Filed 7/21/26 P. v. Douglass CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F089015
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF192903B)
v.
TYLER KEITH DOUGLASS,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John D.
Oglesby, Judge.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and
Viktoriya Chebotarev, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Tyler Keith Douglass, while serving a prison sentence, participated in
an assault with two other inmates upon fellow prisoner, Micheal Iverson, and Iverson
died as a result of the attack.
A jury convicted appellant of involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code,1 § 192, subd.
(b); count 1)2 and assault by a prisoner by means likely to produce great bodily injury
(§ 4501, subd. (b); count 2). The jury also found true that during the commission of
count 2, appellant did personally inflict great bodily injury under both section 12022.7,
subdivision (a) and, as relevant to the issue on appeal, section 12022.7, subdivision (b),
finding specifically that the inflicted injury caused Iverson to become comatose or suffer
paralysis of a permanent nature. In a bifurcated court trial, the trial court found true that
appellant had suffered two strike priors (§§ 667, subds. (c)-(j); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)).3
As to count 2, appellant was sentenced to a prison term of 25 years to life plus five
years for the great bodily injury enhancement under section 12022.7, subdivision (b).
The court imposed and stayed the three-year enhancement under section 12022.7,
subdivision (a) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.447
. Punishment on count 1 was stayed
pursuant to section 654.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The jury found appellant guilty of involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included
offense of the charged crime, premeditated murder (§ 187, subd. (a)).
3 Appellant’s prior strike convictions – first degree burglary (§ 459, subd. (a)) and
grand theft of a firearm (§ 487, subd. (d)(2)) – were also alleged and found true at the
court trial to be prior serious felonies under section 667, subdivision (a). At sentencing,
however, the court struck the section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements in the interest of
justice based on the “circumstances” of the case where appellant was a “coconspirator”
and his youth at the time of the offense.
The trial court also found true several alleged aggravating circumstances.
2.
Appellant appealed from the judgment of his conviction, initially arguing the trial
court erred by (1) declining his Romero4 invitation to strike one of his strike priors and
(2) imposing the great bodily injury enhancement, in contravention of section 1385,
subdivision (c), and thus the matter must be remanded for resentencing. Respondent
disagreed and further pointed out the abstract of judgment contained errors, which this
court should correct.
While this appeal was pending, we granted appellant leave to submit a
supplemental brief. In his supplemental brief, appellant argued the true finding on the
great bodily injury enhancement imposed pursuant to section 12022.7, subdivision (b)
must be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to prove that Iverson became
comatose before dying and that he is entitled to a full resentencing hearing. Respondent
agrees.
Accepting respondent’s concession, we reverse the jury’s true finding on the
enhancement alleged under section 12022.7, subdivision (b). We vacate the sentence and
remand the matter for resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
As for the issues raised in the initial briefing in this appeal, we conclude we need
not reach them because the matter being remanded for resentencing has rendered them
moot.
FACTS
On March 7, 2022, at one of the Wasco State Prison reception center dorms,
appellant and his codefendants, Benjamin Kolehmainen and Joshua Mitchell, began
striking fellow inmate Michael Iverson with their fists in the facial area and upper body.
Iverson fell to the ground, at which point, the perpetrators continued to strike him,
ignoring correctional officers’ commands to stop. They only stopped when correctional
4 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
3.
officers pepper sprayed them. Iverson was not observed to move after he fell to the
ground, and he was unresponsive at the conclusion of the attack. A responding
correctional officer observed Iverson was not breathing and attempted to administer CPR
to no avail. Iverson was later determined to have died from blunt force head and anterior
neck trauma.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of Evidence to Support the Section 12022.7, Subdivision (b)
Enhancement
In assessing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we review “the whole record
in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—
from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66.) Reversal on insufficiency of the
evidence is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].” (People v. Redmond (1969)
71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)
Section 12022.7, subdivision (b) provides: “Any person who personally inflicts
great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony
or attempted felony which causes the victim to become comatose due to brain injury or to
suffer paralysis of a permanent nature shall be punished by an additional and consecutive
term of imprisonment in the state prison for five years.”
“As used in this subdivision, ‘paralysis’ means a major or complete loss of motor
function resulting from injury to the nervous system or to a muscular mechanism.”
(§ 12022.7, subd. (b).) “[A] victim is comatose, for purposes of the enhancement, if [he]
4.
is in a state resembling a coma characterized by profound unconsciousness.” (People v.
Cunningham (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1054.)
Here, the evidence established that Iverson was rendered unresponsive as a result
of the attack and died from injuries to his brain. Respondent concedes that the evidence
fails to prove Iverson was ever comatose.
Without further discussion, we accept this concession and reverse the true finding
on the enhancement.5
II. Appellant’s Remaining Contentions
The parties agree that appellant is entitled to resentencing, at which the trial court
can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances. (See People
v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) As such, we need not reach appellant’s remaining
contentions. At his resentencing, appellant will have the opportunity to make any
arguments regarding the court’s discretionary choices, including an invitation to strike a
strike prior or request to strike any enhancements.
We make no comment on the merits of appellant’s claims in his initial briefing in
the present appeal or on how the trial court should exercise its discretion upon
resentencing.
We also need not address alleged errors in the abstract of judgment, as we rest
assured an accurate amended abstract of judgment will be prepared following appellant’s
resentencing.
5 In appellant’s codefendant’s appeal, People v. Kolehmainen (July 16, 2025,
F087788 [nonpub. opn.]), this court concluded, based on similar reasoning to that in the
supplemental briefing, that the evidence presented in the underlying trial was insufficient
to support the true finding on the section 12022.7, subdivision (b) enhancement imposed
in Kolehmainen’s case and remanded the matter for resentencing.
5.
DISPOSITION
The jury’s true finding on the enhancement alleged under section 12022.7,
subdivision (b) is reversed. The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for
resentencing. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
DE SANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:
LEVY, Acting P. J.
SNAUFFER, J.
6.
