Filed 7/13/26 Walker v. Beacher CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

KYLE WALKER, H053638
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 24CH012660)

v.

JONATHAN BEACHER,

Defendant and Appellant.

GABRIEL BORDEN, H053663
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 24CH012597)

v.

JONATHAN BEACHER,

Defendant and Appellant.
Plaintiffs Kyle Walker and Gabriel Borden each obtained civil harassment
temporary restraining orders (TROs) against defendant Jonathan Beacher under Code of
Civil Procedure section 527.6.1 The trial court initially issued each TRO for
approximately 30 days. It later extended the orders to subsequent dates because Walker
and Borden did not serve Beacher. Beacher was never served in either action, and the
trial court thus stated that the orders expired on their own terms.

1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
 Months later, Beacher moved the trial court to declare the TROs void. The trial
court denied the motion, stating the matter was moot because the TROs had already
expired.
Beacher challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion, along with other aspects
of the trial court’s actions during the motion hearing. We conclude Beacher’s appeal in
each case is moot, and we therefore dismiss the appeals.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The TRO applications by Walker and Borden were based on similar allegations,
and the trial court took comparable action in each case. Borden filed his TRO application
first, on May 28, 2024. Walker filed his TRO application on June 21, 2024. Both
applications asserted that Beacher harassed the petitioners through text messages and
other electronic communications, and they each attached copies of these communications.
Both applications listed no address for Beacher, averring that Beacher used to live in
Santa Clara County, that he lived out of the country at the time of the petitions, that he
worked remotely for a company in California, and that he would visit his brother in San
Jose. Both Walker and Borden also submitted declarations with their TRO applications
stating that giving notice of the applications was impossible because Beacher’s address
was unknown. However, the actual TRO forms listed a San Jose address for Beacher.
The trial court granted both TROs. The court granted Walker’s TRO on June 21,
2024, stating that the order would expire at the end of a hearing scheduled for July 23,
2024. The trial court granted Borden’s TRO on May 28, 2024, stating that the order
would expire at the end of a hearing scheduled for July 2, 2024. The trial court then
ordered the hearing on both TROs continued for good cause due to lack of service on
Beacher, with the hearing on Walker’s TRO continued to September 10, 2024, and the
hearing on Borden’s TRO continued to August 6, 2024.
Sheriff’s declarations in both cases stated that service could not be effected at the
San Jose address listed for Beacher. Thus, the trial court took both matters off calendar

2
on the dates of the rescheduled hearings, stating that the orders expired on their own
terms.
Beacher later moved the trial court to declare both TROs void ab initio. The
motion is not contained in the appellate record, but a transcript of the motion hearing has
been provided. The trial court stated it was “puzzled” by the motion because Beacher
previously moved to set aside the TROs, and the court had ruled that “there was no order
to set aside.” The court then referenced the instant “motion in support to void the
temporary restraining order,” stating that the “temporary restraining order has expired on
its own terms so it does not have any legal effect and is, therefore, moot.”
Beacher’s counsel responded by arguing that the TROs “continue to cause
concrete, . . . ongoing harm,” including reputational damage, potential employment
consequences, and the possibility of contempt proceedings should Walker and Borden
allege Beacher violated the TROs. Beacher’s counsel argued that “void judgments are
never moot” pursuant to section 473, subdivision (d), asserting that “a void judgment can
be set aside at any time because the order is void ab initio from the very outset” and “[i]t
shouldn’t have been ordered at all in the first place.” Counsel argued that the court
lacked personal jurisdiction over Beacher because he was outside the United States
during the entire period of the TROs, service was never effected, and the orders exceeded
the maximum period allowed in section 527.6.
The trial court responded that it granted each TRO based on “reasonable proof of
harassment and irreparable harm to the petitioner,” that the court necessarily issued the
TROs without knowing whether it had personal jurisdiction over Beacher, and that any
questions regarding whether the petitions should have been issued would have been
properly raised at the hearings that were scheduled and continued. The court stated:
“[W]hat’s before me is there are temporary orders that expired and now there’s nothing.
I’m not reviving the orders so that we could discuss them and have a hearing on the
merits.”

3
 After further argument from Beacher’s counsel, the trial court denied the motion.
Beacher separately and timely appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion concerning
both TROs. This court ordered the two appeals considered together for purposes of oral
argument and decision.
II. DISCUSSION
Beacher raises several arguments in both cases concerning the issuance of the
TROs, the denial of his motion to declare the TROs void, and related actions by the trial
court in the motion hearing. His primary argument in both cases is that the trial court
erred in denying his motion because the TROs were void ab initio. We conclude that
Beacher’s appeals are moot because the TROs expired due to lack of service.
A. TRO Application Process Under Section 527.6
“Section 527.6 was enacted ‘to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety,
happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution. [Citations.] It does
so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment. [Citation.]”
(Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412.) “The quick, injunctive relief
provided by section 527.6 ‘lies only to prevent threatened injury’—that is, future wrongs.
[Citation.] The injunctive relief is not intended to punish the restrained party for past acts
of harassment. [Citations.]” (Yost v. Forestiere (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 509, 520.)
Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1) states that a person who has suffered harassment
may seek a TRO. “A temporary restraining order may be issued with or without notice,
based on a declaration that, to the satisfaction of the court, shows reasonable proof of
harassment of the petitioner by the respondent, and that great or irreparable harm would
result to the petitioner.” (Id., subd. (d).) “A request for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order without notice under this section shall be granted or denied on the same
day that the petition is submitted to the court,” except that the order may be granted or
denied on the next business day if “the petition is filed too late in the day to permit
effective review.” (Id., subd. (e).)

4
 “A temporary restraining order issued under this section shall remain in effect, at
the court’s discretion, for a period not to exceed 21 days, or, if the court extends the time
for hearing under subdivision (g), not to exceed 25 days, unless otherwise modified or
terminated by the court.” (§ 527.6, subd. (f).) “Within 21 days, or, if good cause appears
to the court, 25 days from the date that a petition for a temporary order is granted or
denied, a hearing shall be held on the petition.” (Id., subd. (g).) The protected party must
serve the restrained party with the TRO and other documentation at least five days before
the hearing, unless the court shortens the time for service for good cause. (Id.,
subd. (m)(1).)
At the hearing on the TRO petition, the court shall issue an order prohibiting the
harassment if, after receiving evidence, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that unlawful harassment exists. (§ 527.6, subd. (i)(1).) The court may grant a
continuance of the hearing on the TRO petition upon a showing of good cause. (Id.,
subd. (p)(1).) “If the court grants a continuance, any temporary restraining order that has
been granted shall remain in effect until the end of the continued hearing, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. In granting a continuance, the court may modify or
terminate a temporary restraining order.” (Id., subd. (p)(2).)
B. Analysis
As a preliminary matter, Beacher may not prevail on any of his claims of error
because he has failed to include in the record on appeal his motion to declare the TROs
void, along with a declaration that the register of actions states was filed with the motion.
A party challenging a judgment or an appealable order “has the burden of showing
reversible error by an adequate record.” (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574
(plur. opn.).) “ ‘[I]f the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults
and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed. [Citations.]” (Gee v. American
Reality & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.) An adequate record
does not exist where the appellant has not included the motion that is the subject of the

5
appeal. (See Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th
498, 502.) Without reviewing the motion the trial court denied and any materials
submitted with that motion, we cannot meaningfully assess the trial court’s ruling on the
motion and we must affirm the trial court’s ruling.
Moreover, based solely on the transcript of the motion hearing, it appears Beacher
did not raise to the trial court several of the issues he now raises on appeal. For example,
he argues to this court that the TROs were void based on the requirements to surrender
firearms and because Walker and Borden committed fraud in the TRO applications, and
he contends that the TROs should not have been issued because they were based on
constitutionally protected speech. Beacher did not raise any of these arguments during
the motion hearing. “ ‘[A] party to an action may not, for the first time on appeal, change
the theory of the cause of action [citations] and . . . issues not raised in the trial court
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.’ [Citations.]” (Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009)
47 Cal.4th 598, 603.) Beacher has thus forfeited several of the issues he now raises on
appeal.
Setting aside the lack of an adequate record and Beacher’s forfeiture of several
issues, however, Beacher cannot prevail on the merits of his appeals because his appeals
are moot. The trial court denied Beacher’s motion to declare the TROs void, reasoning
that the motion was moot because the TROs expired and no further order was issued. We
similarly conclude that Beacher’s appeals are moot because the TROs expired before his
motion.
“A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actual controversies by a judgment
which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in
issue in the case before it.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) “A
case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide
the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation.] For relief

6
to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an
ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the
outcome the plaintiff seeks. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
The two TROs expired in August and September 2024 because Beacher was not
served and thus no hearing could be conducted. At that point, the orders no longer
remained in effect. “If relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief
granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by the adverse party is
moot.” (Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union High School
Dist. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 139, 144.) Thus, Beacher’s motion to declare the TROs
void was moot. His appeals from the denial of his motion similarly must be dismissed as
moot. (See O’Kane v. Irvine (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 207, 210, fn. 4 [appeal from TRO
following grant of three-year restraining order was moot]; cf. In re E.F. (2021) 11 Cal.5th
320, 326 [appeal of TRO rendered moot by juvenile court’s subsequent grant of three-
year restraining order, but exercising discretion to review issue]; Harris v. Stampolis
(2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 495 [appeal not moot where restraining order was renewed
before its expiration].)
At the motion hearing, Beacher alleged that he could be prosecuted for violating
the TROs during the period they were in effect, be subject to adverse employment
impacts, or sustain reputational damage. However, he raises no assertion on appeal that
any such harm has occurred or might occur. He relies on Caldwell v. Coppola (1990)
219 Cal.App.3d 859 to argue that his appeals are not moot because “a restraining order
carries a specific ‘stigma’ that could damage the defendant’s reputation in the
community” and he “had a right to clear his name even after the order expired.”
However, Caldwell did not discuss mootness or any “ ‘stigma’ ” resulting from TROs.
Instead, Caldwell merely held that “a named person protected under a domestic violence
injunctive order cannot validly personally serve such orders and related legal process on a
defendant.” (Id. at p. 865.)

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 We understand Beacher to make two additional primary arguments why he is
subject to ongoing harm and thus his appeals are not moot. First, he argues that he
experiences ongoing consequences because the TROs were transmitted for entry into the
California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS). He asserts that the
CLETS entries have harmed him because he “has been subject to secondary questioning
and cross examination from United States Border Patrol after the dismissal of the
[TROs], which did not happen before the CLETS entries.” Second, Beacher asserts that
he is “a claimant in pending federal administrative proceedings . . . where the primary
remedy sought is equitable reinstatement of employment.” He asserts that if evidence of
the TROs is introduced in those administrative proceedings, it could negatively impact
his chances of obtaining reinstatement.
Neither of these arguments persuades us that Beacher’s appeals are not moot. The
TROs did direct the clerk to transmit the orders to be entered into the California
Restraining and Protective Order System through CLETS. However, section 527.6,
subdivision (r) states that information about a TRO’s “termination” is also to be provided
to the relevant law enforcement agency or entered into CLETS. (Id., subd. (r)(2)-(3).)
Moreover, Beacher has not shown that he suffers any ongoing harm from any information
about the TROs that was or is in CLETS. He alleges that he has been subject to increased
border patrol questioning, but he provides no declaration or other evidence to support this
assertion, he does not state whether such questioning occurred more than once, and he
does not assert that his ability to cross the border has actually been impacted. And even
if any CLETS entry has caused Beacher to be subject to increased questioning at the
border, he does not contend that granting his motion to declare the TROs void ab initio
would redress or rectify this harm. We recognize that in In re E.F., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 328-329, our Supreme Court stated that the “potential consequences of a TRO” under

8
Welfare and Institutions Code section 213.52—including entry into CLETS—“counsel
against an inference that the Legislature intended to eliminate the standard notice
requirement that affords the juvenile an adequate opportunity to contest an application for
a TRO.” However, that case dealt with notice, not mootness, and the California Supreme
Court did not hold that the possibility of an expired TRO being included in CLETS
causes any ongoing harm to the restrained party.
Beacher’s assertion regarding federal administrative proceedings to seek
reinstatement likewise does not show that he suffers any ongoing harm from the TROs.
He merely speculates that if evidence of the TROs were to be introduced in the federal
administrative proceedings, his case could be harmed. Beacher alleges that these
proceedings seek reinstatement under whistleblower protection actions.3 He does not
explain how evidence of the TROs might be introduced in these proceedings or how such
evidence would damage his claim to reinstatement. In addition, Beacher does not specify
how granting his motion would redress or rectify any harm. We therefore conclude that
Beacher has not demonstrated any ongoing harm in this regard.
Beacher raises numerous other challenges to the trial court’s actions in denying his
motion to declare the TROs void. Many of these arguments appear to be aimed at the
merits of issuing the TROs or related actions by the trial court in the motion hearing
rather than the mootness issue. Because the TROs expired and Beacher’s challenge to

2
Welfare and Institutions Code section 213.5 “empowers the juvenile court to
issue a wide range of restraining orders.” (In re Carlos H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 861,
867.)
3
Beacher requests judicial notice concerning documents related to proceedings
before the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Beacher states that
these documents were not presented to the trial court because they did not exist at the
time of the hearing on Beacher’s motion. “ ‘Reviewing courts generally do not take
judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court’ absent exceptional
circumstances. [Citation.]” (Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 379,
fn. 2.) Beacher has not shown exceptional circumstances here. We therefore deny the
request for judicial notice.

9
the trial court’s denial of his motion is moot, these arguments are likewise moot and need
not be addressed.
Beacher argues that because section 473, subdivision (d) states that a court may
“set aside any void judgment or order,” the trial court could have declared the TROs void
even though they expired. Beacher argues that the TROs were void because he “was not
a resident of California during the restraint period,” and thus the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to issue TROs concerning him. However, the TRO applications supplied
information that: Beacher repeatedly harassed Walker, Borden, and other parties who
live in California; Beacher lived and/or visited California sporadically; Beacher worked
remotely for a company based in California; and Beacher’s brother warned Borden that
Beacher was flying to California. At the initial stage where the trial court issued the
TRO, the court merely considers whether to issue an interlocutory order and does not
make a determination on the merits. (See Landmark Holding Group v. Superior Court
(1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 525, 528.) At this initial stage, the information in the TRO
applications provided reasonable grounds for the trial court to conclude that Beacher had
sufficient “minimum contacts” with California to provide personal jurisdiction. (Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444; cf. Burdick v.
Superior Court (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 8, 13 [in a defamation lawsuit, a nonresident is
not subject to personal jurisdiction in California for allegedly posting defamatory
statements about a California resident on a publicly available Facebook page where there
was no evidence the defendant’s Facebook page was focused on California and defendant
had no other ties to California].)
Beacher also argues that the TROs are void and his appeals are therefore not moot
because the trial court continued the TROs past the 25-day period outlined in
section 527.6, and thus each TRO was “legally transmuted into a de facto preliminary
injunction,” which exceeded the trial court’s jurisdiction. However, nothing in
section 527.6 suggests a hearing occurring beyond the specified 25-day period deprives a

10
trial court of its fundamental jurisdiction to hear the matter, or that the 25-day time limit
is mandatory. Although the statute states that a TRO “shall” remain in effect for the
stated period and that a hearing “shall” be held on the petition within the stated period
(§ 527.6, subds. (f), (g)), other language indicates the Legislature did not intend these
time limits to be mandatory. Section 527.6, subdivision (f) provides that a temporary
restraining order shall remain in effect for a period not to exceed 25 days “unless
otherwise modified or terminated by the court.” The respondent may obtain a
continuance “as a matter of course” and “for a reasonable period” (id., subd. (o)), while
the court may grant either party a continuance “on a showing of good cause” or on the
court’s own motion (id., subd. (p)(1)). During the period of continuance, any TRO issued
remains in effect unless the court otherwise orders, and in granting a continuance, the
court may modify or terminate the TRO. (Id., subd. (p)(2).) The ability both to modify
the length of a temporary restraining order and to continue the hearing on the petition
supports the conclusion that the statute’s time limits are directory rather than mandatory.
Here, the trial court’s actions in setting the hearing dates outside the statutory time limit
and in continuing the hearings did not render the orders void. Accordingly, Beacher’s
claim that his appeals are not moot because the TROs were void fails.
Finally, Beacher asserts that the TROs were void because they specified that he
could not own or possess any firearms during the period of temporary restraint, and that
he must sell, turn in, or store with a licensed gun dealer or a law enforcement agency any
firearms in his possession or control within 24 hours of being served. Beacher argues
that the trial court could not issue such orders because he resided in Canada when the
orders were issued, and complying with the orders would require him to import firearms
into the United States and complete other requirements that could not be accomplished in
the time allotted. However, Beacher does not assert that he actually owned any firearms,
and he was never served with the TROs. Beacher argues that an order directing him to do
an impossible act is void, but the one authority he cites to support this assertion—Board

11
of Supervisors v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1724—does not support his
claim, as that case dealt with contempt proceedings concerning a consent decree and did
not discuss voidness. Thus, this argument fails.
“[T]here are three discretionary exceptions to the rules regarding mootness:
(1) when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur
[citation]; (2) when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties
[citation]; and (3) when a material question remains for the court’s determination
[citation].’ [Citation.]” (Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of
Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473, 479-480.) Beacher’s only argument that
one of these exceptions applies involves his assertion that Walker and Borden “deprived
the trial court of the ability to exercise informed discretion for determining personal and
in rem jurisdiction by committing extrinsic fraud on the trial court” in falsely stating that
they did not know Beacher’s address while listing the San Jose address on the TRO
forms. He asserts that this presents an “important question[] of law” that requires a
decision on the merits. However, both TRO petitions listed no known address for
Beacher and stated that Beacher was believed to be living out of the country. Beacher
does not demonstrate any falsity in this regard. Even if the TRO applications contained
some inconsistency, Beacher does not allege or demonstrate that such discrepancy
extends beyond the instant case or that the issue is likely to recur. Thus, no discretionary
exception to the mootness rule applies.
The TROs expired in August and September 2024, well before Beacher’s
September 2025 notice of appeal. The TROs no longer exist. We therefore must dismiss
these appeals as moot.
III. DISPOSITION
The appeals are dismissed as moot. As respondents made no appearance in this
appeal, there are no costs to award.

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 _______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________________
Danner, J.

______________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H053638 Walker v. Beacher
H053663 Borden v. Beacher