Filed 7/17/26 In re Em.A. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re EM.A., a Person Coming B350521, B352345
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP01971)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
D.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Case No. B350521 dismissed as
moot. Case No. B352345 affirmed.
Christopher Blake, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
In this consolidated appeal, D.M. (mother) appeals from the
juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction over her daughter Em.A,
and also appeals from a custody order granting father Er.A
(father) one 2-hour monitored visit per year on Father’s Day.
The juvenile court has terminated jurisdiction and awarded
full custody to mother. Her jurisdictional challenge is moot, and
we dismiss that appeal.
Mother forfeited her challenge to the visitation order by not
objecting to it below. Even if she had not, it was not an abuse of
discretion for the juvenile court to grant father one brief
monitored visit per year. We affirm the custody order.
BACKGROUND
In June 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral that
mother had filed a domestic violence complaint against father.
According to the referral, mother and father were arguing, and
father choked mother nearly to the point of unconsciousness
while she was holding newborn Em.A. Father then kicked
mother in the buttocks.
DCFS investigated and found inconclusive the allegations
of physical and emotional abuse, but found an allegation of
general neglect substantiated. “Mother and father acknowledged
the seriousness of the incident,” and mother obtained a
temporary restraining order against father. The parents agreed
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to a plan in which mother would request the family law court
grant her custody of Em.A. with monitored visitation for father.
Mother declined parenting and domestic violence services, stating
she was already attending a parenting group and did not intend
to reunify with father.
In May 2025, DCFS received a referral that on April 16,
2025, father and mother again got into an argument, and father
grabbed mother’s neck and strangled her for 10 seconds. Mother
told the reporting party Em.A. was in another room of the home
at the time. When DCFS investigated, mother stated she and
father were not living together, but she had allowed him to come
over because he had gotten into a fight with paternal
grandmother and “needed a place to be.” “Mother acknowledged
that she did not make the right decision in allowing him over,
and she won’t make that mistake again.”
Following further investigation, DCFS filed a petition
under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300 requesting the
juvenile court take jurisdiction over Em.A. The petition alleged
the parents “have a history of engaging in violent altercations in
the child’s presence and in the child’s home,” including the two
incidents in which father choked mother and unspecified prior
occasions of domestic violence. Under section 300,
subdivision (a), the petition alleged father’s “violent conduct”
endangered Em.A. Under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the
petition alleged both that father’s violent conduct put Em.A. in
danger, and “[t]he mother failed to protect the child in that the
1 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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mother allowed the father to reside [in] and frequent the child’s
home and have unlimited access to the child.”
Father was not present at the adjudication hearing on
September 23, 2025. The juvenile court sustained the count
under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) against mother and
dismissed the count under subdivision (a). At the disposition
hearing on October 14, 2025, the court ordered Em.A. removed
from father and placed in the home of mother under DCFS
supervision.
On January 22, 2026, the juvenile court granted mother
sole legal and physical custody of Em.A. The court granted
father one 2-hour monitored visit per year on Father’s Day, with
father providing 48 hours advance notice and paying for the
monitor. The court terminated jurisdiction.
Mother timely appealed from the jurisdictional order and
the custody order. We consolidated the appeals for purposes of
briefing, oral argument, and decision.
DISCUSSION
A. Mother’s Challenge to the Jurisdictional Order Is
Moot
In case No. B350521, mother argues substantial evidence
does not support the jurisdictional findings against her. She
acknowledges that at the time of the May 2025 referral, “[T]here
may have been legitimate concerns that [mother] might not
remain separated from [father] or could not protect [Em.A.] from
him,” but by the time of the jurisdiction hearing in September
2025, the evidence showed mother and father were indeed
separated and mother was protecting Em.A. from further contact
with father.
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Because the juvenile court has returned Em.A. to mother’s
custody and terminated jurisdiction, mother’s challenge is moot.
(See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 282 (D.P.) [termination of
jurisdiction moots challenge to jurisdictional findings when those
findings have no nonspeculative legal or practical consequence to
appealing parent].)
Mother argues her appeal is not moot because “[s]he
remains at peril for being placed on the Child Abuse Central
Index (CACI).” (See In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042, 1048
[appeal from jurisdictional finding not moot if child welfare
agency “must report the allegation underlying the court’s finding
for inclusion in the CACI”].) Penal Code section 11169,
subdivision (a) requires reporting of “child abuse or severe
neglect.” Child abuse is “physical injury or death inflicted by
other than accidental means upon a child.” (Id., § 11165.6.)
Severe neglect is either “the negligent failure . . . to protect the
child from severe malnutrition or medically diagnosed nonorganic
failure to thrive,” or “those situations of neglect where any person
having the care or custody of a child willfully causes or permits
the person or health of the child to be placed in a situation such
that their person or health is endangered . . . .” (Id., § 11165.2,
subd. (a).)
Mother fails to show her conduct as found by the juvenile
court must be reported for inclusion in the CACI. DCFS did not
allege, and accordingly the juvenile court did not find, that
mother injured Em.A. at all, much less nonaccidentally, nor did
DCFS allege mother “willfully” placed Em.A. in danger. Mother’s
conduct would seem at worst to be “ ‘[g]eneral neglect,’ ” which
includes a “negligent failure . . . to provide adequate . . .
supervision where no physical injury to the child has occurred.”
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(Pen. Code, § 11165.2, subd. (b).) General neglect “is not
reportable in the CACI.” (In re Landon M. (July 2, 2026,
B349454) __ Cal.App.5th __ [2026 Cal.App.Lexis 405, at p. *16].)
Indeed, mother concedes “that her placement on CACI is
probably not mandatory.”
To the extent mother speculates she may be placed on
CACI, even if such placement is not mandatory, this is
insufficient to avoid mootness. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 280 [absent indication parent’s conduct was or will be reported
for inclusion in the CACI, parent’s “CACI claim [is] too
speculative to survive a mootness challenge”].)
Mother alternatively argues we should exercise our
discretion to resolve her appeal on the merits because a ruling in
her favor would render her nonoffending. (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 282 [“Even when a case is moot, courts may
exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the
dispute.”].) She cites In re B.H. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 469,
which stated, “ ‘ “[W]hen . . . the outcome of the appeal could be
‘the difference between [a parent] being an “offending” parent
versus a “non-offending” parent,’ a finding that could result in
far-reaching consequences with respect to these and future
dependency proceedings, we find it appropriate to exercise our
discretion to consider the appeal on the merits[.]” ’ ” (Id. at
p. 482, fn. 5.)
Apart from citing B.H., mother does not explain what
consequences might stem from the jurisdictional findings against
her, or why this case otherwise merits our discretionary review.
We therefore dismiss the appeal as moot.
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B. Mother Has Forfeited Her Challenge to the Custody
Order
In case No. B352345, mother challenges the custody order
granting father one 2-hour monitored visit with Em.A. each year
on Father’s Day. Mother argues father’s violent tendencies put
Em.A. at risk.
Mother did not object to the visitation order below, and
therefore has forfeited the argument. (In re A.B. (2014)
225 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1366 [“ ‘As a general rule, a party is
precluded from urging on appeal any point not raised in the trial
court.’ ”].) Even if she had not, mother concedes the juvenile
court granted what “is probably the most restrictive visitation
order possible,” and we agree. Although mother argues the
juvenile court was not required to grant any visitation, we cannot
conclude it was an abuse of discretion to grant father one brief
monitored visit per year. (In re J.P. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1111,
1119 [“Visitation orders in dependency cases . . . will not be
reversed absent a ‘clear showing of an abuse of discretion.’ ”].)
DISPOSITION
In case No. B350521, the appeal is dismissed as moot. In
case No. B352345, the custody order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. WEINGART, J.
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