Filed 7/16/26 Marriage of Angela M. and Jeanne B. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re Marriage of LINO and 2d Civ. No. B338128
JEANNE B. (Super. Ct. No. 14FL-0681)
(San Luis Obispo County)

ANGELA M.,
PUBLIC - REDACTED
Respondent, VERSION OF OPINION

v. Redacts material from sealed
records. (Cal. Rules of Court,
JEANNE B., rules 8.45, 8.46(f)(1) and
(f)(2).1)
Appellant.

In this marital dissolution action, Jeanne B. appeals a
postjudgment order modifying spousal and child support.

This case involves material from a sealed record. In
1

accordance with the California Rules of Court, rules 8.46(f)(1)
and (f)(2), we have prepared both public (redacted) and sealed
(unredacted) versions of this opinion. We hereby order the
unredacted version of this opinion sealed.
Appellant’s former spouse, Lino B. (Lino), died in March 2025
after a long battle with cancer. On June 2, 2025, we granted the
motion of Lino’s subsequent spouse, Angela M., to substitute
herself as respondent in place of Lino.
After the marriage of Lino B. and appellant was dissolved,
appellant’s mother (mother) provided substantial sums of money
to appellant. Appellant and mother claimed the money had been
loaned to appellant. The trial court ruled, “The money given to
[appellant] by [mother] in the years between 2018 and 2024 were
not loans, but regular, recurring gifts, and as such the funds are
[appellant’s] non-taxable income” for the purpose of calculating
support.
Appellant meritoriously contends the court’s ruling was
erroneous. She argues that it “resulted in an order which, rather
than award [her] the substantial back spousal support Lino owed,
resulted in an onerous retroactive child support [award] which
[she] now ostensibly owes Lino.”
We reverse. Although substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s finding that the purported loans were actually gifts,
these gifts were not income to appellant because they were
“outside ‘the traditional concept of income as a recurrent,
monetary benefit.’ ” (In re Marriage of Williamson (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 1303, 1314 (Williamson).) The gifts “were irregular”
(ibid.) and “tied to a specific expense.” (Anna M. v. Jeffrey E.
(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 439, 455 (Anna M.).)
In addition, the trial court’s ruling was inequitable in view
of appellant’s dire financial situation. The trial court ruling
required her to pay a huge sum of back child support that she
could not possibly pay. She would never be able to pay unless her
mother gave her additional money.

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 Factual and Procedural Background
Appellant and Lino married in 2004 and separated in 2014.
They had two children. In August 2016 a judgment was entered
dissolving their marriage. Lino testified, “[H]e had exclusive and
sole custody of the parties’ two minor children throughout the
relevant [time] period of []October 25, 2018, to the present [].”
The trial court found, “[Appellant] has had zero percent custody
of the children since July of 2015.”
In October 2019 Lino filed a Request for Order modifying
child and spousal support. In August 2022 appellant filed
against Lino an Order to Show Cause re: Contempt. Appellant
claimed Lino owed her $97,343.47 in back spousal support. In an
Income and Expense Declaration filed in June 2023, appellant
said she owed mother $1,866,905.
A court trial was conducted in February and March 2024.
The court found that from 2018 to 2024 mother allegedly had
made loans to appellant as evidenced by promissory notes. The
trial court ruled that the loans were actually gifts. The court
characterized “as non-taxable income to [appellant] . . . the
annual funds received from [mother] for each year starting in
2019 set forth as follows:
2019: $78,228.00
2020: $142,560.00
2021: $432,948.00
2022: $92,304.00
2023: $766,970.00
2024: $4,750.00[.]”
The 2024-dollar figure is not for the entire year. The figure
appears in the trial court’s statement of decision, which was filed

3
on May 14, 2024. The statement of decision does not indicate the
cut-off date for the 2024 expenses.
Based on the above non-taxable income of appellant, the
court ordered her to pay Lino the following monthly child support
retroactive to November 1, 2019:
11/1/19 - 12/31/19: $1,712
1/1/20 - 12/31/20: $3,211
1/1/21 - 12/31/21: $7,720
1/1/22 - 12/31/22: $1,792
1/1/23 - 10/31/23: $13,233
11/1/23 - 12/31/23: $8,260
Starting January 1, 2024, the trial court ordered appellant
to pay monthly child support of $765. The court ordered each
party to pay one-half “of all unreimbursed health care expenses”
for the children from November 1, 2019 through December 31,
2023.
The court found: “As of 2019, [appellant] had a reduced
need for spousal support and after December of 2020, she had no
need for spousal support as she received non-taxable income that
well exceeded the marital standard of living.” Beginning January
1, 2021, the court terminated spousal support.
The court allowed appellant to “move forward on her
request for child and spousal support arrears from August 1,
2016 going forward.” It rejected “Lino’s argument that
[appellant] should not be entitled to child and spousal support
arrears due to the Doctrine of Laches.”

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 Motion to Dismiss Appeal Because It Was Taken
from the Nonappealable Statement of Decision
On May 28, 2024, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the
trial court’s Final Statement of Decision, which was filed on May
14, 2024. On July 16, 2024, the trial court filed its “Findings and
Order after Hearing” (the Order). The Final Statement of
Decision was attached to the Order and incorporated therein by
reference. Appellant did not file a notice of appeal from the
Order.
“[A] statement of decision is not treated as appealable when
a formal order or judgment does follow, as in this case.” (Alan v.
American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 901.)
Respondent has moved to dismiss the appeal because it was
taken from the nonappealable Final Statement of Decision and
the time has expired for taking an appeal from the appealable
Order.
“We have authority to treat [appellant’s] notice of appeal as
if it had been timely filed. ‘The reviewing court may treat a
notice of appeal filed after the superior court has announced its
intended ruling, but before it has rendered judgment, as filed
immediately after entry of judgment.’ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.104(d)(2).)[2] . . . ‘[T]here is a well recognized policy in favor of
resolving appeals on their merits . . . .’ [Citation.] In the present
case, [appellant] had the right to appeal from the [July 16, 2024
Order] . . . . [Citations.] . . . Further, [respondent] does not assert
any prejudice resulting from [appellant’s] premature appeal.
Under these circumstances, we will exercise our discretion to
deem [appellant’s] appeal . . . as having been [timely] taken from
the subsequent [Order] entered [on July 16, 2024].” (In re

2 All references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

5
Marriage of Grimes & Mou (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 406, 420; see
also rule 8.100(a)(2) [“The notice of appeal must be liberally
construed”]; In re Marriage of Ankola (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 369,
375 [“In exercising our discretion, we liberally construe a
premature notice of appeal in favor of its sufficiency”].)
In her reply to appellant’s opposition to the motion to
dismiss, respondent raises an issue that was not raised in her
motion to dismiss.3 Respondent claims the appeal “must be
dismissed as [appellant] took it from a bifurcated decision and
did not seek a certificate of probable cause.” (Bold and
capitalization omitted.) The claim is forfeited because
respondent did not raise it in her motion to dismiss. “ ‘We will
not ordinarily consider issues raised for the first time in a reply
brief. . . .’ ” (In re Marriage of Cohen (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 574,
583.)
The claim is also forfeited for failure to support it with
meaningful legal analysis, citations to pertinent authority, and
citations to facts in the record on appeal. (Fernandes v. Singh
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 932, 942-943 (Fernandes) [“a brief must
contain ‘ “meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to
authority and citations to facts in the record that support the
claim of error” ’ and contain adequate record citations, or else we
will deem all points ‘to be forfeited as unsupported by “adequate
factual or legal analysis” ’ ”].)

3 Respondent acknowledges that the California Rules of

Court “do not provide for replies.” (See rule 8.54(a).)

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 Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Moot
Under the Disentitlement Doctrine
On August 6, 2024, respondent filed a motion entitled,
“Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Moot for Disentitlement.” On
October 10, 2025, respondent’s counsel wrote a letter to this court
in which he stated, “[I]t would appear the motion for
disentitlement is now moot.” Accordingly, respondent’s motion is
denied.
Motion for Judicial Notice
On September 10, 2024, appellant filed a motion for judicial
notice of documents that “are related to the determination[] of the
[disentitlement] doctrine’s application.” Since respondent’s
“Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Moot for Disentitlement” is now
moot, appellant’s motion for judicial notice is denied.
Claim Appellant Waived All Arguments Because in
Notice Designating Record on Appeal She Failed
to State Points She Intended to Raise on Appeal
In her Notice Designating Record on Appeal (Notice),
appellant said she would proceed by way of a settled statement
because the oral proceedings had not been reported by a court
reporter. (Rule 8.137(b)(1)(A).) In item 6 of the Notice, appellant
requested that the settled statement include the testimony of
herself, Lino, and mother. Appellant checked a box stating that
their testimony does “not include all of the testimony in the
superior court.”
In the Notice appellant did not state the points she
intended to raise on appeal. Therefore, respondent claims
appellant waived all of her arguments on appeal. Rule
8.130(a)(2) provides, “If the appellant designates less than all the
testimony, the notice must state the points to be raised on appeal;

7
the appeal is then limited to those points unless, on motion, the
reviewing court permits otherwise.”
Appellant asserts, “Respondent’s waiver argument . . . must
be rejected because it is apparent the incorrect box was
checked . . . .” We agree. According to the settled statement,
three witnesses testified at the trial: appellant, Lino, and mother.
The Settled Statement says it “consists of a condensed factual
summary of the evidence and testimony of each witness from the
trial.”
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Accordingly, we reject respondent’s waiver argument. We
also reject his contention that the “Settled Statement . . . is
fatally incomplete.”
Respondent Is Not Collaterally Estopped from Claiming that
Funds Received from Mother Were Income to Appellant
“Collateral estoppel is an aspect of res judicata. [Citation.]
. . . [R]es judicata ‘precludes parties or their privies from
relitigating a cause of action,’ and in this sense ‘has traditionally
been referred to as . . . “claim preclusion.” ’ [Citation.]
[¶] . . . ‘[R]es judicata also includes a broader principle . . .
commonly referred to as “collateral estoppel” or “issue
preclusion.” Under this principle an issue necessarily decided in
prior litigation may be conclusively determined as against the
parties or their privies in a subsequent lawsuit on a different
cause of action.’ [Citation.] [¶] . . . ‘ “Collateral estoppel applies

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when (1) the party against whom the plea is raised was a party or
was in privity with a party to the prior adjudication, (2) there
was a final judgment on the merits in the prior action and (3) the
issue necessarily decided in the prior adjudication is identical to
the one that is sought to be relitigated.” ’ ” (Patel v. Crown
Diamonds, Inc. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 29, 39.)
Appellant contends respondent is collaterally estopped from
claiming the funds provided by mother were not loans but instead
were income to appellant. ---------------------[REDACTED--------------
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4 All statutory references are to the Family Code.

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Finally, appellant asserts that respondent is collaterally
estopped because Lino did not litigate appellant’s claim in her
March 2018 Income and Expense Declaration that she was
indebted to mother in the amount of $296,621.47. Appellant
contends, “Because Lino did not litigate this claim in 2018 when
the claim became apparent, he was estopped from doing so in
2022 and 2024.” The contention is forfeited because it is not
supported by meaningful legal analysis with citation to pertinent
authority and facts in the record on appeal. (Fernandes, supra,
16 Cal.App.5th at pp. 942-943.)
In any event, appellant has not shown that in 2018 Lino
had cause to believe that the alleged loans totaling $296,621.47
were actually gifts. In its statement of decision the trial court

11
found, “The money given to [appellant] by [mother] in the years
preceding and up to 2017 in the amount of $287,306.76 . . . was a
loan which was satisfied by the collateralization of
[appellant’s] . . . property and deferred compensation accounts.”
On the other hand, the court concluded that “[t]he money given to
[appellant] by [mother] in the years between 2018 and 2024 were
not loans, but regular, recurring gifts . . . .”
Relevant Trial Testimony
Appellant’s Testimony
Appellant testified that she was disabled. There is a
documented history of this severe disability: ---[REDACTED]------
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------- She also
borrowed money from mother “to help her secure legal counsel in
relation to this matter and the case-- [REDACTED]--------------------
-----------------------------------------------------, as well as to cover her
medical/--[REDACTED]-- expenses, general legal fees, and assist
her with living expenses if needed.” She obtained a loan from
mother for the purpose of providing her “with a vehicle to drive as
she was unable to procure a loan on a vehicle without a cosigner.”
Appellant had not “made any payments to [mother] after
2016.” “[T]he amount of money she owed her mother was in
excess of $1,800,000.” “[S]he could never pay back the money she
received from [mother] in the years between 2018 and 2024.”
Appellant said, “ ‘I have nothing.’ ” “[H]er mother was aware
[appellant] could not repay the loans.”

12
 Appellant “was unemployed and did not have any current
income. She . . . had been unemployed throughout 2019, 2020,
2021, and 2022. She . . . had a brief job as a pharmaceutical tech
assistant in 2023 with AHMC Healthcare temp Agency, but was
let go.”
“[F]or 2019, [Lino] should have paid her $42,000.00 in
spousal support but only paid her $23,518.82. . . . [I]n 2020,
[Lino] should have paid her $42,000 in spousal support pursuant
to the Court order filed November 1, 2018, but only paid [her]
$1,950.00. . . . [F]or 2021 [Lino] was under a court order to pay
her spousal support of $42,000.00 but only paid $600.00. . . .
[F]or 2022, [Lino] only made $50.00 monthly payments out of the
$3,500 monthly amount owed to her per the September 2016
court order.”5
In its statement of decision, the trial court stated that
appellant’s testimony “did not provide this Court with the
credible evidence it needs to rule in support of many of her
arguments.” The court noted: “When she was asked about the
multiple promissory notes she signed with her mother,
amounting to over $1.8 million of principal and interest, she
frequently answered, ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I don’t recall.’ . . . It is the
opinion of this Court that any reasonable person would know

5 Lino testified: “[H]e was aware of the September 2016

statement of decision and order directing him to pay [appellant]
$3,500 a month in spousal support. . . . [That order] had never
been changed and remained in place. . . . [H]e . . . paid the
support as ordered until February 2020, when he began paying
$50.00 a month in spousal support based on deductions for the
children’s health care and child support. . . . [T]here was no order
authorizing his reduction of payment.”

13
such details regarding transactions of this magnitude and that
she was either not being forthright with her testimony or there
were no legitimate loans of which to testify.”6
The trial court credited appellant’s testimony that she had
“ ‘nothing’ ”: “[Appellant], as she testified herself, will never be
able to make enough money to pay off $1.8 m[illion] in loans and
as she testified, she ‘has nothing left’ . . . .”
Mother’s Testimony
Mother testified: “she had been helping [appellant]
financially over the last several years due to her daughter’s need
for funds to pay for health care costs, legal fees and some living
expenses, as needed. . . . [S]he had provided [appellant] with a
car under a loan secured by a promissory note.” “[S]he had not
gifted or loaned money to the parties or her daughter during their
marriage.”7
Mother testified as to various promissory notes signed by
appellant “and indicated [they] reflect the monies loaned to her
daughter for the periods specified in the notes.” “[T]he
promissory notes were always signed after the expiration date for
the notes. . . . [T]he notes were purposely written so that
[appellant] would already be in default and [mother] could collect
the debts whenever she wanted to.”
Mother “acknowledged that [appellant] had not made a
payment [on the promissory notes] since 2016.” She “did not

6 We parenthetically observe that there is an obvious

alternative: appellant could not recall the transactions because of
her disability.
7 In its statement of decision the trial court found, “[T]he

funds [from mother] were received by [appellant] after she
separated from Lino and every year since.”

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know whether [appellant] would ever be able to repay all of the
money that was owed to her.”
In its statement of decision, the trial court said it was
skeptical of mother’s testimony: “She . . . responded ‘I don't know
. . .,’ or ‘I can't remember . . .’ to key pieces of information
surrounding terms of the [loan] agreements, what the money was
spent on, or explaining how [appellant], who has been
unemployed for most of the last decade would be able to pay back
a $1.8m debt.” One obviously false answer by mother “cast a
cloud of doubt over the entirety of [her] testimony.”
Trial Court’s Findings and
Reasoning in Statement of Decision
In its statement of decision, the trial court concluded the
funds provided by mother were not loans because “[n]o informed
lender would lend money to someone that had never made a
single timely loan payment on a previous loan, did not have a job,
and who had no way of ever repaying the loan back.”8
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The court stated: “mother periodically and regularly gave
any needed funds directly to [appellant]. [Appellant’s] and

8 A mother of a disabled daughter is not an “informed

lender.”

15
[mother’s] testimony established that for the last seven years,
even as late as February 2024, [appellant] received funds to pay
for her monthly car lease, monthly rent, monthly living expenses,
and litigation fees. It appears that the large swings in funds
were due to the degree of litigation activity. [¶] Because of this,
and based on the testimony and evidence admitted at trial, the
Court will characterize the funds received from [mother] as non-
taxable income to [appellant] . . . for each year starting in
2019 . . . .” “Based on the respective current and historical
attorney fee requests, it is a calculated likelihood each party has
spent close to a million dollars in legal fees . . . .”
Decisional Law
Appellant argues that, even if the funds from mother were
gifts, they were not income because they “did not bear a
‘reasonable relationship to the traditional concept of income as a
recurrent, monetary benefit.’ ” “Instead, [mother’s] funds, be
they loans or gifts, were provided more on an as-needed, irregular
basis . . . .”
In In re Marriage of Alter (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 718, 736-
737 (Alter), the court said: “[The] definition [of ‘income’ in Family
Code section 4058] is broad enough to encompass gifts that bear a
reasonable relationship to the traditional concept of income as a
recurrent, monetary benefit. . . . [¶] We conclude that nothing in
the law prohibits considering gifts to be income for purposes of
child support so long as the gifts bear [such] a reasonable
relationship . . . . [T]he question of whether gifts should be
considered income for purposes of the child support calculation is
one that must be left to the discretion of the trial court.” (See
also Kevin Q. v. Lauren W. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 633, 647 [“The
court did not abuse its discretion by considering . . . gifts [from

16
father] to be support (or income) for purposes of calculating
Lauren's ability to pay her attorney fees. The gifts were ‘periodic
and regular’ and bore ‘a reasonable relationship to the traditional
meaning of income as a recurrent monetary benefit’ ”].)
In Alter the husband “argue[d] that the trial court abused
its discretion by considering as income the $6,000 his mother
gave him every month.” (Alter, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 722.)
The court concluded, “[Husband] has been receiving regular cash
payments from his mother for over a decade. The periodic and
regular nature of the payments means that the money is
available to [husband] for the support of his children.” (Id., at
p. 737.)
In Williamson, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307, this
court upheld the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to “declin[e]
to treat historical cash advances from Frederick’s parents as
income in calculating child and spousal support.” We explained:
“[A]side from the annual $26,000 tax-free gifts and the one-time
$900,000 gift in 2000, the cash advances from Frederick's parents
were made upon request, depending upon the family's needs. As
Mary Kate explained, ‘Everybody in the family just gets money
when they need it.’ In some years, Frederick and Mary Kate
needed large sums of cash, primarily to purchase and renovate
homes. In other years, they requested little or no assistance. In
that sense, the advances were irregular and outside ‘the
traditional concept of income as a recurrent, monetary benefit.’ ”
(Id., at p. 1314.)
Finally, in Anna M., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 452, the
court stated: “[L]egal authorities . . . indicate regular, recurrent
gifts to a parent may be characterized as income to that parent
for purposes of calculating guideline child support, but they do

17
not indicate gifts must be so characterized in every case. Instead,
the trial court has discretion to consider gifts as income when
they are a regular, recurrent monetary benefit to the parent.
Further, courts are mindful not to base a child support
calculation on monies a parent does not actually have.” The court
continued, “It is reasonable for a court to conclude a
grandparent’s monthly gifts to a parent, in the same amount, not
tied to a specific expense, and continuing for years, are regular
enough to be characterized as income to that parent and are
funds available to pay child support.” (Id., at p. 455, italics
added.)
The court “conclude[d] the evidence was sufficient for the
trial court to reasonably conclude the financial support Davis [the
godfather of Anna’s child] provides Anna does not represent a
regular, recurrent monetary benefit fairly representing income
for purposes of calculating the child support award.” (Anna M.,
supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 455.) The court explained, “A
reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that Davis’s support
of Anna resembles the gifts provided to the obligor father in
Williamson that were not deemed income: occurring on an as-
needed basis to pay particular expenses. [Citation.] In contrast,
in Alter, the obligor’s mother had been giving him $6,000, a fixed
amount every month for over a decade.” (Id., at p. 454-455,
italics added; see also County of San Diego v. P.B. (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 1058, 1075-1076 [no abuse of discretion in ruling
that grandparents’ direct payment of father’s attorney’s fees did
not constitute income to father since “Mother has not established
that the payments were made at regular time intervals or in
recurring amounts . . . [a]nd the payments were for a specific

18
purpose—Father's attorneys—and are not available to Father for
the support of Child”].)
Standard of Review
As the above cases indicate, the applicable standard of
review is abuse of discretion. “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse
of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced
from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute
its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ [Citation.] ‘To the extent
that we are called upon to review the trial court’s factual
findings, we apply a substantial evidence standard of review.’ ”
(In re Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780.) “A trial
court's decision is an abuse of discretion if it is based on an error
of law [citations] or if the court's factual findings are not
supported by substantial evidence [citation].” (Shapell SoCal
Rental Properties, LLC v. Chico's FAS, Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th
198, 213.)
Substantial Evidence Supports Trial Court’s Factual
Finding that Purported Loans to Appellant Were Actually Gifts
“The question whether a transfer of funds was a gift or a
loan often presents questions of fact, and this case is no different.
The question depends principally upon [mother’s] intent at the
time [s]he advanced the funds to [appellant] . . . .” (Burkle v.
Burkle (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1036.)
In her appellate briefs appellant does not claim that there
is no substantial evidence in support of the trial court’s finding
that the funds provided by mother were gifts instead of loans.
Accordingly, appellant has forfeited this issue. (Rodriguez v.
E.M.E., Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1033.) In any event,

19
there is ample substantial evidence in support of the court’s
finding. (See Alter, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 731.)
The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Ruling
that the Gifts Received by Appellant from 2019
through 2023 Were Income Available for Support
The relevant case law makes clear that, in order for gifts to
a parent to constitute income available for support, the gifts must
be “a regular, recurrent monetary benefit to the parent.” (Anna
M, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 452.) The gifts here were not
regular. Based on the trial court’s calculation of the annual gifts,
they were highly irregular:
2019: $78,228.00
2020: $142,560.00
2021: $432,948.00
2022: $92,304.00
2023: $766,970.00
The 2023 gifts were more than eight times greater than the
2022 gifts and almost 10 times greater than the 2019 gifts. The
trial court said: “[M]other periodically and regularly gave any
needed funds directly to [appellant]. . . . It appears that the large
swings in funds were due to the degree of litigation activity.”
(Italics added.) The facts here are a far cry from Alter, where for
years the mother gave her son $6,000 every month. In our view
mother’s gifts to appellant were “regular.”
This dispute is ruled by the Williamson rationale: “[T]he
cash advances from Frederick’s parents were made upon request,
depending upon the family’s needs [which varied from year to
year]. . . . In that sense, the advances were irregular and outside
‘the traditional concept of income as a recurrent, monetary
benefit.’ ” (Williamson, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314, italics

20
added.) “A reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that
[mother’s] support of [appellant] resembles the gifts provided to
the obligor father in Williamson that were not deemed income:
occurring on an as-needed basis to pay particular expenses.
[Citation.]” (Anna M., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at pp. 454-455.,
italics added.) The trial court erred in ruling that mother’s
irregular gifts to appellant depending upon her needs,
constituted income available for support.
Family Law Equity Rules
Moreover, the trial court abused its discretion because its
ruling was manifestly inequitable. It ordered appellant to pay
huge sums of money that she did not have and would never have
unless mother gave her the money. “[C]ourts are mindful not to
base a child support calculation on monies a parent does not
actually have.” (Anna M., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 452.)
Mother had no duty to support her grandchildren. “Generous
relatives do not have a duty to support a family member's minor
children.” (Williamson, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1315.)
“ ‘Family law cases “are equitable proceedings in which the
court must have the ability to exercise discretion to achieve
fairness and equity. [Citation.]” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Boswell
(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1175; see also Greiner v. Keller
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 332, 339 [“ ‘[T]he court in child support
proceedings, to the extent permitted by the child support
statutes, must be permitted to exercise the broadest possible
discretion in order to achieve equity and fairness in these most
sensitive and emotional cases’ ”]; In re Marriage of Fini (1994) 26
Cal.App.4th 1033, 1043 [“the court, in child support cases, is not
just supposed to punch numbers into a computer and award the
parties the computer's result without considering circumstances

21
in a particular case which would make that order unjust or
inequitable”]; see also In re Marriage of Bowman (2026) 119
Cal.App.5th 922.)
Disposition
The postjudgment order filed on July 16, 2024, is reversed.
The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. Appellant
shall recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

22
 Erin M. Childs, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

John L. Dodd & Associates and John L. Dodd; Jarrette &
Walmsley and Robert R. Walmsley, for Appellant.
Dennis Temko, for Respondent.