Filed 7/20/26 Sandoval v. Perez CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
MARIA SANDOVAL, B347150
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BF048134)
v.
JUAN PEREZ,
Defendant and Respondent;
LOS ANGELES COUNTY CHILD
SUPPORT SERVICES
DEPARTMENT,
Intervener and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Angela Villegas, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorney
General, Maureen C. Onyeagbako, and Ricardo Enriquez, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Intervener and Appellant.
No appearance for Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the mother of a minor child filed a petition under the Family
Code to determine parentage. In 2014, mother obtained an order requiring
the child’s father to pay child support. Shortly thereafter, the trial court
entered an order dismissing the case. No further action was taken in the
case until 2025, when the Los Angeles County Child Support Services
Department (Department) filed a motion to modify the child support order
pursuant to a stipulation by the parents. In response, the trial court struck
the Department’s motion, noting that the case had been dismissed in 2014.
The Department now appeals, arguing the trial court misinterpreted the
2014 dismissal order and violated the parties’ due process rights by striking
the Department’s motion. We find no error by the trial court and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Maria Sandoval (Sandoval) and Juan Perez (Perez) have one child
together. In 2013, Sandoval filed a parentage action alleging Perez was the
child’s father. Perez subsequently filed a declaration under the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act acknowledging parentage.
In 2014, Sandoval filed a request for order seeking child support from Perez
and other relief. The trial court granted Sandoval’s request, ordering Perez
to pay $300 per month in child support.
Sandoval then filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order
against Perez. Sandoval’s request was set for hearing on August 6, 2014.
Neither Sandoval nor Perez appeared for the hearing. In their absence, the
trial court determined Sandoval did not file a proof of service establishing
Perez received notice of the request and took Sandoval’s request off calendar
on its own motion. The court then noted that there were no future hearings
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scheduled in the case and closed by stating, “The Court [o]rders the case
DISMISSED forthwith.”1
The case then sat dormant for more than a decade until the
Department filed a motion to modify the child support order pursuant to a
stipulation by the parents. In March 2025, the trial court entered a minute
order noting the Department submitted an order for the court’s review and
signature. However, on April 8, 2025, the trial court issued a new order
correcting the March 2025 order nunc pro tunc. The court determined the
March order was issued in error because the action was dismissed in August
2014, “and that dismissal has not subsequently been vacated.” Having
determined the case was dismissed in 2014, the court directed the clerk to
remove the Department’s motion and related filings from the court’s file.
The Department then filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that
the trial court misinterpreted the August 2014 order dismissing the case. On
April 21, 2025, the trial court clerk filed a notice of clerical error and
correction removing the Department’s motion for reconsideration from the
court’s case management system. The clerk’s notice did not provide the basis
for this decision, and the record on appeal does not contain an order from the
trial court explaining why the Department’s motion for reconsideration was
removed from the court’s file.
1 In full, the order provides: “The matter is called for hearing. [¶] The
Court finds and determines there are no appearances by or for either party.
[¶] The Court finds the moving papers have NOT been served as of this date
as NO Proof of Service is on file with the Court. [¶] The Court takes the
matter off calendar on the Court’s own motion. [¶] The Court notes the
initial Temporary Restraining Orders request by Petitioner was denied and
there are no orders to be dissolved. [¶] No future date is currently scheduled
in this case and department. [¶] The Court Orders the case DISMISSED
forthwith.”
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The Department timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the Department argues we must reverse the trial court’s
April 8, 2025, order concluding the case was dismissed in 2014. The
Department contends the trial court erred in interpreting the August 2014
order as dismissing the entire case. Alternatively, the Department argues
the trial court violated the parties’ due process rights by rejecting the child
support stipulation without holding a hearing to allow the parties to argue
the issue. We are not persuaded.
I. Legal Standards
The interpretation of a trial court’s written order is governed by the
same rules of construction that apply to any other writing. (Smith v. Ogbuehi
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 453, 473–474.) “Under those rules, the entire order is
taken by its four corners and construed as a whole. [Citation.] Also, the
order’s language is viewed in light of the facts and the issues before the court,
and each statement is considered in its proper context. [Citation.]” (Id. at p.
474.) We therefore review de novo the interpretation of the trial court’s
August 2014 order. (See Mayer v. C.W. Driver (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 48, 57
[“Unless resolution depends on the credibility of conflicting extrinsic
evidence, the interpretation of a writing involves a question of law for de novo
review by the appellate court”].)
II. Analysis
The Department’s arguments on appeal turn on the interpretation of
the August 2014 dismissal order. We note that ordinarily, “[i]n the child
support field, continuing jurisdiction over child support is the rule.” (In re
Marriage of Lusby (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 459, 469; accord Lucachevitch v.
Lucachevitch (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 478, 484–485 (Lucachevitch) [trial court
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has continuing jurisdiction over child support until child reaches age of
majority].) For this reason, family law actions that involve child support are
typically not dismissed before the subject child reaches the age of majority.
However, if the August 2014 order dismissed the entire action, then the trial
court was without jurisdiction to consider the stipulation or the Department’s
motion in 2025. “A dismissal terminates an action. [Citation.] The dismissal
of an entire action deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction of the
matter, as well as of personal jurisdiction over the parties. [Citation.]”
(Estate of Garrett (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 831, 838 [an involuntary dismissal
deprives the court of jurisdiction over the case].) “An order by a court lacking
subject matter jurisdiction is void.” (Kyle v. Carmon (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th
901, 909.) Accordingly, if the August 2014 order dismissed the entire action,
the trial court had no jurisdiction over the parties or the proffered stipulation
in 2025 and had no power to entertain the Department’s request to modify
the child support order.2
As a threshold issue, we must determine whether the court correctly
interpreted the August 2014 order. We start with the plain language of the
order, which provides: “The Court Orders the case DISMISSED forthwith.”
The plain language supports the trial court’s conclusion that the case was
dismissed in 2014.
The Department’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. The
Department argues that because the only matter pending at the August 6,
2 Though it is not clear from the appellate record, we note the
Department concedes that a hearing on its motion to modify the support
order was scheduled for March 17, 2025, and that the Department and
parents elected not to appear for it. Accordingly, we reject the Department’s
contention that the trial court’s order striking the motion to modify “was
issued without any notice or opportunity for the Department or either parent
to be heard.”
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2014, hearing was Sandoval’s request for a restraining order, the dismissal
language quoted above must be construed to apply only to Sandoval’s request
and not the case as a whole. But this argument is belied by the plain
language of the order. In the August 2014 order, the court uses the term
“matter” to refer to Sandoval’s request for a restraining order. For example,
the order notes that, “The matter is called for hearing,” and “The Court takes
the matter off calendar.” The order then switches from discussing the
“matter” to discussing the “case” more broadly, noting “there are no orders to
be dissolved” and “No future date is currently scheduled in this case and
department” before ultimately dismissing “the case.”
The term “case” as used by the trial court cannot be reasonably
construed to be limited to Sandoval’s request for a restraining order. To
interpret the order in this manner would render the second half of the order
surplusage. Having taken Sandoval’s request for a restraining order off
calendar, there would be no need for the trial court to note that there was no
“future date” set in connection with mother’s request, nor any need to
additionally “dismiss” mother’s request. On appeal, the Department does not
explain what “dismissal” could mean in the context of mother’s request for a
restraining order, other than taking her request off calendar.
Alternatively, the Department argues the trial court’s docket noted the
case was dismissed for failure to prosecute, which “could only refer to the
pending restraining order request because final orders were previously
obtained for child custody, visitation, and support.” This language in the
court docket is of dubious relevance, as there is no indication in the record as
to its origin. But even assuming this notation was made at the trial court’s
direction, the Department’s argument is unconvincing. The Department
concedes that as of August 2014, the trial court had already entered final
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orders on custody, visitation, and support. This is consistent with the
language in the August 2014 order, noting that there were no future hearings
set in the case, and no pending orders remaining to be dissolved. In other
words, there was no longer any controversy left to prosecute in the case. This
supports the conclusion that the trial court dismissed the entire action in
August 2014.
Finally, the Department argues that we should not construe the August
2014 order as dismissing the entire case because it would have been error for
the trial court to dismiss the action at that time. This argument is
unpersuasive as the plain language of the order makes it clear the trial court
dismissed the entire action. While we agree the trial court erred in
dismissing the case before the minor child reached the age of majority
(Lucachevitch, supra, 69 Cal.App.2d at pp. 484–485), we are not free to re-
write the trial court’s order under the guise of interpreting its language.
Instead, the Department’s remedy is to bring a motion in the trial court to
vacate the order of dismissal, either by satisfying the statutory grounds for
vacatur under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 or by making a showing for
non-statutory relief on equitable grounds. (See Olivera v. Grace (1942) 19
Cal.2d 570, 574–575 [recognizing that trial courts have non-statutory
equitable powers to set aside a judgment or dismissal at any time]; accord
Bae v. T.D. Service Co. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 89, 97.)
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s April 8, 2025, order is affirmed. The parties are to
bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, P. J.
We concur:
MORI, J.
COGLIATI, J.*
* Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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