Filed 7/16/26 Zamora v. Ramos CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

VERONICA ZAMORA B337175

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23PSRO00968)

HAZEL RAMOS,

Defendant and
Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Melissa C. Lyons, Judge. Affirmed.
Veronica Zamora, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
 INTRODUCTION

Veronica Zamora appeals from the trial court’s order
denying her request for a civil harassment restraining order
against her neighbor across the street, Hazel Ramos, under Code
of Civil Procedure section 527.6.1 Zamora argues her evidence
satisfied the requirements for a restraining order. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Zamora Files a Request for a Civil Harassment
Restraining Order
Zamora and Ramos live approximately 90 feet from each
other, on opposite sides of the street. In 2021 Ramos obtained a
civil harassment restraining order against Zamora under
section 527.6. The order enjoined Zamora from harassing,
intimidating, contacting, threatening, or disturbing the peace of
Ramos and her family and directed Zamora to stay at least
10 yards away from Ramos and her son Troy A. The court
renewed the restraining order in 2022.
On June 1, 2023 Zamora filed a request for a civil
harassment restraining order against Ramos under section 527.6.
Zamora alleged multiple incidents of harassment. First, Zamora
claimed that on May 31, 2023 she was outside her house when,
“all of a sudden,” Ramos walked her dog toward her; later that
morning, while Zamora’s mother Rosalina Zamora (Rosalina) sat
in her car, Ramos “accelerated in reverse to hit” Rosalina’s car.
Second, Zamora alleged that on April 10, 2023 Ramos walked

1 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

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toward Zamora and continued to approach her as Zamora backed
away; Ramos subsequently got into her truck, put it in reverse,
and hit Zamora’s gate. Third, Zamora claimed that on March 22,
2023 Ramos “went into a cursing rampage” and shouted at
Zamora: “Fuck you up again, Fuck you up again, Fuck you, your
family, your friends, you ain’t shit,” and “stay in your fuckin yard
where you belong.” Fourth, Zamora alleged that on February 28,
2023 Ramos walked her dog in front of Zamora’s house and
cursed at Zamora. Fifth, Zamora claimed that on October 12,
2022, as she was placing her trash bin in the street, Ramos drove
her car into the trash bin (while Zamora “was still holding it”),
which caused Zamora to be “so scared that [she] called 911 for
assistance.”2 And sixth, Zamora alleged that on November 29,
2020 Ramos “physically assaulted” her.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order that
enjoined Ramos from harassing, intimidating, contacting,
threatening, or disturbing the peace of Zamora and her family
and directed Ramos to stay at least 100 yards away from Zamora
and her family; the court later reduced the stay-away distance to
10 yards during periods when Ramos needed to enter or leave her
house. The court set the temporary restraining order to expire at
the end of the hearing on Zamora’s request for a restraining
order.

B. The Trial Court Denies Zamora’s Request
At the hearing on Zamora’s request for a restraining order,
which took place over five days, Zamora testified about a number

2 Zamora corrected the year of this incident to 2021 at the
hearing on her request for a civil harassment restraining order.

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of incidents where Ramos engaged in conduct that caused her to
fear Ramos. The alleged incidents largely comprised Ramos
cursing at or threatening Zamora or Rosalina while walking or
driving by Zamora’s house; in some of the incidents, Ramos drove
her truck in or near Zamora’s driveway, which, according to
Zamora, prevented her from entering or leaving her house.
Zamora described in detail the incident where Ramos drove her
truck toward Zamora and struck a trash bin she was holding.
Zamora introduced videos that purported to corroborate her
account of each incident. The court viewed each video and
described what the court saw and heard in the recording. For
example, for the trash bin incident, the court stated that the
video showed Ramos’s white truck hit some trash bins and that,
though an object partially blocked the view, it appeared Zamora
“was possibly” holding onto a trash bin at the time; the court also
observed Zamora appeared to be pushing the bins into the street
“as the white vehicle [was] pulling up.”3 Regarding an incident in
November 2021, Zamora asserted Ramos threw eggs at Zamora’s
car, but the court, upon reviewing the video, stated, “You don’t
actually see anyone throwing eggs.” And regarding an incident in
April 2023, the court stated that the video showed Ramos was
backing up her truck because there was a car parked in front of
her and that Ramos did not “hit the vehicle in any way,” was not
“excessively close in any way,” and was “not leaving at [an]
excessive speed . . . such that one could say she’s using the car to
sort of threaten.”
The court observed that some of the videos showed Zamora
saying loudly that Ramos was “walking by” her house while

3 Referring to the trash bins, Ramos testified Zamora “threw
them in front of [her] moving vehicle.”

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Ramos was walking her dog. Addressing an incident on
February 28, 2023, where Zamora asserted Ramos was “verbally
harassing” her, the court stated Ramos was essentially saying,
“Stop talking to me. I’m walking my dog.” In addition to her
videos, Zamora presented the testimony of Rosalina, who, for the
most part, corroborated Zamora’s description of some of the
incidents. The court allowed Zamora to question Ramos about
certain incidents and viewed the videos Ramos submitted. Troy
testified that, one day in December 2023, as he walked across the
street from his house to his neighbor’s house (located next door to
Zamora’s house), Zamora said, “Here comes Troy, her terrible
son . . . . He claims he’s terrified of my mother, yet he’s here.”
The court concluded that, though “both parties have issues
with credibility,” Zamora had the burden of proof and that, of the
28 videos the court viewed, with the exception of two where
Ramos made “threatening comments” to Zamora, the “bulk of the
videos . . . are essentially Ms. Zamora stalking Ms. Ramos’s
movements . . . via her video camera.”4 The court found that the
“vast majority” of the videos depicted Ramos “doing everyday
things” and that, “at various times, inevitably, when Ms. Ramos
comes out of her house, Ms. Zamora appears.” The court
observed that, whenever Ramos walked by Zamora’s house, she
did not look in Zamora’s direction, while Zamora “loudly” yelled

4 The court found Ramos made threatening comments in two
videos, one taken on February 28, 2023 and one on March 22,
2023. As discussed, with respect to the February 28, 2023
incident, the court commented Ramos was trying to get Zamora
to stop talking to her. For the March 22, 2023 incident, the court
stated the video showed a woman yelling “off-camera,” “I’m going
to lock your ass up,” and then saying a string of expletives.

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at the camera, said Ramos’s name, and commented on whether
Ramos was “afraid of her.” The court stated that Zamora’s “loud
proclamation” of Ramos’s name, when Ramos was “doing nothing
more than an everyday task,” failed to demonstrate Zamora was
“in any way, shape, or form afraid of Ms. Ramos.” The court
concluded that “none of the behavior” in the videos was
“consistent with someone who [was] afraid.” Addressing Zamora,
the court stated, “You do not yell someone’s name when you are
afraid. You do not accost their child when you are afraid and yell
the child’s name and talk to the camera . . . when all he [was]
doing [was] crossing the street to his neighbor’s house to get a
ride to school.”
The court denied Zamora’s request for a restraining order,
and discharged the temporary restraining order. Zamora timely
appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides: “A person who
has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a
temporary restraining order and an order after hearing
prohibiting harassment as provided in this section.” (See Olson
v. Doe (2022) 12 Cal.5th 669, 677; E.G. v. M.L. (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 688, 698.) Section 527.6, subdivision (b)(3),
defines harassment as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of
violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a
specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the
person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (See E.G., at
p. 698; Hansen v. Volkov (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 94, 103.) The

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course of conduct “must be that which would cause a reasonable
person to suffer substantial emotional distress” and “must
actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.”
(§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) The court may issue a restraining order
only after finding “by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful
harassment exists.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i)(1); see Olson, at pp. 677-
678; Hansen, at p. 103.)
“‘[W]hen presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing
evidence, the court must determine whether the record, viewed as
a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability
demanded by this standard of proof.’” (Hansen v. Volkov, supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at p. 104; see Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 1005.) However, “‘where the trier of fact has
determined that the party with the burden of proof did not carry
its burden and that party appeals, “it is misleading to
characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial
evidence supports the judgment.” [Citations.] Instead, “where
the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the
question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence
compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.”
[Citation.] Specifically, we ask “whether the appellant’s evidence
was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’”’”
(Estes v. Eaton Corp. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636, 651; see Juen v.
Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 972, 978-979.)
“‘“Where, as here, the judgment is against the party who has the
burden of proof, it is almost impossible for him [or her] to prevail
on appeal by arguing the evidence compels a judgment in his [or

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her] favor. That is because unless the trial court makes specific
findings of fact in favor of the losing [party], we presume the trial
court found [that party’s] evidence lacks sufficient weight and
credibility to carry the burden of proof.”’” (Jennifer K. v.
Shane K. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 558, 579.)

B. Zamora Forfeited Her Argument, and the Evidence
Does Not Compel a Finding in Her Favor
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that
a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and
the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.
[Citations.] . . . ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the
record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be
made by the appellate court.’” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th
594, 608-609; accord, Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th
514, 527.) “‘This means that an appellant must do more than
assert error and leave it to the appellate court to search the
record and the law books to test his claim. The appellant must
present an adequate argument including citations to supporting
authorities and to relevant portions of the record.’” (L.O. v.
Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 619-620; accord, County of
Los Angeles v. Niblett (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 454, 463.)
“Consequently, ‘[w]hen an appellant fails to raise a point, or
asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and
citations to authority, we treat the point as waived. [Citation.]’
[Citation.] Likewise, ‘“[i]f a party fails to support an argument
with the necessary citations to the record, . . . the argument [will
be] deemed to have been waived. [Citation.]” [Citations.]’

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[Citation.] These rules apply both to parties represented by
counsel and self-represented parties.” (L.O., at p. 620.)
Zamora argues: “The legal standard for issuing a
restraining order requires only that there be a reasonable fear of
harm or harassment. I submit that the evidence presented
clearly meets the standard and that the continued harassment
has caused a real and tangible fear for my safety.” In her
opening brief, however, Zamora has not provided any citations to
the record or to relevant case authority to support her argument,
thus forfeiting it. (See L.O. v. Kilrain, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
p. 620.)
Forfeiture aside, Zamora’s argument lacks merit because
the evidence does not compel a finding in Zamora’s favor as a
matter of law. The trial court questioned the veracity of
Zamora’s testimony and found the videos she presented, which in
the court’s words were “the best evidence independent of” her
testimony, did not show Zamora feared Ramos. For example,
contrary to Zamora’s assertions, the trial court found the videos
did not show Ramos throwing eggs at Zamora’s house or Ramos
driving her truck in a threatening manner near Zamora’s house.
The court determined the various videos showed Ramos going
about her daily life and Zamora trying to “get her attention” by
yelling out her (or Troy’s) name, which undermined Zamora’s
claim she felt threatened by or feared Ramos. (See E.G. v. M.L.,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 700 [“in deciding whether to issue
the order, the trial court views the evidence as a whole”].)
Zamora does not cite anything in the record that compels a
finding Ramos harassed her within the meaning of section 527.6,
subdivision (b)(3). Her argument the evidence she presented
showed “fear of harm or harassment” essentially asks us to
reweigh the evidence and reassess the court’s credibility findings,

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which we cannot do. (See E.G. v. M.L., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 699 [“we must ‘not reweigh the evidence itself’ [citation], but
must instead ‘view the record in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the
trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses,
resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable
inferences from the evidence’”]; see also Curcio v. Pels (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 1, 12 [“We do not determine credibility or reweigh
the evidence.”]; Jennifer K. v. Shane K., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at
p. 579 [“‘in a bench trial, the trial court is the “sole judge” of
witness credibility’”].) In light of the trial court’s credibility
finding against Zamora and court’s finding Zamora’s videos did
not show she feared Ramos, Zamora cannot show the record
compels a finding she met her burden under section 527.6.
Zamora asserts Ramos’s “[o]ngoing and escalating
behavior” has “caused [her] severe psychological distress.” To the
extent Zamora is arguing incidents that occurred after the trial
court’s decision show the court erred in denying her request for a
restraining order against Ramos, we do not consider matters that
were not before the trial court. (See Haworth v. Superior Court
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 379, fn. 2 [“‘It is an elementary rule of
appellate procedure that, when reviewing the correctness of a
trial court’s judgment, an appellate court will consider only
matters which were part of the record at the time the judgment
was entered.’”]; Higginson v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2026)
118 Cal.App.5th 316, 354 [same].)

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 DISPOSITION

The order denying Zamora’s request for a restraining order
against Ramos is affirmed.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

STONE, J.

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