Filed 7/13/26 Marriage of Shen and Qie CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re the Marriage of JIE SHEN and H053016
XIAOUH QIE. (Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 21FL003738)

JIE SHEN,

Appellant,

v.

XIAOUH QIE,

Respondent.

This appeal by Jie Shen, also known as Irene, concerns an order of the family
court reducing temporary monthly spousal support paid by her spouse, Xiaouh Qie, also
known as Tiger, from $18,000 to $0.
After approximately 16 years of marriage, Shen filed a petition for legal separation
on October 18, 2021, against Qie. On April 11, 2024, the court issued temporary support
orders. The court ordered that Qie pay $18,000 per month to Shen for temporary spousal
support pursuant to Family Code section 3600.1 It also ordered that Qie pay $18,000 per
month for temporary child support. A formal order was filed May 15, 2024. (Hereafter,
the April 11 and May 15, 2024 orders are collectively referred to as the prior support
order.)

1 All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise stated.
 In November 2024, Qie filed a request to modify the prior support order. He
requested that temporary spousal support be changed to “guideline support,” effective
March 1, 2024. Qie also requested a modification of temporary child support. In a
minute order dated December 30, 2024, the trial court, over Shen’s objection, adopted its
prior, December 17, 2024, tentative ruling. (Hereafter, the order is sometimes referred to
as the December 30, 2024 minute order.) In that adopted tentative ruling, the court found
that Qie had presented no change of circumstances warranting modification of the prior
support order. But it concluded that, on its own motion, it would reconsider the prior
support order, and it would “correct its error by recalculating guideline support without
the inclusion of Husband’s [Google stock sale] proceeds.” At the hearing on Qie’s
request on December 30, the trial court confirmed that, pursuant to its ruling, Qie would
no longer be obligated to pay a collective monthly amount of $36,000 for temporary
spousal and child support. On March 13, 2025, a “findings and order after hearing”
(the March 13, 2025 FOAH) was filed with the court. (Boldface and capitalization
omitted.) The March 13, 2025 FOAH, including a recital which again adopted the prior
December 17 tentative ruling, included the following language: “Commencing
December 30, 2024, Respondent [Qie] is ordered to pay temporary spousal support in the
amount of $0 per month.”
Shen appealed the court’s December 30, 2024 minute order. She challenges the
order only insofar as it modified temporary spousal support from $18,000 per month to
$0. Shen contends the court abused its discretion by failing to apply the proper legal
standard for temporary support by considering (1) the needs of the supported party, and
(2) the supporting party’s ability to pay. She argues further that there was no justification
for the court’s modification of monthly spousal support from $18,000 to $0, particularly
because there was no material change in circumstances since entry of the prior support
order.

2
 We conclude initially that Qie’s jurisdictional challenge to Shen’s appeal fails.
The order modifying temporary spousal support—as reflected in the December 30, 2024
minute order and the March 13, 2025 FOAH—is an appealable order. (Hereafter, the
orders are collectively referred to as the challenged order or the support modification
order.) We find on the merits that there was no basis for the trial court’s modification of
temporary spousal support, irrespective of the procedural framework by which the order
is considered. Assuming we were to view the challenged order as being based on
traditional standards of modifying a prior spousal support order, the trial court erred. If,
alternatively, if we were to consider the challenged order as being founded upon the
court’s reconsideration of the prior support order, we likewise find error. Accordingly,
we will reverse the trial court’s support modification order, insofar as it modified the
prior order of temporary spousal support by reducing it from a monthly amount of
$18,000 to $0.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Background
Shen and Qie were married in October 2005, and they have one minor child
together. Shen declared that she has had sole physical custody of the child since 2020.
On or about October 18, 2021, Shen filed a petition for legal separation. For over a year,
Shen was unable to serve Qie with process.
B. Shen’s Request for Temporary Spousal Support
1. Shen’s Request for Order
In February 2024, Shen filed a request for order seeking temporary spousal
support and child support from Qie. Shen included a declaration in which she presented

3
the alleged facts stated below in support of her request for an order granting her
temporary spousal support of $25,000 per month.2
Shen declared that she filed the petition for separation in October 2021 after
learning in early 2021 that Qie had entered into a bigamous marriage in China with
another woman. After filing the petition, “[Qie] spent the next year evading service and
actively concealing his location, forcing [Shen] to seek an order authorizing service by
publication . . . .”
While they were together, Shen and Qie maintained a “high standard of living.”
“[Qie] was and remains a highly sought[-]after technology executive, having held senior
and highly lucrative positions at several marquee technology companies, . . . including
Google, Tencent, and Xiaohongshu.” Shen declared that, as a result of his employment
with several technology companies, Qie had accumulated company stock and stock
options having a collective value “in the tens of millions of dollars . . . .”
The couple owned three homes in California located in Fremont (valued at more
than $2,000,000), Saratoga (valued at $6,200,000), and Palo Alto (valued at
approximately $4,600,000). Throughout the marriage, Qie had managed the couple’s
financial affairs and had had near-exclusive control over the community assets. Shen
declared that Qie thus had extensive investments, the details and values of which were
not known to her.

2 Shen initially filed in March 2023 a request for order seeking temporary spousal
support. There were apparently several hearings on the request in 2023. Shen contended
that the trial court never ruled on the support request and that the trial court confirmed
this point at a January 18, 2024 status conference. Shen acknowledged, however, that
Qie had “belated[ly]” submitted to the court a proposed order from a September 26, 2023
hearing, which indicated that the support request had been denied, and that the court had
signed the order. Shen stated in her new request for order that, rather than litigate the
validity of the September 26, 2023 order, she was filing a new request for temporary
support.

4
 Shen stated that, based on his income and expense declaration (IED) filed in
February 2024, Qie had assets of at least $16,700,000, including $1,000,000 in cash or
cash equivalents and $7,700,000 in securities. Qie disclosed $115,000 in debt. Shen,
however, believed Qie’s asset disclosures were understated based on his undisclosed
liquidation of community assets in March 2023.3
Shen declared that as a result of discovery conducted by her attorneys in the
summer of 2023, she discovered that Qie had without her knowledge or consent
liquidated over $6.7 million of community assets; he did so through multiple transactions
occurring in March 2023. The assets were located in two different Morgan Stanley
accounts in Qie’s name but which held community property. Shen stated that on
March 23, Qie had sold Google stock having a value of more than $5,800,000 from a
Morgan Stanley account; Qie wired the proceeds from the sale four days later to an
account that was unknown to Shen. Shen declared further that on March 23, Qie sold
securities valued at $648,000 held in another Morgan Stanley account, and on March 27,
he made transfers totaling $930,000 to two different accounts in his name.
Shen stated that since approximately 2021, she had been “largely precluded” by
Qie from accessing any community property. As a result, she had been required to
borrow $180,000 from friends. Shen declared that she had debt of $205,000, and that she
also owed $178,000 to attorneys in China. The main part of her income was $4,900 per
month, the source of which was one-half of the rental income received from two
California properties; Shen stated that this amount was “not nearly enough to cover [her]
monthly expenses.” Shen indicated that she had received two advances of her share of
community property, namely, $200,000 ordered by the court in May 2023 and $250,000

3 Shen stated that between 2015 and 2023, Qie had worked for three large Chinese
companies that resulted in his receiving stock options, later vested, “that should be
collectively worth tens of millions of dollars, if not more.”

5
pursuant to the parties’ negotiations. These advances had alleviated her cash flow
problems.4
Between 2011 and 2020, Shen worked approximately 10 hours per week as a
psychologist, but her primary duties were focused on maintaining the household and on
childcare. Shen stated that, as of the time of her request, she was unemployed and unable
to be employed.
2. Qie’s Opposition
Qie requested that Shen’s request for child and spousal support be denied and
requested that Shen be ordered to pay him monthly spousal support of $1,554. He stated,
inter alia, that his employment with Tencent had ended in March 2023; he had not
secured new employment; and he had experienced difficulty finding a new job because of
his criminal prosecution in China for bigamy that was publicized by Shen. Qie stated that
since their separation in 2021, Qie had provided her with $240,000 in additional funds.
Qie denied that he had secretly transferred assets from Morgan Stanley accounts as Shen
had claimed. He asserted that he had “made a decision, in the usual course of business, to
cash the Google stock as it ha[d] appreciated significantly over the years.” Qie declared
in his IED of March 2024 that: his monthly income from self-employment was a
negative $5,200; he received monthly rental income of $7,000; he had cash assets of
$299,973; he held securities valued at $8,400,000; and held real property valued at
$7,000,000.
3. Shen’s Reply in Support of the Request
Shen replied that Qie had not disputed and had thus admitted that: (1) given the
extent of his assets and investment, he had the ability to pay the support requested by

4 Shen declared that approximately $280,000 of these funds remained,
representing all of her liquid assets. She described these assets as a safety net for her and
her child which she did not want to deplete further while the contentious proceedings
with Qie were pending, and he was continuing to deny her access to community property
and “mak[ing her] financial life as difficult as possible.”

6
Shen; and (2) Shen and the couple’s minor child did not have the present ability to
maintain the lifestyle to which they were previously accustomed. Shen emphasized that
Qie had transferred from two community property accounts “a total of $6,788,261.95 in a
single week,” and that he had transferred all but $130,000 of those assets to a bank in
Singapore, a country in which the couple had never done banking. (Original italics.) She
explained that, as to Qie’s claim that he had transferred additional sums of $240,000 to
her, most of these funds were for their child’s expenses while living in China, and that, at
Qie’s request, she had returned $30,000 to him.
4. Order Awarding Support
After a hearing on April 11, 2024, the court granted Shen’s request for support,
ordering that Qie pay $18,000 per month in temporary child support and $18,000 per
month in temporary spousal support. The amounts were ordered to be paid retroactive to
March 6, 2023, the date on which Shen originally filed her request for support. The
formal order was filed May 15, 2024.5
C. Qie’s Request to Modify Support Order
1. Qie’s Request for Order
On November 8, 2024, Qie filed a request for order seeking a modification of the
prior support order. The request included a notice of hearing for January 30, 2025. Qie
sought an order that child and spousal support be changed retroactively “to guideline
[support] commencing March 1, 2024.” (Fn. omitted.)
Qie declared that the source of his support payments since April 2024 had been a
joint Morgan Stanley account; that account as of November 8, 2024, had funds totaling
$942,184.14. He stated that the funds from the joint account were “quickly being
exhausted and [he would] soon lose the ability to pay for” the support that had been

5 Qie filed a notice of appeal from this prior support order. Qie filed a notice of
abandonment of the appeal on January 8, 2025.

7
ordered. He stated further that the $5.8 million in proceeds that he received from his sale
of Google stock were invested into a Singapore account “as part of the requirement for
[his] immigration process and, as such, [were] illiquid and” he could not make
withdrawals from that account. Qie declared further that he had made substantial efforts
to obtain employment but had been unsuccessful.
2. Tentative Ruling and Unreported Hearing (December 19, 2024)
The record reflects that the court issued a tentative ruling, apparently served
December 17 (44 days before the date set in Qie’s notice of hearing on his modification
request). The court noted in the tentative ruling that Shen had not filed a response to
Qie’s request. After observing that Qie had presented no change of circumstances
warranting the modification of the prior support order, the trial court proceeded to
reconsider on its own motion the prior support order. The court stated it “intend[ed] to
correct its error by recalculating guideline support without the inclusion of Husband’s
[Google stock sale] proceeds, which are assets subject to division at trial.” The court
indicated it would continue the matter to an unspecified date to permit the parties to brief
the issue of the correct computation of guideline child and spousal support. The trial
court adopted its tentative ruling at an unreported hearing on December 19, 2024,
observing that no objections had been filed to the tentative ruling.6
3. Shen’s Opposition to Tentative Ruling
Although not reflected in the record, the trial court, after adopting its tentative
ruling at the December 19, 2024 hearing, apparently set a further hearing for
December 30, 2024. Prior to that date, Shen filed what was styled as written opposition
and objections to the court’s December 17 tentative ruling.

6 The minute order from the December 19, 2024 hearing included recitals that:
(1) there had been a request for continuance by e-mail from Shen’s counsel, which the
court denied; and (2) Shen’s counsel of record did not appear, but Qie’s attorney
specially appeared on behalf of Shen’s attorney.

8
 Shen contended that the prior spousal support order should not be modified.7 She
asserted that only two factors—the supported spouse’s need and the supporting spouse’s
ability to pay—were relevant. She argued that both factors favored the original order of
spousal support and favored that support remain ongoing as of December 2024. Shen
argued that while Qie claimed that he might sometime in the future lack the ability to pay
spousal support, he “[did] not dispute that he still has the ability to pay $18,000 per
month in temporary spousal support.” (Fn. omitted, original italics.) Shen also objected
to the statement in the tentative ruling that “ ‘it is undisputed that Husband reinvested the
[Google stock sale] proceeds for purposes of his emigration to Singapore.’ ” Shen
asserted that, to the contrary, this was highly contested issue.
Shen also asserted a procedural objection in her opposition papers. She
challenged the court’s recital in the December 17, 2024 tentative ruling that Shen had
“ ‘not filed a response to [Qie’s] motion.’ ” She asserted that because Qie’s support
modification motion had been set for January 30, 2025, her response was not due until
January 16, 2025. Shen asserted further that she had received no notice that the hearing
on Qie’s motion had been advanced by more than one month to December 19, 2024.
4. Reported Hearing (December 30, 2024), Order, and Appeal
The court conducted a further hearing on December 30, 2024 (reported), attended
by both parties and their counsel. It was reflected in the December 30, 2024 minute order
that Shen objected to the December 17, 2024 tentative ruling and that Qie had no
objection to it. Counsel for Shen reiterated that: (1) the legal standards for temporary

7 Shen stated in her opposition that, while she contested any proposed
modification of spousal support, she “accept[ed] that the Court believe[d] it erred by
treating the [Google stock sale] proceeds as income for the purposes of [the temporary
child support] order.” She noted, however, that Qie should be ordered to produce
financial documents in response to Shen’s outstanding discovery requests so that she
could address what she believed would be an appropriate amount of child support.
Shen’s counsel reiterated each of these points at the hearing on December 30, 2024.

9
spousal support differed from those applicable to temporary child support; (2) Qie did not
dispute his ability to pay spousal support; (3) the record did not support modifying the
prior order for spousal support; (4) Shen disputed Qie’s claims in his motion concerning
the exclusion of assets he had in Singapore for calculating child support, and there were
discovery matters outstanding on this issue. The court adopted the tentative ruling, and it
indicated that it was reserving the question of retroactivity to March 6, 2023, as to child
and spousal support, credits, and overpayments. In response to an inquiry from Qie’s
counsel, the court indicated that Qie would no longer be required to make monthly
spousal and child support payments totaling $36,000, as required under the prior support
order.
Shen filed a notice of appeal from the December 30, 2024 minute order.
Subsequent to Shen’s filing the notice of appeal, the March 13, 2025 FOAH—
which was signed by a judicial officer other than the judge who heard and decided the
prior support order and the order reflected in the December 30 2024 minute order—was
entered by the court. In addition to the court’s adoption in the FOAH of the December
17, 2024 tentative ruling, it provided: (1) “Commencing December 30, 2024,
Respondent [Qie] is ordered to pay temporary child support in the amount of $0 per
month”; and (2) “Commencing December 30, 2024, Respondent [Qie] is ordered to pay
temporary spousal support in the amount of $0 per month.” These provisions are
consistent with the trial court’s announcement at the December 30, 2024 hearing that Qie
would no longer be required to provide Shen with $36,000 in monthly support payments.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Appealability
We address as a preliminary matter Qie’s assertion that the support modification
order is not appealable and thus we lack jurisdiction to consider the matter. He contends
that the order is not a final determination of the parties’ rights regarding temporary
spousal support and is thus not a collateral order which is immediately appealable. Qie

10
argues that, although the challenged order established a new spousal support order of $0
as of December 30, 2024, the court “contemplate[d] the setting of a new support order in
its place” after ordering the parties to attend a settlement conference “ ‘to determine the
new calculation of . . . spousal support.’ ”
An interim order for temporary support is operative at the time it is pronounced
and is directly appealable. (See In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 367–368
(Skelley); In re Marriage of Gruen (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 627, 637 (Gruen).) This is
based upon the collateral order doctrine. As our Supreme Court has explained: “When a
court renders an interlocutory order collateral to the main issue, dispositive of the rights
of the parties in relation to the collateral matter, and directing payment of money or
performance of an act, direct appeal may be taken. [Citations.] This constitutes a
necessary exception to the one final judgment rule. Such a determination is substantially
the same as a final judgment in an independent proceeding. [Citations.]” (Skelley, supra,
at p. 368; see also In re Marriage of Garcia (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1334, 1344.)
Qie does not challenge the proposition that generally, a temporary support order is
appealable under the collateral order doctrine. But, he contends (as noted above), the
challenged order in this instance is not appealable because it (1) did not reach a final
determination of the rights of the parties on the issue of temporary spousal support, and
(2) contemplated further judicial action on the issue. Qie’s position that this court has no
jurisdiction to consider this appeal is without merit.
The challenged order represents what is clearly a substantive modification of the
prior support order. Under the prior support order, Qie was ordered to pay Shen $18,000
per month in temporary spousal support. Under the challenged order, Qie is obligated to
pay $0 in temporary spousal support effective December 30, 2024. This is effectively an
order terminating temporary spousal support, i.e., an appealable order. (See In re
Marriage of Campbell (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 502, 506 (Campbell) [order on supporting
party’s request to terminate “temporary spousal support was dispositive of the parties’

11
rights with respect to the collateral issue of temporary support. . . [and was] an appealable
order”].)
The court’s treatment of the pendente lite support order in Gruen, supra,
191 Cal.App.4th 627 is instructive here. In Gruen, the family court issued an order (on
August 1, 2008) requiring that husband pay wife $40,000 in monthly support,8 with the
court appointing an expert to assist it in determining the amount of husband’s income
available for support. (Id. at pp. 632–633.) That support order remained unmodified
until eight months later, on April 10, 2009, due to delays in the court-appointed expert
completing his report. (Id. at pp. 633–635.) In the meantime, in January 2009, husband
“filed a motion for ‘[r]etroactive reimbursement,’ in which he sought a reduction in his
support obligation, retroactive to August 1, 2008, and ‘credits and reimbursements’ for
alleged ‘overpayments of support.’ ” (Id. at p. 634.) Before husband’s motion was
ultimately heard in April, wife filed written opposition to the proposed retroactive
reduction of the support order, and she asserted that the court had no jurisdiction to
modify the order because husband had not filed a modification motion. (Id. at p. 634.)
The court, in its April 2009 order, effectively reduced retroactively by approximately
80 percent the prior support awarded to wife. (Id. at p. 635.)
The appellate court reversed, holding that a prior order of support could not be
retroactively modified (Gruen, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 638), and that an order
modifying temporary support required a motion or order to show cause to modify the
prior order (id. at p. 639). The appellate court thus held that the family court had acted in
excess of its jurisdiction by retroactively modifying the prior support order. (Ibid.) As is
relevant to the instant appeal, the Gruen court rejected husband’s contention that because
the family “court referred to [the support order] as an ‘interim’ order rather than a

8 Although it is clear from a reading of Gruen that the $40,000 of monthly support
was a combination of child and spousal support, the allocation of the monthly payment is
not specified.

12
‘pendente lite’ order,” it was unenforceable. (Ibid.) The appellate court explained:
“Those terms are used interchangeably in family law proceedings, and they both refer to
temporary support orders. [Citation.] A given case may have a series of pendent lite
orders, each of which is separately enforceable and appealable. Contrary to [husband’s]
position, it is not only the last of a series of temporary orders that is enforceable and
appealable. Further, the court’s reference to the order as being made ‘without prejudice’
is unhelpful to [husband], as that is merely the general rule for temporary support orders.
[Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 639–640.) And, although not expressly mentioned in Gruen, the
fact that the support order contemplated the issuance of a future order after the court-
appointed expert completed his report—analogous to the circumstance here that it was
contemplated in the challenged order that there would be a further order after the parties
attended a settlement conference to discuss new calculations for support—did not negate
the immediate enforceability and appealability of the support order.9
Here, the challenged order modified the court’s prior order in which temporary
spousal support was set at $18,000 per month by ordering that such monthly support be
fixed at $0, effective December 30, 2024. The original order of support was subject to
modification at any time. (See § 3603 [temporary order of support “may be modified or
terminated at any time except as to an amount that accrued before the date of the filing of
the notice of motion or order to show cause to modify or terminate”].) The support
modification order was a pendente lite order that was “operative from the time of
pronouncement, and it [was] directly appealable. [Citation.]” (Gruen, supra,

9 Indeed, our acceptance of Qie’s position that the support modification order was
not final and therefore not appealable would result in great uncertainty to a party
aggrieved by such an order. That party would be forced to choose between forgoing the
filing of an appeal because of a belief that the order might not be final and appealable—
running the risk of forfeiting a challenge to it—and filing an appeal to preserve his or her
challenge. These circumstances provide a practical reason why the support modification
order here is deemed a final and appealable order pendente lite, notwithstanding the fact
that further orders might be contemplated.

13
191 Cal.App.4th at p. 637.) Accordingly, Qie’s request that this appeal be dismissed is
denied.
B. Temporary Spousal Support
During the pendency of dissolution proceedings, the family court “the court may
order . . . either spouse to pay any amount that is necessary for the support of the other
spouse, consistent with the requirements of subdivisions (i) and (m) of Section 4320 and
Section 4325 . . . .” (§ 3600.)10
There are notable distinctions—relating both to the legal standards and
motivations for the award—between temporary and permanent spousal support orders.
While “the court’s discretion in setting permanent [spousal] support is constrained by the
enumerated statutory factors. . . , there are no explicit statutory standards governing
temporary support. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269,
312 (Cheriton).) The general criteria for a temporary spousal support award are “the
supported spouse’s needs and the other spouse’s ability to pay. [Citation.]” (In re
Marriage of Samson (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 23, 29 (Samson).) The family court is
vested with “broad discretion” in making a determination of temporary spousal support
based upon a consideration of these two factors. (In re Marriage of Blazer (2009)
176 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1442.) Furthermore, the second factor, “[a]bility to pay[,]
encompasses far more than the income of the spouse from whom temporary support is
sought; investments and other assets may be used for . . . temporary spousal support . . . .
[Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Dick (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 144, 159.)
The rationales of permanent and temporary spousal support awards also differ.
“Whereas permanent spousal support ‘provide[s] financial assistance, if appropriate, as

10 Subdivisions (i) and (m) of section 4320 concern issues of any domestic
violence history involving the parties and the criminal conviction of an abusive spouse,
respectively. Section 4325, inter alia, creates a rebuttable presumption that prohibits a
spouse convicted of domestic violence from receiving spousal support from the injured
spouse. None of these issues are relevant to this proceeding.

14
determined by the financial circumstances of the parties after their dissolution and the
division of their community property,’ temporary spousal support ‘is utilized to maintain
the living conditions and standards of the parties in as close to the status quo position as
possible pending trial and the division of their assets and obligations.’ [Citations.]”
(In re Marriage of Winter (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1926, 1932; see also In re Marriage of
Schulze (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 519, 522 [generally, temporary spousal support “is higher
than permanent support because it is intended to maintain the status quo prior to the
divorce”].)
“A motion for modification of spousal support may only be granted if there has
been a material change of circumstances since the last order. [Citation.] Otherwise,
dissolution cases would have no finality and unhappy former spouses could bring
repeated actions for modification with no burden of showing a justification to change the
order. Litigants ‘ “are entitled to attempt, with some degree of certainty, to reorder their
finances and life style [sic] in reliance upon the finality of the decree.” ’ [Citations.]
Absent a change of circumstances, a motion for modification is nothing more than an
impermissible collateral attack on a prior final order. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of
Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 480.) The requirement that there be a material change
of circumstances to modify spousal support “ ‘is to preclude relitigation of the same
facts.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Freitas (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1068.)
We review the trial court’s order concerning the modification of spousal support
for abuse of discretion. (See In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 104.)
C. The Support Modification Order Must Be Reversed
1. Introduction
We begin our analysis of the merits of this appeal by noting several procedural
matters concerning the trial court’s support modification order that are relevant to our
resolution.

15
 First, the catalyst for the challenged order was Qie’s request to change the court’s
prior order for temporary monthly spousal support ($18,000) and child support ($18,000)
order “to guideline” support. Qie did not propose any particular amounts for modified
support in his motion.
Second, the court did not explicitly grant or deny Qie’s request. In one sense, the
court concluded that Qie’s request was not well taken. It observed that, in general, a
request to modify child support or temporary spousal support will be denied, absent “a
‘material change of circumstances.’ [Citations.]” And the court stated that Qie had “not
cite[d] any change of circumstance since the last order,” thereby effectively finding that
Qie had not met his burden as the party moving for the relief. On the other hand, the
court effectively granted Qie’s request to modify support for reasons other than those
articulated in that request; the court modified spousal and child support to $0, effective
December 30, 2024, after reconsidering the prior support order on its own motion.
Third, the court stated that Qie contended that “the Court erred by including the
sale proceeds from his Google Stock Units (GSU) in the amount of $5.8 million in its
computation of support.”11 The court noted that Qie’s argument was that the proceeds
from the stock sale represented “a one-time distribution of funds which he subsequently
reinvested into a DBS Singapore account . . . as part of his emigration process to

11 Qie did not make the specific assertion in his request to modify order that the
court had erred in issuing the prior support order by including the proceeds from the
Google stock sale in computing the support obligation. Rather, Qie noted that “[Shen]
may argue that the proceeds from the sale of the Google stock in the amount of $5.8
million shall constitute as income and/or liquid funds available to for support payments.
However, that is not the case.” Qie also noted other factors supporting his request to
modify support, including that: he was not employed; there were significant
impediments to his ability to find new employment; he had no liquid assets to draw from
except the parties’ Morgan Stanley account; and the funds from that account were
“quickly being exhausted.”

16
Singapore. . . . [Qie asserts that] the funds cannot be withdrawn, and he is without any
other sources of income other than a joint account containing $942,184 . . . .”
Fourth, the court stated that Qie was “correct” in his assertion that the funds in the
Singapore account traceable from the Google stock sale should not be considered for
purposes of support. The court stated that “[t]ypically, the market value of any unsold
shares of stock are not considered income available for support. . . . The same rationale
applies when stocks are sold but immediately reinvested to avoid market loss. To the
extent the shares are sold only for the purpose of reinvesting the proceeds in income-
producing assets, the resulting gain is not income but simply the replacement of one
capital investment with another. [Citation.]” In support of these statements, the court
relied on In re Marriage of Pearlstein (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1361 (Pearlstein). The
court therefore found that it had “erred by including the [Google] stock proceeds in its
computation of guideline support” due to the fact that those “proceeds [had] remained
untouched and [were] illiquid.”
We will consider whether the challenged order changing monthly temporary
spousal support from $18,000 to $0, effective December 30, 2024, was proper either as
(1) a traditional support modification under section 3603 that was based upon Qie’s
request for change of the prior support order, or (2) a support modification after the court,
on its own motion, reconsidered the prior support order and concluded that it was
erroneous insofar as its award of temporary spousal support was concerned.
2. Modification Based on Change of Circumstances
A temporary order of support “may be modified or terminated at any time” subject
to the limitation that the order may not address the support amount accruing before the
filing of the request for modification. (§ 3603.) Although “ ‘[t]he propriety of an order
modifying spousal support “rests within the trial court’s sound discretion. . .” . . . [, a]
motion for modification of spousal support may only be granted if there has been a
material change of circumstances since the last order. [Citation.]’ ” (In re Marriage of

17
Biderman (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 409, 412 (Biderman).) Therefore, the order modifying
spousal support “ ‘must be based on current facts and circumstances.’ [Citation.] The
moving party has the burden of showing a material change of circumstances since the last
order was made. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Tydlaska (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 572,
575.) And “[w]here there is no substantial evidence of a material change of
circumstances, an order modifying a support order will be overturned for abuse of
discretion. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of West (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 240, 246
(West).)
Here, the trial court expressly found that Qie had “not cite[d] any change of
circumstance since the last order.”12 Assuming the court’s challenged order was a denial
of Qie’s request to modify the prior support order because he had failed to show a
material change of circumstances, there was substantial evidence to support that
conclusion. (Cf. West, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 246.) There was no change in Qie’s
statement of monthly income and employment status—$0 and not employed,
respectively—between the time he opposed Shen’s support request and when he filed his
request to modify the prior support order. There was little change in his disclosure of
assets: Qie declared that he had total assets in March and November 2024 of
$15,699,973 and $15,014,000, respectively.13 And Qie disclosed his sale of the Google
stock in both his March and November 2024 court filings. The key distinction in Qie’s
November disclosure was his assertion that the sale proceeds were deposited into a

12 Qie indicated at the December 30 hearing that he did not have any objection to
the December 17 tentative ruling adopted by the trial court. Thus, inferentially, he did
not challenge the court’s finding that Qie had not shown a material change of
circumstances warranting his request to modify the support order.
13 Qie did, however, characterize the assets differently, apparently because of his
assertion in November 2024 that the stock sale proceeds in a Singapore account were
illiquid, could not be accessed for support, and should not be treated as income of
purposes of calculating support.

18
Singapore account as part of his plans to emigrate, that the funds were illiquid, and he
could not make withdrawals from the account.
Additionally, Qie did not directly state that he was seeking a modification of the
support order due to a material change of circumstances. The closest he came to this
assertion was that his ability to make support payments had changed because he was
“running out of funds.” (Boldface omitted.) Although Qie stated that those funds—from
the Morgan Stanley account—were “quickly being exhausted,” he disclosed that the
balance in that account was $942,184.14. Thus, notwithstanding Qie’s statement that he
was running out of funds, there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
conclusion that Qie had not presented a material change of circumstances in support of
his request.
Furthermore, the record does not suggest that the trial court, in modifying monthly
spousal support from $18,000 to $0, took into consideration the two relevant and
required aspects for such a modification, namely, “the supported spouse’s needs and the
other spouse’s ability to pay” spousal support. (Samson, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at
p. 29.) Shen’s need for support had not lessened since the granting of the prior support
order. And Qie’s own IED and declaration filed in November 2024 demonstrated his
ability to pay temporary spousal support as previously ordered.
From the record before us, the trial court did not base its order on the traditional
grounds of a request to modify a prior spousal support order under section 3603, namely,
that a material change of circumstances justified changing the prior order. Indeed, the
court found that Qie had made no showing of a change of circumstances, and the order
was not based on the existence of a material change since the issuance of the prior
support order. Qie concedes this point on appeal.
Notwithstanding this observation, even upon our review of it as a traditional
support modification order, we cannot uphold the challenged order. As argued by Shen,
there was no showing of a material change of circumstances, as reflected by “a reduction

19
or increase in the supporting spouse’s ability to pay and/or an increase or decrease in the
supported spouse’s needs.” (West, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 246.) Although the trial
court focused on Qie’s income as of November 2024, it did not consider Qie’s continued
ability to pay spousal support. As noted above, Qie disclosed that he held more than
$15 million in total assets. There is no indication the trial court considered this fact in
making its order. Thus, if the court’s intent in the challenged order was to modify
temporary spousal support from $18,000 per month to $0 based upon Qie’s request to
change the prior support order, it abused its discretion. (See ibid.)
3. Modification Based on Reconsideration of Prior Support Order
a. Introduction
The trial court reduced monthly temporary spousal support from $18,000 to $0
based upon its independent reconsideration of the prior support order. The court, upon
such reconsideration, concluded it had erred in issuing the prior support order. We
examine whether the court’s action on this basis is sustainable.
Notwithstanding that Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 limits a party’s ability
to bring a motion for reconsideration of an order unless the motion is based upon new
facts or law, that statute does “not limit a court’s ability to reconsider its previous interim
orders on its own motion, as long as it gives the parties notice that it may do so and a
reasonable opportunity to litigate the question.” (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th
1094, 1097 (Le Francois), original italics.) This is based upon the trial court’s inherent
power, “on its own motion, to reconsider its prior interim orders so it may correct its own
errors.” (Id. at p. 1107.)
As we discuss below, there are three procedural issues here that impact the
viability of the trial court’s reconsideration on its own motion of the prior support order.
And even were we to ignore the procedural matters that disclose that the court erred,
there was no substantive basis for the court’s reconsideration of the prior support order in
which the monthly temporary spousal support fixed at $18,000 was reduced to $0.

20
 b. Jurisdiction to Reconsider Prior Support Order
We first address whether the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider the prior
order.14 On May 23, 2024, Qie filed a notice of appeal from the prior support order.
That appeal was abandoned on January 8, 2025. Thus, the appeal of that prior order was
pending both when Qie filed his request for change of order (November 8, 2024) and
when the matter was heard and decided (December 30, 2024). (See fn. 5, ante.)
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 916, subdivision (a), “the perfecting of an
appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or
upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the
judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the
action and not affected by the judgment or order.” Thus, under that statute, “ ‘the trial
court is divested of’ subject matter jurisdiction over any matter embraced in or affected
by the appeal during the pendency of that appeal. [Citation.]” (Varian Medical Systems,
Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 196–197 (Delfino).) This stay under Code of Civil
Procedure section 916, subdivision (a) applies to any “trial court proceeding [that]
directly or indirectly seek[s] to ‘enforce, vacate or modify [the] appealed judgment or
order.’ [Citation.]” (Delfino, supra, at pp. 189–190, fn. omitted; see also Henry M. Lee
Law Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1383 (Henry M. Lee Law
Corp.) [matter that is “embraced in or affected by” an appeal is stayed if it “would affect

14 The question of the trial court’s jurisdiction to reconsider the prior support order
was not raised by the parties below or in their briefing on appeal. Likewise, neither party
addressed below or in their briefing here the other procedural issues concerning the
reconsideration order or substantive issues related to the reconsideration order that we
discuss, post. Nonetheless, an appellate court has the discretion to address an issue of
law based on undisputed facts raised for the first time on appeal; the new issue may be
raised either by the parties, or by the appellate court sua sponte upon the parties’ being
afforded the opportunity to brief the issue. (See Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings &
Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1341, fn. 6.) We have requested, received, and
considered, supplemental letter briefs from the parties concerning these previously
unbriefed matters.

21
the effectiveness of the appeal”].) This stay is applicable to a trial court’s ability to
entertain a motion to reconsider an order that is being challenged by a pending appeal.
(See, e.g., Jack v. Ring LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1211 [motion to reconsider
order denying petition to arbitrate being appealed]; Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist.
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 35, 53 [defendant’s motion to reconsider appealed order that
effectively denying defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion].)
At the time the trial court decided on its own motion to reconsider the correctness
of the prior support order, Qie was challenging that order on appeal. Although Qie’s
appeal would not stay the trial court’s ability under section 3603 to modify spousal
support prospectively at any time “upon a material change of circumstances since the last
order” (West, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 246), that was not the court’s intent here.
Rather, the record demonstrates that the trial court intended to reconsider, in December
2024, the prior support order based upon a perceived error in its ruling of April 2024.
Since an appeal challenging the prior support order was pending in December 2024,
“ ‘the trial court [was] divested of’ subject matter jurisdiction over any matter embraced
in or affected by the appeal during the pendency of that appeal. [Citation.]” (Delfino,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 196–197.) And the court’s reconsideration on its own motion of
the prior support order was a “trial court proceeding [that] directly or indirectly [sought]
to ‘. . . vacate or modify [the] appealed . . . order.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 189–190,
fn. omitted.)
Qie contends that, notwithstanding the fact that his appeal of the prior support
order was pending at the time of the December 30, 2024 hearing, the trial court was
empowered to act because Qie indicated at the hearing that he would be abandoning the
appeal in the future. Qie provides no legal authority for this argument. (See Dabney v.
Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379, 384 [appellate courts “need not consider an
argument for which no authority is furnished”].) His contention is in any event without
merit. The facts remain that: (1) the trial court announced as early as December 17

22
(through its tentative ruling) that it was reconsidering on its own motion the prior support
order then on appeal; (2) Qie did not indicate that he would in the future abandon his
appeal until 13 days later; (3) Qie did not abandon his appeal until January 8, 2025;
(4) the appeal was pending at all times during the trial court’s reconsideration of the prior
support order, through and including when it heard argument and issued its order on
December 30; and (5) the court’s December 30 minute order contains no reference to
Qie’s stated future intent to abandon the appeal, such as a recital that the court’s order
was contingent upon such abandonment. Thus, the trial court was not empowered to
reconsider the prior support order that was subject to a pending appeal; any such
reconsideration plainly “would affect the effectiveness of the appeal.” (Henry M. Lee
Law Corp., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1383.)
Qie asserts further that “[he] abandoned his appeal on January 8, 2025, well before
the trial court entered the FOAH on March 13, 2025. Accordingly, no appeal was
pending when the court entered the appealable order at issue here.” Qie’s position lacks
merit. First, to reiterate, Qie’s appeal was pending when the trial court reconsidered (on
its own motion) the prior support order as reflected in its tentative ruling, heard the
matter, and issued its order modifying the prior spousal support order to reduce the
monthly amount from $18,000 to $0. The December 30, 2024 minute order was the
culmination of a “trial court proceeding [that] directly or indirectly [sought] to ‘. . .
vacate or modify [the] appealed . . . [prior support] order.’ [Citation.]” (Delfino, supra,
35 Cal.4th at pp. 189–190, fn. omitted.) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 916,
subdivision (a), Qie’s appeal stayed the trial court from taking any action to vacate or
modify (through reconsideration of) the prior support order. Second, Qie is incorrect in
asserting that the December 30, 2024 minute order was “non[]appealable,” while the
March 13, 2025 FOAH is “the appealable order at issue here.” The December 30, 2024
minute order is the order from which Shen’s appeal was taken, and it is an appealable
order. (See Campbell, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 505 [order regarding temporary

23
spousal support is appealable as “ ‘order dispositive of the rights of the parties in relation
to a collateral matter, or directing payment of money or performance of an act’ ”]; see
also Walton v. Mueller (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 161, 167 [minute order that did not
indicate that “a written order be prepared for entry. . . is therefore appealable even though
it is not a formal, signed order”].) The fact that Qie’s appeal was abandoned before the
March 13, 2025 FOAH was entered does not change the fact that the trial court had no
subject matter jurisdiction in December 2024 to conduct proceedings that “directly or
indirectly [sought] to ‘. . . vacate or modify [the] appealed . . . order.’ [Citation.]”
(Delfino, supra, at pp. 189–190, fn. omitted.)
We conclude that under the stay provisions of Code of Civil Procedure
section 916, subdivision (a), the trial court had no jurisdiction to reconsider on its own
motion the prior support order.
c. Consideration of Additional Evidence
As we have held, the trial court had no jurisdiction to reconsider the prior support
order while an appeal challenging that order was pending. However, even assuming the
existence of jurisdiction, the trial court acted outside of its inherent authority to
reconsider an existing order by taking into account additional evidence that Qie included
in his November 2024 request. Three cases on this point are instructive.
In In re Marriage of Barthold (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1303 (Barthold), the
family court, after initially denying wife’s postjudgment motion and after determining
that her motion for reconsideration was not compliant with Code of Civil Procedure
section 1008, concluded nonetheless that it had erred in denying wife’s first motion and
ultimately granted the relief she sought. In reaching this conclusion, the family court
observed that “ ‘the court has inherent authority to correct a mistaken ruling if this is
done before the ruling becomes final.’ ” (Barthold, supra, at p. 1306.) In affirming the
order, the appellate court held that although the family court framed its ruling as granting
the motion for reconsideration, the context made it clear that its “intent was to grant

24
reconsideration on the court’s own motion.” (Id. at p. 1309.) The Barthold court rejected
husband’s contention that the reconsideration order was improper because it was
prompted by wife’s noncompliant motion to reconsider. (Id. at pp. 1308–1309.) In doing
so, the court quoted the Supreme Court: “ ‘If a court believes one of its prior interim
orders was erroneous, it should be able to correct that error no matter how it came to
acquire that belief.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1308, quoting Le Francois, supra, 35 Cal.4th at
p. 1108.) In concluding that there was no error, the Barthold court “stress[ed] that in
order to grant reconsideration on its own motion, the trial court must conclude that its
earlier ruling was wrong, and change that ruling based on the evidence originally
submitted. Thus, our ruling does not permit parties to obtain reconsideration relying on
evidence that could and should have been, but was not, presented to the court in
connection with the original motion.” (Id. at p. 1314, original italics.)
In In re Marriage of Spector (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 201 (Spector), within days
after the family court issued an order awarding temporary spousal support, husband
advised the court there had been an arithmetical error; various correspondence and
briefing from the parties to the court followed. (Id. at pp. 204–206.) There was no
formal motion to reconsider filed by husband, a procedural omission wife highlighted and
to which she objected. (Id. at pp. 205–206.) Approximately one month after the support
order had been served, the court issued an order in which it stated it reconsidered its prior
order under the authority of Le Francois, supra, 35 Cal.4th 1094; although it concluded
that there was no arithmetical error, it made several revisions, including a downward
adjustment of the amount of spousal support awarded. (Spector, supra, at pp. 206–207.)
The appellate court rejected wife’s challenge. It held that “[t]he trial court’s
reconsideration on its own motion was proper ‘because it limited itself to changing its
mind based on the evidence submitted in connection with the [parties’] original
motion[s].’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 214, italics added.)

25
 In In re Marriage of Herr (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1466 (Herr), the trial
court, after a two-day trial, issued an order that included an award to the appellant of
attorney fees and support arrearages. The respondent filed an untimely motion for
reconsideration, and the court granted reconsideration on its own motion, ruling that it
would revisit all issues it had decided in the prior order. (Id. at p. 1467.) In doing so, the
court indicated that it was dissatisfied with the information it had received in making the
prior order; it therefore requested declarations from the parties addressing their financial
circumstances, child custody arrangements, and the husband’s claim that after the prior
order, he had become disabled. (Id. at pp. 1467–1468.) The appellate court found that
the trial court, rather than confining itself to the evidence originally presented and relied
on in the prior order, stated an intention to reexamine the issues after the parties, at the
court’s request, submitted new evidence. (Id. at p. 1470.) The Herr court concluded that
this approach was not a proper reconsideration of a prior order, as approved in Barthold,
supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pages 1308 through 1309, in which the trial court had
reconsidered the prior order “based on evidence previously submitted [citation].” (Herr,
supra, at p. 1470.) Accordingly, the appellate court in Herr found that the trial court’s
action was not a sua sponte reconsideration of a prior order; rather, it constituted a new
trial order which was invalid because the requisite statutory procedures had not been
followed. (Id. at pp. 1470–1471.)
The circumstances of the trial court’s reconsideration of the prior order reducing
Shen’s monthly spousal support to $0 differ significantly from those in Barthold and
Spector, in which the trial courts’ reconsideration had been confined to the evidence
submitted in connection with the original motions. The trial court here—similar to the
trial court’s conduct in Herr in which it purportedly reconsidered a prior order—did
consider and rely on evidence beyond what was submitted in connection with the prior
support order. As indicated in the tentative ruling it adopted after the hearing on
December 30, the court recited that the proceeds from the Google stock sale had been

26
reinvested into a Singapore account “as part of his emigration process to Singapore. . . .
Because the funds cannot be withdrawn, and he is without any other sources of income
other than a joint account containing $942,184. . . .” The court concluded further that
“[b]ecause the [Google stock sale] proceeds remain untouched and illiquid, the Court
erred by including the stock proceeds in its computation of guideline support.”
Qie did not make the claims in the prior support proceedings—as he did in his
request to modify support—that the Google stock sale proceeds invested in the Singapore
account (1) were invested for that reason as part of Qie’s efforts to emigrate to Singapore,
(2) could not be withdrawn, and (3) were illiquid. His March 28, 2024 declaration
contains none of that information. Rather, at that time, he stated that “[t]he funds [from
the stock sale were] still located in an investment account and have not been utilized by
[him] for the payment of any expenses.” Additionally, while Qie, in opposition to Shen’s
original request for temporary support, stressed his unemployment, and that his monthly
income was limited to one-half of the rent received for the parties’ Saratoga property, he
did not claim that he lacked the ability to pay support. His claimed inability to make
support payments was asserted in his later request to modify the prior support order,
including claims that the funds he was using to pay support were “quickly being
exhausted” and that he would “soon lose the ability to pay for” support. In its tentative
decision adopted on December 30, the trial court noted Qie’s claimed inability to pay
support.
The record demonstrates that the trial court’s reconsideration of the prior support
order was not one in which it “conclude[d] that its earlier ruling was wrong, and
change[d] that ruling based on the evidence originally submitted.” (Barthold, supra,
158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314, original italics.) Indeed, the court’s conclusion that it had
erred in granting the prior support order was directly based on information provided by
Qie in his November 2024 request to modify the prior support order; the court concluded
that it had previously erred through its inclusion of Qie’s Google stock sale proceeds as

27
income, which “remain untouched and illiquid,” and were “reinvested . . . for purposes of
[Qie’s] emigration to Singapore.” Therefore, the trial court improperly reconsidered the
prior support order by relying on evidence not presented at the time that prior order was
heard and decided. (See ibid.; Spector, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 214; Herr, supra,
174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1470.)
d. Notice of Intent to Reconsider Prior Support Order
There is also a notice problem with the trial court’s reconsideration of the prior
support order. The trial court has the inherent authority to reconsider a prior interim
order on its own motion, “as long as it gives the parties notice that it may do so and a
reasonable opportunity to litigate the question.” (Le Francois, supra, 35 Cal.4th at
p. 1097, italics added.) As the Supreme Court has explained: “To be fair to the parties,
if the court is seriously concerned that one of its prior interim rulings might have been
erroneous, and thus that it might want to reconsider that ruling on its own motion—
something we think will happen rather rarely—it should inform the parties of this
concern, solicit briefing, and hold a hearing. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1108.) There are,
however, no specific procedural requirements to which the court must adhere in
providing notice to the parties of its intention to reconsider a prior interim order. (See
Spector, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 216 [rejecting claim that reconsideration was
improper because “the trial court did not formally file a motion or an order to show
cause” before issuing its revised order].)
Here, the trial court first indicated to the parties on December 17 that it intended to
reconsider on its own motion the correctness of the prior support order; it did so in its
tentative ruling issued for a December 19 hearing relating to Qie’s prior request for order
modifying support. The court did not solicit briefing on its reconsideration of the prior
order, in the tentative ruling or otherwise. Nor did it schedule a separate hearing on
reconsideration to afford the parties the opportunity to address the court’s intended

28
reconsideration.15 This procedure did not comply with the notice requirements of
Le Francois for cases in which the court reconsiders the correctness of an interim order
on its own motion. The trial court did not provide the parties with “a reasonable
opportunity to litigate the question” of its proposed reconsideration of the prior support
order. (Le Francois, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1097.)
e. Substantive Grounds for Reconsideration16
The trial court stated that its reason for reconsidering the prior support order on its
own motion was that it had “erred by including the [Google] stock [sale] proceeds in its
computation of guideline support.” This conclusion of error was, according to the court
in its adopted tentative ruling, established by Qie’s showing in his request to modify
support that the proceeds had been “reinvested into a DBS Singapore account . . . as part
of [Qie’s] emigration process to Singapore[,] . . . currently remain[ed there,] . . . [could
not] be withdrawn,” and were therefore “illiquid.” However, as it relates to the issue in
this appeal—the modification of temporary spousal support—the court did not explain

15 As noted, ante, Shen filed a written procedural objection to the December 17
tentative ruling, asserting that: (1) the hearing on Qie’s support modification motion had
been set for January 30, 2025; (2) her response was therefore not due until January 16,
2025; (3) the court’s recital in the December 17 tentative ruling that faulted Shen for not
filing opposition was therefore incorrect; and (4) she had received no notice that the
hearing on Qie’s request had been advanced from January 30, 2025, to December 19,
2024.
16 Our discussion of the substantive basis of the challenged order assumes there
were no procedural impediments to the trial court’s reconsideration of the prior support
order. For the reasons discussed, ante, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the
prior support order, erred by considering material not presented at the hearing on Shen’s
original support request, and failed to give proper notice to the parties.

29
why its consideration of the illiquid stock sale proceeds in making the prior spousal
support award constituted error.17
In her December 24, 2024 written opposition to the tentative ruling, Shen argued
that whether the stock sale proceeds constituted income was irrelevant in determining
temporary spousal support. Shen asserted that the criteria for awarding temporary
spousal support differed from temporary child support, in that “the relevant inquiry for
temporary spousal support considers only two factors: (1) Wife’s ‘need’ and
(2) Husband’s ‘ability to pay.’ [Citation.] Here, Husband did not dispute either factor at
the time of the temporary support order at issue [citation,] and so it would be an abuse of
discretion to modify that order. That is true regardless of whether the [Google stock sale]
proceeds are income.” At the December 30, 2024 hearing, Shen’s counsel reiterated this
position. After the trial court indicated it was adopting the tentative ruling, Shen’s
counsel requested that the court clarify the basis for modifying temporary spousal
support. The court responded by referring generally to its tentative ruling.
The trial court erred in ordering, after reconsidering the prior support order, that
monthly spousal support be modified from $18,000 to $0. The record does not support
that in modifying support, the court considered the two criteria for a temporary spousal
support award, namely “the supported spouse’s needs and the other spouse’s ability to
pay. [Citation.]” (Samson, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 29.) Qie’s November 2024 IED
and declaration demonstrated his ability to pay (disclosing liquid assets of more than
$942,000). Further, there was no showing that Shen’s needs had changed in the seven
months since the original award of spousal support. Indeed, as we have noted, the court
itself found there had been no material change of circumstances since the prior support

17 We note that the record concerning the prior support order does not disclose that
the trial court specifically considered the stock sale proceeds in making the spousal
support award. Nor is there a record that the court made specific calculations for
“guideline” spousal support, or that “guideline” appears in the language of the prior
support order.

30
order, a material change being a prerequisite for modifying support. (See Biderman,
supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.)
The trial court cited Pearlstein, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th 1361 in support of its
conclusion that those proceeds should not have been considered as income in calculating
support. That case, however, concerned the treatment of shares of stock in the
calculation of child support. (See id. at p. 1375, fn. omitted [“we conclude that the
market value of unsold shares of stock received by a business owner in connection with
the sale of a business generally is not income for child support purposes”].) Pearlstein
had nothing to do with the calculation of temporary spousal support. (See Sagonowsky v.
Kekoa (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1156 [“ ‘[c]ases do not stand for propositions that
were never considered by the court’ ”].)
Thus, the trial court’s basis for concluding it had fundamentally erred in its prior
support award by considering the stock sale proceeds that Qie claimed to be inaccessible
had no application to temporary spousal support.18 (See Let Them Choose v. San Diego
Unified School Dist. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 953, 961 [abuse of discretion where trial
court “fails to apply the proper legal standard to the issue before it”].) Since the
determination of temporary spousal support is not governed by any “explicit statutory
standards” (Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 312) and is based simply on the
supported party’s needs and the supporting party’s ability to pay (Samson, supra,
197 Cal.App.4th at p. 29), there was no basis in law for the trial court’s conclusion that it
had erred in its original award of spousal support. Consequently, the trial court abused its
discretion by modifying the temporary monthly spousal support award from $18,000 to
$0. (See West, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 246 [abuse of discretion to modify spousal

18 The trial court’s finding that it had previously erred by including the stock
proceeds as income was applicable, if at all, only to its award of temporary child support.
Since Shen’s appeal of the challenged order does not concern the court’s modification of
temporary child support, we do not address the merits of the court’s conclusion that it had
erred in its prior calculation of temporary child support.

31
support absent material change of circumstances, reflected by “a reduction or increase in
the supporting spouse’s ability to pay and/or an increase or decrease in the supported
spouse’s needs”].)19
III. DISPOSITION
The portion of the order (minute order of December 30, 2024 and findings and
order after hearing of March 13, 2025) that modified appellant’s temporary monthly
spousal support from $18,000 to $0 (effective December 30, 2024) is reversed. Appellant
is awarded her costs on appeal.

19 Qie argues that Shen did not submit a request for statement of decision in
connection with the support modification order challenged in this appeal. He argues
that the consequences of such alleged failure are that: (1) Shen has forfeited any
objection to the trial court’s failure to make all necessary findings; and (2) this court must
apply the doctrine of implied findings in presuming that the trial court made all necessary
findings supported by substantial evidence. There is evidence in the record that at the
December 30, 2024 hearing, Shen did request a statement of decision by asking the court
to explain the basis for its decision to modify the prior temporary spousal support order.
(See Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1060–1065
[counsel’s oral request to court for an explanation of its ruling treated as request for
statement of decision].) But even were we to conclude otherwise, application of the
doctrine of implied findings would not change our conclusion that the trial court’s
modification of temporary spousal support constituted error.

32
 WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

GROVER, ACTING P. J.

LIE, J.

Shen v. Qie
H053016