Filed 7/15/26 P. v. Chavez CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F087667
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF187877A)
v.

ADRIAN CHAVEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Charles R.
Brehmer, Judge.
Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Amanda D. Cary and
Jesica Gonzalez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
 INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant Adrian Chavez (defendant) of premeditated murder of
Marilyn Cuervo (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), count 1) (Cuervo murder) and premeditated
murder of Crystal Hernandez (id., § 187, subd. (a), count 2) (Hernandez murder). The
cases were joined before trial and the trial court denied the defense’s motion to sever the
charges and to exclude evidence of either murder against the other under Evidence
Code section 1101, subdivision (b).1 The jury also found true a multiple-murder
special-circumstance allegation (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). In a bifurcated
proceeding, the court found true multiple aggravating factors. The court sentenced
defendant to two consecutive life terms without the possibility of parole.
In this appeal, defendant challenges the denial of his motion to sever the murder
charges, and he argues joinder resulted in “gross unfairness.” He also argues insufficient
evidence supports the premeditation and deliberation findings as to each count.
We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Prosecution Evidence
October 2020 Murder of Marilyn Cuervo
On October 12, 2020, at approximately 8:00 a.m., a team of four people from
CalRecycle were preparing to investigate a landfill in a dirt field near Daniels Lane in
Bakersfield. The field was littered with waste and there were small homeless
encampments and homeless people around. At some point, the team approached a
concrete structure and noticed there appeared to be a person wrapped in a blanket asleep
in the structure approximately 25 feet away; they did not disturb the individual.
Bakersfield Code Enforcement Officer Billy Owens arrived, and the group told him
someone appeared to be asleep in the structure. Owens went to investigate. He “could

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.

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obviously see dried blood on the head that was sticking out from under the covers.”
Owens backed up and told the CalReycle people they could not be in the area. He called
the police. A few minutes later, the police arrived.
Officer Anthony Manriquez, one of the responding officers, testified he observed a
person’s head sticking out of the west wall. The face had blood on it and there were
lacerations on the individual’s forehead near the hairline. The individual appeared to
have a black eye. The person was covered in a blanket and old carpets were stacked on
top of the body. The person was not moving or breathing and, based on his training and
experience, Manriquez presumed that the individual was deceased. The police ultimately
identified the woman as Marilyn Cuervo. Cuervo’s arms were crossed over her chest
when she was found. Multiple videos were taken documenting the scene, surrounding
debris, and Cuervo’s body as it was found. The prosecution also introduced photographs
of Cuervo’s body after it was uncovered from “multiple debris.” Cuervo’s shirt was
pulled up and her pants were pulled partially down to midthigh. There was “[s]ome form
of a rag” in her crotch area.
The police cordoned off the crime scene area and documented the shoe sizes of the
individuals present from CalRecycle, Owens, and the police officers at the scene. The
police photographed and seized items located at the scene including a piece of wood and
multiple sticks with apparent blood on them, a white rock with apparent blood on it,
cardboard with apparent blood spatter on it, a brick with apparent blood on it, a possible
blood trail, blood on a blue plant, a beige and white pillow with apparent blood on it, a
black wheelchair, a mattress and box spring, and brown cardboard with apparent blood
and white clothing. They swabbed the stains on some of the items that appeared to have
blood on them. An individual from the Kern County Sheriff’s Coroner Office moved
Cuervo’s body. There was a wooden stick found underneath her with blood on it that the
police thought could possibly have been used to create the lacerations on her body.

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 Mariam M., who appeared to be transient, approached the police at the scene and
began speaking to Manriquez. The police took photographs of Mariam’s shoes and hands
and collected a DNA sample from her. Mariam testified she lived in her trailer in a field
at Union and Brundage on October 12, 2020. That day, Mariam went to the area where
the police were to take a pizza to her friend, Marilyn; Mariam did not know Marilyn’s
last name. She met Marilyn five days earlier outside of a pizza restaurant where Marilyn
was sitting and asking for money. Mariam would bring Marilyn food three times a day
because Marilyn was pregnant. Marilyn had the baby approximately two days before
Mariam came in contact with the police. Mariam saw several adult Hispanic males
approach Marilyn and ask her if she had something to smoke days earlier. They harassed
Marilyn in the five or six days that Mariam was with her. Mariam told the lead detective
on the case, Frank McIntyre, that she had last seen Marilyn on October 9, 2020; they
spent the night in the structure in the field where Cuervo was later found. Mariam
testified she had been using crystal methamphetamine for five years.
A sexual assault response team (SART) exam was conducted on Cuervo’s body on
October 12, 2020. Cuervo’s body was examined from head to toe; buccal and vaginal
swabs were taken; and her injuries were documented. Cuervo had abrasions to the left
side of her hip and bruising to her left forearm and elbow and her right arm. There were
three to four puncture wounds on her head near the hairline and her eyebrow. Cuervo
also had abrasions on the back of her right thigh and the lower portion of her right leg.
The exam did not reveal any injuries to the genitals or buttocks that were consistent with
sexual assault.
Dr. Robert Whitmore conducted an autopsy on Cuervo’s body on October 15,
2020 in the presence of members of law enforcement. He noticed parts of Cuervo’s skin
had a brown discoloration that is characteristic of being exposed to sunlight postmortem.
There were lacerations, which refers to tearing of the skin resulting from blunt force
trauma, on the top, back, and right sides of the scalp, around and on the ear, and on the

4.
upper face. These lacerations went to the bone, suggesting to Whitmore “[t]hat the
implement is linear,” such as a piece of wood or a brick. There were also lacerations to
Cuervo’s lips, bruising around her eyes, bruising on her right cheek, abrasions on both
cheeks, and contusions or blunt force injuries to her head. Fourteen of Cuervo’s ribs
were fractured and there was bleeding in the soft tissue around each fracture, some of
which was significant. Whitmore opined “[t]hat means this assault took some time, and
she was still alive after the ribs were fractured for a certain amount of time.” “It was not
sudden: Bang, you’re dead.” There was a small amount of blood in the abdominal cavity
and two lacerations or tears in Cuervo’s liver. There were abrasions and bruising on
Cuervo’s torso and abrasions on Cuervo’s back. There were also abrasions and bruising
on Cuervo’s arms that Whitmore opined were defensive wounds that were caused by
blunt force trauma. Whitmore also observed bruising on Cuervo’s legs and he noted,
“[v]ictims can use their legs … to cover up or kick out and try to protect themselves. So
it’s not surprising in this case we see bruising of the legs as well as the arms.” Nail
clippings from each of Cuervo’s hands were taken during the autopsy. Strands of hair
were retrieved from the grasp of Cuervo’s left hand. Whitmore determined the cause of
death to be “homicidal violence” or “multiple blunt force injury” and the manner of death
to be “homicide, death at the hand of another.” He believed death occurred eight hours or
less before Cuervo’s body was found.
A brick found at the scene was processed for DNA. Defendant and Mariam were
excluded as potential contributors to the DNA profile obtained from a stained portion of
the brick, but Cuervo could not be excluded as a potential contributor to the DNA profile
obtained from the stain on the brick. A swab of an unstained portion of brick with
ceramic plating found at the scene revealed a partial Y-STR profile from which neither

5.
defendant nor his paternal male relatives could be excluded as potential contributors.”2
Defendant could not be excluded as a potential contributor to a single-source male DNA
profile taken from a stain on a wooden stick found at the scene that had tested
presumptive for blood; Cuervo and Mariam were excluded as potential contributors to
that stain. However, Cuervo and Mariam could not be excluded from the DNA profiles
taken from the unstained end of that same wooden stick. Defendant and Cuervo could
not be excluded as potential contributors to DNA taken from a stained piece of wood
recovered from the scene. Swabs taken from Cuervo’s right hand revealed a mixture of
at least two contributors; Mariam and defendant fell into the “inconclusive range.”
Neither defendant nor his paternal male relative could be excluded as potential
contributors to the Y-STR profiles obtained from the swab of Cuervo’s right hand and the
swabs from Cuervo’s right and left fingernails.
Douglas S. testified he was homeless in October 2020. He knew Cuervo “from the
park,” referring to Wayside Park in Bakersfield. Douglas would help Cuervo out with
food and money because she was pregnant. He knew her for about six to eight months
and stated he had “never seen her with anybody.” He heard about Cuervo’s death from
people around the park. He had seen her within days before hearing of her death. They
were both trying to sleep near an auto parts store. When Douglas woke up, Cuervo was
gone.
Douglas knew defendant from the “[n]eighborhood” and as the boyfriend of
Crystal Hernandez. Douglas spoke to defendant at some point a few months after
Cuervo’s death and “right before” Hernandez’s death, but he did not remember if it was a
few days or a week prior. During their conversation, defendant told Douglas that he beat
Cuervo up “for a shot of dope,” “a shot of crystal meth.” Cuervo “tried to keep it from

2 Defendant and Mariam were excluded as contributors to the autosomal profile obtained
from this item. The test for “Y-STRs” specifically isolates the male DNA from a sample
and only looks at that DNA, ignoring any female DNA present.

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[defendant] or … threw it down, something like that.” Defendant told Douglas that he
beat Cuervo up in an abandoned house and she “was just taking it,” “she wouldn’t say
anything.” Defendant told Douglas that Cuervo had died. Defendant was “nonchalant”
when he was speaking to Douglas. Douglas was shocked and just walked away. Douglas
did not report to the police that defendant told him he killed Cuervo. Douglas stated he
“didn’t know for sure if it was true or not. It’s hard to do anything like that .…” He
assumed that “other people did” and he told the police what he knew when they contacted
him.
Patricia A. met defendant “on the streets” approximately five years before trial.
Patricia knew Cuervo, whom Patricia referred to as “Whispers.” Patricia was at the park
one day after Cuervo died with a group that included defendant. Defendant told Patricia
that he misplaced a syringe full of drugs; he had made “one for him, one for [Hernandez],
and one for [Cuervo], and … he was upset because he couldn’t find his.” Defendant told
Patricia he kept asking Cuervo where it was and hitting her and she would not answer
him. Defendant eventually found the syringe but was upset that Cuervo did not “just tell
him.” Patricia did not tell the police about this story at the time because she did not
realize its significance. Patricia testified that although she was unsure whether defendant
was in a relationship with Cuervo, she believed that defendant was in a relationship with
Hernandez for at least a year or more, including in October 2020.
Debra Vallejo, an investigating social worker with the Kern County Department of
Human Services, testified she contacted Cuervo on October 2, 2020 at the hospital after
Cuervo had a baby. Vallejo began her investigation and placed Cuervo’s child in
protective custody that day. Vallejo explained that, as part of her job, when she places a
child in protective custody, she has to notify the parent to let them know the child is in
custody and to explain the court process. Accordingly, she followed up with Cuervo late
in the afternoon on October 9, 2020. Vallejo first went to the house of Cuervo’s sister,
April; April directed Vallejo to an area where she might find Cuervo. Vallejo observed

7.
Cuervo walking on East Brundage by P Street. Vallejo testified that Cuervo was with a
shirtless Hispanic male who was holding a 40-ounce alcohol bottle and walking with a
bicycle; Vallejo identified the male at trial as defendant. Vallejo attempted to serve
Cuervo with a document, but Cuervo would not accept it. Vallejo conveyed this
information to police detective McIntyre. Several months later, Vallejo also identified
defendant in a photographic lineup as the male she saw Cuervo with on October 9, 2020;
she stated she was 75 percent certain about the identification.
Alexis L. testified that she contacted police on September 28, 2020 to report
concern about a woman sitting on the ground in front of a pizza restaurant off Union and
Brundage. Alexis described the woman as Hispanic with brown hair in a ponytail,
wearing a white shirt and red boxers, and no shoes on her feet, which appeared dirty. The
woman was pregnant and appeared to be homeless. She identified herself as Marva
Cuervo. Alexis took a picture of Cuervo and gave her water and pizza. She went back
the next day, but Cuervo was gone. On October 12, 2020, a police detective contacted
Alexis and asked her to identify Cuervo; Alexis sent the picture she took to the police.
July 2021 Murder of Crystal Hernandez
On July 26, 2021, defendant called 911 at 1:23 a.m. and identified himself as
Armondo Gonzales. Defendant stated he needed police and an ambulance at the Desert
Star motel, noting his “girl,” his “friend” was still breathing. When the operator asked
defendant what happened, he said, “That’s not important.” Then, he stated he did not
know what happened, he “just came here” and found “her here like this.” Another
individual, later identified as Daniel R., told the operator defendant borrowed his phone
and defendant’s girlfriend was sitting in front of the door and she was “unconscious,”
“bleeding from her head,” “all beat up,” “unresponsive,” and it looked like her arm was
broken.

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 Officers Aspen Resendez and Rene Garcia responded to the call for service at the
motel. Resendez explained that the motel was abandoned, meaning it was locked off and
there should not be any subjects on the property. Nevertheless, homeless people used the
rooms of the abandoned motel to sleep and for drug use.
When the officers arrived on scene, they saw a male pushing a female in a stroller;
they identified the male on the scene as defendant and the female in the stroller as
Hernandez. Resendez noticed “the victim laying in the stroller clearly needing medical
aid,” so she went to render aid. Resendez testified that Hernandez had “major head
injuries” and “major lacerations to her arms.” “She was covered in blood. She had
bruising all around her body, little marks of lacerations in different places, abrasions
everywhere. She just overall had major trauma to her person.” Resendez was unable to
detect a pulse. Hernandez was not breathing and she was cold to the touch though it was
a hot night. Hernandez was wearing blue jeans that were pulled down, exposing her
underwear, and a blood-stained brown shirt.
Officer Eric Hearn spoke with defendant. Defendant initially identified himself as
Armando Angel Gonzales. He stated he last saw his friend Hernandez in the morning.
She was arguing with an individual named “Nyatto.” Defendant came home and there
was a big mess. “She was laying right there … in the beginning,” on her back. He
reported that he had found Hernandez 10 minutes earlier and he picked her up. When
asked if there was a pool of blood around her, defendant stated, “it was dark.” He stated
he saw his friend “Critter” and asked to use his phone to call 911. When the police told
defendant to have a seat in the car, he said, “I have nothing to do with this. I just came
back f- home.”
Officer Jesse Perez processed the scene. He noticed a blood trail that led from
Hernandez to a motel room that was close by. There was a large amount of blood in the
room. Perez described the amount of blood as “significant,” noting it was in the room
and on the ceiling. Perez testified “[i]t was obvious that an assault and the homicide had

9.
occurred in that room.” The room did not have a door but there was a sheet covering the
entrance. There were several blunt objects thrown around the room, including a
sledgehammer head that had blood on it, a metal tube, and a wooden handle that was
consistent with an axe handle. The police also seized narcotics paraphernalia, a cellular
phone, and a large crowbar from the main portion of the motel room.
Palm prints were lifted from the metal tube collected from the scene and the palm
prints were found to match defendant’s right palm. Latent prints lifted from a beer can at
the scene also matched defendant’s prints.
The crowbar taken from the scene tested positive for presumptive blood. “There
was not enough statistical support to draw a conclusion as to whether or not [defendant]
could be excluded” as a potential contributor from swabs taken from the silver metal tube
and sledgehammer head retrieved from the scene. Hernandez could not be excluded as a
contributor to the DNA found on the tube or from the sledgehammer head. Hernandez
could not be excluded as a contributor to a DNA profile taken from a reddish-brown stain
on a piece of wood found at the scene and a stick with a rounded edge. There “was not
enough statistical support to determine whether or not [defendant] or Daniel [R.] could be
excluded as contributors to the DNA profile obtained from” the stick with the rounded
edge found at the scene. Neither defendant nor Daniel R. were found to be known
contributors to vaginal swabs taken from Hernandez.
Two videos of the scene taken by the police that night were shown to the jury.
One video shows the scene on the exterior of the motel, including Hernandez in a stroller,
and the second video documents the inside of the motel room to which the blood trail led.
After the investigation at the motel was completed on October 26, 2021, the scene was no
longer secured by the police. At some point thereafter, the motel was “burned.” “It was
victim of an arson.”
A sexual assault examination was conducted on Hernandez’s body. The nurse
who conducted the exam did not observe injuries consistent with sexual assault.

10.
 Dr. Eugene Carpenter performed an autopsy on Hernandez’s body on
September 1, 2021. Hernandez had “blunt force large bruises from the top of her head
down to her legs.” Specifically, on Hernandez’s head, hiding in her hair, there was “a
large area of irregular geographic tears or even cuts, like injuries going all the way to her
scalp down to the bone and exposing bone.” The injuries were consistent with a heavy
and blunt instrument with edges and corners based on the straight lines, as opposed to a
spear or knife. There was no skull fracture or trauma to Hernandez’s brain. There were
similar blunt force injuries consistent with a heavy blunt weapon on the front left
forehead and at the back of the head. There was bruising on Hernandez’s forehead, at the
top of the right shoulder along the upper side of the left and right upper arms, at the left
chest area near the breast, and up and down the right and left lower extremities; the lower
left leg was red and swollen. There was a “stab wound going into the skin” on
Hernandez’s left forearm. Carpenter opined that the wound was caused by “a knife-like
blade” and that the injury was consistent with a defense-type wound. There was severe
bruising to the internal body tissue over the hard bone of the spine, which is “very rare”
because, in most conditions, “tissues below the fat do not bruise.” Carpenter also noted
“clear evidence of probable chronic needle use … all over the front part [of] her arms.”
He determined the cause of death to be “blunt injuries” and the manner of death to be
“homicide.” He opined, physiologically, “[t]he injuries were so extensive that it’s clearly
within … medical reason that the mechanism of the death is due to traumatic shock.” In
other words, “this body was beaten to death.” He further noted that, “without signs of
blunt trauma to the brain or blood inside from internal hemorrhaging, one must consider
that the body could have been smothered or the vessels in the throat could have been
compressed.”
Douglas S. testified he also knew Hernandez. They were friends and had known
each other for almost five years. Hernandez was also homeless. Douglas knew
defendant from the neighborhood and interacted with him on occasion “because of

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[Hernandez].” Hernandez and defendant were “boyfriend/girlfriend” for three or
four years. Douglas did not talk to defendant “because it would … just cause problems.”
When Douglas spoke to defendant at some point a few months after Cuervo’s
death, days before Hernandez’s death, Douglas was concerned for Hernandez because
she and defendant had come to Douglas’s camp and Hernandez “looked like she had been
roughed up.” She had teeth missing and her arm was swollen. Defendant was getting in
Hernandez’s face and yelling at her. “He would jump at her, and she would scream.”
During his conversation with defendant, Douglas asked where Hernandez was; defendant
said he did not know. When defendant was describing what “he did to her” (Cuervo),
Douglas initially thought defendant was talking about Hernandez; when Douglas asked if
he killed Hernandez, defendant replied, “no, silly. Whispers,” which was Cuervo’s
nickname.
Douglas also testified he saw defendant and Hernandez together the day before
Hernandez was killed. They were arguing about Douglas; defendant was trying to
convince Douglas to go to a motel with them. Defendant was grabbing Hernandez’s arm
and face and screaming at her; Hernandez was also screaming “the whole time.” Douglas
walked with Hernandez “trying to talk to her to see if she wanted to go somewhere safe.
She said no.”
Other Evidence
The police conducted three interviews with defendant—on July 26, 2021, July 29,
2021, and October 28, 2021. A portion of the October 28, 2021 interview was played for
the jury. Defendant denied killing Hernandez or Cuervo or having sex with either of
them. He stated he had not seen Cuervo in a long time. He denied that his DNA would
be on the sticks and bricks used on Cuervo. He also denied touching the metal tube or
the stick found in his room at the motel where Hernandez was beaten. He stated that
none of it should have his DNA.

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 Marisa S. testified that she and defendant dated for a few months and they had a
child together in 2015. On March 3, 2017, Marisa called the police about a conflict with
defendant. Marisa was walking to the store and a car pulled up; defendant’s brother was
driving. Defendant grabbed Marisa’s jacket from behind and she fell. Defendant
grabbed Marisa’s purse, kicked her in the back and stomach, and “socked” her in the
face. Marisa was pregnant at the time. She urinated on herself because of the attack.
Defendant told her he was going to kill her. As a result of the incident, Marisa had lumps
on her face, a cut on her lip, and a footprint on the back of her jacket. The prosecution
introduced photographs of Marisa after the incident at trial. The parties stipulated that
defendant was convicted of a violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a) for
inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on a person who is the mother
of his child or with whom he had a current or prior dating relationship on March 3, 2017,
because of the assault on Marisa. They further stipulated defendant was arrested for a
violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a) for inflicting corporal injury
resulting in a traumatic condition on Marisa who is the mother of his child or with whom
he had a current or prior dating relationship on March 30, 2016, and that he was charged
and convicted for a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a)
in Kern County Superior Court case No. BM882047A. Notably, the jury was instructed
that it could only consider Marisa’s testimony in relation to count 2, which charged
defendant with Hernandez’s murder.
Defense Evidence
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He was homeless on October 12, 2020 and
would break into stores for money. He met Cuervo, whom he referred to as “Whispers,”
in 2010. Defendant could not recall how he met Cuervo, but he testified he was “pretty
sure it had to do with drugs,” and they “probably ran into each other and met on the
streets.” They would “smoke[]” and “just cross paths.” Defendant had sex with Cuervo

13.
approximately two to three times over the course of a month, but it did not lead to
anything else. He could not exactly recall when they had sex, but he testified it was
closer to 2010 than 2020.
Defendant testified he last saw Cuervo on October 10, 2020, or three days before
she died in the field where her body was later found.3 Earlier that day, defendant saw
Cuervo with a Hispanic male in that field. Defendant approached them and they all
smoked methamphetamine together. Then, defendant left to go to the store. He returned
and gave Cuervo water, snacks, and a pipe and then left. At the time, defendant was
living in an abandoned house near the train tracks. Defendant returned to the field later
that night on his bicycle and he heard “some fussing.” He thought someone “was getting
jumped,” or beat up. Defendant approached and “pushed this dude off of her, then
… started wrestling with the guy.” Defendant ended up on the ground and someone was
kicking him; eventually, the individuals left. Defendant did not recognize them.
Defendant did not realize he was bleeding that night but realized he was the next day.
Defendant realized Cuervo was there and she had “a bunch of trash over her legs.” He
“s[a]t her upright there by the concrete slab.” Cuervo said she was thirsty, so defendant
left to get her water from a place that had a faucet near the Desert Star motel. Defendant
brought Cuervo water and asked her if she wanted to go to his “spot,” referring to the
abandoned building where he was staying. Cuervo did not want to go. Defendant went
back to his abandoned house to get clothes for Cuervo. Two females arrived and
defendant asked one of them to take his bicycle and take the clothes to Cuervo, but she
did not. Two days later, defendant learned from a man named “Dre” that there were “a
bunch of police in dead man’s trail,” and they found Cuervo’s body.

3 Defendant denied he was with Cuervo on October 9, 2020, or that he ever met Vallejo.
He testified he had not seen Cuervo for at least a year prior and he did not see her when
she was pregnant.

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 Defendant knew Patricia A.; they were “[s]moking buddies.” Defendant denied
ever telling Patricia that he beat someone up because of a misunderstanding about
whether they took his drugs or pipe. He testified Patricia became “distant” after Cuervo
died. However, he testified they never had any problems; he never did anything to make
her dislike him; and she had nothing against him, and he had nothing against her.
Defendant met Douglas S. at Wayside Park at the same time he met Hernandez.
Defendant asked them for a lighter. Defendant liked Hernandez and asked her to “hang
out.” After they knew each other for a few weeks, they “got together.” Sometime after
meeting Douglas, defendant and Douglas had a conflict. They were hanging out at the
house of defendant’s drug dealer and a female there told defendant that Douglas was a
child molester. Defendant told his friends, “let’s go beat this dude up. He’s a child
molester.” So, they confronted Douglas. Defendant threw Douglas’s bicycle to the
ground and they “rushed him,” punching him without breaking a bone. Douglas was
bleeding. Sometime after that, defendant saw Hernandez hanging out with Douglas
outside. Douglas told defendant to “get the fudge out of here.” Defendant grabbed
Hernandez by the hand to take her with him and Douglas threw a rock at a window.
Defendant testified that he and Hernandez were no longer dating at the time he
found her body. Defendant denied that he abused Hernandez but admitted that he had
“pushed her around before.” He admitted that he had physically assaulted a girlfriend
before Hernandez and that he had suffered convictions for domestic violence against
Marisa S. Defendant stated he was “not a violent person.”
Defendant testified that he heard Hernandez have an argument with an individual
named “Nieto” about money the morning of July 25, 2021. A little before dark that day,
defendant left to go canning. Eventually, defendant went back to the Desert Star motel
because he could not “leave the room alone too long.” As defendant approached his
room, he saw the windows open and “the board down.” He noticed “black spots
everywhere” and his door was open. Defendant explained the door to his room was off

15.
the hinges and he would put it in place when he left. He looked down and saw what
“looked like a person.” He got scared and flicked the lighter because it was pitch black.
He saw blood on Hernandez and was “moving her,” “trying to get her attention.”
Defendant put Hernandez on her back and tried blowing into her mouth; he thought he
heard her breathing. He put Hernandez in a stroller outside the door. Defendant’s friend
Daniel R., whom defendant referred to as “Critter,” was staying at the motel around that
time. Defendant ran up to Daniel and asked him if he had a phone. Daniel had one that
was not activated but Daniel managed to call 911 while defendant attempted CPR on
Hernandez.
When the officers arrived, defendant told them his name was Armando Gonzales
because he had outstanding warrants for burglary and did not want to go to jail. The
police conducted a recorded interview with defendant that night. Defendant was arrested
later that day for the warrants. Defendant then had two more interviews with the police.
Defendant admitted that, during the second interview, he told McIntyre he had not seen
Cuervo for over a year and he did not tell McIntyre he saw her with two males who
assaulted her in a field. Defendant stated he lied because he “didn’t want to be involved
in anything with that” and he did not “know how DNA works.”
Defendant testified that he had been staying at the Desert Star motel for
approximately two months at that point. He was “jumping around rooms,” and people
would stay with him and “smoke all night.” He had been staying in the room where
Hernandez was found. Defendant stated some of the things that could be seen in the
video footage of the room were his including tools that he would use to break into stores
such as the crowbar, bolt cutters, a pole, the sledgehammer, and train track spikes. He
testified he used every tool in his room for burglary—to break into stores—not to hurt
people.
McIntyre testified that when he saw Cuervo’s body, it appeared the body had been
manipulated or staged postmortem. It appeared to him that someone had gotten behind

16.
her, put their arms underneath her, and dragged her to her position and then crossed her
arms over her chest.
Captain Chad Mullen of the Bakersfield Fire Department testified on behalf of the
defense. Mullen explained that he was an arson investigator and he responded to a call
for service on July 28, 2021 to the Desert Star motel. When he arrived on scene, Mullen
noticed fire damage to one room of the motel which was completely burned, though the
rooms next door to that room also sustained some smoke damage. Mullen opined that
“this was an incendiary fire,” meaning “someone intentionally set fire to the room or the
fire was caused by a reckless act.” He was unable to identify any suspects in his
investigation and noted “[t]here was obvious transient activity on the property and inside
the secured rooms.”
Ruth Ballard, a research scientist professor, testified on behalf of the defense. She
explained that, typically with trace DNA, you only get a partial profile, “which makes it
much harder to tease everything out.” Ballard reviewed the lab results for the Cuervo and
Hernandez cases. She opined, in the Cuervo case, there was weak evidence for inclusion
of defendant in the Y-STR profile obtained from the right hand swab of Cuervo. There
was moderate support for inclusion of defendant in the Y-STR profile from the unstained
portion of the ceramic-plated brick. She agreed there was “extremely strong inclusion”
of defendant as the source of DNA on a stain on a wooden stick obtained from the scene
of Cuervo’s body and there was strong evidence for inclusion of Cuervo and Mariam M.
as contributors to DNA found on the unstained area of the stick. There was also very
strong evidence of inclusion of Cuervo and defendant as contributors to an unstained
portion of a piece of wood found at the scene. Ballard stated it was possible that
defendant’s DNA got on the wood while beating the victim, leaving his DNA behind.

17.
Rebuttal
On rebuttal, McIntyre reiterated that during his second interview with defendant,
defendant denied that he was with Cuervo three days before her murder when the CPS
worker contacted her. He also reiterated that he told defendant they were going to test
items recovered from the field for DNA and he asked defendant several times if his DNA
would be at the scene; defendant said, “ ‘No.’ ” During the third interview, Detective
Randy Petris told defendant his palm print was found on the metal tube that was seized
and defendant denied it.
Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder of Cuervo and Hernandez
(counts 1 and 2) and found true that, in this proceeding, defendant had been convicted of
more than one offense of murder in the first degree or one offense of murder in the
first degree and one in the second degree within the meaning of Penal Code
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3). The trial court sentenced defendant to life without the
possibility of parole on count 1 and a consecutive term of life without the possibility of
parole on count 2.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the murder
counts or, alternatively, that joinder resulted in gross unfairness. He also argues
insufficient evidence supports the jury’s findings that each murder was willful, deliberate,
and premeditated. We discuss and reject each of these contentions in turn.
I. Trial Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Sever the Charges
Defendant first contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the
murder charges. Alternatively, he asserts joinder resulted in gross unfairness. For the
reasons that follow, we disagree.

18.
 A. Relevant Procedural History
Before trial, the defense moved in limine to “[e]xclude evidence of either
homicide being offered against the other for proof of identity, or any other
[section]1101[, subdivision ](b) purpose,” asserting the crimes did not have sufficiently
unique aspects and circumstances such that they could be introduced for proof of identity.
(Boldface omitted.)
The defense also moved in limine to sever counts 1 and 2 from each other
pursuant to Penal Code sections 352 and 954, Evidence Code section 1101,
subdivision (a), and the Due Process Clause. The motion asserted, “[t]he vast majority, if
not all, of the evidence in this case will not be cross-admissible.” “The responding
officers were different, the victims had no known connection to each other, and there are
various civilian witnesses that will be relevant to only one of the two charges. All of the
physical evidence (DNA results, photographs, autopsy reports, items seized from the
scene) will also be relevant to only one of the two charges.” Defendant argued evidence
of the two different homicides would inflame the jury given “that both involve
accusations of brutal violence, bloody pictures and crime scenes, and this would cause a
jury to look to the mere number of allegations as impermissible character evidence,
denying [defendant] the presumption of innocence.” He also argued the evidence of
Cuervo’s murder was “significantly more compelling,” making it a stronger case that is
joined with a weaker case—the Hernandez murder. Defendant also noted that joining the
cases together made him death eligible, though the People “waived death in this case.”
“Nevertheless, [he] faces life without the possibility of parole if convicted of both counts
and the [multiple-murder] special circumstance allegation.” He also asserted joinder
violated his right against self-incrimination. He argued he would likely need to take the
stand to rebut allegations of the Cuervo murder, but he would refrain from testifying as to
the Hernandez murder.

19.
 During a hearing on the motion, the prosecutor argued that evidence of the
murders was admissible pursuant to section 1101, subdivision (b) for the “noncharacter
purpose” of establishing identity and intent. He noted similarities in the crimes including
that each woman had a prior relationship with defendant, they were beaten with multiple
objects, and both suffered severe injuries:

“Both of the victims in this case were women involved in
[defendant]’s life. Ms. Cuervo, by the one admission of having sexual
relations with her a year prior, or even excluding his statement altogether,
the social worker, Deborah Vallejo, who observed the two of them together
three days before the homicide hanging out. [¶] So they’re obviously
known to each other independently of his own admission. [¶]
Ms. Hernandez, both by other homeless witnesses who knew they were
boyfriend and girlfriend, his own admission to dating her, as well as him
obviously being with her at the time of her death. Both of the women in
this case were beaten with what appears to be multiple objects, not just a
singular object: Bricks, sticks, metal tube in one. [¶] And in both
instances, both received severe injuries all over their bodies. I would
characterize … as exceptionally violent beatings.”
The prosecutor also noted that neither victim was sexually assaulted, “but both were
found with their pants pulled down around their legs just above the knees, which is also a
characteristic that is unique .…”
The defense responded that “a general intent of ill will or harm” is not enough to
justify admissibility under section 1101, subdivision (b) on the issue of intent. Counsel
argued the facts of the two cases also did not present the “level of specificity” that must
be shown for such evidence to be admissible on the issue of identity. Counsel asserted
the prejudice would be “incredibly high” if evidence of each crime was found to be
cross-admissible.
The trial court noted it reviewed, read, and incorporated into its ruling “everything
submitted by both sides, including review of all the cases and the arguments, and that’s
incorporated into the record and is part of the record.” The court found “there is some
evidence that’s cross admissible.” As to whether certain charges would inflame the jury,

20.
the court stated: “Both charges. There’s not one worse than the other. They’re similar
level of offenses so this is not a situation, by way of example, where you have a weak
case joined with a strong one that creates a spillover effect. It’s similar strength for each
count.” The court also noted that the joinder did not turn the case into a death penalty
case, but there was “a special circumstance multiple murder allegation that would only be
applicable with both charges.” The court noted the section 1109 evidence (related to
Marisa S.) was only admissible as to count 2 and was not to be considered with regard to
count 1, related to Cuervo. The court also noted similarities between the murders and
discussed the admissibility pursuant to sections 352 and 1101, subdivision (b):

“We have two female victims. They’re both in a homeless situation.
They both are known to and are … friends with … defendant. [¶] They
both had [a] sexual relationship at some point with … defendant. [¶]
Ms. Hernandez, he at various times referred to her as his girlfriend. At
one point he says it’s his girlfriend even though she’s also engaging in
activities with other people. As far as Ms. Cuervo, it’s a one-time thing
that’s referenced, at least that we know about or anticipate the evidence.
[¶] So they both have a sexual relationship with … defendant at … a
reasonable time period before the two homicides. Both … victims hang out
at or stayed in the area of Union Avenue and Daniels Lane. Both victims
had extensive injuries attributed to blunt force trauma. [¶] Both were
savagely or severely beaten. Both were victims of exceptional acts of
violence. Both were either staged or found. I don’t know if staged is the
right term, but … in [sic] one occasion the pants pulled down around or
below knees and the other the underpants. Yet neither had evidence of
sexual assault, so it’s commonality.

“The argument of evidence of one homicide being inflammatory
with respect to the other, these killings are so similar, as previously stated,
that as we address mental state and intent, it’s relevant and it’s more
probative then prejudicial under [section] 352.

“When we get to [section]1101[, subdivision ](b), which goes to
identity, it’s still the same or similar analysis. It makes it appropriate to
allow both [c]ount 1 and [c]ount 2 related to each other—or both homicides
related to each other under [section]1101[, subdivision ](b). It’s not. It’s
for a noncharacter purpose.”

21.
 The trial court disagreed with the defense’s contention that one case was much
weaker than the other. It acknowledged there were statements attributed to defendant in
which he admits to killing Cuervo; but it further noted “we do have … defendant
personally present with blood all over him” and defendant’s palmprint on a metal pole
with regard to the Hernandez murder, so it did not view that case as “substantially weaker
or stronger than the other one.” The court also stated it considered defendant’s argument
that he may wish to testify about the Cuervo murder but not the Hernandez murder. It
noted defendant “made quite a few statements in regard to the [Hernandez murder] and
completely denied everything other than it’s his room. Essentially it’s his room. He’s
present. He knew her and he is trying to help her.” Ultimately, the court stated it did not
“believe there’s a showing that rises to the level of severance,” noting “that the jury will
need to be specifically advised that the [section] 1109 evidence that [the court is]
allowing to be admitted would only be considered or can or shall only be considered in
regard to … Hernandez’s death. So [section]1101[, subdivision ](b) can be used.”
Accordingly, the court denied the motion to sever.
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“Section 954, in relevant part, permits the joinder of ‘two or more different
offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses.’ Joinder is ordinarily favored because it
avoids the increased expenditures of funds and judicial resources that may result from
separate trials. [Citation.] Joinder, therefore, ‘is the course of action preferred by the
law.’ [Citation.] Nonetheless, a trial court has discretion to sever properly joined
charges in the interest of justice and for good cause.” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th
98, 122 (Simon).) “In exercising its discretion in this regard, the court weighs ‘the

22.
potential prejudice of joinder against the state’s strong interest in the efficiency of a joint
trial.’ ” (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 37 (Merriman).)
“Our review proceeds in two steps. First, we examine whether, in light of the
information available at the time, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
severance motion prior to the guilt phase. [Citation.] Where, as here, the statutory
requirements for joinder are met, a defendant must make a ‘clear showing of prejudice’ to
establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. [Citation.] A
defendant seeking severance of properly joined charged offenses must make a stronger
showing of potential prejudice than would be necessary to exclude evidence of other
crimes in a severed trial.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 122–123, fn. omitted.) In
evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion, we consider the particular
circumstances of each case and the following factors: “(1) whether the evidence relating
to the various charges would be cross-admissible in separate trials, (2) whether any of the
charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant, (3) whether a weak
case has been joined with a strong case or with another weak case, and (4) whether one of
the charges is a capital offense or the joinder of the charges converts the matter into a
capital case.” (Id. at p. 123.)
“Second, even if the trial court’s ruling was proper as a matter of state law, we will
reverse the judgment if the defendant shows that joinder of the charges actually resulted
in ‘ “ ‘gross unfairness’ ” ’ amounting to a denial of due process during the guilt phase.”
(Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 123; accord, People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 575.)
C. Analysis
Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to sever the two murder cases.
We conclude defendant has not made a “clear showing of prejudice” nor can we conclude
joinder of the charges resulted in “ ‘ “ ‘gross unfairness’ ” ’ ” in violation of defendant’s
due process rights.

23.
 1. Consolidation of cases did not “clearly prejudice” defendant
As a threshold matter, defendant concedes the murder charges met the statutory
requirements for joinder because they are “different offenses of the same class of crimes
or offenses.” (Pen. Code, § 954.) Thus, our review turns to whether defendant has
established a clear showing of prejudice such that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the motion to sever. (See Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 122–123.) Weighing
the relevant factors in evaluating the trial court’s decision to deny severance, we cannot
conclude the court abused its discretion.
a) Cross-admissibility of evidence
Regarding the first factor, defendant denies evidence of the two incidents would
have been cross-admissible in separate trials. He contends the trial court erred in
concluding evidence of each count was cross-admissible on the issues of identity and
intent pursuant to section 1101, subdivision (b). He contends the crimes were committed
more than nine months apart; there was no evidence the two victims knew each other;
and “the circumstances of the two assaults were substantially different.” The People
argue evidence of defendant’s intent in committing each murder was relevant and
cross-admissible given the similarities between the offenses, tending to show the offenses
were “not accidental.”
“[T]here exists a hierarchy, or continuum, with respect to the degree of similarity
that is needed for cross-admissibility, depending upon the purpose (see … § 1101,
subd. (b)) for which introduction of evidence is sought.” (Alcala v. Superior Court
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1222, fn. omitted (Alcala).) In People v. Ewoldt (1994)
7 Cal.4th 380, in discussing the admissibility of uncharged act evidence, the California
Supreme Court explained, “The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and
the charged offense) is required in order to prove intent. [Citation.] ‘[T[he recurrence of
a similar result … tends (increasingly with each instance) to negative accident or
inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or other innocent mental state, and tends to

24.
establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the presence of the normal, i.e.,
criminal, intent accompanying such an act ….’ [Citation.] In order to be admissible to
prove intent, the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support the
inference that the defendant ‘ “probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.” ’ ”
(Id. at p. 402.)
We cannot conclude the trial court abused its broad discretion in concluding the
evidence underlying the murder charges would be relevant and cross-admissible in
separate trials to prove intent and to demonstrate the mental states of premeditation and
deliberation required for murder. (See Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1224, fn. omitted
[“The evidence underlying the … charges supports a conclusion, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that petitioner was the perpetrator in each, and the factual similarities
among the charges tend to demonstrate that, in each instance, the perpetrator harbored the
intent to kill and the homicides were premeditated.”].) As the court noted, both victims
were homeless females who hung out or stayed in the same general area; there was
evidence defendant was seen with both victims within days of their deaths and that he
knew both women and had relations with them before died; both homicides involved
blunt force trauma resulting in significant wounds on the victims and occurred within a
10-month period; the bodies of the victims appeared to have been moved after the killings
and both victims’ pants were pulled down, though neither victim was sexually assaulted.
(See, e.g., ibid. [“Each of the victims was a young, single Caucasian female; all of the
homicides involved blunt-force facial trauma and occurred within a 19-month period; and
the bodies of all of the victims were discovered unclothed, or nude from the waist
down.”].) Such evidence “ ‘support[s] the inference that the [perpetrator] “ ‘probably
harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1226.) And we cannot
conclude the court erred in concluding that the probative value of such evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create a substantial
danger of undue prejudice such that section 352 would bar admissibility.

25.
 On reply, defendant challenges the cross-admissibility of the evidence of each case
on the issue of identity. We need not address this contention, however, given our
conclusion the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding such evidence would
be cross-admissible on other grounds, namely with respect to intent. Irrespective,
although cross-admissibility of evidence may be an independently sufficient condition
justifying a court’s denial of severance, it is not a necessary one. (Simon, supra,
1 Cal.5th at p. 123; see Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1221.) “In the absence of
cross-admissibility, we turn to the remaining factors to assess whether the trial court
abused its discretion.” (Simon, at pp. 123–124.)
b) Inflammatory evidence and relative strength of cases
Defendant next contends the “facts” of the Cuervo murder were more
“inflammatory,” given that he called 911 to help Hernandez but Cuervo’s body “was
placed between concrete blocks in a dirt field and covered with various items.” He also
contends the evidence against him in the Cuervo case “was substantially stronger than
that in the Hernandez case, based on the fact that [defendant]’s DNA was found on some
of the bloody objects near Cuervo’s body that were likely used to assault her, and there
was evidence that [defendant] told some civilians that he had killed Cuervo.” He asserts,
though his palm print was found on the metal pole in the motel room where Hernandez
was attacked, he had been staying in that room and the property in that room belonged to
him. We disagree with defendant’s contentions and his characterization of the evidence.
The “animating concern” underlying the second factor is “ ‘whether “ ‘strong
evidence of a lesser but inflammatory crime might be used to bolster a weak prosecution
case’ on another crime.” ’ ” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 124.) “Only when a defendant
has made a clear showing of potential prejudice may we find an abuse of discretion in
this context.” (Id. at p. 127.) “The core prejudice concern arising in connection with this
issue is that jurors may aggregate evidence and convict on weak charges that might not
merit conviction in separate trials.” (Ibid.) “But even where evidence from one incident

26.
could be considered ‘inflammatory’ as the term is understood in our case law [citation],
we will find no abuse of discretion if the evidence of guilt for each of the joined incidents
is sufficiently compelling.” (Ibid.)
Here, neither case was more inflammatory than the other, and the evidence of both
cases was strong; thus, these factors do not weigh in favor of severance. That is, the
victims in each case died after being brutally beaten by a blunt object. Their injuries and
the scenes where they were found were extensively documented and introduced to the
jury. And the circumstances of each murder could be viewed as equally egregious. On
this record, we cannot conclude one case was more likely to inflame the jury’s passions
than the other.
Additionally, compelling evidence supported both the charges. Regarding the
Hernandez murder, defendant admitted he had been staying in the motel room where
Hernandez was beaten. His palm print was found on a metal pipe in that room and
Hernandez could not be excluded as a contributor to the DNA on the same metal pipe,
supporting an inference that it was used in the beating. There was eyewitness testimony
that defendant and Hernandez had been arguing near in time to the murder and there was
evidence that defendant had previously committed uncharged domestic violence. With
regard to the Cuervo murder, defendant’s DNA was also recovered from the scene,
including on objects that were consistent with the properties of the murder weapon.
Douglas S. testified defendant admitted to him that he had beaten Cuervo to death. And
Patricia A. also testified that defendant had admitted to her that he beat Cuervo. Even
assuming that, when viewed as a whole, evidence of the Cuervo murder may have
appeared, at the time of the severance motion, to be somewhat stronger than evidence of
Hernandez’s murder, “the salient point is that the proffered evidence was sufficiently
strong in both cases.” (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 781 (Soper).)
Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude the evidence of Cuervo’s killing
was “ ‘ “ ‘used to bolster a weak prosecution case’ ” ’ ” because the evidence defendant

27.
killed Hernandez was also supported by strong evidence. (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 125.) Because neither was a weak case that needed joinder to bolster the likelihood of
conviction, defendant fails to make a clear showing of potential prejudice under this
factor.
c) Joinder of counts did not convert the matter to a capital
case
Defendant next argues that joinder permitted the prosecution to charge the
multiple murder special circumstance, thereby exposing defendant to the death penalty.
He contends, though the prosecution waived the death penalty, the same concerns
supporting heightened scrutiny apply. The People respond that heightened scrutiny does
not apply here since this was not a capital case.
As the parties note, while joinder of the counts allowed the prosecution to pursue a
multiple murder special circumstance, the prosecution did not seek the death penalty.
Thus, joinder did not convert this matter into a capital case. And neither party cites any
decisional law expressly holding whether joinder is (or is not) subject to heightened
scrutiny when the prosecution elects not to seek the death penalty on a multiple-murder
special-circumstance allegation.
Notably, as defendant contends, even though the death penalty was not sought,
joinder still gave rise to the multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation. (Simon,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 128 [“Even greater scrutiny is required, we have said, when the
joinder of separate murder charges gives rise to the special circumstance allegation of
multiple murder.”]; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1318 [“The present case
is one in which the joinder itself gave rise to the special circumstance allegation (multiple
murder, [Pen. Code,] § 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), requiring that a higher degree of scrutiny be
given the issue of joinder.”].) This special circumstance allegation alone rendered
defendant death-eligible for each of the murders, and subjected defendant to the greater
penalty of life without the possibility of parole under Penal Code section 190.2,

28.
subdivision (a). And, had the charges been severed, no multiple murder special
circumstance would have been applicable to the first murder charge tried. (Id., § 190.2,
subd. (a)(2); Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 454.) However, the
prosecutor’s election meant the death penalty was not at issue, despite the multiple
murder allegation, and joinder could not “bolster[] the possibility of [defendant] receiving
a death sentence,” the most severe form of punishment. (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 128; see Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 780 [this is not a situation “in which the
prosecutor sought joinder in order to convert the matter into a capital case”].)
Nevertheless, we need not resolve whether heightened scrutiny applies in this
circumstance because, even assuming that it does, defendant has not established an abuse
of discretion. Here, the trial court heard extensive argument by counsel on the issue and
scrutinized the evidence closely before rendering its ruling. As discussed, the court did
not err in concluding that evidence of the murders could be cross-admissible. And
neither case was more inflammatory than the other or “weak” such that joinder would
bolster the likelihood of conviction. On the record before us, after considering the factors
set out above, we conclude that defendant has “ ‘failed to carry his burden of making the
clear showing of prejudice required to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in
declining to sever the [two] charges.’ ” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 783; Alcala,
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1227; see People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1318 [though
joinder gave rise to a multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation, trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying motion to sever where it was “apparent that the trial court
heard extensive argument by counsel on the issue and scrutinized the evidence very
closely”]; People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 632 [no abuse of discretion in
denying motion to sever even though joinder gave rise to special circumstance allegation
and higher scrutiny applied where trial court heard extensive argument and carefully
scrutinized the issue].)

29.
2. Consolidation did not result in gross unfairness
Finally, defendant argues, joinder resulted in “gross unfairness.” Defendant
contends, “[t]he government cannot prove that a rational jury would have found appellant
guilty of each of the charged murders if evidence of the other murder had not been
presented at trial,” asserting the jury deliberated for six hours over the course of two days
before reaching a verdict. However, “[t]his argument is speculative. The length of jury
deliberations in this two-homicide case, by itself, supports no conclusion as to the
closeness of the case or as to any prejudicial effect of joinder.” (People v. Johnson
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 734, 753.) And, for all the reasons discussed ante, defendant does not
establish joinder resulted in a denial of fundamental fairness, depriving him of his
constitutional right to due process of law.
“ ‘ “A pretrial ruling that was correct when made can be reversed on appeal only if
joinder was so grossly unfair as to deny due process.” ’ ” (People v. McKinnon, supra,
52 Cal.4th at p. 632.) “Gross unfairness” exists when there is a reasonable probability
that joinder affected the jury’s verdict. (Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 49.)
Here, defendant asserts that the prosecutor did not discuss the limited admissibility
of the other crime evidence in closing and the jury was not given a limiting instruction
regarding the use of the other crime evidence. He argues “[t]he jury likely used evidence
of each of the charged murders to fill in the evidentiary gaps related to each charge, and
as propensity evidence in finding appellant guilty of the other charged murder.” He
argues the lack of severance implicated his constitutional rights and reversal is required
unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
But, contrary to defendant’s contention that the jury was not given a limiting
instruction, here, the trial court instructed the jury that “[e]ach of the counts charged in
this case is a separate crime” and it “must consider each count separately and return a
separate verdict for each one.” And, “[t]he record does not suggest that the jury was
unable to decide each count separately as it was specifically instructed to do.” (People v.

30.
Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 277; Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 784 [instructions on the
burden of proof for conviction, elements of murder, and emphasizing that each charge
should be considered separately mitigated the risk of any prejudicial spillover].)
Furthermore, given the strength of the evidence in support of both convictions,
including biological evidence connecting defendant to both crime scenes and potential
murder weapons and testimony of witnesses connecting him to both victims at or around
the time of their death and providing evidence of potential motive, we cannot conclude it
is reasonably probable the joinder affected the jury’s verdict. Rather, joinder of the
charges did not render the joint trial fundamentally unfair. (Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th
at p. 49.)
We reject defendant’s first contention.

II. Sufficient Evidence Supports Jury’s Conclusions Both Murders Were Willful,
Deliberate, and Premeditated
Defendant next argues that insufficient evidence supports the jury’s findings that
the murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated and, thus, first degree murder. We
disagree with defendant’s contentions.
A. Standard of Review
“Review on appeal of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding of
premeditated and deliberate murder involves consideration of the evidence presented and
all logical inferences from that evidence in light of the legal definition of premeditation
and deliberation …. Settled principles of appellate review require us to review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendant premeditated
and deliberated beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] The standard of review is the
same in cases such as this where the People rely primarily on circumstantial evidence.
[Citation.] ‘Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that

31.
circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt
and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the circumstances reasonably justify
the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances
might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of
the judgment.’ ” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1124 (Perez).)
B. Applicable Law
“ ‘Murder that is premeditated and deliberated is murder of the first degree.’ ”
(People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 443.) Premeditation “encompasses the idea
that a defendant thought about or considered the act beforehand.” (Ibid.) Deliberation
“ ‘ “refers to careful weighing of considerations in forming a course of action .…” ’
[Citations.] ‘An intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate if it occurred as the
result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.’ ”
(Ibid.) “However, the requisite reflection need not span a specific or extended period of
time. ‘ “ ‘Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated
judgment may be arrived at quickly….’ ” ’ ” (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514,
543 (Stitely).)
In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 (Anderson), the California Supreme
Court “distilled certain guidelines to aid reviewing courts in analyzing the sufficiency of
the evidence to sustain findings of premeditation and deliberation. The Anderson
analysis was intended only as a framework to aid in appellate review; it did not propose
to define the elements of first degree murder or alter the substantive law of murder in any
way.” (Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1125 [“[t]he Anderson factors, while helpful for
purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder,
nor are they exclusive”]; see People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1081.) “Anderson
identified three factors commonly present in cases of premeditated murder: ‘(1) [F]acts

32.
about how and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that the
defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in
the killing—what may be characterized as “planning” activity; (2) facts about the
defendant’s prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could
reasonably infer a “motive” to kill the victim, which inference of motive, together with
facts of type (1) or (3), would in turn support an inference that the killing was the result
of “a pre-existing reflection” and “careful thought and weighing of considerations” rather
than “mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed” [citation]; (3) facts about the
nature of the killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so
particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a
“preconceived design” to take his victim’s life in a particular way for a “reason” which
the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2).’ ” (Koontz, at p. 1081.)
“These factors need not be present in any particular combination to find substantial
evidence of premeditation and deliberation.” (Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 543.) “In
conducting this analysis, we draw all reasonable inferences necessary to support the
judgment.” (Ibid.) “The Anderson guidelines are descriptive, not normative. [Citation.]
The goal of Anderson was to aid reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence is
supportive of an inference that the killing was the result of preexisting reflection and
weighing of considerations rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse.” (Perez, at
p. 1125; see Anderson, at p. 27.)
C. Analysis
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the premeditation
and deliberation findings as to both murder counts. For the reasons that follow, we
conclude sufficient evidence supports the jury’s conclusions.

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 1. Cuervo Murder
As to Cuervo’s murder, defendant contends that there was no evidence of
planning, only slight evidence of motive, and the manner of the killing does not indicate a
preconceived design. The People concede the evidence of planning was “slim,” but they
assert the evidence of motive and the manner of killing supported the jury’s finding of
premeditation.
Initially, we reiterate “[t]he Anderson factors are not the exclusive means for
establishing premeditation and deliberation.” (People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107,
1127.) And we conclude the record provides substantial evidence to support the jury’s
finding that the killing of Cuervo was deliberate and premeditated.
Here, there was evidence—namely the testimonies of Douglas S. and Patricia A.—
to support a conclusion that defendant became angry at Cuervo because he believed she
had taken his syringe of drugs, evidencing a motive to kill her. Defendant himself
admitted that he had a prior relationship with Cuervo—he had had sex with her in the
past and they had done drugs together. There was no evidence that defendant was
initially armed so the jury could infer that defendant had to arm himself with a blunt
object or multiple blunt objects before beating Cuervo to death, evidencing planning
activity. There was no evidence that Cuervo was armed or that she otherwise provoked
the assault. And, though “the brutality of a killing cannot in itself support a finding that
the killer acted with premeditation and deliberation” (Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at
p. 24), “the vicious form and the long duration of the assault” can support the inference
that defendant acted with a willful, deliberate and premeditated purpose (People v.
Isby (1947) 30 Cal.2d 879, 888.). Dr. Whitmore testified that the nature and extent of
Cuervo’s injuries established the assault took time; “It was not sudden: Bang, you’re
dead.” Thus, there was a period of time for reflection and the assault appeared calculated
to ensure death. (See Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 544 [evidence pressure was applied
to victim’s neck for a long time “suggests defendant had ample opportunity to consider

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the deadly consequences of his actions.”].) There was also evidence to support a
conclusion defendant moved and manipulated the body after Cuervo’s death. Cuervo’s
body was found lying on a cement block with her arms crossed over her chest. She was
covered with various objects and debris and her pants were partially pulled down, though
there was no evidence she had been sexually assaulted. Defendant then left Cuervo’s
body and denied to police that he had encountered her in the days before her death. (See
Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1128 [jury could reasonably consider defendant’s conduct
after the stabbing in relation to manner of killing; defendant did not immediately flee the
scene which appears inconsistent with a state of mind that would produce a rash,
impulsive killing].)
We conclude the combination of these factors supports the jury’s verdict of
premeditated and deliberate first degree murder. (See People v. Alvarez (2025) 18
Cal.5th 387, 474 [“Based upon a combination of various factors—the multiple means of
attack, the prolonged and unprovoked nature of the attacks, and evidence supporting
planning and motive—a rational trier of fact could conclude that the manner of killing
supports that the murder was premeditated and deliberate.”]; People v. Cook (1940) 15
Cal.2d 507, 516 [jury may determine whether premeditation exists “from a consideration
of the type of weapon employed and the manner of its use; the nature of the wounds
suffered by the [victim]; the fact that the attack was unprovoked and that the [victim] was
unarmed at the time of the assault; the conduct of [the] assailant in … neglecting to aid
[the victim] …, and [the assailant’s] immediate flight thereafter from the scene of the
assault”].)
2. Hernandez Murder
Defendant contends the evidence failed to establish defendant acted willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation in killing Hernandez because there was no evidence
of planning, no evidence of a motive, and the matter of killing does not indicate a

35.
preconceived design. He argues, as a result, his conviction for count 2 violates his
federal constitutional right to due process and must be reversed. We disagree.
Here, defendant testified he had a prior relationship with Hernandez and that she
had been his girlfriend. There was evidence from which the jury could infer that
defendant had previously abused Hernandez—Douglas S. testified he had seen injuries on
Hernandez in the past and he had witnessed defendant grabbing Hernandez and yelling in
her face. Douglas also testified that he saw defendant and Hernandez together the day
before Hernandez was killed. They were arguing, defendant was grabbing Hernandez’s
arm and face and screaming at her, and Douglas was concerned for Hernandez’s safety.
The jury could infer from such evidence that defendant had a motive to kill Hernandez.
(See Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 27 [facts about the defendant’s prior relationship
and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonable infer a “motive” to
kill the victim support premeditation and deliberation finding]; People v. Kovacich
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 863, 893 [holding that “ ‘quarrels, antagonism or enmity between
an accused and the victim of a violent offense is proof of motive to commit the
offense’ ”]; see also People v. Cruz (1980) 26 Cal.3d 233, 245 [“Defendant’s pent-up
resentment toward his victim[] establishes the prior relationship from which the jury
reasonably could infer a motive for the killing[].”].) The jury could also consider
evidence of defendant’s prior uncharged acts of violence against Marisa S. in considering
defendant’s propensity for violence, his motive, and his state of mind. (See People v.
Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 274 [evidence of prior incidents of abuse were important
evidence of motive, and was probative of material issues of identity, intent,
premeditation, and deliberation].) Additionally, like the circumstances of Cuervo’s
murder, here there was also no evidence that defendant was initially armed, so the jury
could infer that defendant had to arm himself with a blunt object or multiple blunt objects
before beating Hernandez to death, suggesting some planning activity. There was also no
evidence that Hernandez was armed or that she otherwise provoked the assault. And the

36.
nature and extent of Hernandez’s injuries, including injuries to Hernandez’s head,
“suggests defendant had ample opportunity to consider the deadly consequences of his
actions.”4 (See Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 544.)
We conclude such evidence, when viewed as a whole, was sufficient to permit a
rational trier of fact to conclude defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation in
killing Hernandez. (See People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1020 [“Although the
evidence was far from overwhelming, we need not be convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant premeditated the murders. The relevant inquiry on appeal is
whether ‘ “any rational trier of fact’ ” could have been so persuaded.”].)

Thus, we reject defendant’s contentions.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

GUERRA, J.
WE CONCUR:

HILL, P. J.

MEEHAN, J.

4 It bears worth noting that evidence that defendant had brutally beaten to death another
homeless woman, Cuervo, mere months earlier after which she, too, was left with her pants
partially down, supports a conclusion defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation in
killing Hernandez rather than in a rash, explosive manner. (See People v. Steele (2002) 27
Cal.4th 1230, 1250 [where the defendant had killed another woman in almost the same
distinctive manner the “manner of killing, and doing so the same way twice, ‘supports the
inference of a calculated design to ensure death, rather than an unconsidered “explosion” of
violence.’ ”]; People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 815 [“ ‘the more often one kills,
especially under similar circumstances, the more reasonable the inference the killing was
intended and premeditated.’ ”].)

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