Filed 7/22/26 Tran v. DW2R CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JASMINE TRAN,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G065271
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2021-
01220737)
DW2R, INC.,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Craig L. Griffin, Judge. Affirmed. Motion to Disregard. Denied.
Lakhman & Kasamatsu and Ann L. Lakhman for Defendant and
Appellant.
J. Gill Law Group and Jasmin K. Gill; Love Law and Calvin F.
Love for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The jury in the underlying employment case awarded plaintiff
Jasmine Tran more than $10.7 million in damages, unpaid wages, punitive
damages, and statutory penalties against defendant James Hooper, her
former supervisor at the medical spa “Don’t Wait 2 Rejuvenate” (the Spa),
and against multiple corporate entities owned by Hooper. One of those
corporate entities is appellant DW2R, Inc., an entity co-owned by Hooper and
a dermatologist named Dr. Anh-Dao Le (Dr. Le).1 Following entry of
judgment, the trial court denied DW2R, Inc.’s motion for a new trial, but
granted in part its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV).
In so doing, the court vacated the punitive damages award against DW2R,
Inc., finding no evidence was presented at trial regarding its financial
condition. The court upheld the remainder of the judgment against DW2R,
Inc.
DW2R, Inc. contends substantial evidence does not support the
jury’s findings against it. Specifically, DW2R, Inc. contends the judgment is
based entirely on an agency theory not supported by the evidence and is the
result of improper argument by plaintiff’s counsel. We affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff worked at the Spa from the date it first opened in
Newport Beach in November 2018 until June 2021, when she was fired for
refusing to sign a “Non-Disclosure, Non-Circumvention, Non-Employment,
Non-Sue, and Non-Competition Agreement” (NDA). The proposed NDA
purported to be between plaintiff, who was referred to as the “[c]onfidant”
1
The Spa, which had one location in Newport Beach, operated
under multiple names, including Don’t Wait 2 Rejuvenate, DW2R, LLC,
DW2R, Inc., Skin Cell Rejuvenation, Facelift Med Spa, Growing Skincare,
Innergy Development, and Butterfly Facelift.
2
and “independent contractor,” and Hooper, both individually and on behalf of
his affiliated companies and approved agents and official representatives. It
required plaintiff to agree: (1) she is an independent contractor with no right
to receive any benefits or health insurance; (2) she was informed Hooper has
Tourette’s syndrome and “will speak out unexpectedly, sometimes in an
inappropriate way with sexual harassment words”;2 (3) she will not be able to
sue Hooper in court; (4) any sexual harassment conversations “will not stand
in a court of law”; (5) plaintiff “accepts working in this environment and
accepts the ‘sexual harassment’ conversations with maturity and [will] not be
offended by [Hooper’s] opinion and/or suggestions to improve her personal
image”; and (6) she is fully releasing all claims against Hooper “and/or Don’t
[Wait] 2 Rejuvenate, the company, or any of the company employees.”
Plaintiff filed her complaint on September 13, 2021, alleging 16
causes of action against Hooper, DW2R, Inc., DW2R, LLC, and Don’t Wait 2
Rejuvenate, LLC. Plaintiff alleged that during her employment at the Spa,
she was sexually harassed on numerous occasions by Hooper and that, after
she complained about Hooper’s conduct, defendants demanded she sign the
NDA and then terminated her employment when she refused to do so.
Of the 16 causes of action in the complaint, seven were alleged
under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). They included
the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth causes of action, for
(1) sexual harassment—hostile work environment (Govt. Code, § 12940, subd.
(j)), (2) sexual harassment—quid pro quo (ibid.), (3) failure to take reasonable
2
Plaintiff testified at trial Hooper does not have Tourette’s
Syndrome, Hooper repeatedly sexually harassed her during her employment,
and before being asked to sign the NDA, she had told Hooper his conduct was
inappropriate and must stop.
3
steps to prevent sexual harassment (id., § 12940, subd. (k)), (4) sex
discrimination (id., § 12900, et seq.), (5) retaliation (id., § 12940, subd. (h)),
(6) requiring plaintiff to sign an NDA and harassment agreement as a
condition of employment (id., § 12964.5), and (7) wrongful termination (id., §
12900, et seq.). Plaintiff also alleged causes of action for retaliation under
Labor Code section 1102.5 (sixth cause of action), wrongful termination in
violation of public policy (ninth cause of action), and violation of Business and
Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (sixteenth cause of action).
The complaint also included six wage and hour claims, including
the tenth cause of action for failure to pay overtime wages pursuant to Labor
Code sections 510, 1194, 1197 and applicable Industrial Wage Commission
orders; the eleventh cause of action for failure to pay minimum wages
pursuant to Labor Code sections 1194, 1194.2, 1197 and applicable wage
orders; the twelfth cause of action for failure to provide meal periods
pursuant to Labor Code sections 512, 226, 226.7, and applicable wage orders;
the thirteenth cause of action for failure to provide rest periods pursuant to
Labor Code sections 226.7 and applicable wage orders; the fourteenth cause
of action for wage statement violations pursuant to Labor Code section 226,
subdivisions (a) and (e); and the fifteenth cause of action for failure to provide
wages due upon termination pursuant to Labor Code sections 201 and 202.3
The case was tried over multiple days in October 2024. The jury
returned a verdict against DW2R, Inc. on all causes of action except the
minimum wage claim and awarded plaintiff damages in the total amount of
3
Multiple other defendants were added to the action prior to
trial, including Qin Moody, Innergy Development d/b/a Don’t Wait 2
Rejuvenate (Innergy), Facelift Medspa, LLC (Facelift), Butterfly Medspa,
LLC (Butterfly), SkinCellRejuvenation, LLC (SkinCell), and Growing
Skincare, LLC (Growing Skincare).
4
$10,768,381, which included $10 million in punitive damages.4 The trial court
entered judgment based on the verdict on November 27, 2024.
DW2R, Inc. filed its JNOV motion on November 18, 2024, and its
notice of intention to move for a new trial and motion for new trial on
November 19, 2024.5 Plaintiff opposed both motions.
After hearing the matter and taking it under submission, the
court granted the JNOV motion “in full” (capitalization and boldface omitted)
as to the punitive damages award and denied it regarding “the liability of
DW2R, Inc.” on the ground that, “as set forth in Plaintiff’s opposition,
substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings against DW2R, Inc.” The
court denied the motion for new trial on the ground “the weight of the
4
In addition to the punitive damages, the jury awarded plaintiff
the following: (1) $166,220 in economic damages for past and future lost
wages and earnings; (2) $500,000 in non-economic damages for past and
future loss of enjoyment of life, mental suffering, anxiety, humiliation, grief,
inconvenience, and emotional distress; (3) $7,680 for unpaid overtime,
(4) $10,640 premium wages for missed meal breaks; (5) $10,640 premium
wages for missed rest breaks; (6) $1,650 in penalties for wage statement
violations; and (7) $4,800 in waiting time penalties for unpaid wages.
5
DW2R, Inc. moved for a new trial, asserting (1) irregularity in
the proceedings based on allegations of improper argument by plaintiff’s
counsel (Code Civ. Proc., § 657(1)); (2) the punitive damages award was
excessive (id., § 657(5)); and (3) the evidence was insufficient to justify the
verdict, or the verdict is against the law (id., § 657(6)).
5
evidence supports the jury’s findings against DW2R, Inc.” DW2R, Inc. timely
appealed.6
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“On appeal from an order denying a JNOV motion, ‘the standard
of review is whether any substantial evidence—contradicted or
uncontradicted—supports the jury’s conclusion. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]
Accordingly, we may reverse an order denying a JNOV motion ‘only if,
reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to [plaintiff], resolving
all conflicts, and drawing all inferences in her favor, and deferring to the
implicit credibility determinations of the trier of fact, there was no
substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict in her favor.’” (Hurley v.
Department of Parks & Recreation (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 634, 644.)
In ruling on a motion for new trial, a trial judge is accorded wide
discretion, and “the exercise of this discretion is given great deference on
appeal.” (City of Los Angeles v. Decker (1977) 18 Cal.3d 860, 871–872.) The
denial of a new trial motion based on insufficiency of the evidence will only be
reversed “if there is no substantial conflict in the evidence and the evidence
compels the conclusion that the motion should have been granted.” (Howell v.
State Dept. of State Hospitals (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 143, 149.) Where a trial
court denies a new trial motion that was sought on grounds of attorney
misconduct and the appellate court concludes misconduct was shown, the
appellate court reviews “the entire record, including the evidence . . . to make
6
Moody filed a separate appeal from the judgment in case No.
G065203.
6
an independent determination as to whether the error was prejudicial.” (City
of Los Angeles v. Decker, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 872.)
II.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JUDGMENT AGAINST DW2R, INC.
DW2R, Inc. contends the jury’s verdict is not supported by
substantial evidence and that, in denying its motions for JNOV and new
trial, the trial court erroneously relied on plaintiff’s opposition papers
because they contained an erroneous statement of facts and
misinterpretations of the law. We find no merit to its arguments.
DW2R, Inc. describes the evidence it contends supports its
position that it was not plaintiff’s employer or an agent of Hooper—including
Hooper’s and/or Moody’s testimony that DW2R, Inc. did not conduct business
at the Spa, run advertisements, have a bank account, or employ plaintiff.
DW2R, Inc. further argues that evidence showed it was neither plaintiff’s
employer nor an agent of plaintiff’s employer and that plaintiff’s testimony
was impeached by other witnesses and her own evidence. But contrary
evidence was introduced at trial regarding the company’s purpose and
involvement in the Spa, as explained below.7 In reviewing a jury’s factual
determinations for substantial evidence, we do not resolve evidentiary
conflicts. (See In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640 [factual
determinations should be upheld even though substantial evidence exists to
the contrary].) The jury was entitled to accept the truthfulness of plaintiff’s
7
Dr. Le was not a party to the action and did not testify at trial.
7
testimony and reject contrary testimony as lacking credibility. (People v.
Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)
We conclude the trial court properly ruled substantial evidence
supports the verdict against DW2R, Inc. First, there was substantial evidence
of a joint venture between DW2R, Inc. and Hooper and his other entities with
respect to the operation of the Spa. At trial, the court instructed the jury with
CACI No. 3712, which stated: “Each of the members of a joint venture, and
the joint venture itself, are responsible for the wrongful conduct of a member
acting in furtherance of the venture. [¶] You must decide whether a joint
venture was created in this case. A joint venture exists if all of the following
have been proved: [¶] 1. Two or more persons or business entities combine
their property, skill, or knowledge with the intent to carry out a single
business undertaking; [¶] 2. Each has an ownership interest in the business;
[¶] 3. They have joint control over the business, even if they agree to delegate
control; and [¶] 4. They agree to share the profits and loss of the business. [¶]
A joint venture can be formed by a written or an oral agreement or an
agreement implied by the parties’ conduct.”8
Evidence showed Hooper and Dr. Le were the co-owners of
DW2R, Inc., and the corporation was incorporated in 2019 listing the Spa’s
address as its address. As with his other entities, Hooper was DW2R, Inc.’s
incorporator and was at the helm of its operations. DW2R, Inc. was listed as
the tenant on the initial commercial lease for the Spa’s premises. Hooper
signed the lease as DW2R, Inc.’s “CEO.” There was evidence Dr. Le, the co-
owner of DW2R Inc., administered botox injections and performed other
8
DW2R, Inc. does not contend there was any instructional error
at trial.
8
procedures at the Spa, that plaintiff performed work for DW2R, Inc., and that
without Dr. Le’s involvement, certain medical services could not be performed
and medical devices could not be purchased for and used at the Spa.
There also was substantial evidence DW2R, Inc. was an employer
of plaintiff. It was just one of multiple related entities created by Hooper that
he used interchangeably to conduct the operations of the Spa.9 Plaintiff
testified the Spa was marketed under several names, including “Don’t Wait 2
Rejuvenate,” “DW2R,” “SkinCell Rejuvenation,” “Facelift Medspa,” and
“Butterfly Medspa.” Hooper acknowledged “DW2R” was shorthand for “Don’t
Wait 2 Rejuvenate” and that he had created several companies using that
trade name to promote the same medical spa services at the same location.
As plaintiff aptly described the situation in her appellate briefing: “Hooper
blurred the distinction between entities, used them collectively to operate the
same medical spa, and . . . Plaintiff’s work was performed for DW2R, Inc. as
part of that unified business operation.”
DW2R, Inc. contends it cannot be liable to plaintiff because
Hooper’s acts were unauthorized or because the corporation conducted no
business. As discussed above, the record shows otherwise. And because
Hooper’s harassment occurred while he was acting in his supervisory
capacity on behalf of DW2R, Inc., DW2R, Inc. is liable for his conduct. (Roby
v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 707 [“When the harasser is a
supervisor, the employer is strictly liable for the supervisor’s actions”].)
9
Government Code section 12926, subdivision (d), states:
“‘Employer’ includes any person regularly employing five or more persons, or
any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly . . . .”
There was evidence admitted at trial showing Hooper had five or more
employees working at the Spa while plaintiff worked there.
9
III.
DW2R, INC.’S CLAIM OF ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT
DW2R, Inc. argues counsel for plaintiff committed multiple acts
of misconduct during closing argument, including misrepresenting the facts
and evidence, attempting to impeach Hooper for using a wheelchair during
his deposition, arguing facts not in evidence, “personalizing” the case, and
trying to inflame the jury against defendants. We find no grounds for
reversal.
DW2R, Inc. does not contend opposing counsel’s closing argument
violated any orders issued by the court, and it has failed to show it objected at
trial to any of the alleged misconduct. “‘Generally, a claim of misconduct is
entitled to no consideration on appeal unless the record shows a timely and
proper objection and a request that the jury be admonished.’” (Janice H. v.
696 North Robertson, LLC (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 586, 604.) “‘In the absence of
a timely objection the offended party is deemed to have waived the claim of
error through participation in the atmosphere which produced the claim of
prejudice.’” (Ibid.) DW2R, Inc.’s claims of attorney misconduct have been
waived.
Even assuming for the sake of argument counsel’s statements
during closing argument constituted misconduct and DW2R, Inc. did not
waive its right to challenge them on appeal, DW2R, Inc. has failed to
demonstrate prejudicial error by showing it is “‘reasonably probable that the
jury would have arrived at a different verdict in the absence of the argument
10
by [plaintiff’s counsel].’” (City of Los Angeles v. Decker, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p.
872.)
IV.
MOTION TO DISREGARD PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S BRIEF
DW2R, Inc. filed a motion asking us to disregard portions of
plaintiff’s appellate brief on the grounds it misstates the record, contains
assertions not supported by any citations, attributes to DW2R, Inc.
admissions it never made, “manufacture[s] liability through narrative,” and
advances factual assertions unsupported by the record in violation of
California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).10 The motion is denied. DW2R,
Inc. filed a reply brief, in which it had a full opportunity to correct any
purported misstatements of the record. As to any violations of rule
8.204(a)(1)(C), we decline to consider any arguments and factual assertions
not supported by specific citation to the appellate record whether they appear
in appellant’s or respondent’s briefing. (See Baer v. Tedder (2025) 115
Cal.App.5th 1139, 1166.)
10
That rule requires every reference to a matter in the appellate
record be supported with a citation to the volume and page number of the
record where the matter appears.
11
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs on
appeal.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.
12
