Filed 7/9/26 P. v. Martinez CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H052755
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C1915159)

v.

JORGE SANCHEZ MARTINEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

In 2024, a jury found defendant Jorge Sanchez Martinez guilty of multiple counts
stemming from numerous acts of sexual abuse against his daughter, G. Doe,1 and his
cousin, D. Doe. The trial court sentenced Martinez to a total indeterminate term of 150
years to life in prison, with an additional determinate term of five years in prison.
On appeal, Martinez claims that the trial court committed instructional error and
impermissibly lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof by instructing the jury that it
could consider G. Doe’s prior statements regarding the alleged sexual abuse for certain
limited purposes. Martinez further argues that the trial court committed sentencing error
by imposing full, separate, consecutive sentences for his offenses against G. Doe and
limiting his presentencing custody credits to the offense against D. Doe only.
For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

1 We refer to the victims in this matter by their first initial and last name “Doe” to
protect their confidentiality pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).
 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing
On February 26, 2020, the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office filed an
information charging Martinez with six counts of aggravated sexual assault (rape) against
G. Doe, a child under the age of 14 and more than 10 years younger than Martinez (Pen.
Code2, § 269, subd. (a)(1); counts 1–6); two counts of aggravated sexual assault (oral
copulation) against G. Doe, a child under the age of 14 and more than 10 years younger
than Martinez (§ 269, subd. (a)(4); counts 7–8); two counts of aggravated sexual assault
(sexual penetration) against G. Doe, a child under the age of 14 and more than 10 years
younger than Martinez (§ 269, subd. (a)(5); counts 9–10); and one count of assault with
intent to commit an enumerated felony against D. Doe, a person under the age of 18
(§ 220, subd. (a)(2); count 11).
Following a multi-day trial, on August 6, 2024, the jury found Martinez guilty on
all 11 counts.
On November 8, 2024, the trial court sentenced Martinez to the following: (1) six
consecutive indeterminate terms of 15 years to life in prison on counts 1 through 6
(§ 269, subd. (a)(1)); (2) two consecutive indeterminate terms of 15 years to life in prison
on counts 7 and 8 (§ 269, subd. (a)(4)); (3) two consecutive indeterminate terms of 15
years to life in prison on counts 9 and 10 (§ 269, subd. (a)(5)); and (4) a consecutive
determinate lower term of five years in prison on count 11 (§ 220, subd. (a)(2)).
Martinez’s aggregate sentence was for an indeterminate term of 150 years in prison, with
an additional determinate term of five years in prison. The trial court awarded Martinez
1,901 days of actual credit and 285 days of local conduct credit pursuant to section
2933.1, which were applied to count 11 only.
Martinez timely appealed.

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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B. Factual Background
1. Prosecution’s Case
a. Offenses against D. Doe (count 11)
D. Doe, who was 24 years old at the time of trial, testified that Martinez3 was her
cousin and was approximately 20 years older than her. D. Doe indicated that because her
extended family, including Martinez, lived in one household for a long period of time,
she was very close to Martinez and saw him daily during elementary school. While she
and Martinez were no longer living in the same household by the time she was in high
school, she still saw him on a regular basis at family events.
D. Doe testified that during the fall of her freshman year in high school, when she
was approximately 13 or 14 years old, she had gone to Martinez’s brother’s home with
her family to borrow the brother’s truck. D. Doe’s parents left, and Martinez was left in
charge of D. Doe, her two younger brothers, and her three younger cousins. While the
other children were watching a movie in the living room, Martinez called D. Doe into his
room and asked her to watch a movie with him. When D. Doe entered the room,
Martinez was lying down on the bed and asked her to lie down next to him. Martinez
then asked D. Doe to move closer to him, and began showing D. Doe photos on his phone
of girls, who were wearing what D. Doe described as “minimal clothes”; Martinez also
made comments about the girls’ bodies. As Martinez was making the comments, D. Doe
“froze” and was unable to think or move, even though she felt she should.
Martinez told D. Doe that if she wanted to have a “pretty body type[]” like the
girls in the pictures, she needed to have sexual intercourse. Martinez then began touching
D. Doe over her breasts and started kissing her. Martinez subsequently moved his hand
down over her stomach and thighs, and put his hand in between her legs. The kissing and

3 Most of the witnesses, including D. Doe, referred to Martinez as Eric Hernandez,
which defense counsel indicated was Martinez’s “true name” at the outset of trial.

3
touching went on for approximately five to 10 minutes. During this time, D. Doe felt
“stuck” and unable to move, as she did not expect anything like this to happen. However,
she was ultimately able to shake her head to say “no” when Martinez asked if she wanted
him to continue further. Martinez then told D. Doe she could get up and leave, but to not
to tell anyone about what happened. D. Doe immediately went to the bathroom and tried
to wait there until her parents came back, but ultimately came back out to sit in the living
room, while Martinez remained in his room.
D. Doe was initially too scared to tell anyone about what happened because she
was afraid Martinez might physically hurt her, based on her previous observations of him
getting very aggravated and “intense” while drinking and his significantly bigger size.
She also believed that Martinez was involved in gang activity. However, a few days
later, D. Doe told two of her cousins over the phone that Martinez had touched her
inappropriately. Both cousins told her they would talk to her more about the incident in
person, but never did. D. Doe finally told her parents a few years later after being
encouraged to do so by her friends. After D. Doe disclosed the incident to her parents
and reported it to the police, most of her extended family cut off communication with her,
and certain family members began pressuring her to “remove” the allegations against
Martinez.
b. Offenses against G. Doe (counts 1–10)
i. G. Doe’s Testimony and Prior Statements
G. Doe, who was 17 years old at the time of trial, testified that Martinez, her
father, gained custody of her while she was in elementary school after he discovered she
had been living in foster care. G. Doe initially lived with Martinez and his then-
girlfriend, K. Doe4, at K. Doe’s home. G. Doe stated that she never developed a strong

4 We refer to Martinez’s girlfriend as K. Doe based on her testimony, as described
in detail below, regarding her past sexual relationship with Martinez, which began when
she was under the age of 18.

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father-daughter relationship with Martinez, as they did not talk much and she did not feel
like opening up to him. However, they frequently got into arguments, and if G. Doe did
not listen, Martinez would hit her with his hand, belt, or sandal. G. Doe estimated that
Martinez hit her at least twice a week while she was living with him, causing her to
become afraid of him.
In 2017, when G. Doe was approximately 10 years old, she spoke with a police
officer and told him that Martinez made her get on her knees, then hit her on her leg and
hand with an iPhone charger cable because she made mistakes while learning her
multiplication tables. She also told the police officer that Martinez had been hitting her
daily with multiple objects, including a hanger, a seatbelt, his belt, and his sandal. After
G. Doe spoke with the police, she recalled that officers came to speak with Martinez and
gave him a warning, but did not take any further action. Martinez subsequently sent her
to Las Vegas to live with her aunt for a year. G. Doe became afraid to say anything else
regarding Martinez’s behavior because she was concerned that if he were arrested, she
would be left with no place to live and would have to go back into foster care.
In the summer of 2018, G. Doe chose to return to California and live with
Martinez. Although their relationship improved for some time, G. Doe and Martinez
continued to have arguments. When G. Doe was approximately 12 and started dating,
Martinez became angry with her and told her she could no longer talk to her boyfriend,
then hit her on her arm. G. Doe subsequently stopped dating her boyfriend because she
was afraid to disobey Martinez and wanted to maintain the improved relationship
between them.
After her return to California, G. Doe moved between relatives’ homes and was
not regularly staying with Martinez, who had since broken up with K. Doe. In 2019,

5
while G. Doe was 12 years old and staying with her aunt C.R.,5 she decided she did not
want to move anymore and wanted to live permanently with C.R. When G. Doe told
C.R. that she was scared to go back home with Martinez, C.R. asked if Martinez had ever
touched her (G. Doe) inappropriately, and G. Doe confirmed that he had. The following
day, C.R. took G. Doe to the police.
During G. Doe’s first interview with the police, which took place on June 18,
2019, she told Detective Kelly Stenger that she had been touched in her “private things”
by Martinez and did not like it. G. Doe told Stenger that a few months prior, when she
was asleep at K. Doe’s home, Martinez came into her room at 3:00 a.m. and began
touching her under her clothing in her chest area and between her legs. Martinez then
took off his clothes and put his “private spot” inside G. Doe’s “private spot.” 6
Afterwards, G. Doe’s stomach began hurting, and she was unable to use the bathroom
due to the pain.
G. Doe told Detective Stenger that Martinez sexually assaulted her in a similar
manner approximately eight to 10 times. G. Doe additionally saw something that was
“yellowish white” come out of Martinez’s private part onto the bed. Martinez also
attempted to have her touch his penis during some of the assaults, but G. Doe would
refuse or “fake cry” to make him stop. The most recent occasion took place while she
and Martinez were staying at the Milpitas-Calaveras hotel, when Martinez asked if he
could touch her because it was Father’s Day, but she refused.
G. Doe was subsequently interviewed on the same day in Spanish by Detective
Tony Vera. G. Doe told Vera that Martinez had been touching her inappropriately for the

5 We refer to the civilian witnesses by their initials to protect their confidentiality
pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(9) and (11).
6 During her interview, G. Doe was provided a diagram of the female body, and
marked areas on the chest and between the legs in the diagram as the places where
Martinez had touched her. G. Doe was also provided a diagram of the male body, and
marked Martinez’s “private spot” as an area between the male’s legs.

6
past few months since she had returned from living in Las Vegas with her aunt. G. Doe
again stated that the first incident had occurred around 3:00 a.m. one morning when
Martinez had put his “private thing” inside of her. G. Doe stated that she was initially
asleep when Martinez first began touching her inside her shirt, then woke up once he “put
his thing” inside of her. G. Doe told Detective Vera that Martinez sexually assaulted her
approximately five times while she was still living at K. Doe’s house, which included
him touching her chest with his hands and penetrating her vagina with his penis. On
some of these occasions, Martinez also used his fingers to penetrate her vagina.
G. Doe stated that after Martinez broke up with K. Doe, she (G. Doe) and
Martinez began staying in two different hotels in Milpitas and Gilroy. G. Doe stated that
Martinez sexually assaulted her at least five times at the Milpitas hotel and approximately
six or seven times at the Gilroy hotel, in a manner similar to the previous incidents at K.
Doe’s home. At both hotels, Martinez also used his mouth to lick G. Doe’s vagina.
At trial, G. Doe recanted her prior statements regarding the assault. G. Doe
testified that approximately one week after she told C.R. about the sexual assault, she
informed C.R. that she had been lying. G. Doe stated that she and Martinez had fought,
and Martinez had told her she was not his daughter, which made her feel very hurt. G.
Doe then went to stay with C.R. and decided to lie that she had been assaulted because
she wanted to “get away” from Martinez.7 G. Doe also testified that the details she
described about the abuse were taken from television shows she watched that involved
sexual acts, as well as from a friend who had confided in G. Doe that she had been raped.
G. Doe stated that she did not remember what she told the two detectives about Martinez

7 G. Doe additionally stated that she had previously testified that she had only told
C.R. that she was lying one day before the preliminary hearing, and that she had not
mentioned the fight between her and Martinez in prior statements or testimony before
trial. G. Doe further confirmed, after having her recollection refreshed, that she had
previously testified that she had lied about Martinez sexually assaulting her because she
felt Martinez paid more attention to her little brother than her.

7
sexually assaulting her, including specific details about the incidents, and testified that
the information she had given them was not true.
ii. Testimony of C.R.
C.R., Martinez’s aunt, testified that G. Doe had been in her custody since G. Doe
made her report to the police in 2019. Before C.R. took custody of G. Doe, she was
concerned about G. Doe’s wellbeing while in Martinez’s care, as Martinez frequently
moved G. Doe from home to home, and C.R.’s home was the only place where G. Doe
felt like she had a family. C.R. stated that on the day G. Doe revealed the alleged assault
to her, G. Doe was crying and told C.R. she did “not have a life” because she was going
from home to home and Martinez was touching her. Prior to this, C.R. did not suspect
that Martinez had been behaving inappropriately with G. Doe. However, once G. Doe
told her about the alleged assault, C.R. “got in a real bad way” because her daughter was
the same age as G. Doe. C.R. assured G. Doe that she would support her, and that G.
Doe should tell the truth regardless of what it was.
C.R. spoke with the police on the same day that she brought G. Doe in to report
the assault. At that time, C.R. told one of the detectives that G. Doe had stated Martinez
had opened her legs, sucked her breasts, and placed his mouth on her vagina. G. Doe
also told C.R. that Martinez had penetrated her with his penis, which hurt a lot and made
G. Doe cry. G. Doe additionally told C.R. that Martinez had assaulted her on multiple
occasions, including at home, at a hotel in Gilroy, in Martinez’s van, at a park, and on
camping and fishing trips when K. Doe was not present. In addition, G. Doe told C.R.
that on Father’s Day, Martinez wanted to touch her and G. Doe refused, leading to
Martinez getting upset and threatening to send G. Doe away to Mexico to live with her
grandmother.
C.R. testified that she emphasized to G. Doe numerous times how serious the
allegations were and how important it was for G. Doe to tell the truth. At the time, G.

8
Doe maintained that the allegations were true, and after consulting with other family
members, C.R. decided to have G. Doe report them to the police.
C.R. testified that some family members, including Martinez’s mother, blamed her
for getting Martinez in trouble. She also told a victim advocate from the District
Attorney’s office that she felt conflicted because of the blame and backlash she was
receiving. C.R. confirmed that two days prior to Martinez having a scheduled court
appearance, G. Doe told C.R. she felt “very badly” and had lied about the allegations.
iii. Testimony of H.G.
H.G., Martinez’s uncle, testified that in 2019, G. Doe would occasionally spend
the night at his home. On these occasions, Martinez would pick G. Doe up late at night,
which H.G. did not approve of, and H.G. confronted Martinez about his behavior. H.G.
testified that C.R. had come over with G. Doe one night in June 2019 and asked H.G. to
come with her to the police department the following day to make a statement. At that
time, G. Doe revealed to H.G. that Martinez had been touching her inappropriately. G.
Doe told H.G. that Martinez had touched her “parts,” referring to her breast and vagina,
and that he had penetrated her with his “organ,” which referred to Martinez’s penis. G.
Doe told H.G. that the penetration hurt and she did not like it.
When C.R. told him she planned to go to the police, H.G. agreed and accompanied
them there, and spoke to the police. During his police interview, H.G. stated that G. Doe
had told him that on one occasion when Martinez was touching her inappropriately, K.
Doe saw what was happening and became upset with Martinez. G. Doe also reported to
H.G. that the abuse took place many times, including in Martinez’s van and while they
were fishing.
iv. Testimony of E.L.
E.L., G. Doe’s maternal grandmother, testified that she saw G. Doe often as a
baby, but did not see her very much after G. Doe was taken away from E.L.’s daughter
(G. Doe’s mother). E.L. stated that G. Doe and C.R. came to visit her shortly after C.R.

9
discovered the alleged abuse, and G. Doe told E.L. that Martinez had touched her
inappropriately in the past. When E.L. asked G. Doe why she had not said anything
before, G. Doe said she was afraid that Martinez would be taken to jail, and she would be
left alone with nowhere to stay. G. Doe also told E.L. that Martinez had threatened to
leave her (G. Doe) “on the streets” in Oakland, and that no one loved her. E.L. stated that
G. Doe later told her she had lied about the alleged abuse because she no longer wanted
to live with Martinez.
v. Testimony of Detective Vera
Detective Vera of the San Jose Police Department testified that in 2019, he and
Detective Stenger were working together in the sexual assaults unit and had both
interviewed G. Doe. Vera personally observed Stenger’s interview with G. Doe as it was
taking place, including Stenger’s use of the diagrams of the female and male bodies—
known as gingerbread sketches. Vera confirmed that when Stenger asked G. Doe about
her private place, G. Doe circled her vaginal area on the female body diagram. G. Doe
had also circled the penis area on the male body diagram when Stenger asked her which
portion of the body Martinez had used to insert. Vera used the same gingerbread
sketches during his interview with G. Doe, and confirmed that G. Doe had pointed to the
penis area and the vaginal area as the part that Martinez had used and where he had
inserted it, respectively. G. Doe additionally pointed to the breast area of the sketch
when describing where Martinez had touched her. Vera stated that apart from some
reluctance in describing the male and female body parts used, G. Doe did not appear
reluctant to share information about the alleged abuse or hesitate during her interview.
vi. Sexual Assault Examination
Medical Examiner Mary Ritter, who testified as an expert in child sexual abuse
evaluations, stated that she performed a sexual assault forensic examination (SAFE) on
G. Doe on June 24, 2019. G. Doe told Ritter that she had pain with sexual contact, as
well as pain with urination and bowel movements after her first sexual contact. G. Doe

10
also told Ritter that she had been touched in her private area by Martinez with his hands,
mouth, and private area, and that Martinez had hurt her by touching her in this manner.
Ritter tested G. Doe for sexually transmitted diseases and pregnancy, which were
negative. Ritter also examined G. Doe’s vaginal and anal areas, which did not show any
signs of trauma or injury. Hower, Ritter noted that this was not unusual even when
someone complains of pain, because typical injuries to that area in children heal within a
week to two weeks. Ritter also stated that due to puberty, a teenage girl’s vaginal
opening is more durable and tolerant of injuries, and generally heals well, thus making it
possible for a lack of injury to the hymen to be consistent with abuse. Ritter observed
that G. Doe had a V-shaped edge to her posterior hymenal rim, and noted that while this
could have been the result of past trauma, it could also have been a normal irregularity
that G. Doe was born with. Ritter did not note anything else unusual during G. Doe’s
exam.
c. CSAAS evidence
Dr. Dawn Blacker, a clinical psychologist, testified as an expert on child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). Dr. Blacker defined CSAAS as a theoretical
framework developed in the 1980s to assist therapists working with child victims in
dispelling common myths or misconceptions they may have about sexual abuse. She
noted that CSAAS was not used to diagnose or give an opinion on whether someone was
the victim of sexual abuse.
Dr. Blacker testified that the primary purpose of CSAAS is to better understand
why children who are victims of abuse may not act in a way that people would hope for
or expect. She also explained different ways that child victims experience sexual abuse
and their subsequent ability to disclose, or not disclose the abuse. For example, Dr.
Blacker indicated that in many cases, the perpetrator may be someone whom the child
knows or has an ongoing relationship with, thus allowing the perpetrator to engage in
grooming behaviors that emphasize the special relationship they have with the child and

11
allow the child’s parents to trust the perpetrator more. As a result, the perpetrator is often
able to convince the child that disclosing would be negative or harmful, or forms a very
close relationship with them prior to the abuse that makes them very important to the
child, thus making it even harder for the child to disclose the abuse for fear of negative
consequences. Dr. Blacker also spoke about the five general categories of CSAAS:
secrecy, helplessness, entrapment or accommodation, delayed, unconvincing, and
conflicted disclosure, and recanting or retraction. With respect to recanting and
retraction, Dr. Blacker identified six factors that could play a role in the victim denying a
previous disclosure of sexual abuse, which included, among other things, if the
perpetrator is the child’s primary caregiver, an unsupportive non-offending caregiver or
family, and feelings of responsibility or guilt.
Dr. Blacker testified that she was not familiar with the facts of this case or any of
the parties related to the case, and was not offering an opinion as to whether any of the
victims had been sexually abused.
d. Uncharged Sexual Conduct8
i. Testimony of K. Doe
K. Doe testified that she met Martinez when she was 17 years old and began a
romantic, sexual relationship with him shortly after, which lasted approximately two and
a half years. K. Doe and Martinez began living together when K. Doe was 18, and
subsequently had a child together, who was born when K. Doe was 19. While K. Doe
was pregnant, G. Doe moved in with them, and they lived together for approximately one
and a half years.

8 Prior to trial, the trial court granted the People’s motion in limine to present
evidence of Martinez’s uncharged sexual conduct pursuant to Evidence Code section
1108, which provides, in pertinent part, that in a criminal action involving allegations of a
sexual offense, evidence that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense or offenses
is not inadmissible under the general rules regarding the inadmissibility of character
evidence. (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a).)

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 K. Doe described G. Doe’s and Martinez’s relationship as “fine.” She did not
observe Martinez physically harm G. Doe or observe any inappropriate sexual contact
between them. K. Doe and Martinez broke up in January 2019, and K. Doe did not see
G. Doe afterwards.
ii. Testimony of A. Doe
A. Doe, Martinez’s and D. Doe’s cousin, testified that she and Martinez were very
close and saw each other regularly while she was growing up. Martinez was
approximately 10 years older than A. Doe, and she viewed him as a “big brother.” When
A. Doe was approximately 13 or 14 years old, Martinez would often pick her up from
school, and she started skipping school to hang out with him. Martinez would often bring
his friends, who were also older than A. Doe, and asked A. Doe to bring some of her
peers as well.
Although Martinez initially told A. Doe to bring friends so she was not lonely, he
later asked her to bring specific friends for romantic purposes, such as saying that he
wanted her (A. Doe’s friend) to be his girlfriend, or “liked” A. Doe’s friend “for” others.
A. Doe also noted that Martinez liked girls that appeared older and bigger in stature.
About one year after Martinez and A. Doe had been hanging out regularly,
Martinez asked A. Doe to invite her friend M. Doe over because he thought M. Doe was
“really pretty and tall.” Martinez then picked up A. Doe and M. Doe from school, and
took them to a hotel, where they met one of Martinez’s friends. A. Doe began talking to
Martinez’s friend, and left M. Doe and Martinez alone in the hotel room together.
When A. Doe was 14 years old, Martinez picked her up from school and took her
to a hotel in San Jose. A. Doe had not been able to bring one of her friends with her that
day. After they reached the hotel, Martinez told her he was going to take a shower. A.
Doe began to feel something was “off,” as though Martinez was disappointed she had not
brought anyone and therefore wanted something from her. Martinez left the door open
while showering, which A. Doe did not find normal and saw as a “red flag.” Martinez

13
asked A. Doe to bring him a towel, which she refused; he then came out of the bathroom
with only a towel wrapped around his waist and asked her to lay down on the bed with
him while they waited for some friends. While A. Doe initially refused to lie down,
Martinez told her she was “exaggerating,” so she laid down next to him. Martinez kept
trying to get A. Doe to drink alcohol to help her relax, which A. Doe found odd as
Martinez had previously warned her not to drink or go out with boys. Martinez then told
A. Doe to move closer to him, and put his left arm around her head, then put his hand in
the middle of her chest. When A. Doe pushed his hand down away from her chest,
Martinez grabbed her right hand, told her he wanted her to touch something, and placed
her hand on the towel over his penis. A. Doe tried to pull her hand away, but Martinez
said “no” and tried to keep her hand on top of his penis. A. Doe then sat up and moved to
the edge of the bed, and told Martinez she wanted to go home. Martinez again told her
that she was exaggerating, and asked her to relax, lie down, and drink. A. Doe refused
and told him to take her back to school, or she would walk back by herself.
Martinez then took A. Doe back to school, but seemed upset with her. When he
dropped her off, he told her “don’t need to remind you nothing happened. You’re just
being exaggerated,’ ” which she took to mean that she should not say anything because
no one would believe her. After this incident, A. Doe stopped being alone with Martinez
or cutting school to meet him. She did not tell anyone about what had happened at the
time.
A. Doe noted that Martinez was overprotective of the female cousins in their
family, and often told them not to have boyfriends because he would “fuck them up.”
She also saw him acting inappropriately with her cousin, who was the same age as A.
Doe, including hugging the cousin around the waist, sitting her on his lap, and
disappearing with her for hours at gatherings. A. Doe finally told her boyfriend about the
incident a few months prior to trial. She also told D. Doe about the incident after

14
observing the family pressure and alienation D. Doe was facing from disclosing that
Martinez had inappropriately touched her.
iii. Testimony of M. Doe
M. Doe testified that she was introduced to Martinez by her school friend, A. Doe,
when she was approximately 13 years old. According to M. Doe, A. Doe told her to cut
school and walk to her house, where Martinez, A. Doe’s older cousin, would pick them
up and take them to get tattoos. Martinez and a friend came and picked them up from A.
Doe’s home, then drove to a liquor store to buy beer for A. Doe and M. Doe to drink so
the tattoos would not hurt. Martinez then drove to a Motel 6, and the group went inside.
Martinez and his friend started drinking, then gave M. Doe a large beer and told her to
“chug” it so that her tattoo would not hurt. When M. Doe asked why they had gone to
the motel, Martinez told her it was just to hang out and drink before getting the tattoos—
however, M. Doe felt very uncomfortable and unsafe.
While M. Doe was drinking the beer, Martinez told his friend to go get snacks; A.
Doe went with him, leaving Martinez and M. Doe alone in the room. M. Doe finished
approximately half the beer and began to feel warm—however, since she had never had
alcohol before, she did not realize she was possibly drunk or “buzzing.” Martinez, who
was lying on the bed, kept asking M. Doe to come on the bed with him, to which M. Doe
replied she would not. At one point, Martinez got up from the bed and began pulling her
arm, but because M. Doe was taller, she felt strong enough to pull back and tell him no.
M. Doe told Martinez “no” repeatedly, said that she was a virgin and did not want to do
anything, and that she would not want her first time to be with Martinez. Martinez kept
trying to pull her towards the bed, and M. Doe eventually ended up on the bed with
Martinez on top of her. Martinez and M. Doe were “kind of wrestling” on the bed, as
Martinez tried to pin her down with his hands and began kissing her on her face and
mouth while telling her to relax. Because M. Doe was bigger than Martinez, she finally
was able to kick him off her, then ran to the room door and opened it to leave.

15
 Once M. Doe opened the door, Martinez told her not to leave and that A. Doe
would be coming back soon so they could go get tattoos. While M. Doe did not feel safe,
she got back in the car with A. Doe, Martinez’s friend, and Martinez, then drove to the
tattoo shop. M. Doe did not tell A. Doe what happened in the motel room at that time.
After they reached the tattoo shop, M. Doe got a tattoo, which Martinez signed a waiver
for because she was a minor, and Martinez took her home.
After the incident, M. Doe stopped talking to A. Doe, as she felt A. Doe had put
her in a bad position and was not a real friend. M. Doe never saw Martinez again, but did
not tell anyone about the incident until the trial because she wanted to “erase it”;
however, she was able to remember most of the details because it was a traumatic
experience.
2. Defense’s Case
Martinez presented five witnesses to testify on his behalf regarding his character.
C.T., who was 23 years old at the time of trial, testified that she had known Martinez all
her life and he had been a family friend since before she was born. In 2014, when C.T.
was 14, Martinez lived with C.T.’s family, which included C.T.’s parents, C.T., C.T.’s
younger sister, and C.T.’s younger brother. In C.T.’s opinion, Martinez was very
respectful towards women and teenage girls, and acted appropriately around them. C.T.
never observed Martinez being “creepy” towards women or girls or demonstrate an
unnatural interest in young girls. C.T. was aware of the allegations in the case, but noted
that this did not change her opinion of Martinez. C.T. also was familiar with D. Doe and
considered her to be a dishonest person, an opinion also held by others in the same
community.
P.R. testified that she met Martinez through his aunt C.R., and often spent time
with Martinez and his family for special occasions and events. P.R. also observed
Martinez and G. Doe interacting with one another while they were working in their
clothing business. P.R. never observed any inappropriate interactions between Martinez

16
and any women or young girls, and described Martinez as very respectful and “proper.”
P.R. became aware of G. Doe’s allegations against Martinez because P.R. accompanied
C.R. and G. Doe to the sexual assault examination, and watched C.R.’s son while C.R.
and G. Doe were in the examination room. P.R. testified that she asked G. Doe at that
time if Martinez had done anything to her, and G. Doe shook her head to say “no.” P.R.
had also observed Martinez interact with D. Doe on several occasions, and did not
observe anything unusual or inappropriate.
A.H., Martinez’s cousin, testified that she had a close relationship with Martinez
and spent time with him often over summer breaks and vacations. A.H. had never
observed Martinez behaving inappropriately towards young women or girls or engaging
in inappropriate sexual contact. A.H. had also observed Martinez interact with G. Doe,
and while she described Martinez as “strict,” she never observed Martinez hit G. Doe or
interact with G. Doe in a concerning manner. A.H. had also observed D. Doe interact
with Martinez on several occasions and did not see anything unusual, or any changes in
D. Doe’s behavior towards Martinez. A. H. was aware of the allegations in the case, and
stated that this did not change her opinion of Martinez as respectful to women and
children with no unnatural sexual interest in young girls.
E.G., Martinez’s aunt testified that G. Doe had lived with her briefly in Las Vegas
for approximately a year when she was nine or 10 years old because she was becoming
“very rebellious” and Martinez was having trouble taking care of her. E.G. had observed
G. Doe and Martinez interact with one another and did not observe anything unusual
about their relationship. E.G. had also observed D. Doe and Martinez interact with one
another on numerous occasions at family events, and did not observe anything unusual or
abnormal, or observe D. Doe avoiding Martinez.
R.R., Martinez’s cousin, testified that from her observations of G. Doe, she
appeared to be very rebellious. R.R. had observed Martinez around women and young
children, including D. Doe, and never saw him treating them or touching them

17
inappropriately. R.R. also did not see any unusual interactions between D. Doe and
Martinez or notice D. Doe avoiding him at any family events or functions.
3. Prosecution’s Rebuttal Witness
After the defense rested, the prosecution presented rebuttal testimony from E.R.,
Martinez’s cousin and A. Doe’s younger sister. E.R. viewed Martinez as an older brother
and frequently interacted with him at family events while growing up. E.R. testified that
starting when she was approximately 10 years old, Martinez would bite her on the cheek
whenever she greeted him at family events, which made her feel uncomfortable. After
E.R. told her father about Martinez’s behavior, her father told Martinez to stop.
However, Martinez only stopped biting her when her father was around, but continued to
bite her when her father was not present, even after she asked him to stop. Martinez also
exhibited controlling and jealous behavior towards E.R. by telling her she couldn’t have a
boyfriend, making her boyfriend uncomfortable when she introduced him to Martinez,
and getting angry at her when he saw her hugging and kissing a boy when she was young.
E.R. additionally observed Martinez acting inappropriately with her cousin, A.H.,
including A.H. sitting on his lap frequently and him grabbing A.H.’s thigh. A.H. and
Martinez would also leave the room together and come back in adjusting their clothing.
E.R., who was also D. Doe’s cousin, stated that D. Doe and Martinez had a close
relationship while D. Doe was younger. However, when D. Doe was approximately 13 to
14 years old, E.R. observed a change in the relationship where D. Doe no longer wanted
to go anywhere with Martinez, and would caution E.R. against going with Martinez.
Around the same time, D. Doe became very antisocial and started self-harming. E.R.
opined that D. Doe was an honest person and had not lied to her before.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Instructional Error
Martinez claims that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM
No. 318 regarding witness statements made prior to trial. Martinez argues that the

18
instruction prejudicially violated his right to due process and a fair trial by improperly
reducing the prosecution’s burden of proof and shifting the burden to the defense to prove
that the prior statements were not true.
1. Relevant Procedural Background
As set forth previously, after G. Doe initially disclosed the alleged abuse in June
2019 to C.R., she made statements to both Detective Stenger and Detective Vera with
details about the abuse, including the number of times it occurred, the locations where the
assault took place, and the type of assault. Subsequently, at both the preliminary hearing
and at trial, G. Doe testified that she had lied about the abuse for varying reasons. At
trial, G. Doe claimed that she had lied about the abuse because she was tired of moving
from house to house and wanted to stay permanently with C.R. G. Doe also
acknowledged that she had previously testified at the preliminary hearing that she had
lied about the abuse because she felt Martinez paid more attention to her little brother
than her.
At trial, the People admitted G. Doe’s prior interviews with Detectives Stenger
and Vera into evidence with no objections from defense counsel. In addition, at the
conclusion of the trial, the trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 318
as follows: “You have heard evidence of statements that a witness made before the trial.
If you decide that the witness made those statements, you may use those statements in
two ways: 1. To evaluate whether the witness’s testimony in court is believable, AND 2.
As evidence that the information in those earlier statements is true.” Defense counsel did
not object to the instruction as given.
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“We determine whether a jury instruction correctly states the law under the
independent or de novo standard of review.” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th
1082, 1088.) When we review a purportedly erroneous instruction, we consider
“ ‘ “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged

19
instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” ’ ” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43
Cal.4th 959, 1028.) We consider the instructions as a whole and “ ‘assume that jurors are
intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions
which are given.’ ” (Ibid.)
3. No Error in Instructing with CALCRIM No. 318
In making his argument, Martinez acknowledges that “the propriety” of
CALCRIM NO. 318 has been previously upheld in People v. Hudson (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 1025 (Hudson). However, Martinez challenges the logic of the Hudson
decision by arguing that CALCRIM No. 318 allows for a permissive inference that the
prior statement is true, leading to the “ineluctable conclusion that prior unsworn out-of-
court statements are inherently more credible or reliable than in-court testimony sworn
under penalty of perjury.” Martinez further argues that the instruction impermissibly
“remove[s] from the jury’s consideration the opportunity to use the evidence of [G.
Doe’s] prior out-of-court statements as evidence the information in those statements were
false.”
We find no merit to Martinez’s contentions. The California Supreme Court has
explicitly approved instructing a jury with CALCRIM No. 318 if the evidence presented
includes prior witness statements. (See People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 394
(Thomas).) In addition, a number of appellate courts, including the court in Hudson, have
concluded that CALCRIM No. 318 accurately states the law. (See People v. Golde
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 119–120; Hudson, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 1029;
People v. Tuggles (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 339, 366.) Martinez does not provide us with
any reason to disregard binding precedent from our state Supreme Court that CALCRIM
No. 318 is a correct statement of the law. In addition, we find nothing in the language of
CALCRIM No. 318 that would cause a reasonable juror to conclude that the out-of-court
statements are inherently more reliable or credible, or compel the jury to use the
statement in either of the two ways suggested. Indeed, by stating that the jury “may” use

20
the out-of-court statements, the instruction does not require the jury to credit the earlier
statements even while allowing it to do so. (See People v. Anderson (1989) 210
Cal.App.3d 414, 427 [“a permissive inference empowers the jury to credit or reject the
inference based on its evaluation of the evidence, and therefore does not relieve the
People of any burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”].) Moreover,
nothing in the language of the instruction creates a presumption of truthfulness or
suggests in any way how much weight out-of-court statements deserve in comparison
with sworn testimony. Thus, we reject Martinez’s argument that CALCRIM No.
318 lessens the prosecution's standard of proof by somehow compelling or encouraging
the jury to accept the out-of-court statements as true or more credible than the sworn
testimony at trial.
We also reject Martinez’s argument that CALCRIM No. 318 prevented the jury
from using the evidence of G. Doe’s prior out-of-court statements as evidence the
information in those statements were false. The California Supreme Court in Thomas
dealt with a similar argument, and held that the instruction was not improper simply
because it informed the jury that “it may consider whether testimony is true … [but] does
not also tell the jury it may consider whether the testimony is false.” (Thomas, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 394.) Moreover, the Thomas court concluded that when evaluating the jury
instructions as a whole, the use of additional instructions, including CALCRIM No. 226
(regarding factors to consider in evaluating the credibility of a witness’s testimony),
demonstrated there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury had applied CALCRIM
No. 318 in an improper manner. (Thomas, supra, at p. 394.) The appellate court in
Hudson reached a similar decision in pointing out that the trial court in that case had
instructed the jury with additional instructions, including CALCRIM No. 226 and
CALCRIM No. 220 (regarding the prosecution’s burden to prove all charges beyond a
reasonable doubt). (Hudson, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 1029.) Therefore, the Hudson
court concluded that “[r]ead as a whole, the instructions did not lessen the prosecution’s

21
burden of proof by elevating out-of-court statements to unquestionable reliability.”
(Ibid.)
In the instant case, like Thomas and Hudson, the trial court similarly instructed the
jury with CALCRIM No. 226, which informed the jury it alone was charged with judging
the credibility or believability of each witness and that it could believe all, part, or none
of any witness's testimony. The instruction additionally told the jury that in making that
determination, it could consider, among other matters, prior inconsistent
statements. Accordingly, the jury was fully apprised of its job to fairly determine the
credibility of any and all statements made by a witness, including a witness’s out-of-court
statements. The court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 220, which explained
the prosecution’s burden to prove Martinez guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all
offenses. In addition, as noted by the Attorney General, the trial court instructed the jury
with CALCRIM No. 302, which explains the jury’s role in deciding what evidence, if
any, to believe if there is a conflict. Accordingly, given the binding nature of the
decision in Thomas, while also viewing the jury instructions together as a whole and
applying the presumption that a jury was able to follow all of the court’s instructions (see
People v. Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1190), we conclude that the trial court’s
use of CALCRIM No. 318 did not impermissibly lower the prosecution’s burden or
violate Martinez’s due process rights.
B. Sentencing Error
Martinez argues that the trial court erred in imposing mandatory full consecutive
sentences for the offenses in counts 1 through 10 because there was no substantial
evidence to support a finding that these offenses occurred on separate occasions.
Martinez argues that because G. Doe did not provide any details about when the alleged
offenses occurred, including the oral copulation and digital penetration charges, there was
no indication that there were sufficient “intervening acts” between each offense that
would mandate the imposition of consecutive terms as required under section 667.6,

22
subdivision (d).
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“When a person is convicted of two or more crimes,” California law generally
requires a court to determine “whether the terms of imprisonment … shall run
concurrently or consecutively.” (§ 669, subd. (a).) Generally, most felony crimes are
sentenced pursuant to section 1170.1, which provides that “a court imposing determinate,
consecutive sentences for two or more felonies is required to impose an ‘aggregate term
of imprisonment for all these convictions,’ which is the sum of the ‘principal term,’ the
‘subordinate term[s],’ and any enhancements.” (People v. Catarino (2023) 14 Cal.5th
748, 752, citing § 669, subd. (a) and § 1170.1, subd. (a).)
For certain sex offenses, including oral copulation and sexual penetration, the
Penal Code establishes two alternative sentencing frameworks under section 667.6,
subdivision (c), and section 667.6, subdivision (d). Under section 667.6, subdivision (d),
if the sentencing court finds that multiple sex offenses carrying determinate terms
involved separate victims or were committed against the same victim on separate
occasions, “[a] full, separate, and consecutive term shall be imposed for each violation,”
and the terms “shall not be included in any determination pursuant to Section 1170.1.” (§
667.6, subd. (d)(1) and (3).) In determining whether the crime was committed against the
same victim on separate occasions, the court “shall consider whether, between the
commission of one sex crime and another, the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to
reflect upon the defendant’s actions and nevertheless resumed sexually assaultive
behavior. Neither the duration of time between crimes, nor whether or not the defendant
lost or abandoned the opportunity to attack, shall be, in and of itself, determinative on the
issue of whether the crimes in question occurred on separate occasions.” (§ 667.6, subd.
(d)(2).)
We apply a deferential standard of review to the trial court’s determination that a
defendant’s convictions for multiple sex offenses constituted “separate occasions” under

23
section 667.6, subdivision (d). (People v. Garza (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1092
(Garza).) “Once a trial judge has found under section 667.6, subdivision (d), that a
defendant committed offenses on separate occasions, we may reverse only if no
reasonable trier of fact could have decided the defendant had a reasonable opportunity for
reflection after completing an offense before resuming his assaultive behavior.” (Garza,
at p. 1092.)
2. Sentencing Proceedings
In the probation department’s report prepared for Martinez’s sentencing, the
department noted that all of Martinez’s offenses were violent sex crimes pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, subdivision (b). The department considered
counts 1 through 10 as involving separate occasions against the same victim, in which
Martinez “had a reasonable opportunity to reflect on his actions and nevertheless resumed
sexually assaultive behavior,” while count 11 involved a separate victim on a separate
occasion. The department opined that full, separate, and consecutive terms were
mandatory on all counts pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (d). Because count 11—
the offense against D. Doe—was deemed the base term, the department recommended
that Martinez be sentenced to the midterm of seven years on that count. The department
further recommended that pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (d), Martinez was to
serve consecutive terms on counts 1 through 10, each of which carried an indeterminate
term of 15 years to life, for a total aggregate indeterminate term of 150 years to life.
Accordingly, the department recommended a total cumulative sentence of 150 years to
life consecutive to a determinate term of seven years.
At sentencing, defense counsel indicated that “count 11… [was] the sole count
that the court has discretion,” and requested that Martinez be sentenced to the lower term
of five years instead of the recommended midterm of seven years, particularly given that
his remaining terms were mandatory and his familial relationship with G. Doe, the victim
in most of the counts, with respect to the case. Although the People objected to

24
imposition of the mitigated term, the court stated that: “frankly, given the mandatory
sentences on the remaining counts, that is going to result in the 150-year sentence, that
variation in a mitigated term versus a midterm is miniscule. And I don’t see that it
accomplishes any of the objectives of sentencing in terms of rehabilitation, punishment,
deterrence in a two-year variance from a five-year to a seven-year. I will impose the
mitigated term on count 11.” Defense counsel did not request any further reductions to
the recommended sentence or object to imposition of the full consecutive indeterminate
terms on counts 1 through 10. The trial court accordingly adopted the recommended
sentence from probation as to counts 1 through 10, and sentenced Martinez to a total
cumulative sentence of 150 years to life on counts 1 through 10, with a consecutive
determinate term of five years on count 11.
3. The Record Does Not Reflect The Trial Court Committed Sentencing Error
In Imposing Mandatory Consecutive Terms For Counts 1 Through 10
As a threshold matter, the Attorney General argues that because Martinez’s
counsel failed to object to the trial court’s imposition of full consecutive sentences on
counts 1 through 10, and did not request that the trial court make factual findings to
support its sentence, Martinez has forfeited such a claim on appeal. As Martinez chose
not to file a reply brief, he did not respond to this, or any other point raised in the
Attorney General’s responsive brief.
“A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise ‘claims involving the trial
court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices’ if the
party did not object to the sentence at trial.” (People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745,
751, citing People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 (Scott).) “Included in this category
are . . . cases in which the court purportedly erred because it . . . failed to state any
reasons.” (Scott, supra, at p. 353.) While we recognize section 667.6, subdivision (d) is
“a legislatively mandated sentencing scheme” where full, separate, consecutive
sentencing is mandatory under the circumstances therein specified (People v.

25
Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 595), the trial court still retains discretion under that
subdivision in determining whether the crimes occurred on separate occasions. Because
Martinez challenges the trial court’s failure to state any reasons to support this
discretionary determination, we apply the forfeiture rule under Scott. (See also In re
Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880 [“Ordinarily, a criminal defendant who does not
challenge an assertedly erroneous ruling of the trial court in that court has forfeited his or
her right to raise the claim on appeal”].)
Here, we acknowledge that the trial court did not provide any factual explanation
for its decision to impose full, separate, and consecutive sentences on counts 1 through 10
pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (d). However, when imposition of consecutive
sentences is mandatory under that section, the trial court is not required to make a
statement of its reasons. (See People v. Craft (1986) 41 Cal.3d 554, 559 [“When the
court sentences under subdivision (d), it need not give a statement of reasons”],
superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th
98, 112; People v. Smith (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 539, 543 (Smith) [“Where the court
sentences under that subdivision, it is not required to state reasons for imposing a full
consecutive sentence”].) The trial court also stated on more than one occasion that it
intended to impose such a sentence. Defense counsel did not object, and appeared to
concede that such a sentence was appropriate by stating that count 11 was the “sole
count” where the trial court could exercise sentencing discretion.
However, assuming arguendo that Martinez has not forfeited his sentencing claim,
we find there was substantial evidence demonstrating that the offenses in counts 1
through 10 each took place on separate, distinct occasions such that Martinez had a
reasonable opportunity to reflect on his actions prior to engaging in further acts of abuse.
The jury’s guilty verdict on all 10 counts involving G. Doe, particularly after she recanted
the allegations at trial, reflected that the jury believed G. Doe’s out-of-court disclosures
regarding the abuse. In her out-of-court statements, G. Doe told both detectives that

26
Martinez had sexually assaulted her by inserting his “private part” into her “private part”
on multiple different occasions, including five times at K. Doe’s home, at least five times
at the Milpitas hotel and approximately six or seven times at the Gilroy hotel. G. Doe
also told Detective Vera that Martinez had used his fingers to penetrate her on more than
one occasion and had licked her vagina at both hotels, which indicated that these assaults
had taken place on separate occasions. Based on this description, there was substantial
evidence to conclude that there was a break between each occasion where Martinez had a
reasonable opportunity to reflect before engaging in further sexually assaultive behavior
within the meaning of section 667.6, subdivision (d).
In addition, the trial court noted prior to imposing its sentence that “the jury heard
everything that everybody presented here. They have reached their verdict. I think their
verdict is supported by the evidence. It’s been presented before all of you and for the
public. The record will speak for itself. Very serious allegations. The proof was
presented. The jury heard it. Counsel argued it. The decision of the jury has to be
respected.” We find that such statements reflected the trial court’s conclusion that: (1)
Martinez qualified “as ‘precisely the type of offender from whom society seeks
protection by the use of recidivist statutes’ ” (People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th
524, 570); and (2) its final sentencing decision was based on the severity of the
allegations and evidence presented of Martinez’s multiple, separate assaults against G.
Doe. Finally, as noted above, while there was no affirmative duty for the trial court to
give a statement of reasons under section 667.6, subdivision (d) for imposing consecutive
sentences (see Smith, supra,155 Cal.App.3d at p. 543), there is also nothing in the record
which indicates the trial court misunderstood or misapplied the law under that sentencing

27
scheme. We therefore conclude that the trial court properly imposed consecutive terms
on counts 1 through 10 pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (d).9
C. Application of Credits
Martinez finally contends that the trial court erred in improperly applying his
presentence credits to count 11 only, instead of applying his credits to all counts.
Martinez claims that such a limitation was incorrect because consecutive sentences form
a single aggregate term, thus requiring credits to apply throughout the term. We find no
merit to Martinez’s claim.
As noted above, the trial court awarded Martinez 1,901 days of actual credit and
285 days of local conduct credit pursuant to section 2933.110, which were applied to
count 11 only. Pursuant to section 669, subdivision (a), when a defendant is committed
to prison on a life sentence that is ordered to run consecutive to a determinate sentence,
the determinate sentence is to be served first. (See People v. Rodriguez (2012) 207
Cal.App.4th 204, 211 [“When the defendant is sentenced to determinate and
indeterminate terms, the determinate term is served first”].) Moreover, as the Attorney
General correctly notes, section 2900.5 provides that “[f]or the purposes of this section,
credit shall be given only where the custody to be credited is attributable to proceedings
related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted. Credit shall be
given only once for a single period of custody attributable to multiple offenses for which
a consecutive sentence is imposed.” (§ 2900.5, subd. (b).) Accordingly, since the only
determinate sentence in Martinez’s case was for count 11, and that term was to be served

9 As we are reaching the merits of Martinez’s claim without finding forfeiture, we
do not address his alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on
counsel’s failure to object to the court’s final sentence.
10 This section provides, in relevant part, that any person convicted of a felony
offense listed in section 667.5, subdivision (c), shall accrue no more than 15 percent of
work time credit. In turn, section 667.5, subdivision (c) identifies several offenses as
violent felonies, including rape, oral copulation, and sexual penetration.

28
first, the trial court appropriately applied Martinez’s credits towards that count.11 (See
People v. Bruner (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1178, 1192, fn. 9 [noting that “when consecutive terms
are imposed for multiple offenses in a single proceeding, only one of the terms shall
receive credit for presentence custody”]; see also People v. Cooksey (2002) 95
Cal.App.4th 1407, 1414–1415 [finding that § 2900.5, subd. (b) complied with when
“credit was awarded on the consecutive principal term”].)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

11 We further note that the three cases cited by Martinez in support of his claim all
pertain to the calculation of conduct credits pursuant to section 2933.1, with no
discussion of the application of credits to a sentence consisting of both indeterminate and
determinate terms.

29
 ___________________________________
Wilson, J.

WE CONCUR:

__________________________________________
Grover, Acting P. J.

__________________________________________
Lie, J.

People v. Martinez
H052755