291628 (Mathis); Brannon-Thompson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 466–467.) We respectfully disagree with the contrary holding
of People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 329–330.4
Further, nothing in the record suggests that the trial court
was unaware of its authority to impose a lesser sentence on
counts 3 and 4. And because the aggregate sentence was less
than that originally imposed, the court was not required to make
a finding that a lesser sentence on counts 3 and 4 would
endanger public safety. (See § 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)
V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Smith argues that his counsel at resentencing was
constitutionally ineffective because she did not ask the trial court
to dismiss the “bodily injury” enhancement on count 1 or to
impose less than the upper terms on counts 3 and 4. Smith also
faults his counsel with failing to adequately “advise” the court on
the scope and requirements of its resentencing authority.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show that counsel’s performance was both deficient and
prejudicial. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) “When

4 The California Supreme Court has granted review to
resolve the split regarding “whether section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4), allows a trial court to reimpose an upper term
sentence where the facts underlying one or more aggravating
circumstances were neither stipulated to by the defendant nor
found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the factfinder. (See
People v. Eaton (Mar. 14, 2025, C096853), review granted
May 14, 2025, S289903.)” (Mathis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at
p. 373, fn. 6, review granted.)

11
examining an ineffective assistance claim, a reviewing court
defers to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a
presumption counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” (Ibid.) To establish prejudice, “[t]he
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694
(Strickland).)
We reject Smith’s ineffective assistance claim because he
has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that any
purported error by counsel affected the resentencing. (See
Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 691 [“An error by counsel, even
if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the
judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the
judgment”].) The record reflects that the trial court was aware of
its resentencing authority, weighed aggravating and mitigating
factors, and reduced Smith’s sentence from LWOP plus 11 years
to LWOP plus 5 years in a case the court described as “one of the
most heinous . . . that [it had] ever reviewed.” It is not
reasonably probable that any omitted request or argument from
counsel would have resulted in a more favorable outcome for
Smith.
VI. Custody Credit
Smith contends, and the People concede, that the trial
court incorrectly calculated his custody credit. We agree with the
parties. The abstract of judgment following the resentencing
hearing does not reflect the actual days of custody credit as of the
date of resentencing. (See People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th

12
20, 23.) We therefore remand the matter so the court may
recalculate Smith’s actual days of custody credit and prepare an
amended abstract of judgment.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded for the trial court to recalculate
Smith’s actual days of custody credit, prepare an amended
abstract of judgment, and forward a certified copy of the amended
abstract of judgment to the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation. The court’s January 29, 2025, order is
otherwise affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

GOORVITCH, J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

RICHARDSON, J.

13