Filed 7/21/26 Marriage of McGuire CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re the Marriage of MELANI McGUIRE and
ROBERT McGUIRE.
MELANI McGUIRE, F090217
Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 18CEFL04067)
v.
OPINION
ROBERT McGUIRE,
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Glenda Allen-
Hill, Judge.
H. Ty Kharazi for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Robert McGuire and Melani McGuire (now Melani Scribner) were married for
approximately 20 years. Their divorce was finalized in 2022. On February 18, 2025,
Robert filed a petition for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO), asserting that
Melani was harassing him. On April 15, 2025, Melani filed a filed a special motion to
strike the DVRO petition pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.161 (an anti-
SLAPP motion2), arguing that the alleged harassment involved protected activity and that
Robert’s request for a DVRO fails as a matter of law. The trial court denied the anti-
SLAPP motion, and Melani appealed. On appeal, Melani argues her anti-SLAPP motion
should have been granted.3 We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
On February 18, 2025, Robert filed a petition for a DVRO against Melani. In an
attached declaration, he described sixteen incidents of alleged harassment, although in a
subsequent filing he withdrew his assertion that seven of the incidents constituted
harassment. All of the incidents still at issue were based on Melani’s activity on
Facebook.
Robert summarized the incidents as follows:
“Incident 2:
“12/22/2023: Melani[] posted on her Facebook, ‘Oh, look the
narcissist is turning into a victim again’. This was 5 days after I
moved back from Arkansas due to my abusive relationship ending.
It was known through the hate page that Melani[] had been in
contact with my abuser [(Micah D.)].
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2 An anti-SLAPP motion is “a special motion to strike a ‘strategic lawsuit against
public participation (SLAPP).’ ” (Parrish v. Latham & Watkins (2017) 3 Cal.5th 767,
773–774.)
3 Robert did not file a respondent’s brief. However, “[w]e do not treat his failure
to do so as a default or an admission that the trial court erred[.]” (Hogue v. Hogue (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 833, 835, fn. 1.)
2.
[¶]…[¶]
“Incident 3:
“05/19/2024: Melani[] joined the ‘Fuck You, Rob (FYR)’
Facebook page that was created by my abuser (Micah [D.]) and is
designed to hate me. Melani[] took things from my personal page
and posted [them] on the FYR page to mock and make fun of me.
[¶]…[¶]
“Incident 4:
“06/07/2024: Melani[] posted on her personal social media
page ‘this is so true! I think some tend to forget those little kids turn
into adults. They remember and they will figure it out’. The post is
titled ‘Someday your kids are going to figure you out’.
[¶]…[¶]
“Incident 5:
“08/04/2024: Melani[] reposted my post on FYR, stating ‘He
is always the victim! And everyone else is crazy (with a laughing
emoji)’.
[¶]…[¶]
“Incident 6:
“08/27/2024: Melani[] reposted my post on FYR, stating
‘sounds familiar’. The post talks about narcissistic behaviors.
[¶]…[¶]
“Incident 7:
“09/25/2024: Melani[] posted on the FYR page: ‘when
someone makes fake profiles. Narcissistic people are the worst!
They want to pretend to be just like your new love but they just can’t
pull it off!’
[¶]…[¶]
3.
“Incident 11:
“10/26/2024, Melani[] liked a post that Curtis [S., Melani’s
current husband,] made on the FYR page. The post was ‘Keep my
wife’s name out your F****** mouth’.
[¶]…[¶]
“Incident 12:
“My abuser (Micah [D.]) posted on the FYR page
07/05/2024, stating ‘this is so accurate. Then they wonder why their
kids want nothing to do with them. #fyr[.]’ Melani[] liked it, and
posted on it, stating ‘This is so true! I know first hand the damage
they cause.[’]
[¶]…[¶]
“Incident 13:
“My abuser (Micah [D.]) posted on the FYR page
05/24/2024, stating ‘The part about their kids tho! ... TRUT[H]’.
Melani[] liked the post and responded on it, ‘Wow! This is so
accurate its eerie. The problem is the damage it causes also lasts a
lifetime. But at least I was able to move on and leave the chaos
behind where he will never be able to get away from himself. I
always say at least I’m not him! At least I don’t have to live this
everyday anymore. #FYR #myhouseisonfire
#narcissisticrecovery’.”
According to Robert, because of the harassment he attends weekly therapy
sessions, he is afraid to leave his house, and he is afraid the harassment will impact future
career opportunities.
In response, Melani filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which included supporting
evidence.4 She asserted that Robert was abusive, that the incidents of alleged harassment
involved protected activity, and that his request for a DVRO fails as a matter of law.
Robert opposed the anti-SLAPP motion. He asserted that the dissolution judgment
contained a provision stating that he and Melani agreed not to harass each other. He
4 On June 17, 2025, she filed additional supporting evidence.
4.
argued that, given this agreement, Melani waived her free speech rights and privileged
communications rights as to the incidents alleged in the petition for a DVRO. He also
argued that Melani failed to sufficiently explain how the communications at issue
involved activity protected by section 425.16 and that Melani’s actions disturbed his
peace.
On July 3, 2025, the trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion. Subsequently, on
Melani’s request, the court issued a written order.
On July 31, 2025, Melani timely filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
“Section 425.16 provides that a cause of action arising from an act in furtherance
of a person’s constitutional right of petition or free speech in connection with a public
issue is subject to a special motion to strike, unless the plaintiff … establishes a
probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Bassi v. Bassi (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1080,
1093 (Bassi).)
“The analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion proceeds in two steps[.]” (Barry v. State
Bar of California (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 321.) “In the first step, the trial court determines
whether the claim ‘ “arises from” an “ ‘ “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition
or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a
public issue.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] The court must evaluate whether the moving defendant
has shown the speech or act underlying the plaintiff’s claim falls within one or more of
the four categories of protected acts set out in section 425.16, subdivision (e)[.]
[Citation.] The categories protect any written or oral statement or writing made
(1) ‘before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law,’ (2) ‘in connection with an issue under consideration or
review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law,’ (3) ‘in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with
5.
an issue of public interest,’ or (4) ‘any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the
constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with
a public issue or an issue of public interest.’ ” (Bassi, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094.)
“If the defendant prevails at the first step, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate the merit of the claim.” (Bassi, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094.) At this
step, “the plaintiff must show ‘ “that the complaint is both legally sufficient and
supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if
the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
“ ‘Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e.,
that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a
SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.’ ” (Bassi, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1094.)
II. Standard of Review
“We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion. [Citation.] We
exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based on our own review of the
record, the challenged claims arise from protected activity. [Citations.] In addition to the
pleadings, we may consider affidavits concerning the facts upon which liability is based.
[Citations.] We do not, however, weigh the evidence, but accept [the] plaintiff’s
submissions as true and consider only whether any contrary evidence from the defendant
establishes [her] entitlement to prevail as a matter of law.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067.) Moreover, “[e]ven though our
standard of review is de novo, an appellant ‘still bears the “ ‘burden of affirmatively
demonstrating error.’ ” ’ ” (Luo v. Volokh (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1312, 1322.)
III. Analysis
Melani’s anti-SLAPP motion fails at the first step of the analysis. Melani appears
to assert she engaged in conduct protected by section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(3) (“any
written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum
6.
in connection with an issue of public interest”) and (e)(4) (“any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right
of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest”).5 Melani
argues that Facebook is a public forum. She also argues that her Facebook activity was a
matter of public interest because “[d]omestic violence is a significant concern
nationwide” and she “discussed overcoming an abusive relationship, surviving spousal
mental, physical, and financial abuse, living through the nightmarish life with her
children and learning how to overcome it.” She was also trying to teach others “to be
aware of the behavioral patterns which she considers narcissistic[.]”
Melani has failed to demonstrate that her activity was in connection with a public
issue or an issue of public interest. “[A] matter of public interest should be something of
concern to a substantial number of people. [Citation.] Thus, a matter of concern to the
speaker and a relatively small, specific audience is not a matter of public interest.”
(Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1132 (Weinberg).)
Here, most of the Facebook activity at issue took place in a group called,
according to Robert, “Fuck You, Rob.” In her activity in this group, Melani repeatedly
refers to a “he” or “him,” presumably Robert. Moreover, Melani admits that her “posts
were representative of her firsthand experiences dealing with domestic violence[.]”6
Thus, based on the record before us, her activity on Facebook involved her personal
5 Melani also argues that her posts were privileged under Civil Code section 47,
subdivision (b) and Civil Code section 47.1. However, to prevail on her anti-SLAPP
motion, Melani must show that her communications fall “within one or more of the four
categories of protected acts set out in section 425.16, subdivision (e)[.]” (Bassi, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094.) Neither Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) nor Civil
Code section 47.1 are listed in section 425.16, subdivision (e). Thus, these sections do
not assist her at the first step of the analysis.
6 There is no evidence before us suggesting that Melani was referring to a different
individual who allegedly abused her, and Robert has asserted that she was referring to
him.
7.
experiences with Robert. However, the record does not show, nor does Melani
adequately explain, how her experiences with domestic violence are a “concern to a
substantial number of people.” And while she does assert, in a conclusory fashion, that
she was sharing her experiences to help or advocate for survivors of domestic abuse,
nothing on the face of the communications supports this assertion. (Weinberg, supra, 110
Cal.App.4th at p. 1132 [“there should be some degree of closeness between the
challenged statements and the asserted public interest [citation]; the assertion of a broad
and amorphous public interest is not sufficient”].)
Melani does discuss the facts of two cases, but both are inapposite.
In M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 623, “Sports Illustrated and
an HBO television program … used the 1997 team photograph of a Little League team to
illustrate stories about adult coaches who sexually molest youths playing team sports.
Plaintiffs, all of whom appear in the photograph, were formerly players or coaches on the
Little League team.” (Id. at p. 626.) In addressing whether the defendants’ conduct
involved a public issue, the court held that “[t]he broad topic of the article and the
program was not whether a particular child was molested but rather the general topic of
child molestation in youth sports, an issue which, like domestic violence, is significant
and of public interest. [¶] The … defendants, in publishing and broadcasting on the
serious topic of child molestation, exercised orally and in writing their right of free
speech concerning an issue of public interest in a public forum.” (Id. at p. 629,
fn. omitted.) In contrast, here there is no evidence that Melani wrote an article of any
kind, and as discussed above, she discussed only her personal experiences with Robert.
In Terry v. Davis Community Church (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1534, the
defendants created a report, and had meetings thereon, regarding allegations that the
plaintiffs had “an inappropriate sexual relationship with a minor female in their work as
church youth group leaders.” (Id. at pp. 1538, 1540–1543.) The report “concluded that
both plaintiffs exhibited gross misconduct, negligence, and insubordination, to the
8.
detriment of at least one member of the Church’s youth group, warranting their
resignation and removal from contact with the youths,” and “recommended among other
things that the Church should update its sexual harassment policy, clarify appropriate
boundaries for interpersonal conduct, involve members of the youth group and their
parents in the selection of new youth leaders, and provide immediate support to youth
group members and their families.” (Id. at pp. 1542–1543.) The court held that “the
broad topic of the report and the meetings was the protection of children in church youth
programs, which is an issue of public interest.” (Id. at p. 1548.) Here, Melani discussed
only her personal experiences with Robert. There is no evidence before us suggesting
that the broad topic of her communications was protecting others from domestic violence.
Accordingly, based on the record before us, Melani has failed to show her
communications involved a public issue or an issue of public interest. Thus, her anti-
SLAPP motion was properly denied.7
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s July 28, 2025 order denying Melani’s anti-SLAPP motion is
affirmed. In that Robert has not appeared in this appeal, no costs are awarded.
SNAUFFER, J.
WE CONCUR:
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
MEEHAN, J.
7 Nothing in this opinion should be read as suggesting that Robert’s petition for a
DVRO is meritorious. We hold only that Melani failed to show her communications
involved a public issue or an issue of public interest.
9.
