Filed 7/10/26 P. v. Robles CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B344207
(Super. Ct. No. F000381847)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)

v.

JUAN FRANCISCO ROBLES,

Defendant and Appellant.

Juan Francisco Robles appeals from the postjudgment
order denying his motion to vacate his conviction. (Pen. Code,1
§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) He contends his failure to understand the
immigration consequences of his no contest plea was prejudicial.
We affirm.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
In December 2005, Robles slowed the vehicle he was
driving at a hotel known for narcotics activity. When contacted
by police, he gave a false name and date of birth. Police found a
container under the driver’s seat containing nine grams of
methamphetamine. Robles had $700 cash on his person. He
claimed the drugs belonged to a “friend” who was purportedly in
the car with him, despite no one else being present.
Robles was charged with felony transportation of a
controlled substance, i.e., methamphetamine (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 1); a misdemeanor violation of
providing false identifying information to a peace officer (§ 148.9,
subd. (a); count 2); and misdemeanor driving on a suspended
license (Veh. Code, § 14601.5, subd. (a); count 3). He was also
charged with violating probation in a driving under the influence
(DUI) case.
In January 2006, the prosecution orally amended the
complaint to add count 4, felony possession of a controlled
substance, i.e., methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377,
subd. (a)). Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, Robles pleaded
no contest to the suspended license and felony drug possession
charges (counts 3 and 4). He agreed to a negotiated sentence of
probation with 60 days in county jail, which included the
violation of probation. Counts 1 and 2 were dismissed.
Before the plea was entered, the trial court advised, “If you
are not a citizen of the United States, by virtue of your felony

2 Because the case was resolved without a preliminary
examination or trial, the factual summary is based on the
incident reports of the Paso Robles Police Department, which
served as the factual basis for the no contest plea.

2
plea here, you could be denied citizenship, deported or excluded.”
Robles said he understood.
The presentencing probation report indicated Robles lived
alone and had been separated from his wife for four years. His
only family in the area was his 21-year-old daughter, a United
States citizen. He had one sibling in Texas and 11 in Mexico.
Robles told the probation officer the drugs did not belong to him
and the cash was from his job. He said he intended to stay in the
county and continue working.
Pursuant to the negotiated plea, the trial court placed
Robles on three years’ supervised probation with terms including
60 days in county jail, credit for time served of 49 days, and the
remaining time to be served on weekends. The court also ordered
60 hours community service, narcotics offender registration, and
fines and fees.
In 2024, Robles filed a motion to vacate his conviction
(§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1)). The motion was supported by his
declaration, which stated as follows: Since his arrival in the
United States at age 16, Robles had worked steadily in
agriculture and construction. At the time of the plea, he had
been living in the United States for 28 years, was married to a
United States citizen, and had a 21-year-old U.S. citizen
daughter. His attorney advised him that pleading guilty would
be in his best interest and did not inform him about the
immigration consequences. If he had known the immigration
consequences, including mandatory deportation, he “would not
have accepted the deal.” Instead, he “would have requested an
immigration safe plea or demanded a jury trial.” He prioritized
staying in the United States because it provided the best
opportunities to provide for himself and his family. He did not

3
claim he had been subjected to deportation or other immigration
enforcement.
The district attorney’s opposition to the motion stated
Robles “does not and cannot demonstrate prejudice because he
would not have had an immigration-neutral plea available to him
and he did not have a viable defense against the charges at trial.”
The opposition stated the district attorney did not have a
charging policy regarding immigration status. It noted that
Robles had multiple previous DUI convictions, and “it is unlikely
there would be any comparable offenses to which the defendant
could have pled instead.”
At the hearing on the motion, the prosecutor said he did not
know if the district attorney’s office would have “substitute[d]
non-related charges.” He also stated, “I do not believe that in this
case there would have been an immigration neutral alternative.”
The trial court found that Robles “was not fully informed of
the immigration consequences of the plea.” The court found “the
conviction has the potential to cause Mr. Robles to be deported,”
and Robles “placed importance on avoiding deportation.” But the
court found Robles had not shown that he had a viable defense to
the charges, or that an immigration neutral disposition was
available at the time of the plea. The court concluded, “[V]iewed
objectively, the totality of the circumstances do not show it is
reasonably probable that he would have rejected a generous plea
offer and risked a lengthy state prison sentence if he had been
advised of the immigration consequences of the plea. And for
those reasons, I’m denying the motion.”
DISCUSSION
Standard of review
Relief pursuant to section 1473.7 requires that the

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defendant show “prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s
ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly
accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences
of a conviction or sentence.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).)
“We apply independent review to evaluate whether a
defendant has demonstrated a reasonable probability that he
would have rejected the plea offer had he understood its
immigration consequences.” (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14
Cal.5th 311, 319 (Espinoza).) Because no live testimony was
presented, “the trial court’s findings ‘derive entirely from written
declarations and other documents,’ ” and we exercise our
“ ‘independent judgment, [to determine] whether the facts
establish prejudice under section 1473.7.’ ” (Id. at p. 320.)
Inadequacy of advisements
Because Robles’s conviction related to a controlled
substance, it rendered him inadmissible to the United States
(8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)), deportable (8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)), and ineligible for the discretionary relief of
cancellation of removal (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C); People v.
Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 895). The trial court’s advisement
that there “could be” immigration consequences was therefore
inadequate because deportation was mandatory. (Patterson, at
pp. 895–896; People v. Ruiz (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1063–
1065.) And Robles’s declaration was uncontradicted that counsel
did not advise him of the adverse immigration consequences.
(See Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320.)
Robles’s ignorance of the immigration consequences was an
error that damaged his ability to “meaningfully understand” and
“knowingly accept” those consequences. (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1);
People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 871.) Prejudice may

5
be based on “the ‘defendant’s own error in . . . not knowing that
his plea would subject him to mandatory deportation and
permanent exclusion from the United States.’ ” (Mejia, at p. 871.)
Thus, the trial court properly found that Robles did not
meaningfully understand the immigration consequences.
Because we conclude the immigration advisement was
inadequate, we need not address Robles’s more specific
contention that he should have been advised that adverse
immigration consequences could be avoided if a first-time
conviction of simple drug possession were later expunged after
successfully completing probation based on Ninth Circuit
authority at the time. (Lujan-Armendariz v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3d 728, 735–736.)3
But even if we reached the merits, our Supreme Court has
held that a defendant need not be advised of collateral
consequences, including the effect of a subsequent probation
violation, when pleading guilty or no contest. (People v. Arnold
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 294, 309–310.) Moreover, the fact that
immigration consequences might later be avoided contradicts
Robles’s contentions that deportation was mandatory and the
advisement that he could be deported was inadequate.
Prejudice
In addition to showing the defendant did not meaningfully
understand the immigration consequences, a defendant seeking
section 1473.7 relief must demonstrate that the error is
“prejudicial.” The defendant must show a “ ‘reasonable
probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the

3 Lujan-Armendariz was later overruled in Nunez-Reyes v.
Holder (9th Cir. 2011) 646 F.3d 684, 690, 694, but only regarding
convictions after July 14, 2011.

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defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential
immigration consequences.’ ” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 316.) “ ‘A reasonable probability does not mean more likely
than not. [Citation.] Instead, it means merely a reasonable
chance, which is more than an abstract possibility.’ ” (People v.
Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950, 959.) This “ ‘might be based
either on the desire to go to trial or on the hope or expectation of
negotiating a different bargain without immigration
consequences.’ ” (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529.)
Relief under section 1473.7 may be granted even if the defendant
could not reasonably expect a disposition “ ‘with no immigration
consequences,’ ” if they “may have reasonably hoped to secure a
plea to a charge with lesser immigration consequences.” (Padron,
at p. 965.)
“ ‘Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry include the
defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the
defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s
priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant
had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated
disposition was possible.’ [Citations.] Also relevant are the
defendant’s probability of obtaining a more favorable outcome if
[they] had rejected the plea, as well as the difference between the
bargained-for term and the likely term if [they] were convicted at
trial. [Citations.] These factors are not exhaustive, and no single
type of evidence is a prerequisite to relief.” (Espinoza, supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 320–321.) “A defendant must provide ‘ “ ‘objective
evidence’ ” ’ to corroborate factual assertions” such as
“contemporaneous documentation of the defendant’s immigration
concerns.” (Id. at p. 321.)
There is evidence here that Robles wished to remain in the

7
United States and had ties here: a job, a spouse from whom he
was separated, and a grown daughter. He also had ties to
Mexico, including 11 siblings. But his assertion that he might
have gone to trial is uncorroborated and unconvincing. He was
facing up to four years in prison (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379,
subd. (a)), plus a year in custody for the misdemeanors (§§ 148.9,
subd. (a), 19; Veh. Code, § 14601.5, subd. (d)(1)), and whatever
custody time remained for violation of his DUI probation. He
accepted a favorable disposition of simple drug possession and
the driver’s license violation for probation and 60 days in jail, of
which he had already served 49.
Robles nevertheless raises two theoretical alternative
dispositions. He suggests the parties could have agreed to a plea
that “could have been to a specific substance not on the federal
list, making this conviction not a controlled substance offense for
any purpose.” In our view, this was not a viable alternative
because the substance was methamphetamine, not something
else. The district attorney could not ethically charge possession
of a substance not supported by probable cause. (Rules Prof.
Conduct, rule 3.8(a) (former rule 5-110(A).) Robles also now
suggests he could have pleaded to accessory after the fact (§ 32),
based on his uncorroborated claim that the drugs belonged to a
“friend.” But Robles has not offered “ ‘evidence that would have
caused [him] to expect or hope a different bargain would or could
have been negotiated.’ ” (People v. Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 529, italics omitted.)
Factors relevant to “whether alternative, immigration-safe
dispositions were available at the time of the defendant’s plea”
include “the district attorney’s charging policies with respect to
immigration consequences, and the existence of comparable

8
offenses without immigration consequences.” (Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 323.) Robles did not offer any evidence regarding
the district attorney’s disposition policies in 2006. And it would
have been unreasonable to expect a disposition with lesser
immigration consequences in light of Robles’s three prior DUI
convictions and the fact he was on probation when he committed
the current offenses. (Id. at p. 325.) The trial court properly
concluded that no evidence established that the prosecution
would have offered a disposition with neutral (or more favorable)
immigration consequences.
Although he does not claim ineffective assistance of
counsel, Robles contends that counsel should have advocated for
preplea diversion (§ 1000 et seq.). We may decline to consider
this contention because it was raised for the first time in the
reply brief. (People v. Newton (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1000,
1005.) The contention would also fail on the merits because
diversion was not available for a violation of Health and Safety
Code section 11379. (§ 1000, subd. (a).) Nor was diversion
available for a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377
where, as here, there was “evidence of a violation relating to
narcotics or restricted dangerous drugs other than a violation of
the sections listed in this subdivision.” (§ 1000, subd. (a)(3), as
amended by Stats. 2002, ch. 545, § 5.)
Based on the totality of the circumstances and our de novo
review, we conclude Robles has not shown a reasonable
probability that he would have gone to trial or reasonably
expected a more favorable disposition if he had meaningfully
understood the consequences of his plea. (Espinoza, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 325.) Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the
motion to withdraw his no contest plea.

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 DISPOSITION
The order denying Robles’s section 1473.7 motion is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

MCKAIG, J.

 Judge of Ventura County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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 Rita Federman

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Sarah Vanessa Perez, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.