Filed 7/15/26 P. v. Landazuri CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B343499

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24WCCF00383)
v.

ADRIAN LANDAZURI,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Reversed.
Monique Hemli-Munoz, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
 A jury convicted Adrian Landazuri of second degree
robbery. Before Landazuri’s trial, the People moved to admit
incriminating statements Landazuri made to police officers when
they arrived at the scene and questioned Landazuri. Landazuri
objected to the admission of his statements on the ground that
the officers obtained them in violation of Miranda v. Arizona
(1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). The trial court admitted the
statements, finding that Landazuri was not in custody when he
made them and therefore Miranda advisements were
unnecessary. We hold that the officers’ questioning of Landazuri
was a custodial interrogation and reverse the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the late morning of April 14, 2024, Gelacio Gallardo was
selling flowers on a street corner. Gallardo’s customers paid in
cash, which he kept in his pants pocket. Gallardo saw Landazuri
every day sleeping at the nearby bus stop, but they never had any
interaction. Gallardo testified that on that morning Landazuri
approached him and asked Gallardo for money in an aggressive
and “abusive voice,” grabbed Gallardo by his sleeve and took
money from Gallardo’s pocket. After taking the money,
Landazuri returned to the bus stop. Gallardo testified that
around $80 had been taken. Gallardo called 911, but gave the
operator a false name.
Officer Garcia responded to the 911 call, and on arriving at
the scene, detained Landazuri at the bus stop. Officer Ortega
also responded to the scene and spoke to Gallardo and then to
Landazuri. The officers’ body-worn cameras recorded their

2
interaction with Landazuri, and the video was played for the
jury. The transcript from the exchange is reproduced here:1
Officer Ortega: Adrian, Adrian, Adrian, man. Uhm,
so you took money from the gentleman, okay. All he
wants is his money back. If not, he’s gonna press
charges. So that’s why I was trying to get your
statement. Now, what is your statement? You’re not
under arrest right now.

[Landazuri]: He said that?

Officer Ortega: Yeah, standing over there I spoke to
him. So I’m asking you, you’re not under arrest,
okay? I’m asking you what happened, man. And if
it’s true, all he wants is his money back. Okay?
Whatever you’re going through, okay? But it’s one
thing going to jail and whether or not you have a
chance. So, what do you wanna do? You’re not under
arrest. Would you like to give me a statement? Or
just return the money and we are good. What do
you wanna do Adrian? Think about it.

[Landazuri]: Where’s your, uh, your chief at? Or
whatever it’s called.

Officer Ortega: I don’t need one right now.

[Landazuri]: Well, I’m asking for one.

1 A transcript of the body-worn video was produced at the
hearing regarding the exclusion of Landazuri’s statement. Upon
the court’s independent review of the video, we identified several
statements that were uttered on the video but not included in the
transcription. These statements are denoted in bold italics.

3
Officer Ortega: Okay, well you get one after you get
arrested. Is that what you wanna do? I’m just trying
to have a conversation.

[Landazuri]: I want him right now before I get
arrested. That’s why you call him.

Officer Ortega: No man, you’re detained. Okay?
Right? So, can I look through your bag?

[Landazuri]: No.

Officer Ortega: No? You don’t give me permission to
go through your bag?

[Landazuri]: No.

Officer Ortega: Okay. Stand by real quick.

Officer Garcia: What?

Officer Ortega: Stand by with him. Are you saying
you want to speak to my supervisor as well?

[Landazuri]: [inaudible]

Officer Ortega: Charges? You got theft on a person.
Possible 211. So. I said we have theft on a person.
You went in his pockets. You had him turn around
and you said, “give me your money.” Okay? You
went into his pockets and you took his money.

[Landazuri]: He said that?

Officer Ortega: I told you three times already.

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[Landazuri]: I’m asking you if that’s what he said.

Officer Ortega: Yeah. So what do you wanna do?
You don’t want to speak on it? Cool.

[Landazuri]: So, should I return his money then or
what?

Officer Garcia: Do whatever you want. You have his
money?

[Landazuri]: What’s he walking away for?

Officer Garcia: What?

[Landazuri]: What’s he walking away for?

Officer Garcia: Bro, we don’t have all day. Do you
have his money yes or no?

[Landazuri]: He just asked him what happened. He
said nothing.

Officer Garcia: How much did you take? You didn’t
count it? Hey, do you have his money? Where do you
have his money, in your right pocket or your left
pocket?

[Landazuri]: Left pocket.

Officer Garcia: Your left pocket?

[Landazuri]: I have money in my left pocket.

Officer Garcia: Do you have his money in your left
pocket?

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 [Landazuri]: I have money in my left pocket.

Officer Garcia: Alright, go ahead and stand up.
Stand up.

Officer Ortega: Does that money belong to you?
The officers handcuffed Landazuri and walked him to the
police vehicle where he was searched. Officers took money out of
Landazuri’s pocket, amounting to $56.
Landazuri was tried for second degree robbery (Pen. Code,
§ 211). Before trial, the People moved to admit statements
Landazuri made to Officers Garcia and Ortega when they arrived
at the scene. The defense objected to admission of the statements
on the ground they were obtained in violation of Landazuri’s
Miranda rights. At the hearing on the motion, the People offered
the trial court the opportunity to review the transcript of the
body-worn camera. The court did not review the transcript or the
video but relied on counsels’ representations of the interaction to
determine whether the statements were to be excluded.
The People represented that officers arrived at the scene
about 15 minutes after the robbery. The officers approached
Landazuri, who was at a bus stop, and told him he was being
detained but was not under arrest. With respect to the
circumstances of the questioning, Landazuri noted that the
interaction took place while he was “seated on the bus bench with
two officers standing right in front of him [¶] . . . [and that] at one
point one of the officers leaves to go down the block to talk to the
victim and he tells the other officer, ‘stay here with him.’ ”
In response to the trial court’s question as to the nature of
the questioning, Landazuri stated that the officers went “directly

6
to the object of the investigation, the money. There was really no
other discussion other than that.” When the court questioned the
People how this would not qualify as a custodial interrogation
under those facts, the People responded that the officers “were
merely at that time attempting to gather information about what
might have occurred. [¶] . . . I don’t know that they ever actually
asked, ‘Do you have his money,’ they say, ‘Oh, would you like to
give me a statement? Would you like to just return the money?
What would you like to do? You can think about it.’ [¶] . . . As for
when the one officer does ask, ‘Where is his money,’ that is only
after the defendant has said, ‘Should I just turn over the money?’
He goes ‘Well, where is it? Which pocket is it in?’ And that’s
when the defendant says it’s in his left pocket. It’s only at that
point in time that I believe the officers have gathered enough
evidence to then later arrest the defendant.”
The trial court found that the question was “close,” but
“there was [not] enough to show that he was in custody as
opposed to simply being detained for purposes of an investigatory
questioning.” The court noted that “[i]t would have been different
had the officers . . . [done] some type of felony detention after
being advised by the alleged victim that [they were] robbed.”
Based on the trial court’s understanding of the interaction, it
concluded that “[i]t appears to be more of an investigation step to
find out more or less what happened as opposed to focusing on
the defendant as the actual perpetrator and so I cannot make
that step that it’s a custodial situation.” The trial court observed
that the officers’ questions were “designed to elicit incriminating
responses” and were not limited to “can you tell us what
happened, if he was directly accused of having money purportedly
taken from the victim. So this went beyond a what happened

7
type of inquiry as opposed to an accusatory type of inquiry. [¶]
But, again, the detention still doesn’t turn it into an
investigation—a custodial situation. So I think one tier has been
satisfied, but the other has not and for those reasons these
statements are admissible without a Miranda advisement.”
Gallardo testified at trial. Appellant introduced Officer
Ortega’s recorded interview with Gallardo in which he stated
that Landazuri “actually, . . . didn’t even touch me. All he did
[was] he took money from me.” He also admitted to having
provided a false name when he called 911. Officer Ortega also
testified, and the People introduced the body-worn camera video
of Landazuri’s exchange with police and played it multiple times
during the trial.
A jury convicted Landazuri of second degree robbery. On
January 17, 2025, the trial court sentenced Landazuri to the low
term of two years in prison.
DISCUSSION

I. Standard of review
To “give force to the Constitution’s [Fifth Amendment]
protection against compelled self-incrimination,” a custodial
interrogation must be preceded by Miranda warnings and the
suspect’s voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of Miranda
rights. (Florida v. Powell (2010) 559 U.S. 50, 59; People v.
Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 530–531.) Persons in custody
thus must be warned that they have the right to remain silent,
any statement made may be used as evidence against them, and
they have the right to an attorney. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at
p. 444.) For Miranda purposes, “ ‘interrogation’ ” means “express
questioning” or “words or actions on the part of the police (other
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the

8
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.” (Rhode Island v. Innis
(1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301, fn. omitted.)
A custodial interrogation occurs when a reasonable person
in the defendant’s position would feel that their freedom has been
deprived in any significant way; for example, a formal arrest or a
restraint of movement of the degree associated with formal
arrest. (California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121, 1125; People
v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 491.) When there has been “no
formal arrest, the question is how a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would have understood [their] situation.
[Citation.] All the circumstances of the interrogation are relevant
to this inquiry, including the location, length and form of the
interrogation, the degree to which the investigation was focused
on the defendant, and whether any indicia of arrest were
present.” (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 395.) “Whether
a person is in custody ‘depends on the objective circumstances of
the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either
the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.’ ”
(People v. Torres (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 162, 172 (Torres).)
On appeal, “we accept the trial court’s findings of historical
fact if supported by substantial evidence but independently
determine whether the interrogation was ‘custodial.’ ” (People v.
Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1161 (Aguilera).) Where, as
here, an interview is recorded, “the facts surrounding the
admission are undisputed and subject to our independent
review.” (Torres, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 173.)
If the court determines that the trial court admitted
statements obtained in violation of Miranda, it then must
determine whether such error is harmless beyond a reasonable

9
doubt, such that the jury would not have reached a different
result had the trial court excluded the challenged statements.
(People v. Caro, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 493, 495 [applying
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, standard to
Miranda violation].)

II. Analysis
A. Landazuri was in custody
When the court considers whether an individual was in
custody during their questioning, it looks at “the interplay and
combined effect of all the circumstances to determine whether on
balance they created a coercive atmosphere such that a
reasonable person would have experienced a restraint
tantamount to an arrest.” (Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1162.) The courts have articulated a number of non-exhaustive
factors to consider when conducting this analysis. The relevant
factors include: (1) “whether contact . . . was initiated by the
police or the person interrogated, and if by the police, whether
the person voluntarily agreed to an interview”; (2) “whether the
express purpose of the interview was to question the person as a
witness or a suspect”; (3) location of the interview; (4) whether
police informed the person they were under arrest or in custody;
(5) whether they informed the person they were free to terminate
the interview and leave at any time; (6) “whether there were
restrictions on the person’s freedom of movement during the
interview”; (7) length of the interrogation; (8) “how many police
officers participated”; (9) “whether they dominated and controlled
the course of the interrogation”; (10) “whether they manifested a
belief that the person was culpable and they had evidence to
prove it”; (11) “whether the police were aggressive,
confrontational, and/or accusatory”; (12) “whether the police used

10
interrogation techniques to pressure the suspect”; and
13) “whether the person was arrested at the end of the
interrogation.” (Ibid.)
After a consideration of these factors, the court concludes
that the totality of the circumstances reflect that Landazuri was
in custody.
1. Whether law enforcement initiated contact
or if person voluntarily agreed to an
interview
The circumstances are less likely to suggest to an
individual that they are unable to leave or end the questioning
when they voluntarily subject themselves to such an
examination. (People v. Potter (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 528, 541
[holding that the defendant was not in custody when he
voluntarily came to the police station for an interview]; People v.
Torres, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 173 [defendant’s agreement to
be voluntarily interviewed in unmarked police car weighed
against a custodial finding].) In this case, the officers approached
Landazuri as he sat on a bus stop bench and informed him that
he was detained. They immediately began questioning Landazuri
and did not ask if he wanted to speak to them nor did they extend
an invitation to speak with him in another location. This was not
a voluntary encounter for Landazuri and the initiation by
officers, coupled with the other factors present here, weighs in
favor of a finding that he was in custody during his questioning.
2. Whether the express purpose was to
question the person as a suspect or as a
witness
A custodial interrogation does not occur where an officer
detains a suspect for investigation and limits questioning to the

11
purpose of identification or obtaining sufficient information to
confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions that a crime has
occurred. (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 180; People v.
Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 679–680.)
Officer Ortega’s first words to Landazuri were, “[S]o you
took money from the gentleman . . . [a]ll he wants is his money
back. If not, he’s gonna press charges. So that’s why I was trying
to get your statement. Now, what is your statement.” He later
specifically told Landazuri that he was suspected of “theft on a
person” and asserted that Landazuri “went in [Gallardo’s]
pockets and . . . took his money.” Officer Ortega also conveyed
that he had the victim’s statement asserting that Landazuri
committed the act. These statements demonstrated that the
officers’ express purpose in questioning Landazuri was as a
suspect, not a potential witness.
It is worth noting that the trial court’s determination that
Landazuri was not in custody was swayed by its understanding,
based on the People’s representation, that the officers did not
begin their questioning with Landazuri as a suspect but were
“merely . . . attempting to gather information about what might
have occurred.” The body-worn camera captured a much
different exchange. Given the trial court’s recognition that this
was a “close” case even without the benefit of the correct record of
the officers’ statements, it is likely that it would have come to a
different conclusion had it considered an accurate picture of
Landazuri’s interaction with the officers.

12
 3. Whether the officers manifested a belief
that the person was guilty and had
evidence to prove it
The mere fact that an individual is a suspect is not enough
to foster a custodial environment; the officers’ suspicion must also
be communicated to that person for it to factor into the custody
determination. (People v. Vasquez (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1158,
1163—1164 (Vasquez); see also Torres, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at
p. 176 [holding that officers’ expressed “belief that [the
defendant] was culpable and they had evidence to prove it”
weighed in favor of custody determination].) “ ‘ “The awareness
of the person being questioned by an officer that . . . the police
have ample cause to arrest him, may well lead him to conclude,
as a reasonable person, that he is not free to leave, and that he
has been significantly deprived of his freedom.” ’ ” (People v.
Saldana (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 432, 458 (Saldana).)
As already discussed, the officers’ belief that Landazuri was
a suspect was clearly conveyed through their statements. They
even went so far as to identify the Penal Code section they
believed that he violated and told him that they had evidence—
the victim’s statement—supporting that charge. These
statements clearly would have made Landazuri aware that he
was the subject of the investigation and that the police were not
simply questioning him to determine what occurred or as a
potential witness.

13
 4. Where the interview took place
An interview that takes place in public within view of any
passersby reduces the ability of an unscrupulous officer to use
illegitimate means to elicit incriminating responses and should
lessen a suspect’s fear of abuse should they not cooperate.
(Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 438.) Courts have
also recognized that traffic stops and other investigatory street
detentions are generally understood as temporary and therefore
less likely to make individuals feel as though they are not free to
leave. (Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165 [Miranda
warnings not required for brief investigatory stops “because the
restraint on liberty often occurs in a nonthreatening or
noncompulsive public environment and its duration is limited”];
Vasquez, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1163–1164 [questioning
was not custodial where defendant stopped “on a public street in
broad daylight”].) Despite this presumption, courts have also
found that interviews taking place in settings that occur outside
of the closed doors of an interrogation room—including on public
streets or in an individual’s own home—are custodial where the
totality of the circumstances indicate that the person was in
custody.
Landazuri’s interview took place on a public street, as he
was seated on a bus stop bench in a structure open in the front
but enclosed on the sides, back and top. While the public nature
of the interaction lessened the likelihood that inappropriate
investigative tactics would be used by the officers, the fact that it
took place in a partially enclosed structure and that the officers’
physical positions prevented him from exiting the situation
undermines the presumption that on the street interactions are
inherently transitory and noncustodial.

14
 5. Whether law enforcement informed the
person that they were under arrest or in
custody
Officer Ortega told Landazuri that he was “not under
arrest right now,” but did state that he was being “detained.” It
has “ ‘never been the law that a police officer can insulate an
otherwise clearly custodial interrogation from Miranda’s reach
simply by telling a suspect that he or she is “not under arrest.” ’ ”
(Torres, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 174, citing Smith v. Clark
(9th Cir. 2015) 804 F.3d 983, 988.) Rather, we “ ‘must consider
the delivery of these statements within the context of the scene
as a whole.’ ” (Saldana, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th 432, 457 (quoting
United States v. Craighead (9th Cir. 2008) 539 F.3d 1073, 1088.)
In this instance, Landazuri was detained after having been
approached by two officers who initiated the questioning and
clearly conveyed that he was suspected of a crime. Additionally,
Officer Ortega also directed Officer Garcia to remain with
Landazuri when he walked away to speak with Gallardo, further
suggesting in both words and actions to Landazuri that he was in
the custody of the police and not free to end the interaction,
notwithstanding the absence of a clear statement that he was
under arrest.
6. Whether the officers informed the person
that they were free to terminate interview
and leave at any time
The officers never conveyed to Landazuri that he was free
to leave. Similar to the advisement that an individual is not
under arrest, “ ‘[t]he mere recitation of the statement that the
subject is free to leave or terminate the interview . . . does not
render an interrogation non-custodial per se.’ ” (Saldana, supra,

15
19 Cal.App.5th at p. 457 (quoting United States v. Craighead,
supra, 539 F.3d at p. 1088.) However, in this case, Landazuri did
not receive that notice. (See Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p.
1164 [noting officers’ failure to advise the defendant that they
were free to leave weighed in favor of custodial finding].)
7. Whether there were restrictions on the
person’s freedom of movement
Whether an individual’s movements have been restrained
obviously heavily influences the assessment whether the
individual reasonably believes they are free to leave. While a
formal arrest is not necessary for a custodial finding, the type of
restrictions relevant here are those that impose physical
limitations on an individual’s freedom. (Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th
at p. 395 [“Custody consists of a formal arrest or a restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal
arrest”].) The loss of freedom thus refers specifically to freedom
of “physical movement,” not the effects of other coercive factors on
an individual’s will. (TRW, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 25
Cal.App.4th 1834, 1850 [recognizing “freedom of action refers to
freedom of physical movement,” and rejecting argument that
“intimidating circumstances” for reasons such as potential job
loss or general interview pressures can trigger a custodial
finding].)
While Landazuri was not handcuffed, he was approached
while sitting on a bus bench by two officers who stood close to
him and whose positions prevented Landazuri from exiting the
interaction. It is unlikely that a reasonable person would have
felt that they were free to stand and walk through the
interviewing officers in order to exit the scene. Officer Ortega’s
direction to Officer Garcia to remain with Landazuri while

16
Officer Ortega stepped away further underscores that the officers’
physical presence was used to convey to Landazuri that he was
not free to leave.
8. How long the interrogation lasted
The length of an interrogation is relevant to the custody
analysis because, in general, longer interrogations more strongly
convey that one is not at liberty to terminate the questioning
until they provide their interrogators with the desired response.
(Berkemer v. McCarty, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 437.) “The longer the
period of questioning, the more likely it will be found to be
coercive and custodial, although even one question may be
enough in the proper circumstances.” (People v. Herdan (1974) 42
Cal.App.3d 300, 307, fn. 12 (Herdan).)
The relatively short duration of Landazuri’s interaction with
the officers—around six minutes—was not on its own long
enough to cause a reasonable person to infer that they were not
free to leave. However, “case law provides no bright-line rules
regarding how long an interrogation must proceed before its
duration is more consistent with custody than not.” (Saldana,
supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 463 [interrogation for less than an
hour held custodial]; see also In re Anthony L. (2019) 43
Cal.App.5th 438, 446–447 [20-minute interview held custodial];
People v. Davidson (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 966, 972–973 [two-
minute detention held not custodial]; Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at
pp. 402–403 [one hour 45 minute long interview at police station
held not custodial]; Vasquez, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164
[brief stop with single question not custodial]; Sims, supra, 109
Cal.App.3d at pp. 904–905 [brief stop with two questions held
custodial].) In an “otherwise close case where duration might
serve as a tipping point, [however] the more significant factor is

17
the nature of the questioning, the character and quality of the
interaction between law enforcement and the person being
interrogated.” (Saldana, at p. 463.) In a case that did not have
as many other objective indicia of custody, the relatively brief
period of questioning might have tipped the scales against
finding that a reasonable person would have believed they were
not free to leave. However, in the absence of any bright line rule
precluding a custody finding for questioning of this length, this
factor does not outweigh the factors that support a custody
finding.
9. How many officers participated
The number of officers involved in the questioning of a
defendant is relevant because, “[l]ogically, the fewer the number
of officers surrounding a suspect the less likely the suspect will
be affected by custodial pressures.” (People v. Bejasa (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 26, 36.) The ratio of officers to suspects may
therefore impact whether a reasonable person would feel free to
terminate an interaction with the police. (People v. Pilster (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403.) Landazuri was confronted by two
officers. This two-to-one ratio has repeatedly been found by
courts to weigh in favor of a custodial finding, with a one-to-one
ratio weighing in the opposite direction. (Compare Torres, supra,
25 Cal.App.5th at p. 176 [interview with two officers deemed
custodial] with Saldana, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 459
[recognizing that questioning by only one officer weighed against
a custody finding]; Vasquez, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163
[same].) The trial court also acknowledged that the two officers
approaching Landazuri “appears to be somewhat of a show of
force.” We agree. The two-to-one ratio here, while not sufficient

18
on its own, was more apt to convey that Landazuri was in custody
than that he was free to leave.
10. Whether the police dominated and
controlled the interrogation
Miranda concerned itself with combating the
“ ‘psychological pressures “which work to undermine the
individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely,” ’ which are created by . . . [a]
‘ “police-dominated atmosphere.” ’ ” (Saldana, supra, 19
Cal.App.5th at pp. 454–455.) Courts have found that police
dominated in cases, for instance, where they repeatedly rejected
the suspect’s claims of innocence or suggested that the
questioning would continue until the suspect admits or explains
their guilt. (Id. at pp. 459–460; People v. NavaAdame (2025) 116
Cal.App.5th 1, 21 (NavaAdame).)
The record does not reflect that the officers dominated their
encounter to the same degree as in Saldana or Aguilera where
the officers dismissed repeated denials; however, the totality of
the interaction—from the officers’ physical confrontation of
Landazuri to their accusatory questioning—demonstrates that
the situation was controlled by the police, not Landazuri.
Further, during the exchange, Landazuri asks to speak with a
“chief,” and this request is denied by Officer Ortega who says “I
don’t need one right now.” The People argue that Landazuri’s
requests for the officers’ “chief” demonstrates that Landazuri was
not intimidated by the officers. However, this request is one of
the first statements made by Landazuri, and it is rejected by
Officer Ortega whose answer indicates that whether a
supervising officer will be called is dependent on Officer Ortega’s
assessment of the need for such an officer, not at the request of

19
Landazuri. This exchange is more reasonably interpreted as an
expression by the officers that they are controlling the scene and
requests by the suspect will not be accommodated than as
evidence of Landazuri’s perceived freedom of movement.
11. Whether the police were aggressive,
confrontational and/or accusatory
“[O]n the issue of custody, courts consider highly significant
whether the questioning was brief, polite, and courteous or
lengthy, aggressive, confrontational, threatening, intimidating,
and accusatory.” (Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164.)
They recognize that “ ‘[a]ccusatory questioning is more likely to
communicate to a reasonable person in the position of the
suspect, that he is not free to leave’ than would general and
neutral investigatory questions.” (Ibid.; People v. Farnam, supra,
28 Cal.4th at p. 180.)
As already discussed, the officers first approached
Landazuri by asserting that he had taken Gallardo’s money.
Their questioning was consistent with the position that the
officers believed him to be guilty of theft: “[Y]ou took money from
the gentleman . . . . So that’s why I was trying to get your
statement. Now, what is your statement?” “You went into his
pockets and you took his money . . . . So, what do you wanna do?
You don’t want to speak on it?” “Where do you have his money,
in your right pocket or your left pocket?” It was solely focused on
the crime and clearly accusatory toward Landazuri, not merely
geared to identifying who Landazuri was or discerning whether
there was a competing version of events that would negate a
crime in the first instance. (See, e.g., Sims, supra, 109
Cal.App.3d at p. 905 [asking suspect twice where the contraband
was located “was highly accusatory”]; compare Herdan, supra, 42

20
Cal.App.3d at p. 308 [being approached and questioned by two
officers and being asked one question that was “clearly intended
to elicit an incriminating admission [¶] . . . indicate[d] that
appellant was in custody at the time of arrest [and] that he was
not free to leave”]; with NavaAdame, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at
p. 18 [reasonable person would have felt free to terminate an
interview where the officer “spent much of the time listening to
[defendant] freely narrate matters . . . [citation] . . . [while the
officer] maintained an inquisitive and nonaggressive tone”].)
While the officers in this case were respectful and not
aggressive, “a pleasant and conversational tone of voice does not
negate the inherently coercive nature of this interrogation in the
absence of Miranda warnings.” (Saldana, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th
at p. 460.) The accusatory nature of the questioning therefore
renders it less likely that Landazuri would have felt free to end
the questioning.
12. Whether the police used interrogation
techniques to pressure the person
The mere utilization of interrogation techniques is not
evidence of improper police conduct, but when employed during a
custodial interrogation in the absence of a Miranda warning,
there is concern that any statements so procured may be
involuntary at best and false at worst. (Saldana, supra, 19
Cal.App.5th at p. 460 [“These tactics are not unusual, nor are
they unreasonable. In fact, if Saldana had been properly
Mirandized and made the same confession, it might be called
good police work”]; In re Elias V. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 568
(Elias V.) [“The foundational theses of Miranda are that ‘the
modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically
rather than physically oriented’ . . . and the psychological

21
techniques now employed by interrogators ‘trade[ ] on the
weakness of individuals,’ and ‘may even give rise to a false
confession’ ” (citation omitted)].)
While the relatively brief length of the encounter
necessarily limited the officers’ ability to employ any
interrogation techniques, Landazuri argues that the officers used
the technique known as “ ‘maximization/minimization’ . . .
designed to convey two things. The first is ‘the interrogator’s
rock-solid belief that the suspect is guilty’ . . . [and the second]
‘communicates by implication that leniency in punishment is
forthcoming upon confession.’ ” (Elias V., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th
at p. 583.) He asserts this is evident from the officers’ first
approach when they assert unequivocally that he took Gallardo’s
money and then tell him his options are to give a statement or
“return the money and we are good.” While this iteration of the
technique was not as extreme as those recounted in other cases,
it is present nonetheless. The officers’ framing of Landazuri’s
choices is strategically designed to ensure that he believes his
options are limited and to encourage him to respond in an
inculpatory manner. This therefore weighs in favor of a finding
that Landazuri was subject to a custodial interrogation.
13. Whether the person was arrested at the
end of the questioning
When an officer arrests an individual at the end of the
interaction this may be additional evidence that an individual
correctly perceived that they were not free to leave, and weighs in
favor of finding that the stop was custodial. (Saldana, supra, 19
Cal.App.5th at p. 461 [custody finding where defendant arrested
a few minutes after inculpatory statements]; People v. Potter,
supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at pp. 542, 539 [no custody finding where

22
defendant arrested three days after police interview].) That
Landazuri was arrested at the end of his questioning is therefore
another factor weighing in favor of finding that the stop was
custodial.
B. Landazuri was interrogated
The protections provided by Miranda apply only to
custodial interrogations. “ ‘[T]he term “interrogation” under
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any
words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect.” (People v. Zapata (2026) 118
Cal.App.5th 529, 538 (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446
U.S. at p. 301).) Volunteered statements, for instance, that were
not made in response to police questioning are not the product of
an interrogation and thus not inadmissible under Miranda even
when the statements were made while in custody. (People v.
Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 648.) Where a defendant seeks to
exclude statements made in the absence of a Miranda
advisement, they must therefore establish both that the police
questioning was an interrogation and that it occurred while the
individual was in custody.
The trial court found based on its understanding of the
conversation that Landazuri’s interaction with the officers was
an interrogation. We agree, and this is even more apparent upon
review of the complete exchange. The officers expressly ask
Landazuri questions that required an incriminating response,
such as Officer Garcia’s inquiry, “Where do you have his money,
in your right pocket or your left pocket?” Landazuri’s statements
were not volunteered and were directly responsive to the officers’
inquiries. The officers’ questioning constituted an interrogation.

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 C. The admission of Landazuri’s statements was
prejudicial
After concluding that Landazuri’s non-Mirandized
statement was inadmissible, the court must now determine
whether its admission was harmless error and did not impact the
jury’s guilty verdict. “That is, we assess ‘ “whether it appears
‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” “To say that an error did not
contribute to the verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in
relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in
question.” ’ ” (NavaAdame, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at pp. 21–22,
citations omitted.) On the trial record, we must conclude that the
inclusion of Landazuri’s testimony was prejudicial.
“A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, ‘the
defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and
damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.’ ” (Arizona
v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 296.) In this case, Gallardo’s
testimony was the only evidence against Landazuri other than
Landazuri’s statement. The People expressly relied on
Landazuri’s statements to establish that a theft occurred. They
played the video of Landazuri’s statements multiple times during
trial and cited Landazuri’s statement, “left pocket,” as an
admission of the theft. They also cited Landazuri’s question, “Is
that what he said?” in response to Officer Ortega’s statement that
Gallardo said Landazuri had gone “into his pockets and . . . took
his money,” as an adoptive admission. The People clearly relied
heavily on Landazuri’s statement, and we cannot say that in the
absence of this statement the jury would have come to the same
conclusion. (Compare with People v. Pilster, supra, 138
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1406–1407 [finding no prejudice from

24
admission of defendant’s statement where the prosecution never
argued that the jury should consider defendant’s statement and
additional evidence including third-party eyewitness testimony
was introduced].)
The People did introduce photos of the $56 found on
Landazuri and expressly argued that this amount was “around
the same” as what Gallardo testified had been taken. However,
possession of money—particularly money in an amount that
differed from what the victim claimed had been stolen—is not on
its own evidence of any crime. Without evidence or argument
supporting the inference that this theft was the only likely source
of the money, Landazuri’s possession of $56 is not such
persuasive evidence of any crime that it would render admission
of his statement harmless error.
Both parties acknowledge that Landazuri’s primary
argument at trial was that the People had not established that
Landazuri took the money through force or fear. Landazuri’s
statements, as reflected in the video, did not include any direct
admissions regarding the use of force or fear. Indeed, even his
statements that could be interpreted as an admission of theft
were relatively ambiguous. Nonetheless, Landazuri’s own
statements that can be construed as an admission of theft likely
bolstered the jury’s assessment of Gallardo’s testimony,
particularly where there appeared to be inconsistencies. (See,
e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 298 [holding
that admission of confession was not harmless where the “jury’s
assessment of the confession to [the witness] could easily have
depended in large part on the presence of the [illegal confession].
Absent the admission . . . the jurors might have found [the
witness’s] story unbelievable”].) Moreover, in the absence of

25
Landazuri’s inculpatory statements, he could have made a
completely different argument at trial that did not solely focus on
the element of force or fear. We therefore cannot find that the
admission of Landazuri’s statements was harmless error.
(Torres, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 181 [finding prejudice where
there were no witnesses or physical evidence and defendant’s
non-Mirandized statements was primary evidence].) Accordingly,
we must reverse.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

OCHOA, J.*

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

ADAMS, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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