Filed 7/20/26 P. v. Manning CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)

THE PEOPLE, C102568
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 22FE013178)
v.

MICHAEL MANNING,
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Michael Manning appeals his convictions of unlawful possession of a
firearm and ammunition. His primary argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in
excluding evidence regarding his wife’s prior conviction for attempted involuntary
manslaughter and her “admission to being vindictive.” We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code,
§ 29800, subd. (a); count one) and unlawful possession of ammunition (id., § 30305,
subd. (a); count two). It was further alleged defendant had a prior strike. (Id., §§ 667,
subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.) Two aggravating factors were also alleged. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.21.)

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 I. Trial Testimony
During the July 2024 trial, Deputy Sheriff Steven Guild testified that, around
midnight on August 2, 2022, he and his partner responded to a domestic violence call at a
large apartment complex. The caller, V.G., (who defendant testified was his wife) told
the two deputies that defendant had been “pulling on her,” and she believed defendant
would return. She also showed the deputies a photo that she took of firearms that
defendant “possibly possessed.” There was an unidentified man in the photo. At this
point, Deputy Guild testified that “we would be looking for a gun.”
As the two deputies and V.G. were talking, Deputy Guild noticed a “silhouette of
a person” about 75 yards away, near a car. Soon afterward, V.G. pointed in the same
direction and said she saw defendant. As defendant walked behind the patrol car, Deputy
Guild approached and eventually detained him on suspicion of domestic violence. The
officer never lost sight of defendant, did not see him throw or drop anything, and never
saw anyone else near him.
After detaining defendant, Deputy Guild searched defendant but did not find any
weapons. Defendant was then placed in the back of the patrol car. While Deputy Guild’s
partner talked to V.G., Deputy Guild retraced defendant’s steps. He found a loaded
Glock 30 semiautomatic pistol on the corner of a grassy patch, close to where he first saw
defendant. The gun appeared to have been dropped, not hidden. Deputy Guild placed the
firearm in the trunk of his patrol car and later booked it into evidence. Photos of the
firearm and where it was found were shown to the jury. Video from Deputy Guild’s
bodycam was also shown to the jury.
Analysis of the firearm revealed three DNA contributors to the firearm frame area,
with 83 percent of the DNA almost certainly coming from defendant. Both female and
male DNA was present on the firearm. According to the criminologist, the DNA testing
did not indicate who touched an item the most, or who touched it last.

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 The parties stipulated that defendant had a prior felony conviction. Defendant
testified that he previously had a drug problem and had gone to prison for domestic
abuse. V.G. was aware of his history of domestic violence.
Defendant testified that, on the day of the incident, he returned home from work
and found his wife (V.G.), her son, her grandson, and her “nephew” in their apartment.
Defendant learned that his wife’s nephew was actually her ex-fiancé’s nephew.
Concerned that his wife was having an affair with her ex-fiancé, defendant argued with
her about whether the nephew could come over to their home. The two had previously
argued over other men. During this argument, his wife “got loud,” and defendant grew
angry and threatened to move out, making the wife angry. Defendant grabbed his
television and, while walking out the door said, “to hell with it” and threw the television
on the ground in the parking lot. The two had previously destroyed items during
arguments, including televisions.
Defendant then decided to move one of his cars to a nearby parking lot because his
wife had previously damaged one of his cars. He planned to return so he could also move
his second car. He had done this about six or seven times before, and his wife knew his
route.
As he was walking back toward his second car, defendant did not see police until
he encountered them in the street. Defendant denied owning a gun or carrying one on the
night of the incident, and he had “no idea” how the firearm got to the corner of the grassy
area. He felt he was being wrongly accused in this case.
Defendant acknowledged that the photo of the guns that his wife showed to the
responding deputies was taken in his bedroom, with the guns placed on his side of the
bed. However, he denied being the man in the picture, and he reiterated that he did not
own any of the guns in the picture. Defendant testified his wife’s son owned a gun and
had previously brought it to their apartment.

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 II. Evidence Regarding V.G.
V.G. had previously been convicted of attempted involuntary manslaughter. She
shot someone who had abused her and her child.
Defense counsel asked the court to admit evidence of this conviction because it
showed V.G.’s “vindictive nature,” lack of credibility, and familiarity with guns. He
noted that V.G. told the police, “You know my history, right? I finna had to shoot my
baby daddy.” According to defense counsel, V.G. also told a defense investigator that
she was vindictive.
After reading a summary of the defense investigator’s interview, the court stated
that V.G.’s statement could mean that she was vindictive about defendant throwing the
television, because defendant “allegedly came back drunk from … being with a friend
she doesn’t like,” or “because in her past life she has been beaten, threatened and raped.”
The court stated it was “seeing a lot of 352 issues,” cautioning that this would take an
inordinate amount of time, and the prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.
The court promised to return to the issue later after V.G. could confer with her own
counsel about whether she should testify.
Prior to voir dire, defendant clarified that he thought the evidence of V.G.’s
vindictiveness was “pretty crucial” to his defense that his wife had framed him. The
court reasoned that, at best, such evidence might show her propensity to “do extreme
things during domestic altercations,” or to “carry guns.” The court stated, “It’s all
propensity evidence without an [Evidence Code section]1101exception.” 1

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.

Section 1101 generally provides that evidence of a person’s character (whether in
the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of
conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove conduct on a specified occasion. (§ 1101,
subd. (a).)

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 Defense counsel responded that defendant’s understanding of V.G.’s past showed
why defendant did not want any guns in the house, and the jury would not believe him
without “context.” Counsel asserted it would help the jury understand why defendant left
that night “when she started apparently accusing him of abuse and then returned when
police were there.”
The court clarified that, although the issue could be revisited later, pursuant to
section 3522 it would not at that time allow defendant to testify about his understanding
of V.G.’s attempted involuntary manslaughter conviction. In addition, the court ruled
there be no mention of defendant being aware that V.G. possessed guns in the past
because it was inadmissible propensity evidence.
Later in the trial, the court ruled that nothing about V.G. “killing a baby daddy” or
the fact that Deputy Guild may have overheard V.G. state, “I know you guys looked me
up. I know you know my history” were admissible based on what the court knew at that
time. The court reasoned this evidence was inadmissible hearsay, although it might be
admissible as impeachment evidence if V.G. testified during trial. V.G. was
subsequently called as a defense witness and exercised her Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.
Since defendant planned to testify, the trial court revisited argument about whether
it should allow testimony about defendant’s “state of mind because of potential fear of
[V.G.].” The court stated it did not find such evidence to be admissible under section
1101 as “it would come in for additional character for violence for [V.G.]”. The court
was also concerned that such evidence was not relevant and that introducing it could not
be done “quickly.” (§ 352.) The court clarified that it would not allow any testimony

2 Section 352 allows a trial court to exclude otherwise admissible evidence when its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will
unduly consume time or create substantial danger of undue prejudice.

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from defendant regarding the shooting of V.G.’s previous partner, or any statements
regarding her alleged possession of guns. However, defendant could testify that V.G.
was angry with him and wanted to get back at him. The court reasoned, “it’s part of the
defense in this case because the defense is that [V.G.] set [defendant] up.”
During defendant’s testimony, defense counsel asked him how the gun got “over
there on that corner?” Defendant answered that he had “no idea” but suggested “it could
have been [V.G.] setting me up.” The court ordered the jury to disregard defendant’s
testimony that V.G. set defendant up. The court later explained it did so because the
answer was speculative.
Prior to closing argument, the trial court held that defense counsel could argue that
defendant was not the person who put the gun in the location where it was found.
However, defense counsel could not argue that a “specific person” placed the gun there to
“frame him” because there was no evidence that happened.
During closing argument, defense counsel told the jury that defendant’s DNA
profile, which matched a DNA profile extracted from the gun, could have been
transferred to the gun when it was placed on defendant’s side of the bed. Counsel also
reminded the jury that defendant had argued with V.G. that night, and she was angry
when he left. V.G. knew he would, as usual, come back after moving his car.
“Somebody,” counsel argued, must have dropped the gun that Deputy Guild found.
III. Verdicts and Sentencing
The jury found defendant guilty of both counts. In bifurcated proceedings, the
trial court found true that defendant had a prior strike. The court also found the two
aggravating factors to be true. The court sentenced defendant to prison for an aggregate
term of four years.
Defendant timely appealed.

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 DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence about
1) V.G.’s prior conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter, and 2) statements V.G.
allegedly made about being vindictive. According to defendant, there was “more than
sufficient circumstantial evidence linking [V.G.] to the possession of the firearm.”
Further, when taken together, the excluded evidence would have “fully presented
[defendant’s] defense of third party culpability.3
The People respond that defendant has, at least in part, forfeited the argument
because the trial court failed to exclude V.G.’s statements about being vindictive to the
police or the defense investigator. We read the record differently and will proceed to the
merits.
I. No Error in Excluding Third Party Culpability Evidence
As our Supreme Court has explained, “courts should simply treat third-party
culpability evidence like any other evidence: if relevant it is admissible (§ 350) unless its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay, prejudice, or
confusion (§ 352).” (People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834.) To be admissible, third
party culpability evidence offered by a defendant to demonstrate that a reasonable doubt
exists as to his guilt must link the third party directly or circumstantially to the actual
perpetration of the crime. (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 372-373.)
“[E]vidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in another person,
without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt.”

3 In his reply brief, defendant mentions that he argued in his opening brief that the
trial court erred in “not instructing the jury on third party culpability.” We are unable to
locate this argument in defendant’s opening brief and therefore decline to address the
issue. (Nordstrom Com. Cases (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 583 [“[a] party may not
raise an issue for the first time on appeal [citation], and points raised for the first time in a
reply brief on appeal will not be considered, absent good cause for failure to present them
earlier”].)

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(Hall, at p. 833.) When “ ‘assessing an offer of proof relating to such evidence, the court
must decide whether the evidence could raise a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt
and whether it is substantially more prejudicial than probative under [section 352].’ ”
(McWhorter, at pp. 367-368.) We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s order
excluding third party culpability evidence. (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 581.)
Despite defendant’s contentions, defendant’s proffered third-party culpability
evidence does not raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Neither V.G.’s prior attempted
involuntary manslaughter conviction nor her passing statements about vindictiveness
demonstrate a direct or circumstantial link between her and the loaded gun found by
Deputy Guild. (See People v. McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 373 [a court may
properly exclude third-party culpability evidence where it “merely show[s] that the third
party was the more likely perpetrator because he had a history of violence”].)
Similarly, although the proffered evidence might have demonstrated motive or
anger toward V.G.’s previous romantic partners, this does not render it admissible here.
(See People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1137 [cases holding “mere evidence of
third party’s anger toward victim was insufficient,” and “third party’s possible motive
alone insufficient to raise reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt”].) Under the
circumstances, defendant’s proffered evidence amounts to nothing more than speculative
conjecture that does not link V.G. to the actual perpetration of the crime, i.e., possession
of a loaded gun. (People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 681-682 [“ ‘[s]peculative
inferences that are derived from evidence cannot be deemed to be relevant to establish the
speculatively inferred fact in light of [§ 210], which requires that evidence offered to
prove or disprove a disputed fact must have a tendency in reason for such purpose’ ”].)
Further, even if defendant’s proffered evidence had some minimally probative
value, we would still conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling it was
inadmissible under section 352. Such evidence ran a risk of confusing the jury and

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unduly consuming time, leading to a high risk of prejudice that outweighed the (at best)
minimal probative value.4
II. No Denial of Meaningful Opportunity to Present a Defense
A defendant has a right to present “a complete defense.” (California v. Trombetta
(1984) 467 U.S. 479, 485.) In general, “ ‘the ordinary rules of evidence do not
impermissibly infringe on the accused’s [constitutional] right to present a defense.
Courts retain . . . a traditional and intrinsic power to exercise discretion to control the
admission of evidence in the interests of orderly procedure and the avoidance of
prejudice.’ ” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611.) This principle is equally
applicable in the case of evidence of third-party culpability. (Ibid.)
The court’s exclusion of evidence regarding V.G.’s attempted involuntary
manslaughter conviction and statements that she was vindictive did not prevent defendant
from presenting his defense. The jury heard defendant’s testimony that 1) V.G. was
angry due to their fight, 2) she was familiar with defendant’s practice of moving his cars
during and following their fights, and 3) V.G. called the police and warned them that
defendant might have a gun. During closing argument, defense counsel pointed to certain
parts of this testimony and argued that “[s]omebody” other than defendant must have
dropped the gun found by Deputy Guild. Although the jury ultimately rejected
defendant’s third-party culpability defense, that does not mean defendant was prevented
from presenting this defense. (See People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1242-1243

4 Defendant claims the evidence was admissible under section 1230 as a statement
made by an unavailable witness (V.G. asserted her Fifth Amendment right not to testify)
because it was against V.G.’s penal interest. Unlike admitting to an uncharged crime, as
the trial court recognized, describing oneself as vindictive or explaining that one has a
prior conviction is not against one’s penal interest. Likewise, evidence that someone
claims to be vindictive or previously tried to harm a former romantic partner is exactly
the type of character evidence that section 1101 prohibits.

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[exclusion of third party culpability evidence did not constitute a violation of the federal
constitutional rights to present a defense or to confront and cross-examine witnesses].)
Having found no error, we need not address defendant’s claim of prejudice.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.

We concur:

/s/
MAURO, Acting P. J.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

 Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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