Filed 7/21/26 C.H. v. S.T. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

C.H., D085511

Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 24FL010427C)
v.

S.T.,

Respondent.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Leah Boucek, Commissioner. Affirmed.
C.H., in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
C.H. appeals from the family court’s orders awarding child custody and
visitation, denying his request for a domestic violence restraining order
(DVRO) against the mother of his child, and granting the mother’s request for
a DVRO against him. We affirm each order.

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 BACKGROUND
I.
Custody and Visitation
C.H. (Father) and S.T. (Mother) share one child born after their brief
relationship ended. The child, who is now a little over 21 months old, was
born prematurely and spent time in the neonatal intensive care unit.
Three days after the child’s birth, in September 2024, Father filed a
petition to establish his parental relationship and a request for order (RFO)

seeking orders for custody and visitation.1 Father requested primary
physical custody of the child but if Mother could demonstrate that she is
mentally stable, he agreed to “split custody 50/50.” Mother requested
primary physical custody of the child on the basis the child was born
prematurely, with low birth weight, and is currently breastfeeding. She
expressed her belief it would be in the child’s best interest if the parties
“gradually work [their] way up to joint physical custody once [the] child
weans.”
The family court services (FCS) mediator recommended the parties
exercise joint legal custody, that the child primarily reside with Mother, and
Father would be on a step-up plan where his parenting time with the child
would expand at certain milestones. The mediator also recommended the
parties split holidays, Mother vacation with the child for up to three days
each year, and Father to have the same vacation option once the child turned
one year old.

1 Father withdrew his request for court-ordered genetic testing because
he took a voluntary paternity test that established he was the child’s
biological father. Judgment of parentage was entered on December 23, 2024.
Father also requested a legal change of the child’s name, which was granted.

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 On November 26, 2024, Commissioner Leah Boucek held a hearing on
Father’s RFO. The court informed the parties that it had read their

declarations and the FCS report and recommendations.2 Father stated he
agreed with the recommendations for joint legal custody and the split holiday
schedule. He disagreed with the recommendation on physical custody,
explaining that it was a reduction from his current practice of six hours each
day and one overnight. He believed the parties should share “equal time”
with the child. Mother explained she went along with the parties’ current
schedule “to stop the pressure” she feels from Father. Nevertheless, she
agreed with FCS’s recommendations and was fine with joint physical custody
when the child was a little older.
In response to the parties’ statements, the court explained it was not
inclined to “jump[ ] to a 50-50 equal sharing time for a two-month[-]old child,”
explaining “[t]here are reasons, as explained by [FCS], that they recommend
parenting plans based on the developmental age and stage of a child.” The
court, however, asked Mother whether she would be amenable to “something
in between” the parties’ current schedule of “every day and an overnight” to a
step-up plan that gradually increased time for Father. Mother agreed more
overnight visits would be appropriate after the child was six months old
because she felt the child was already under stress with the current, frequent
exchanges.
The court gave Father the last word at the hearing. Father responded
by going through his exhibits with the court, including for example text
messages between the parties he asserted showed Mother’s intention to
“make things hard for [him].” Father had lodged 63 exhibits, totaling over 90

2 Both parties proceeded as self-represented litigants throughout the
family court proceedings, and Father has continued to do so on appeal.

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pages, for the hearing. After Father had discussed several of his exhibits, the
court stated they were “running out of time,” that it had “already reviewed
some of [the] exhibits” but would keep Father’s exhibits and go through them
and “make sure that everything” would be considered before ruling. The
court informed the parties they would receive a written ruling the next day
by email.
On November 27, 2024, the court issued written findings and order
after hearing (FOAH) adopting FCS’s recommendations for custody and
visitation. The court awarded joint legal custody to the parties and primary
physical custody to Mother. It awarded Father four hours of parenting time
with the child each Tuesday and Thursday and three and half hours each
Sunday. The court provided a step-up plan where Father’s time expanded on
the child’s 6-month, 9-month, and 12-month milestones. At the 12-month
milestone, Father’s parenting time would increase to six hours each Tuesday,
Thursday, and Saturday and overnight visits each Sunday from 11:00 a.m. to
Monday 5:00 p.m.
On January 10, 2025, Father filed his first notice of appeal, challenging
the November 27, 2024 FOAH.

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 II.
DVRO Requests
On February 24, 2025, Mother filed a request for a DVRO against
Father. Father followed by filing one of his own the same day. The court
issued temporary restraining orders pending an evidentiary hearing. The
evidentiary hearing, with Commissioner Boucek presiding, took place over

four partial days—March 17, March 24, April 1, and April 18, 2025.3 Both
parties testified and presented numerous exhibits, including video recordings,
and Father’s fiancée, C.J., testified.
The court addressed Mother’s DVRO request first because it was filed
first. The court deemed Mother’s sworn declaration as part of her sworn
testimony. Mother testified that the parties had a custody exchange on
February 20, 2025. Father walked to Mother’s car, with his fiancée holding
the child, and he had a note in his hand. Father told Mother, “ ‘I don’t want
to say too much but . . . ’ ” and held up the note for Mother to read. It said,
“ ‘Leave son with me and go kill yourself.’ ”
Mother filmed the note with her phone camera. She testified this is
Father’s “whole game, this sadistic game with trying to provoke emotional
responses out of [her] so that he can keep bringing [her] back to court,” and
she was tired and exhausted by his conduct. She explained that “most of the
exchanges go fine” because the parties do not speak to each other. But
Father will do “indirect things” like insult Mother to another person within
Mother’s earshot for her to hear. At another exchange earlier in January,
Father arrived “blasting music” with lyrics of “I can’t stand you. I want to
beat you black and blue.” Mother took the lyrics to be “cues.”

3 We have the reporter’s transcripts of the proceedings on March 17,
April 1, and April 18 but not March 24, 2025.

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 The court confirmed the statement in Mother’s declaration that she has
struggled in the past with mental health issues and had sought therapy for
depression because of her experience with Father. The court also confirmed
it had a “screenshot” of the note from the February 20 exchange which was
attached to Mother’s DVRO request. Mother then played video recordings of
the January exchange with Father’s music lyrics and the February exchange
with Father’s note. Mother testified that the note disturbed and destroyed
her peace, and she has been staying with her mother despite having her own
apartment because she does not feel safe.
In response, Father testified Mother is “a manipulator” and began
referring to text messages he had as “proof” of Mother admitting she was a
manipulator. Mother objected she had not seen the asserted evidence and
when the court told Father he could not submit the evidence to the court if he
had not served it in advance, Father said, “Okay. That’s fine.” Regarding the
video recording of the January exchange, Father testified “none of the music
that I play has anything to do with [Mother].” Father explained that Mother
is “always making anything about her” and he begs her to not fight with him.
He denied that he ever threatened, stalked, harassed or “done anything
otherwise to pose a risk to her safety.” As for the February exchange and the
note, Father stated, “I’m not even going to speak on that” and asserted his
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
The court confirmed Father’s refusal to answer “any questions” about
Mother’s claim regarding the note. Despite the invocation, Father asserted
the video recording of the February exchange showed Mother “slapped” and
“pushed [their child] to the side and then chased after” Father, “swinging” at
him. Later in the hearing, Father played his “slowed-down version” of the
recording for the court, after which the court stated, “You cannot tell from the

6
video that what you are alleging happened happened. It is not clear at all.”
Father responded, “[M]aybe I need a better laptop if you can’t see it.” The
court told Father, “I will let you play it next week again, if you need to,
whether it’s on a different laptop or on your phone. What I have seen today
does not at all clearly show what you are alleging happened.”
The court asked Father if he had anything else he wanted the court to
know regarding Mother’s claim since he was not going to respond regarding
the note. Father stated, “the note doesn’t show what she claims it does.” The
court stopped Father since he had asserted his Fifth Amendment right on
that topic and stated that it had “a copy of the note that says, ‘Leave our son
and go kill yourself.’ ” Father testified the note said, “Leave son with me.
Don’t kill yourself.” He explained Mother had been telling him and other
people she was depressed and “suicidal kind of things.” Father, however,
stated he no longer had the note. C.J., Father’s fiancée, testified that she
read the note and it said, “ ‘Leave son with me. Don’t kill yourself,’ with a
smiley face.”
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court confirmed that it
had reviewed the parties’ pleadings, stipulated exhibits, and “viewed at least
three different versions of the video from the [February] incident.” The court
found Mother’s testimony to be credible and the evidence established that
“Father, with knowledge of [Mother’s] mental health struggles, wrote a note
to the effect, ‘Leave son with me and go kill yourself,’ which he flashed to her
at a custody visitation exchange which destroyed her mental and emotional
calm.” The court found no evidence to support Father’s argument that
Mother misstated the note or that it was taken out of context. The court
found Mother met her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence

7
that Father perpetrated abuse within the meaning of Family Code

section 6340.4 The court granted Mother a two-year restraining order.
Regarding Father’s DVRO request, the court found Father’s testimony
“to be mostly credible.” But it found that his allegations of abuse “relate to
communications between the parties both during [Mother’s] pregnancy and
after the child was born relating to relationship issues and custody visitation
disputes and that [Mother’s] messages do not rise to the level of abuse.” The
court rejected Father’s “allegation that Mother struck their child at the
exchange” because “that was not in [Father’s] description of the incident in
his restraining order application nor can it be seen in the video.” It thus
denied issuance of a DVRO against Mother.
The court noted that the DVRO against Father triggered the rebuttable
presumption against awarding him custody under section 3044. The court
awarded Mother sole legal and sole physical custody, and permitted Father to
continue his court-ordered parenting time under the existing FOAH but
ordered that the child’s exchange continue to be supervised by a
nonprofessional third party selected by the parties, or by a professional
monitor with Father paying all costs if the parties were unable to agree on a
third party.
On April 21, 2025, Father filed a second notice of appeal, challenging
the court’s orders granting Mother’s DVRO request and denying his DVRO
request.

4 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

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 DISCUSSION
I.
Motions to Augment Record
Father filed three unopposed motions to augment the record. In an
order issued November 17, 2025, we deferred ruling on two of these motions,

filed October 6 and October 20, 2025.5
In his October 6, 2025 motion, Father identified 18 separate documents
he wished to add to the appellate record. We grant his request as to page 21,
a one-page declaration by Father filed with the court on November 4, 2024.
We deny his request as to the remainder, pages 22 to 67, as none of these
documents bear any stamp by the superior court that they were filed or
lodged for the challenged proceedings. Absent extraordinary circumstances,
we will only consider matters that were presented to the trial court before the
time it entered the judgment being challenged on appeal. (Cal. Rules of

Court,6 rule 8.155(a)(1); In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405 [“an appeal
reviews the correctness of a judgment as of the time of its rendition, upon a
record of matters which were before the trial court for its consideration”];
Vons Companies Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3,
[“Augmentation does not function to supplement the record with materials
not before the trial court.”], overruled on other grounds by Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court (2017) 582 U.S. 255, 264.)

5 On December 16, 2025, we issued an order denying in part and
granting in part the third motion to augment the record, filed on December 5,
2025.

6 Further undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of
Court.

9
 In his October 20, 2025, Father identified seven separate documents he
wished to add to the appellate record. In our previous order on November 17,
2025, we granted his request to include Mother’s declaration filed with the
court on November 8, 2024, pages 11 to 13; Father’s peremptory challenges to
Commissioner Boucek filed June 13 and June 21, 2025, pages 17 to 19; and
Father’s income and expense declaration filed February 6, 2025, pages 40 to
43. We denied his request to include witness statements, pages 27 to 32, and
deferred ruling on the remainder. We now grant his request to include pages
14 to 15 titled “Revocation of Stipulation for Commissioner to Act as Judge
Pro Tempore” dated May 19, 2025. We deny his request to include pages 20
to 25, emails from Father to “The UPS Store #7391” dated July 9, 2025; and
page 38, a certificate from “Palomar College Public Safety Programs” as these
documents were not presented to the court at or before the relevant hearings.
II.
Custody and Visitation Orders
Father asserts a litany of errors in his challenge to the court’s
November 27, 2024 FOAH on custody and visitation. We do not find any
persuasive. Our review of Father’s contentions on appeal is limited by the
standards and presumptions that involve substantial deference to the trial
court on its discretionary decisions and its resolution of factual issues. The
judgment is presumed correct and all ambiguities are resolved in favor of
affirmance. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 (Jameson).)
Father carries the burden to overcome the presumption of correctness and
show prejudicial error. He must do so by providing an adequate record on
appeal and presenting argument and legal authority on each contention
showing the trial court erred. (Ibid.) As a self-represented litigant, he “is
entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration” as any other attorney or

10
litigant on appeal and is required to follow the rules. (McComber v. Wells
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 523.)
First, Father asserts the court deprived him of his due process right to
have a meaningful opportunity to be heard because it “prematurely
terminat[ed]” the evidentiary hearing “due to time limitations,” failed to
review his exhibits “contemporaneously,” “did not invite either party to
present their version of events and did not question either party or allow an
opportunity for cross-examination.” We conclude Father has forfeited any
due process claim by failing to raise any of these assertions in the trial court

at the time of the relevant hearing.7 (D.Z. v. L.B. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 625,

7 On December 4, 2024, Father filed an RFO requesting reconsideration
of the court’s November 27, 2024 FOAH, amendment of the child’s birth
certificate, and “right of first refusal.” In his supporting declaration, Father
asserted he was not “able to fully plead” his case “because of the amount of
evidence that was submitted in a hearing that wasn’t an evidentiary
hearing,” he had evidence that he did not submit “because of the
overwhelming amount that was already submitted,” and he disagreed with
the court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law and asserted the court
overlooked certain of his requests, including his request for the child’s name
change and for Mother to undergo a mental evaluation. On December 10,
Father filed another declaration in support of this RFO, again, disagreeing
with the court’s custody and visitation orders and requesting pursuant to
“Rule 3.1590” for an “[a]nnouncement of tentative decision, statement of
decision, and judgment” before he files an appeal.
At a hearing on January 16, 2025, the court denied the request for
reconsideration of its custody and visitation orders because Father did not
identify any new facts or law. It granted Father’s request to amend the
child’s birth certificate to add his name and to change the child’s last name to
reflect both parents’ surname, hyphenated, as well as his request that if
either parent is unavailable for three hours or more, the parent shall contact
the other to offer the right of first refusal to provide care.
Father’s notice of appeal does not identify the January 16, 2025 order
and thus it is outside the scope of this appeal. (Faunce v. Cate (2013)
222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170 [“ ‘Our jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to

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632 [“California courts recognize that claims alleging violations of due
process rights can be forfeited by failing to raise them in the trial court.”];
ibid. [appellant forfeited claim their constitutional right to procedural due
process was violated because trial court held hearing on civil harassment
restraining order with different methods of appearance for the parties].)
Father did not request nor assert he needed additional time when the
court signaled the hearing was coming to an end. He did not request the
court review all his exhibits “contemporaneously” with the parties, nor object
when the court stated it would keep and review his exhibits and take the
matter under submission for a written ruling. He did not request to cross-
examine Mother. Even if he had preserved these claims, we would reject the
assertion that Father did not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Our review of the record confirms that Father was given ample time to
present his case, with having both the first and last words at the hearing.
Second, Father asserts the court violated section 217 by denying his
request for live testimony. We reject the claim because we have no record
that Father requested to present live testimony. Section 217, subdivision (c),
requires that “A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other
than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a
brief description of the anticipated testimony.” (Italics added.) Both parties
were sworn in and provided testimony. Father does not point us to any
written witness list in compliance with section 217, nor does he identify any
other witness he wanted to testify at the hearing.

the notice of appeal and the judgment or order appealed from.’ ”].) We
therefore disregard his opening brief’s assertions of error as to the
January 16, 2025 order. We also reject his claim the trial court erred in
denying a statement of decision as he did not timely request one for the
November 27, 2024 hearing.

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 Third, Father claims the court prejudged his matter by announcing it
was not inclined to award “ ‘any sort of shared parenting,’ ” asking only
Mother for her proposal on custody and visitation and adopting Mother’s
proposals. We disagree with this characterization of the record. The court
allowed both parties to present their views and reasons for their proposed
custody and visitation plan, before and after the court made the comment
that Father now criticizes. And the full statement by the court was: “[I]t’s
going to be shared because frequent and continuing contact is the policy of
the state. In terms of “jumping to a 50-50 equal sharing time for a two-
month[-]old child, the court is not inclined to do that. There are reasons, as
explained by [FCS], that they recommend parenting plans based on the
developmental age and stage of a child.” After that statement, the court
continued to invite both parties to state their views on custody and visitation.
And ruling the next day, the court adopted FCS’s recommendations, not
Mother’s proposal.
Relatedly, Father asserts that, by stating it was adopting the FCS
recommendations, the court failed to independently review evidence and
improperly delegated judicial authority to FCS. We reject these unsupported
claims too. The court found the FCS recommendations were appropriate
given the specific circumstances of the infant child and the parties, and only
after listening to the parties’ presentations and reviewing their pleadings and
exhibits.
We also reject Father’s claim that the court relied on a “disputed and
biased facilitator report” and that “he had not seen or agreed to the report
and requested it be disregarded.” When the court commenced the hearing, it
ensured that the parties had received and read the FCS report. Father
confirmed he had “looked through” the report but did not have a copy with

13
him. The court printed a copy for him and recessed to allow him time to
review it. When proceedings resumed, Father stated he agreed with FCS’s
recommendations for joint legal custody and the split holiday schedule and
disagreed with the recommendation on physical custody.
As for his assertion that the FCS mediator was biased, Father claimed
in the trial court that he “filed a motion against the mediator because [he
has] noticed that pretty much most people feel that the mother of—the baby
is supposed to go with the mother no matter the case.” We assume he was
referring to a declaration he filed on November 4, 2024, in which he stated:
“Seems to be a popular opinion that babies belong with the mother or that a
mothers [sic] role is more important from the beginning[.] [T]he mediator
showed this was her stance as well.” Other than this asserted personal
opinion, Father did not provide the trial court with evidence to substantiate
his claims of bias. He could have but did not subpoena the FCS mediator to
testify and be subject to cross examination at the hearing.
Turning to the merits of the court’s custody and visitation orders,
Father devotes 14 lines to his claim that the court erred in making the orders
without “findings of detriment, reference to statutory factors, or evidence-
based analysis” or considering the child’s best interest. Father is incorrect.
Detriment is not a required finding in an initial custody determination. “In
an initial custody determination, the trial court has ‘the widest discretion to
choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child.’ ” (§ 3040,
subd. (b).) It must look to all the circumstances bearing on the best interest
of the minor child,” including the specific factors under section 3011. (In re
Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 31–32.) The standard of appellate
review of custody and visitation orders is the deferential abuse of discretion
test. (Id. at p. 32.) “The precise measure is whether the trial court could

14
have reasonably concluded that the order in question advanced the ‘best
interest’ of the child. We are required to uphold the ruling if it is correct on
any basis, regardless of whether such basis was actually invoked.” (Ibid.)
Father has not overcome the presumption of correctness because he has
failed to provide both an adequate record on appeal and a fair and complete
summary of the relevant facts. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608–609.)
Rule 8.122(b), sets out the required contents of a clerk’s transcript, Father’s
choice of record on appeal. In addition to other requirements, a clerk’s
transcript “must” include “[a]ny . . . documents filed or lodged in the case in
superior court” pertaining to the issue(s) on appeal (rule 8.122(b)(3)(A)) and
“[a]ny exhibit admitted in evidence, refused, or lodged” (id., (b)(3)(B)).
Here, according to the superior court’s register of actions, Mother filed
responses to Father’s petition and RFO on November 8, 2024, but neither are
included in the record on appeal. The FCS report which set forth the reasons
that persuaded the court to adopt the recommended custody and visitation
plan as age-appropriate for the child is also not included in the record. In the
absence of an “adequate record” or “a contrary showing in the record, all
presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate
court.” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.) These omissions require us to
resolve the issue against Father. (Randall v. Mousseau (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th
929, 935 (Randall) [“Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue
requires that issue be resolved against appellant.”].)
Further still, Father fails to provide a fair and complete summary of
the relevant facts. Instead, when arguing his points, he ignores facts and
evidence unfavorable to his position. A party that presents a one-sided
version of the facts has forfeited any claim the court’s order is not supported
by substantial evidence. (See Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel &

15
Emly (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 209, 218 (Roman Catholic) [party that
presented a “one-sided version of the facts” “failed in his obligations
concerning the discussion and analysis of a substantial evidence issue,”
resulting in forfeiture of the issue]; Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971)
3 Cal.3d 875, 881 (Foreman & Clark) [failure to identify all evidence relevant
to a point forfeits the issue].)
Lastly, Father argues the cumulative errors collectively denied him due
process and constituted structural error. But since we have found no error,
there are none to cumulate.
III.
DVROs
We next turn to Father’s challenge to the court’s orders on the parties’
DVRO requests. We review the court’s order granting or denying a DVRO for
abuse of discretion, and its factual findings for substantial evidence. (M.S. v.
A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1143 (M.S.).) “The inquiry is whether
substantial evidence supports the court’s finding, not whether a contrary
finding might have been made.” (Id. at p. 1144.) We accept as true all
evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s findings and
resolve every conflict in favor of the judgment. (Ibid.) However, the question
whether a trial court applied the correct legal standard to an issue in
exercising its discretion is a question of law that we review de novo. (Cueto v.
Dozier (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 550, 560.)
The purpose of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (§ 6200
et seq.) “is to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse and
to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence for
a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of
the violence.” (§ 6220.) It authorizes courts to issue restraining orders to

16
enjoin “abuse,” which is includes harassing or disturbing the peace of
another. (§§ 6203, subd. (a)(4), 6320, subd. (a).) “ ‘[D]isturbing the peace of
the other party’ refers to conduct that based on the totality of the
circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.”
(§ 6320, subd. (c).) “A trial court has broad discretion under the DVPA to
determine whether to grant a petition for a restraining order.” (M.S., supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at p. 1143.)
In his appellate briefing addressing the court’s orders on the parties’
DVRO requests, Father states “this appeal challenges legal error, not the
weight of the evidence.” (Capitalization omitted, italics added.) In addition
to this concession, we conclude there is substantial evidence supporting the
court’s issuance of a DVRO for Mother and denial of a DVRO for Father.
This is so because Father has, again, failed to overcome the presumption of
correctness by (1) presenting a decidedly one-sided version of the relevant
facts and procedural background (Roman Catholic, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at
p. 218; Foreman & Clark, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881; and (2) failing to provide
an adequate record on appeal (Rule 8.122(b); Randall, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th
at p. 935.) On this last point, Father has failed to provide the reporter’s
transcript of the second day of the four-day evidentiary hearing; Mother’s
DVRO request and her supporting declaration, which attached a screenshot
of Father’s note; and Mother’s videos of the January exchange with Father’s
music lyrics and the February exchange with Father’s note. The court
specifically relied on this body of evidence to conclude Father had perpetrated
abuse. We thus assume they contain substantial evidence to support the trial
court’s factual findings and exercise of discretion in issuing the DVRO
against Father.

17
 We turn to Father’s contentions of “legal error.”8 As to the two-year
DVRO against Father, Father asserts the court failed to apply “the
mandatory dominant-aggressor analysis under sections 3044 and 6305.” He
contends sections 3044 and 6305 require the court, “where competing
[domestic violence] allegations exist, to determine the primary or dominant
aggressor by considering” prior acts of violence or aggression, self-defense,
credibility, and coercive, manipulative, or controlling conduct. Father is
incorrect. Section 3044 is inapplicable to the court’s grant or denial of a
DVRO; it provides for a rebuttable presumption against an award of sole or
joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person found to have perpetrated
domestic violence. (§ 3044, subd. (a).) Section 6305 is also inapplicable here.
It provides, “The court shall not issue a mutual order enjoining the parties
from specific acts of abuse described in Section 6320 unless . . . [¶] . . . [b]oth
parties personally appear and each party presents written evidence of abuse
or domestic violence . . . using the mandatory Judicial Council restraining

8 Although Father begins his argument stating that his “appeal
challenges legal error, not the weight of the evidence,” he spends a significant
amount of time arguing Mother was not credible because he “demonstrated—
through testimony, exhibits, and declarations—that [Mother’s] allegations
were inconsistent and self-impeaching” and the court’s failure to address the
contradictions constitutes legal error. Father is incorrect. When an
appellant challenges a trial court’s resolution of factual issues, our role is
limited to reviewing those findings for substantial evidence. (Haraguchi v.
Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711.) “It is not our role as a reviewing
court to reweigh the evidence or to assess witness credibility.” (Thompson v.
Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) And when we consider the validity of
a trial court’s factual findings, “we resolve all conflicts in the evidence in [the
respondent’s] favor and indulge all reasonable, legitimate inferences in favor
of upholding the trial court’s order.” (McCord v. Smith (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th
358, 364.) We thus decline Father’s invitation to reweigh the court’s
credibility determinations.

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order application form,” and “[t]he court makes detailed findings of fact
indicating that both parties acted as a primary aggressor and that neither
party acted primarily in self-defense.” (§ 6305, subd. (a), italics added.) The
court did not issue a mutual order enjoining both Mother and Father; it
issued an order restraining only Father from abuse.
Father contends the court improperly shifted the burden by stating
that Father would need a copy of the note to “ ‘show it doesn’t’ ” state, as
Mother proved, “ ‘Leave son with me and go kill yourself.’ ” We disagree that
the court improperly shifted the burden. It explained several times that
Mother had the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and, to
carry that burden, she had presented testimony, the video evidence, and a
screenshot of the note. The court asked Father if he still had a copy of the
note to support his defense that the note said, “ ‘Leave son with me. Don’t kill
yourself.’ ” He did not.
Father next asserts the court erred in denying his DVRO request
because it “improperly applied a narrow definition of abuse” because the
court failed to consider that abuse under the DVPA “includes harassment,
disturbing the peace, coercive control, intimidation, and conduct that
destroys emotional calm.” We disagree. We see nothing in the record to
suggest the court misunderstood the scope of conduct that can constitute
“abuse” under the DVPA. To the contrary, the court granted Mother’s
request for a DVRO on the basis that Father’s note telling Mother “to go kill
yourself” was abuse because it “destroyed her mental and emotional calm.”
The court denied Father’s DVRO request because he suffered from a
failure of proof. After viewing three versions of the video evidence of the
February 20, 2024 exchange, the court found none supported Father’s
allegation that Mother struck their child. The court also found the text

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messages Father presented in his attempt to demonstrate that Mother was
harassing and disturbing his peace did “not rise” to abuse. Rather, the court
found the text messages pertained to communications relating to their
relationship and custody visitation disputes and, impliedly, there was
nothing abusive in those communications to warrant a restraining order
against Mother. Because Father does not challenge the weight of the
evidence, we will not disturb the court’s factual findings.
IV.
Asserted Judicial Bias
Father asserts Commissioner Boucek demonstrated bias against him at
the DVRO proceedings, which constitutes structural error requiring

automatic reversal of the orders on the parties’ DVRO requests.9 He makes a
myriad of claims that the court abandoned neutrality and engaged in judicial
advocacy, including for example, by showing a “[p]redisposition” to credit
Mother while demonstrating “[h]ostility” toward him; frequently interrupting
Father’s testimony while “siding” with Mother’s “version of events despite
contradictory evidence”; demonstrating “impatience” with Father “while
guiding” Mother’s testimony; and “[p]rejudging evidence and denying full

9 In the section of his appellate opening brief challenging the court’s
November 27, 2024 FOAH on custody and visitation orders, Father asserts
under the subheading “Repeated Restrictions on [Father’s] Testimony
Reinforced the Appearance of Bias” that “This Pattern continued across
multiple hearings and mirrors the due process violations requiring reversal
in Carlsson.” That is it. Thus, to the extent Father intended to raise a claim
that judicial bias affected the November 27, 2024 FOAH, he has waived or
forfeited any such claim by making only conclusory and/or speculative
assertions of judicial bias, unsupported by citations to the record, and not
presenting any substantive legal analysis showing any prejudicial bias by the
trial court. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 606–609.)

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presentation of video evidence.” Father has waived or forfeited any claim of
judicial bias by not timely asserting these claims in the proceedings below.
“Bias and prejudice are grounds for disqualification of trial judges.”
(Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1218
(Moulton), citing Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. (a)(6).) If judges fail to recuse
themselves, there is a statutory procedure under Code of Civil Procedure
section 170.3 to litigate the issue. (Moulton, at p. 1218.) A party seeking to
disqualify a judge on grounds a person aware of the facts might reasonably
entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial, or any other
ground identified in section 170.1, “may file with the clerk a written verified
statement objecting to the hearing or trial before the judge and setting forth
the facts constituting the grounds for disqualification of the judge.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (c)(1).) Important here, “[t]he statement shall be
presented at the earliest practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts
constituting the ground for disqualification.” (Ibid., italics added.)
“This strict promptness requirement is not to be taken lightly, as a
failure to comply constitutes forfeiture or an implied waiver of the
disqualification.” (Tri Counties Bank v. Superior Court (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 1332, 1337 (Tri Counties); In re Steven O. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d
46, 54 (Steven O.) [“Failure to comply with this requirement constitutes an
implied waiver of the disqualification.”].) “The purpose of the requirement
that alleged grounds for disqualification be asserted at the earliest
practicable opportunity is that it would seem . . . intolerable to permit a party
to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately
standing by without making an objection of which he is aware and thereby
permitting the proceedings to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if
favorable, and which he may avoid, if not. In other words, a party should not

21
be allowed to gamble on a favorable decision and then raise such an objection
in the event he is disappointed in the result.” (Tri Counties, at pp. 1337–1338
[cleaned up]; Steven O., at p. 55 [“This promptness requirement is not to be
taken lightly, especially when the party delays in challenging the judge until
after judgment. Otherwise, a defendant can sit through a first trial hoping
for an acquittal, secure in the knowledge that he can invalidate the trial later
if it does not net a favorable result.”].)
According to the register of actions, both parties filed their stipulation
to have Commissioner Boucek act as a temporary judge in their case on
November 26, 2024. At no time before the November 26, 2024 hearing on
custody and visitation or the commencement of DVRO hearings did Father
withdraw his stipulation and consent to Commissioner Boucek.
Father verbally raised a complaint of judicial bias on the third day of
the continued DVRO hearing (April 1, 2025), with a request that the court
“recuse herself.” Citing Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, Father stated:
“In the interest of justice, reasonable doubt, and substantial doubt, along
with my peace of mind, I respectfully ask and plead Your Honor to recuse
herself. I’m 100 percent certain I will never get a fair and impartial trial
unless I’m assigned a new justice, preferably, an appointed judge.” Father
did not provide any specific grounds for his assertion of bias. However,
Commissioner Boucek denied the request, stating she did not have any
concerns about her ability to be impartial and that the request was not
timely. Specifically, the court stated it “has now had at least two hearings on
the cross-domestic violence restraining orders, last time being the start of the
evidentiary hearing where both parties presented testimony and other
evidence, and so we are going to continue and complete this evidentiary
hearing.”

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 Despite verbally raising his general concerns of bias on April 1, 2025,
Father did not file a peremptory challenge until June 13, 2025, after the court
had issued the DVRO against Father and denied his DVRO request, and even
after Father had filed a notice of appeal challenging the DVRO orders. He
filed another peremptory challenge on July 21, 2025 and, according to his
briefing on appeal, he made “three additional verbal recusal requests on
July 29, 2025, August 7, 2025, and September 16, 2025.”
These efforts were all too late. (Tri Counties, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1337 [“This strict promptness requirement is not to be taken lightly, as a
failure to comply constitutes forfeiture or an implied waiver of the
disqualification.”]; Steven O., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 54 [“Failure to
comply with this requirement constitutes an implied waiver of the
disqualification.”].) We conclude Father forfeited any right to challenge the
Commissioner or her rulings for bias. (Moulton, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1218 [party waived claims of judicial bias based on comments the trial
judge made because the party failed to object to or challenge the judge in the
trial court].)
To the extent Father contends the grounds for disqualification he
asserts also establish the court violated his due process right to an unbiased
judge, he has forfeited that challenge for reasons we have already explained.
“It is true that [Code of Civil Procedure] section 170.3, subdivision (d), does
not bar appeal from a final judgment on constitutional grounds of judicial
bias. Nevertheless, a litigant should seek to resolve such issues by the
required statutory means and ‘his negligent failure to do so may constitute a
forfeiture of his constitutional claim.’ This is particularly true in civil cases
where ‘a constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity or
it will be considered to be waived.’ ” (Tri Counties, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at

23
p. 1339 [“We conclude petitioner’s due process claims were forfeited by this
dilatory conduct.”].) Even if not forfeited, Father has the burden to show the
alleged bias was so prejudicial that it deprived him of a fair hearing, as
opposed to a perfect one. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112,
overruled on another ground in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151.)
We have reviewed the record on appeal. Contrary to his assertions, the
record demonstrates Father received a fair hearing by an impartial and

unbiased court.10
DISPOSITION
The November 27, 2024 FOAH on custody and visitation is affirmed.
The April 18, 2025 DVRO enjoining Father and the order denying Father’s
DVRO request are affirmed. The parties to bear their own costs.

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

O’ROURKE, J.

10 In the last section of Father’s appellate brief, he makes conclusory
assertions that the court erred by imposing “financial obligations and
procedural burdens,” citing references to sanctions under section 271. We see
nothing in the record to suggest the court imposed section 271 sanctions
against Father. However, these assertions are forfeited because they are
conclusory, undeveloped, and unsupported by citations to the record.

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