Filed 7/15/26 P. v. Schiefer CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B335154
(Super. Ct. No. SA101219)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

JOHN SCHIEFER,

Defendant and Appellant.

John Schiefer appeals the judgment entered after a jury
found him guilty of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd.
(a), 189, subd. (a).)1 Appellant contends the evidence is
insufficient to support his conviction. He asks us to review an in
camera hearing to determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion in ruling on his discovery motion under Brady v.
Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady). We correct a clerical error
in the abstract of judgment and affirm.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
 Procedural Background
Shavonne (aka Erica) Webster, Haena Worthing, and
appellant were charged with murdering William Webb (William).
The information alleged that, in the commission of the offense,
appellant and Webster had personally used a deadly or
dangerous weapon – a hammer.
Worthing pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192,
subd. (a)) and another offense.2 After a jury trial, both appellant
and Webster were convicted of first degree murder. As to
appellant, the jury found “not true” the personal use allegation.
As to Webster, the jury found “true” the same allegation.
Appellant was sentenced to prison for 25 years to life.
Facts
On August 16, 2019, William’s burned body was discovered
on the side of a road in the area of Joshua Tree National Park.
The cause of death was “[b]lunt force injury to the [back of the]
head.” A forensic pathologist opined that “the damage to the
back of the head was done with a hammer or some other type of
tool that’s consistent with a hammer.” The tool had made holes
in the skull that exposed the brain. The pathologist identified
between 15 and 20 lacerations on the back of William’s head.
Other portions of his head had non-fatal wounds. There were
also injuries to his ribs that could have been caused by a fall.
After William’s death, more than 90 percent of his body sustained
“thermal injuries.”
William was 72 years old. His body weighed approximately
116 pounds and was five feet, eight inches tall. The forensic
pathologist testified that “thermal injuries do burn off liquid, so

2 The record on appeal does not disclose the nature of the

other offense.

2
he would have [weighed] more than 116 pounds” when he died.
Appellant weighed about 235 pounds and was six feet, three
inches tall. At the time of trial in March 2023, appellant was 42
years old.
William and his former wife, Deborah, owned a home in
Marina Del Rey. William wanted to sell the home, but Deborah
tried to block a sale. Over Deborah’s objection, William
succeeded in arranging a sale. Escrow was scheduled to close on
August 23, 2019.
Deborah had three children from prior relationships. One
of her children was codefendant Haena Worthing. Joey Valentino
was a close friend of both Worthing and appellant. In August
2019 Valentino was living in Worthing’s apartment with
appellant and appellant’s girlfriend, codefendant Erica Webster.
Valentino testified that Worthing had expressed anger at
William.3 Valentino believed that, on two or three occasions, he
had heard Worthing “ ‘say [something] about “killing this mother
fucker” in reference to [William].’ ” Valentino further testified
that, “a couple of days” before William died, appellant and
Webster had moved into the Marina Del Rey home. Worthing
and her daughter were already living there.
On August 15, 2019, Valentino had two telephone
conversations with appellant. Both times, appellant telephoned
Valentino. During the first conversation, appellant said,
“ ‘William kept bugging Erica [Webster], harassing her for some
money behind his back, trying to charge them to stay there [the
Marina Del Rey home] when they were guests from the

3 Valentino was unavailable to testify at trial.
The
transcript of his preliminary hearing testimony was read to the
jury.

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beginning.’ ” Appellant said “ ‘[h]e was going to nail him
[William] with a hammer.’ ” Valentino warned appellant, “ ‘ “If
you use a hammer that is fucking murder, you idiot.” ’ ”
Appellant testified that he had spoken to Valentino “minutes”
before William was killed.
The second time appellant telephoned Valentino, appellant
“ ‘just said, “it’s all done.” ’ ” Valentino asked, “ ‘ “What’s
done?” ’ ” Appellant replied, “ ‘William.’ ” Valentino believed that
appellant had said, “ ‘ “He is dead,” ’ ” and “ ‘ “I slipped him with
a hammer.” ’ ” Valentino responded, “ ‘ “You could have just
pushed him off the stairs, let him fall by himself.” ’ ” Appellant
“ ‘started laughing, and he was really serious. He told
[Valentino], “It’s not a joke.” ’ ” After the conversation, appellant
texted Valentino a photo of William’s bloody body. A detective
testified that Valentino had told him that appellant said, “ ‘I
slipped him with a hammer.’ ”
Appellant testified that, during the second conversation
with Valentino, he “wanted [Valentino] to believe that [he] hit
[William] with a hammer.” Appellant explained that he was
“protecting [his] girlfriend,” Webster.
After appellant was arrested, detectives placed an
informant in his cell. Appellant described to the informant the
circumstances surrounding the killing. Appellant said: “That fool
[William] was a fucking rapist child molester, man.” The
informant asked, “ ‘So when you found out, you were like, ‘Fuck, I
got to take him out’?” Appellant replied, “Yeah.” Appellant said
his “homie was gonna do it, but . . . he didn’t make it in time, so
we did it and fucking dealt with it . . . .”

4
 Appellant testified that the “homie” he was referring to was
Valentino. Appellant further testified that his statements to the
informant about his “homie” were lies and “puffery.”
Appellant told the informant that he “was choking
[William] out” and William “was almost dead.” While this was
happening, his girlfriend hit William 15 times in the head with a
hammer. She “had [the hammer] in her hand the whole time.”
Appellant was “just choking him out” and was “holding [him]
down.” Appellant then “threw [William] down the stairs.”
Appellant “[p]ut [William’s] ass in the car, [and] drove him out to
the fucking desert.” Appellant “was there” when William’s body
was burned. Although appellant said his girlfriend had inflicted
the blows with the hammer, he initially told the informant that
his “girl” had not see him “do it” and “won’t tell.”
In his reply brief appellant acknowledges that he “told the
[informant] that Deborah [the former wife of William] and
Worthing gave him William’s credit cards after the murder.”
Appellant used the credit cards to make purchases.
Appellant testified as follows: On August 15, 2019,
appellant and Webster were inside William’s home when William
said they had to move out. Appellant replied that William “was
inappropriate with women and children, and at that point,
[William] tried to attack [him].” William “came at [appellant],
and with his right hand he tried to hit appellant.” Appellant
“grabbed” William “[a]nd held him against the wall.”
Appellant “couldn’t handle [William] anymore so [he] yelled
for help.” “[Webster] came out and she hit William with a
hammer a couple of times at the top of the stairs.” The hammer
blows were delivered to William’s head. Appellant testified:
“[William] let go, and at that point, I noticed the blood and I had

5
to . . . act, so I flipped [William] down the stairs.” “He came
charging back up, and . . . tried to attack me again.”
Appellant, Webster, and William struggled on the stairs.
Webster “started to hit [William] again.” Appellant sat down
because he had a bad back and was unable to further engage in
the struggle. The next thing he remembered was seeing William
“lying face down on the stairs and there is blood everywhere.”
Webster was “kind of next to [William’s] body” and was holding
the hammer.
Appellant did not want William to die. He never hit
William with the hammer. But he admitted ownership of the
hammer. He testified that it “came from [his] laptop case.”
Appellant was impeached with prior felony convictions.
Worthing testified that she was inside the Marina Del Rey
home during the fight between appellant and William. Before
the fight began, she saw appellant grab a hammer. Appellant
then walked into the hallway where he angrily confronted
William and said, “ ‘Don’t disrespect my wife [referring to
Webster]. I told him not to disrespect my wife like that.’ ”
Worthing saw William “rush at” appellant, but could not see
what happened after that. She heard the fight but did not
witness it.
Codefendant Webster did not testify.
Substantial Evidence Supports the Theory that
Appellant Was the Direct Perpetrator of the Murder
In his opening brief appellant states: “[The prosecution]
presented two theories of first-degree murder: (1) [appellant was]
the direct perpetrator who hit William with the hammer, the act

6
that caused . . . death [record citation,]4 and (2) [he was] the aider
and abettor who aided and abetted Webster, the direct
perpetrator.” Appellant argues: “The jury rejected the direct
perpetrator theory when it found not true the allegation
[appellant] personally used a deadly weapon.” “There is no
substantial evidence supporting the prosecution’s aiding and
abetting theory . . . .”
In evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the
appellate “ ‘ “court must review the whole record in the light most
favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ”
(People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 277 (Ghobrial).) We
“presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.
[Citation.] ‘Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to
justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for
it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine
the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts
upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve
neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for
substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A reversal for
insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that
upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial

4 The prosecutor told the jury, “[Appellant] and Erica

Webster are what are known as the direct perpetrators, the ones
who committed the actual act that murdered William Webb.”

7
evidence to support” ’ the jury's verdict.” (People v. Zamudio
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
Appellant claims that, because the jury found “not true” the
personal use allegation as to him, the test for sufficiency of the
evidence is whether there is substantial evidence in support of
the aiding and abetting theory. The Court of Appeal rejected a
similar claim by the defendant in People v. Miranda (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 398 (Miranda). There, the jury found “ ‘not true’ ”
personal gun-use enhancement allegations. Based on this
finding, the defendant contended the jury “necessarily found
defendant guilty . . . only as an aider and abettor . . . . Stated in
the converse, the jury must have found defendant was not the
direct perpetrator of any of the crimes.” (Id., at p. 405.) The
Court of Appeal concluded that “under the inconsistent verdict
doctrine, the ‘not true’ finding on the personal use enhancements
does not inexorably lead to a finding that defendant was not the
direct perpetrator of the substantive offenses.” (Ibid.)
The Miranda court explained: “In part, section 954
provides: ‘An acquittal of one or more counts shall not be deemed
an acquittal of any other count.’ It is well established that, under
section 954, inconsistent verdicts are allowed to stand if the
verdicts are otherwise supported by substantial evidence.
[Citation.] ‘[A]ny verdict of guilty that is sufficiently certain is a
valid verdict even though the jury's action in returning it was, in
a legal sense, inconsistent with its action in returning another
verdict of acquittal or guilt of a different offense.’ [Citation.] The
rule applies equally to inconsistent enhancement findings
[citation], and to an enhancement finding that is inconsistent
with the verdict on a substantive offense [citation]. In [People v.
Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 656] the court explained,

8
‘ “Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review involves assessment by the
courts of whether the evidence adduced at trial could support any
rational determination of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Citations.] This review should be independent of the jury's
determination that evidence on another count was insufficient.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘An inconsistency may show no more than
jury lenity, compromise, or mistake, none of which undermines
the validity of a verdict. . . .’ ” (Miranda, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 405-406; accord, People v. Carter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th
831, 843; People v. Federico (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 20, 31-33.)
“ ‘[U]nless the testimony is physically impossible or
inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient
to support a conviction.’ ” (Ghobrial, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 281.)
The testimony of multiple witnesses supports the theory that
appellant was a direct perpetrator of the hammer blows that
caused William’s death. Appellant admitted that the hammer
belonged to him. Worthing saw appellant grab the hammer and
walk into the hallway where he angrily confronted William.
During appellant’s first conversation with Valentino, appellant
said “ ‘[h]e was going to nail [William] with a hammer.’ ” During
the second conversation, appellant said William was dead and
that he had “ ‘ “slipped him with a hammer.” ’ ” Appellant did not
tell Valentino that Webster had used the hammer. Appellant
mentioned Webster’s use of the hammer during his conversation
with the informant. But at the beginning of the conversation,
appellant said his “girl” did not see him “do it” and “won’t tell.”
Even if the jury had found appellant guilty of murder only
as an aider and abettor, substantial evidence would still have
supported the conviction. “Under a direct aider and abettor
liability theory, the prosecution must prove the person who is not

9
the actual killer ‘engaged in the requisite acts and had the
requisite intent’ to aid and abet the target crime of murder.
[Citation.] A direct aider and abettor’s ‘guilt is based on a
combination of the direct perpetrator’s acts and the aider and
abettor’s own acts and own mental state.’ ” (People v. Pacheco
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 118, 124.)
If Webster had solely inflicted the hammer blows to
William’s head, ample evidence shows that appellant engaged in
the requisite acts and had the requisite intent for liability as an
aider and abettor of murder. Appellant and Webster worked in
tandem to kill William. It is reasonable to infer that appellant
supplied Webster with the hammer for the purpose of killing
William. The hammer belonged to appellant, and he grabbed it
before he went into the hallway to confront William. Appellant
told the informant that, while Webster was hitting William with
the hammer, appellant “was choking [William] out” to the point
that he “was almost dead.” Appellant was “holding [William]
down” “the whole time” so that he could not defend himself.
It is also reasonable to infer that appellant knew and
intended that the 15 to 20 powerful hammer blows to the back of
William’s head would be fatal. Appellant testified that the blows
sounded as if Webster had “smashed a pumpkin or a
watermelon.” There was no need to inflict so may blows if they
had not intended to kill William.
Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding that
Appellant Premeditated and Deliberated the Murder
Appellant contends there is no substantial evidence that
appellant personally premeditated and deliberated the murder.
“ ‘Murder that is premeditated and deliberated is murder of the
first degree.’ [Citation.] The very definition of ‘premeditation’

10
encompasses the idea that a defendant thought about or
considered the act beforehand. ‘ “ ‘[P]remeditation’ means
thought over in advance,” ’ and ‘ “ ‘[d]eliberation’ refers to careful
weighing of considerations in forming a course of action . . . .” ’
[Citations.] ‘An intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate
if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection
rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.’ ” (People v. Pearson
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 443.)
Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that
appellant personally premeditated and deliberated the murder.
The jury reasonably inferred that, prior to the confrontation with
William in the hallway, appellant had planned to kill William
with the hammer. Valentino testified that, during the first
telephone conversation on the day William was killed, appellant
complained, “ ‘William kept bugging Erica [Webster], harassing
her for some money behind his back, trying to charge them to
stay [in the Marina Del Rey home] when they were guests from
the beginning.’ ” Appellant declared that “ ‘[h]e was going to nail
[William] with a hammer.’ ” Valentino warned appellant, “ ‘ “If
you use a hammer that is fucking murder, you idiot.” ’ ”
Before he went into the hallway to confront William,
appellant grabbed the hammer. It is reasonable to infer that he
intended to use the hammer against William, just as he had said
he would in the prior conversation with Valentino, despite
Valentino’s warning that he would be committing murder.
“ ‘ “ ‘Premeditation and deliberation can occur in a brief interval.
“The test is not time, but reflection. ‘Thoughts may follow each
other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be
arrived at quickly.’ ” ’ . . . ” ’ ” (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52
Cal.4th 1056, 1069.)

11
 Appellant told the informant that he had planned to kill
William. Appellant said: “That fool [William] was a fucking
rapist child molester, man.” The informant asked, “ ‘So when you
found out, you were like, ‘Fuck, I got to take him out’?” Appellant
replied, “Yeah.” Appellant said his “homie was gonna do it,
but . . . he didn’t make it in time, so we did it and fucking dealt
with it . . . .”
The People claim: “[I]n addition to appellant’s
acknowledgement that a plan in fact existed, there was
circumstantial evidence of another plan to kill William, which
appellant was aware of and in which he was to play a key role.
The goal of that plan was to prevent the close of escrow on the
[Marina Del Rey home] in late August 2019.” We need not
consider this additional theory of a plan to kill William.
Irrespective of whether such a plan existed, there is ample
evidence of premeditation and deliberation.
Appellant’s Brady Motion
Appellant notes that he “joined in Worthing’s request for
disclosure of Brady . . . information in police personnel files . . . .”
(Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83.) After conducting an in camera
hearing, the trial court ordered that three complaints be
disclosed. Appellant requests that we review the in camera
hearing “to determine whether the lower court abused its
discretion by concluding [that] there was no [other] relevant
discoverable Brady information to turn over to the defense.”
“ ‘Under Brady, . . . the prosecution must disclose to the
defense any evidence that is “favorable to the accused” and is
“material” on the issue of either guilt or punishment.’ [Citation.]
‘ “[E]vidence is favorable if it helps the defense or hurts the
prosecution, as by impeaching a prosecution witness.” ’ ”

12
(Schneider v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 613, 624
(Schneider).) “ ‘[E]vidence is “material” only if it is reasonably
probable a prosecution's outcome would have been different had
the evidence been disclosed.’ ” (Id., at p. 629.) “ ‘The requisite
“reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to
“undermine[] confidence in the outcome” on the part of the
reviewing court.’ ” (People v. Jimenez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 409,
418.)
“[A] citizen complaint that has been deemed unfounded
typically would not meet Brady’s . . . materiality standards.”
(Schneider, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 629.) “[W]hen a court
determines that an officer's personnel file contains Brady
information, by definition, the relevance of the material is not
‘minimal.’ Rather, the court has concluded that the information
has the potential to affect the outcome of the trial.” (Id., at
p. 631.)
We review the trial court’s Brady ruling for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442,
466.) “ ‘Discretion is abused whenever, in its exercise, the court
exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it
being considered. . . .’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2
Cal.3d 557, 566.)
We have reviewed the transcript of the in camera hearing.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling
that there was no discoverable Brady information in addition to
the three complaints that it ordered disclosed.
Correction of Abstract of Judgment
The abstract of judgment erroneously shows that appellant
was convicted of second degree murder. The People request that

13
the abstract be corrected to show that he was convicted of first
degree murder.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to
correct the abstract of judgment to show that appellant was
convicted of first degree murder. The trial court shall send a
certified copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

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 William L. Sadler, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Ana R. Duarte, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.