Filed 7/22/26 I.R. v. S.M.L. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

I.R.
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A173164
v.
S.M.L., (Solano County
Super. Ct. No. FFL158954)
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Plaintiff and respondent I.R. instituted this action against defendant
and appellant S.M.L. for a determination of parentage as to her son. During
the course of the proceeding, respondent sought a protective order under the
Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.).2 After

We resolve this case by memorandum opinion under California
1

Standards of Judicial Administration section 8.1.
“The purpose of the . . . DVPA . . . is ‘to prevent acts of domestic
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violence, abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the
persons involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable
these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence.’ (Fam. Code,
§ 6220.) Under the DVPA, ‘abuse’ means intentionally or recklessly causing
or attempting to cause bodily injury; sexual assault; placing a person in
reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or
another; or engaging in behavior that could be enjoined pursuant to section
6320. (§ 6203.) Section 6320 includes ‘molesting, attacking, striking,

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a multi-day hearing, at which both parties personally appeared, the trial
court issued a protective order with a three-year duration and visitation
orders.
Appellant appeals from the orders. The only brief before us is
appellant’s opening brief, as respondent did not file a brief.
Appellant predicates his appeal on a single assertion—that he was
denied the right to have several of the days of the hearing reported by a court
reporter or recorded electronically. He states, for example, “The rationale for
this appeal rests singularly upon the negligent or intentional act of the trial
court judge seated to take up the DVRO Petition. The court was not honest
with [appellant] and misstated that the trial was being audio recorded,” a
recording that would “be accessible at a later date so the [appellant’s] hired
court reporter could transcribe it.” But “[i]n fact no such recording system
was present nor enabled.” He complains, “the trial court allowed evidentiary
rulings and witness testimony while knowing the trial was not being recorded
or reported. Despite [appellant’s] clearly articulated statements to the Court
of his need for a Reporter’s Transcript, the court thwarted the [appellant].”
Although he was aware from the outset of the hearing that no court reporter
was present, he asserts he did not discover the hearing was not being
electronically recorded until the close of the second day. He then hired a
court reporter, and thus obtained transcripts of the remaining days, including
the day on which the court issued its ruling from the bench granting a

stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, [and] battering . . . harassing,
telephoning, . . . contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise,
coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other
party.’ (§ 6320, subd. (a).)” (Perez v. Torres-Hernandez (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th
389, 396, fn. omitted.)

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domestic violence protection order (DVPO) and issuing a limited visitation
order.
As best we can discern, appellant’s argument is that had the
proceedings been taken down by a court reporter or electronically recorded,
he would have been able to mount evidentiary and substantial evidence
challenges to the orders. But since he purportedly cannot do so due to the
electronic recording misinformation provided by the trial court, he has,
instead, been subject to a “ ‘miscarriage of justice’ ” entitling him to reversal
of the orders and a new hearing.
It is clear from the reporter’s transcript of the final day of the hearings,
when the trial court ruled from the bench, that the court does not agree
counsel for appellant was ever told the proceedings would be electronically
recorded and thus appellant would be able to hire a court reporter to prepare
a written transcript. Indeed, it appears that counsel seems to have assumed
that when the trial court stated proceedings were “on the record,” the court
meant the proceedings were being electronically recorded.3

For example, the following colloquy occurred about the admission of
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several exhibits:
Appellant’s counsel: “When we came in here we were told that there
was a recording device and then we were actually on the record, but
there wasn’t, so I wanted my reporter to be able to get the recording
and then transcribe the October session and the prior session. And
when I came here–do you have a recording device?”
Clerk: “There’s no recording.”
Appellant’s counsel: “But I was told that we would actually be on the
record. Do you recall saying we’re on the record? Do you have that
recording device? You asked for—you said for the record and you
introduced this. This is in our first. . . .”
Court: “When I say for the record it doesn’t mean. . . .”

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 Moreover, the local superior court rules state no court reporter would
be provided by the court, but a party could hire their own reporter (Super. Ct.
Solano County, Local Rules, rule 18.1; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.956),
and no electronic recording would be made unless in lieu of reporter in a
proceeding in which a court reporter was required by statute, which was not
the case as to the proceedings here at issue, or on application to and approval
by the court (Super. Ct. Solano County, Local Rules, rules 17.1 [general
requests to record proceedings], 18.1 [electronic recordings in lieu of court
reporter where reporter required to be present]).
In any case, we need not attempt to sort out exactly what colloquies
occurred between the court and counsel on hearing dates where no court
reporter was present. Appellant had alternatives to a reporter’s transcript—
namely, an agreed-to statement pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule
8.134, or a settled statement pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule
8.137. (See Leslie v. Roe (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 104, 108 [although appellants
did not have the right to transcripts at public expense, the rules of court
provided “alternative means of preparing the record on appeal” by way “an
agreed statement of the parties” or “a settled statement”]; People v. Scott
(1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 80, 86 [where “trial judge and both trial attorneys were

Appellant’s counsel: “And I said—I asked is there a record?· And you
said, yes, there is a record, there’s a recording device. So I just wanted
to have access to the recording device for my court reporter.”
Court: “I don’t recall exactly what I said but—so you want a record of a
recording that was not for purposes of—was not recorded for evidence
purposes. That’s why you have a reporter and that’s why the parties
are told that there’s no recording of the—we don’t provide a court
reporter; they must provide one of their own. And if they don’t, then
there’s no record. When I say on the record, I meant on the record just
so that we can present that that there’s people present.”

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available to help reconstruct” the trial proceedings, “counsel on appeal had
available to him a preliminary hearing transcript,” the People’s case was
“straightforward,” the “settled statement” contained “a detailed explication of
the facts,” and no “issues of fact or law which were before the trial court”
were “omitted from the settled statement,” the settled statement was “a fair
substitute for a complete transcript” and the record was “adequate to afford
defendant effective appellate review”]; Le Font v. Rankin (1959)
167 Cal.App.2d 433, 436–437 [“When an appellant desires to present any
point which requires consideration of the oral proceedings, he must obtain
and file in the appellate court a reporter’s transcript, certified by the
reporter; or, where a transcript is unavailable, a settled statement of the oral
proceedings prepared by the parties and settled by the judge who heard the
matter; or an agreed statement prepared by the parties, consisting of a
condensed statement of the relevant proceedings.”].)
It appears, however, appellant never availed himself of either
procedure. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.134 [setting forth procedure for
agreed-to statement], 8.137 [setting forth procedure for obtaining a settled
statement].) He provides no citation to the clerk’s transcript that he did so,
and the table of contents of the clerk’s transcript identifies no submissions in
such regard. At a minimum, however, to prevail on his argument that he has
been effectively denied appellate review for lack of an adequate record, he
was required to establish that he was wrongfully foiled in efforts to obtain
either an agreed-to or settled statement. He has not done so. (See Jameson
v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 [“[I]t is a fundamental principle of
appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be
correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the

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record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an
error that justifies reversal of the judgment.”].)
Finally, it is apparent from the trial court’s ruling from the bench,
which was reported, that ample evidence supports the DVPO and the limited
visitation order. The court read on the record a series of highly abusive text
messages to respondent that appellant did not dispute that he authored.4

4 The following are a sample of the texts the court read into the
record:
“ ‘You’re a piece of shit. I don’t know your schedule and the days you
are home it doing shit, you don’t even contact me to see if I want to see
my son. Your a degenerate, for reals. Your a piece of shit and never
want to see triumph again. You disgust me every time I see you.’ ”
“ ‘Your a fucking lame. I’m tired of your disrespect. . . .’ [¶] . . . ‘Telling
you why I can’t have [minor] over and you talk shit about it. You bitch,
I barely have a roof over my head.’ ”
“ ‘I also can’t wait for the day your parents ain’t here no more. Wanna
be nurse. I hope you fail. Ima make sure [minor] knows how much of a
piece of shit you are when he’s older and because of you I won’t be
around as much.’ ”
“ ‘You made me disrespect you the way I do cuz you started all of this.·
Ima show you the same energy you been shown me. And at this point
in my life I ain’t scared to die, even if it means taking some people with
me.’ ”
“ ‘Ima celebrate the day your parents die. I can’t wait to have you out
of my life for good.’ ”
“ ‘I fucking hate you. I wish you would of had an abortion and honestly
it would’––‘I would have been good. But I have a supposed son with
your stupid ass.’ ”
“ ‘I wish a car hits you one day.’ ”
“ ‘I pray that you pass away in the next year. That way I can take
custody of my son and I will make sure he doesn’t know who your side
of the family is or will ever be around them again.’ ”

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These text messages, alone, support issuance of the challenged orders. (See
Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1144 [unannounced and
uninvited visit and repeated contacts by phone, e-mail, and text, despite
requests of no contact, “ ‘disturb[ed] the peace’ ” and constituted “ ‘abuse’ ”
within the meaning of Fam. Code, § 6320].)
In short, the trial court’s rulings are supported by uncontradicted
evidence to which he did not object and which constitute “abuse” under the
DVPA. Accordingly, whatever spin he may want to put on these text
messages, or whatever he may argue should have detracted from
respondent’s credibility, are not arguments that can carry the day given our
standard of review. “ ‘We review the grant of a DVPA restraining order for
abuse of discretion, and, to the extent we are called upon to review the court’s
factual findings, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review.
[Citation.] In reviewing the evidence, we examine the entire record to
determine whether there is any substantial evidence—contradicted or
uncontradicted—to support the trial court’s findings. [Citation.] We must
accept as true all evidence supporting the trial court’s findings, resolving
every conflict in favor of the judgment. [Citation.] We do not determine
credibility or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] If substantial evidence
supports the judgment, reversal is not warranted even if facts exist that
would support a contrary finding.’ ” (Parris J. v. Christopher U. (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 108, 116.)

“ ‘And my boy is gonna see how much of a piece of shit you are and
because of you I can’t be in my son’s life as much as I wanted to, and
you did that on purpose.’ ”
“ ‘What the fuck, [I.R.]. The social worker never informed me of any
safety plan. I was told by her that I couldn’t see my son until she spoke
with me, which she already did. You’re a piece of shit just like my ex.’ ”

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 DISPOSITION
The DVPO and visitation orders issued by the court on February 10,
2025, are AFFIRMED.

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 _________________________
Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Humes, P. J.

_________________________
Smiley, J.

A173164, I.R. v. S.M.L.

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