Filed 7/20/26 P. v. Karam CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064716

v. (Super. Ct. No. 24CF1286)

WALID KARAM, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Terri K. Flynn-Peister and Larry Yellin, Judges. Reversed and remanded.
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and Ksenia Gracheva, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Defendant Walid Karam was convicted by a jury of resisting and
deterring an executive officer, vandalism, and resisting and obstructing a
peace officer. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on
two years of formal probation. On appeal, Karam contends the trial court
erred in denying his objection under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 to
the prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge during voir dire. 1 He
contends one of the prosecutor’s reasons for the challenge was a
presumptively invalid demeanor-based reason and the presumption was not
overcome, meaning we must reverse the judgment and remand the matter for
a new trial. Additionally, he requests we independently review the sealed
portion of the record to determine whether the trial court erred in concluding
there was no material to be disclosed to him pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior
Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). We find no error regarding the latter
but agree the trial court erred in overruling the section 231.7 objection.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the matter for a new trial.
FACTS
I.
THE CHARGES
A May 2024 complaint charged Karam with resisting and
deterring an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69), felony vandalism (id., § 594),
and misdemeanor resisting and obstructing a peace officer (id., § 148, subd.
(a)(1)). After a preliminary hearing and other proceedings, the trial court

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure unless stated otherwise.

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granted a motion by the prosecution to amend the then-existing information
to reduce the vandalism count to a misdemeanor.
II.
JURY SELECTION
During jury selection, the court asked prospective jurors
questions and then turned questioning over to the prosecution and defense.
One of the jurors questioned was Prospective Juror Number 118 (PJ118).
During preliminary questioning by the court, PJ118 said he was
an unemployed student studying math, with no legal training or prior jury
service. He had no family or friends in law enforcement, had never been
arrested or been the victim of a crime, and did not know any attorneys or
judges.
When questioning was turned over to defense counsel, one of the
questions asked to the full panel of prospective jurors was whether, on a scale
of one to three, any of them did not want to be there. PJ118 and at least two
other prospective jurors raised their hands. Defense counsel inquired with
PJ118 first and the following exchange took place:
“[Defense counsel]: Well, I’ll start 118. You’re on a scale—on the
scale of one to three, you’re a three in that you don’t really want to be here.
Why is that?
“[PJ118]: I’m not sure if I would be much help to this case.
“[Defense counsel]: Why is that?
“[PJ118]: Lack of experience.
“[Defense counsel]: Lack of experience—lack of experience in
what, exactly?
“[PJ118]: In law.
“[Defense counsel]: Is that just a lack of legal experience?

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 “[PJ118]: Yeah.
“[Defense counsel]: Okay. Is there any other sort of lack of
experience—lack—anything else besides that?
“[PJ118]: A lack of cooperative experience.
“[Defense counsel]: Cooperating experience?
“[PJ118]: Yeah.
“[Defense counsel]: Thank you for sharing that.”
Defense counsel did not ask PJ118 any other questions.
The only exchange the prosecutor had with PJ118 came at the
end of the prosecutor’s questioning of the initial panel of prospective jurors.
The prosecutor posed the following question: “Does everyone here so far in
our 18, do you feel like you can be a team player, be able to listen and
collaborate with the other jurors, and then ultimately make your decision
based on your convictions?” The prosecutor turned to PJ118 for a response
before turning to two other jurors. PJ118 said, “I think I can do that.”
Following the excusal of three jurors for cause, the trial court
turned to peremptory challenges. The first person the prosecutor exercised a
peremptory challenge to excuse was PJ118. Defense counsel objected and the
court took the parties for a discussion outside the presence of the jury.
The court first turned to defense counsel, letting him “make [his]
record.” Defense counsel stated PJ118 “appear[ed] to be [of] a cognizable
group,” to which the court responded PJ118 “appear[ed] to be Asian” and the
prosecutor agreed. After the court indicated “the cognizable group burden is
there,” defense counsel offered what he described as another perceived
cognizable group: “his age . . . pales in comparison to the other people in the
group.” He also clarified the objection was under section 231.7.

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 Turning to the prosecutor, the court inquired whether there was
anything he “want[ed] to put on the record.” The remainder of the exchange
regarding PJ118 proceeded as follows:
“[Prosecutor]: Yes, your Honor. I believe [PJ118], during his voir
dire, he mentioned that he might not be—well, he said he didn’t want to be
there or it might not be appropriate for him to be there. And his reasoning
was that—was his lack of—he didn’t say life experience. But that’s how I took
it—life experience. And outside of that, I think he had an overall timidity. I
wouldn’t say reluctance but soft-spoken. So I’ll put that in.
“The Court: All right. I’m going to overrule the objection and
excuse [PJ118], I guess. Because if we talk race as it relates to this statute,
Mr. Karam does not appear to be Asian. I’m positive about that.
“[Defense counsel:] He’s from the Asian continent. But yeah.
“The Court: I’m also fairly confident our prosecutor sitting here is
Asian of some—
“[Prosecutor]: What, your Honor? Yeah.
“The Court: Throwing it out there, Mr. [Prosecutor]. But that
would mean the juror you’re excusing is the same continent of your original
heritage. And I think those are actual factors that are—that apply to that
statute.
But beyond all of that, [PJ118] hesitated to answer almost any
question given. And it doesn’t seem out of anger. It seems out of timidity.
It’s—[the prosecutor’s] word is appropriate. He also indicated that he wasn’t
up to the job, based on whatever experience was—whether it was life, or
education, or decision, or judgment.
So I’m going to overrule the objection. We’ll excuse [PJ118].”

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 III.
CONVICTION AND JUDGMENT
The jury convicted Karam on all counts. The trial court
suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on two years of formal
probation. Karam timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Karam’s primary argument on appeal concerns the trial court’s
overruling of his objection to the peremptory challenge against PJ118.2 He
argues one of the reasons given by the prosecutor for exercising the challenge
is presumptively invalid under subdivision (g) of section 231.7. So his
argument goes, the record fails to demonstrate the presumption was
overcome, meaning the trial court was required to sustain his objection and
its error in failing to do so requires reversal. The Attorney General argues
Karam forfeited his right to argue about the presumptive invalidity of the
prosecutor’s reason by failing to make the argument below. We find no
forfeiture and conclude the trial court erred.
I.
JURY SELECTION
A. Section 231.7, Generally
Section 231.7, subdivision (a), prohibits the use of “a peremptory
challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of the prospective juror’s

2 Karam’s appellate counsel originally filed a brief pursuant to

People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386
U.S. 738, indicating they found no arguable issues. Upon independent review
of the record, this court identified section 231.7 related issues which could, if
resolved favorably to Karam, result in reversal of the judgment. This court
ordered the parties to brief those issues, as well as any other arguable issue
Karam’s counsel identified from the record.

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race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or
religious affiliation, or the perceived membership of the prospective juror in
any of those groups.”
The statute specifies the process that must be followed if a party
or the trial court objects to the use of a peremptory challenge. First, “the
party exercising the peremptory challenge shall state the reasons the
peremptory challenge has been exercised.” (§ 231.7, subd. (c).) Second, the
trial court determines whether any of the provided reasons is presumptively
invalid, and, if so, whether the presumption is overcome under the
circumstances. (Id., subds. (e) & (g).) Third, if there is no presumption of
invalidity or any presumption is overcome, the trial court “evaluate[s] the
reasons actually given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the
totality of the circumstances.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).) “If the court determines
there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would
view race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national
origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those
groups, as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the objection
shall be sustained.” (Ibid.) Because the statute is aimed at both targeted and
unconscious bias, “an objectively reasonable person is aware that unconscious
bias, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair
exclusion of potential jurors in the State of California.” (Id., subd. (d)(2)(A).)
In a similar vein, “[t]he court need not find purposeful discrimination to
sustain the objection.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).) When the trial court makes a ruling,
it must “explain the reasons for its ruling on the record.” (Ibid.)
Two different subdivisions of the statute provide lists of
presumptively invalid reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge and
specify the processes that must be followed if such reasons are asserted in a

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section 231.7 scenario. (Id., subds. (e) & (g).) Relevant here, subdivision (g)
lists three categories of presumptively invalid reasons that “have historically
been associated with improper discrimination in jury selection.” (Id., subd.
(g)(1).) One category includes the following reasons: “[t]he prospective juror
exhibited either a lack of rapport or problematic attitude, body language, or
demeanor.” (Id., subd. (g)(1)(B).) Those reasons, like those listed in the other
two categories of the same subdivision, are “presumptively invalid unless the
trial court is able to confirm that the asserted behavior occurred, based on
the court’s own observations or [those] of counsel for the objecting party.” (Id.,
subd. (g)(2).) “Even with that confirmation, the counsel offering the reason
shall explain why the asserted demeanor, behavior, or manner in which the
prospective juror answered questions matters to the case to be tried.” (Ibid.)
On appeal, we review the overruling of a section 231.7 objection
de novo, “with the trial court’s express factual findings reviewed for
substantial evidence.” (Id., subd. (j).) We may only consider those reasons
given by the party exercising the peremptory challenge and those factual
findings expressly made by the trial court. (Ibid.) If we conclude the trial
court erred by overruling an objection, “that error shall be deemed
prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new
trial.” (Ibid.)
B. Forfeiture
The Attorney General argues Karam’s failure to assert in the
trial court the presumptive invalidity of the prosecutor’s reason for the
peremptory challenge to PJ118 or the alleged lack of compliance with
subdivision (g) of section 231.7 precludes him from raising the issue for the

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first time on appeal.3 We are not persuaded forfeiture applies under the
circumstances.
‘““An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural
defects or erroneous rulings, in connection with relief sought or defenses
asserted, where an objection could have been, but was not, presented to the
lower court by some appropriate method.”’” (People v. Saunders (1993) 5
Cal.4th 580, 589–590.) “Our Supreme Court has . . . cautioned, however, that
the forfeiture doctrine is ‘not automatic.’” (In re L.C. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
728, 738, citing In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) Further, courts have
recognized there are circumstances in which it should not apply. (See, e.g., In
re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889 [pure question of law]; In re S.B., at
p. 1293 [important legal issue]; In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532,
539 [conflict with due process].) Among those circumstances are when its
application “would be incompatible with the fundamental purposes of a
statutory scheme.” (L.C., at p. 738.)
As explained in People v. Espiritu (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 1128
(Espiritu), the Legislature enacted section 231.7 in response to shortcomings
of the inquiry under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson),
and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler), overruled in part
in Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162. (Espiritu, at p. 1139.) Whereas
Batson/Wheeler targets purposeful discrimination only (People v. Lenix (2008)

3 The Attorney General raises the forfeiture issue as a “backup”

argument, asserting that “if [we] find[] that the trial court erred, [we] should
find that any claim as to the presumptively invalid reason is barred on
appeal.” However, forfeiture is properly considered at the outset because it
does not depend on the merits of an appellant’s argument and it impacts
whether we even consider the claim of error in the first instance. (See People
v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593.)

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44 Cal.4th 602), section 231.7 aims to eliminate purposeful and unconscious
bias (see Stats. 2020, ch. 318, § 1(a); § 231.7, subd. (d)(2)(A)). And, whereas
Batson/Wheeler employs a largely deferential burden shifting evaluation
which places the ultimate burden of persuasion on the objecting party (People
v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 569), section 231.7 sets forth a
comprehensive process which expressly imposes virtually all burdens on the
party exercising the peremptory challenge or the trial court (§ 231.7, subds.
(c), (d)(1), (e), (f), (g)(2), (h)).
Under section 231.7, after the party exercising the peremptory
challenge offers its reasons for the challenge, the trial court is tasked with
“evaluat[ing]” them “in light of the totality of the circumstances” to determine
whether “there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable
person would view [membership or perceived membership in a listed group]
as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.” (Id., subd. (d).) Although
not expressly stated in the statute, it logically flows from the legislative
purpose and established scheme that the first required step in such an
evaluation is to consider whether any of the reasons fall into a presumptively
invalid category listed in subdivision (e) or subdivision (g). (See People v.
Caparrotta (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 874, 893 (Caparrotta) [after party objects
under § 237.1, it is trial court’s responsibility to apply correct procedure to
decide whether to sustain objection].) Stated differently, the presumptively
invalid categories embody circumstances in which the Legislature has
declared the court must presume an objectively reasonable person would view
membership or perceived membership in a listed group as a factor in the use
of the peremptory challenge, unless the party exercising the challenge
overcomes the presumption in the statutorily specified manner.

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 As in Espiritu, this case does not present a situation in which a
defendant failed to object at all under the applicable statute. It is undisputed
and clear from the record that defense counsel objected under section 231.7
after the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse PJ118.
Instead, we are faced with the question of whether the initial objection made
by defense counsel was sufficient to preserve an argument alleging error
based on a category of presumptively invalid reasons not brought to the trial
court’s attention by defense counsel. Because the record does not demonstrate
the trial court considered whether any of the proffered reasons were
presumptively invalid, the initial objection to the peremptory challenge under
section 231.7 preserved Karam’s right to challenge the presumptive invalidity
of any of the reasons. (See Espiritu, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1141
[rejecting forfeiture argument grounded in defense counsel’s failure to make
targeted objection specifically referring to presumptively invalid category];
People v. Aguilar (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1, 11 (Aguilar) [same].)
The Attorney General’s reliance on People v. Garcia (2025) 115
Cal.App.5th 92, and People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 941, to argue
otherwise is unavailing. In the former, the appellate court found forfeiture of
an argument regarding presumptive invalidity, but it did so in circumstances
where the trial court expressly considered and determined none of the
proffered reasons were presumptively invalid. (Garcia, at p. 106.) And in the
latter, defense counsel failed to object at all under section 231.7, but the
appellate court rejected the forfeiture argument based on a conclusion that a
section 231.7 objection would have been futile under the circumstances.
(Jaime, at p. 946.) Put simply, neither of the cases involved a trial court’s
failure to consider whether the reasons given by the party exercising a
peremptory challenge were potentially subject to a presumption of invalidity.

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C. Analysis
Recognizing our review of an objection to a peremptory challenge
is de novo, with factual determinations reviewed for substantial evidence
(§ 231.7, subd. (j)), the parties each point to parts of the record to support
their respective arguments for why the trial court’s overruling of Karam’s
objection was or was not proper. We conclude the record demonstrates error.
The prosecutor gave two reasons for exercising the peremptory
challenge against PJ118: (1) he said he did not want to be a juror because of a
lack of experience; and (2) he was timid and soft spoken. Appellant contends
the latter is presumptively invalid under section 231.7, subdivision (g),
because it concerns a juror’s demeanor. The Attorney General rightly
concedes the point. (See § 231.7, subd. (g)(2); People v Uriostegui (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 271, 280.)
Although, as previously explained, the trial court did not mention
the presumption of invalidity or evaluate the demeanor-based reason to
determine if the presumption was overcome, the court did comment about
PJ118’s behavior. It indicated PJ118 “hesitated to answer almost any
question given” and said the prosecutor’s characterization of him as timid
was appropriate. Even assuming, arguendo, this could be considered a
confirmation of the demeanor described by the prosecutor (see § 231.7, subd.
(g)(2) [trial court must first “confirm that the asserted behavior occurred”]),
the second component necessary to overcome the presumption is nowhere to
be found. That is, the prosecutor did not “explain why the asserted
demeanor . . . matter[ed] to the case to be tried.” (Ibid.) The absence of that
information in the record means the presumption of invalidity was not
overcome and Karam’s objection should have been sustained. (See Aguilar,
supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 12 [failure to overcome § 231.7, subd. (g)

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presumption of invalidity requires sustaining of objection]; Caparrotta, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 896 [same].) The trial court’s action to the contrary was
error.
The Attorney General argues the trial court followed the correct
process because after confirming the asserted behavior, it “evaluat[ed] the
prosecutor’s given reasons under the subdivision (d) totality of the
circumstances analysis to overrule the objection.” It premises this argument
on an assertion that the “[f]ailure to rebut the presumption as to one
subdivision (g) reason does not render the entire preemptory challenge
automatically invalid” because the court is only obligated to “accord[] the
demeanor-based reason the weight it is due in conducting its totality
analysis” under subdivision (d) of section 231.7.
We disagree. Subdivision (g) of section 231.7 states that the
reasons listed in the subdivision “have historically been associated with
improper discrimination in jury selection.” (Id., subd. (g)(1).) Thus, when the
presumption of invalidity is not overcome, it means the proffered reason is
deemed by operation of law to reflect improper discrimination. As concluded
in Caparrotta, that ends the analysis. (Caparrotta, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
p. 891.) Indeed, the statute begins with a clear proscription: “[a] party shall
not use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of
the prospective juror’s” actual or perceived membership in any listed group.
(§ 231.7, subd. (a).) When a proffered reason is deemed to reflect improper
discrimination, a person has necessarily used a peremptory challenge to
remove a prospective juror on such an invalid basis.
Even if the totality of the circumstances evaluation set forth in
subdivision (d) of section 231.7 were applicable after a failure to overcome a
subdivision (g) presumption of invalidity, the outcome would be the same.

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Subdivision (d) requires evaluating whether “there is a substantial likelihood
that an objectively reasonable person would view [actual or perceived
membership in one of the listed groups] as a factor in the use of the
peremptory challenge.” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)., italics added.) When one of the
proffered reasons for exercise of the challenge is deemed to reflect improper
discrimination, an objectively reasonable person inescapably would view
membership in a listed group as “a factor” in the use of the challenge.
The error in overruling Karam’s objection requires we reverse the
judgment and remand the matter for a new trial. (§ 231.7, subd. (j).) As the
Attorney General concedes, “erroneously overruled [objections] are not
subject to harmless error analysis.”4 (See Aguilar, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at
p. 10.)
II.
PITCHESS REVIEW
In Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, the Supreme Court “held a
criminal defendant could obtain discovery of certain law enforcement
personnel records upon a sufficient showing of good cause.” (Riverside County
Sheriff’s Dept. v. Stiglitz (2014) 60 Cal.4th 624, 630.) The Legislature
subsequently “‘codified the privileges and procedures surrounding’” Pitchess
motions. (Riverside, at p. 630.) When a defendant makes the requisite good

4 The Attorney General does not challenge the constitutionality of

any portion of section 231.7, including subdivision (j) which mandates
automatic reversal and remand for a new trial when an appellate court
determines an objection to a peremptory challenge was erroneously denied.
Because the error stemming from the prosecutor’s first proffered reason,
alone, requires a remand for a new trial, we do not address Karam’s
argument concerning the other reason given by the prosecutor. (See
Caparrotta, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 896.) For the same reason, we do not
reach Karam’s Batson/Wheeler related arguments.

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cause showing, the trial court conducts an in camera review of records
provided by the law enforcement custodian of records and then orders
“disclosure of information ‘relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending litigation.’” (People v. Thompson (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1316.)
Prior to trial and pursuant to a request by Karam, the trial court
conducted an in camera review of certain law enforcement personnel files.
The court determined there was no discoverable material. Karam requests we
independently review the sealed documents and hearing transcript to
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in that regard, and
the Attorney General agrees he is entitled to such review.
We conducted an independent review and have found no
discoverable material. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. (See People
v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1228 [appellate court reviews order denying
Pitchess motion for abuse of discretion].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new
trial.

DELANEY, J.

I CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, J.

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Moore, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying defendant Walid Karam’s Pitchess motion. (See
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.) Therefore, I concur in that
portion of the majority opinion.
I also agree with the majority that the trial court committed an
error by erroneously denying Karam’s objection to the prosecutor’s use of a
peremptory challenge. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7.)1 But under our state
Constitution, that is not supposed to end our analysis, we are also supposed
to determine whether the error was prejudicial:
“No judgment shall be set aside . . . unless, after an examination
of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion
that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 13, italics added.)
Here, if we analyzed for prejudice and determined that the trial
court’s error was not prejudicial, then there would be no need for a new trial.
But under section 231.7, the Legislature does not allow us to fulfill our
constitutionally required obligation:
“Should the appellate court determine that the objection [to the
peremptory challenge] was erroneously denied, that error shall be deemed
prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new
trial.” (§ 231.7, subd. (j), italics added.)
In short, I respectfully dissent to the portion of the majority
opinion concerning the trial court’s section 231.7 ruling because:

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of

Civil Procedure.
1
 “The Legislature has neither the right, nor the power, to amend
the California Constitution by statute.” (People v. Garcia (2025) 114
Cal.App.5th 1154, 1167 (conc. opn. of Yegan, J.) review granted, Dec. 30,
2025, S293973; see also People v. SanMiguel (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 880,
891–893, (conc. opn. of Yegan, J.) review granted, Dec. 18, 2024, S287786.)

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

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