Filed 7/23/26 Connolly v. Garamendi CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Calaveras)

KATHERINE GARAMENDI CONNOLLY et al., C101495
Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Appellants,
(Super. Ct. No. 21CV45154)
v.

MARY ANNE GARAMENDI,
Individually and as Trustee, etc.,
Defendant, Cross-compliant and Respondent.

This case involves a property dispute between family members regarding the
Garamendi McSorley Ranch (the Ranch), located in Calaveras County. The dispute
concerns the interpretation of several easements that plaintiffs granted to defendant so
that she could access her otherwise landlocked parcels. The easements state that they are
granted “solely for the purpose for providing ingress and egress” to the benefitted parcels.
The parties dispute whether (1) the easements permit defendant to travel directly between
her parcels or only to pass over plaintiffs’ property to reach the nearest state highway; (2)
the easements permit defendant to use the easements for non-travel related purposes, such
as recreational activities, dog walking, and temporary parking; (3) plaintiffs have the
right to maintain locked gates across the easements; (4) plaintiffs have the right to install
and maintain recording devices to monitor use of the easements; and (5) plaintiffs have
the right to install “no trespassing” signs on the easements.

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 After trial, the trial court issued a decision that is mostly in defendant’s favor.
Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting extrinsic evidence to aid
its interpretation of the easements and by interpreting the easements to permit defendant
to use the easements for purposes other than ingress and egress. We conclude that the
trial court either properly admitted the extrinsic evidence or that any error was harmless.
We also conclude that the trial court correctly interpreted the easements to permit
defendant to travel directly between parcels without the obstruction of locked gates.
However, in certain other respects, the trial court’s interpretation of the easements was
overbroad. Thus, we will affirm the judgment in part but reverse and remand other
portions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Ranch, which has been in the family since the 1860’s, was previously owned
by Raymond and Mary Jane McSorley Garamendi as trustees of the Garamendi Family
Trust (the Trust). Raymond and Mary Jane1 had seven children who were the primary
beneficiaries of the Trust: Thomas, John, Samuel, Robert, Celeste, Debra, and Mary
Anne (defendant).
After the deaths of Raymond and Mary Jane (in 1991 and 2015, respectively),
disputes arose among the surviving children (or their heirs) regarding the disposition of
the Trust property. In March 2017, the co-trustees filed a petition seeking court
instructions on the administration of the Trust. One of the heirs (Celeste) objected and
filed a competing petition. The dispute culminated in a court-approved Settlement and
Distribution Agreement (the Settlement).

1 We will refer to individuals by their first names and mean no disrespect.

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 A. The Settlement Agreement
Under the Settlement, the Ranch property was divided into four parcels,
designated C-1, C-2, C-3, and D-1. As relevant here, defendant received Parcel C-1,
which includes the “Main House” and “Slim’s cabin,” and Parcel D-1, which includes the
“JJ McSorley House.” The allocation to defendant also included several lot line
adjustments, which had the effect of transferring approximately 11 acres from Parcel C-2
to Parcels C-1 and D-1. Among other things, the lot line adjustments (1) extended the
boundary of Parcel C-1 to the south and west, creating a direct connection from Parcel C-
1 to Parcel C-3; (2) added a 10-foot-wide strip along the north edge of Parcel D-1; and
(3) extended the northeast boundary of Parcel D-1 so that it abuts Parcel C-3.
Debra received Parcel C-3, which includes the “Lower House.” Her parcel (Parcel
C-3) lies between the parcels allocated to defendant (Parcels C-1 and D-1).
Celeste’s allotment, Parcel C-2, was distributed directly to her daughters,
Katherine and Bridget (collectively, plaintiffs).2 There is no residence on Parcel C-2, but
the property includes a corral, a barn, and a “blacksmith’s shop.” The barn, which has no
doors, is used to store materials and equipment, including, at times, an all-terrain vehicle.
The corral abuts the barn. Across from the barn is the blacksmith’s shop, which is owned
by four siblings (defendant, Robert, John, and Debra, hereinafter the “ ‘Family Member
Owners’ ”). The largest part of Parcel C-2 is open space, which sometimes serves as a
“holding field” for cattle.
In addition to the structures, a roadway lies over Parcel C-2, extending from
Highway 49 to a point just before the barn, from which it diverges in three directions:
straight toward the Main House on Parcel C-1; right toward the JJ McSorley House and

2 In 2021, Katherine and Bridget conveyed their interests in Parcel C-2 to
Garamendi McSorley Ranch, LLC, of which they are the sole members.

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Lower House on Parcels C-3 and D-1; and left toward a gate near Slim’s cabin on Parcel
C-1.
The Settlement agreement contains an integration clause. It provides: “The terms
of this Agreement, including all exhibits attached hereto, are intended by the Parties as a
final expression of their Agreement with respect to each and every term and condition
included herein and may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement,
contemporaneous oral agreement, or prior and/or contemporaneous oral representations.
The Parties further intend that this Agreement constitutes the complete and exclusive
statement of its terms and conditions and that no extrinsic evidence whatsoever may be
introduced in any judicial proceeding, if any, involving this Agreement. Any and all
agreements or representations regarding the terms and conditions of this Agreement that
are not expressly set forth herein are null and void. Any amendments to this Agreement
shall be in writing and executed by all Parties to this Agreement.”
1. The Easements
Because Parcel C-2 lies between Highway 49 and the other three parcels, there
would be no access to Parcels C-1, C-3, D-1 from Highway 49 without easements over
Parcel C-2. Thus, as part of the Settlement, the parties negotiated non-exclusive
easements benefitting Parcels C-1, C-3, and D-1 for ingress and egress over the existing
roadway (hereafter, the Easements). The Easements to be conveyed are described in the
Settlement, as follows:
“a. Main House Roadway Easement. A deeded 20’ non-exclusive
easement for ingress and egress on an existing roadway located on Parcel C-2 to Parcel
C-1 as shown on EXHIBIT E-3 as exiting Highway 49 and proceeding east along an
existing roadway to boundary of Parcel C-1. This easement, known as the ‘Main House
Roadway Easement’, shall be appurtenant to Parcel C-1 and solely for the purpose for
providing ingress and egress to Parcel C-1 for pedestrians, street-legal registered
vehicles, construction equipment or persons on horseback. This easement shall allow

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access to Parcel C-1 only at and through an existing gate at its termination at Parcel C-1
at the base of the hill and shall not allow access to C-1 at any other point along the
roadway easement. Nothing in this easement shall prevent the fencing of any part of the
boundary between C-1 and C-2.
“b. JJ McSorley (Parcel D-1) and Lower House (Parcel C-3) Roadway
Easement. A deeded 20’ non-exclusive casement for ingress and egress on an existing
roadway located on Parcel C-2 to the residences on Parcels C-3 and D-1 as shown on
EXHIBIT E-3 and EXHIBIT E-4 as exiting Highway 49 and proceeding along an
existing roadway adjacent to the barn on Parcel C-2 to Parcels C-3 and D-1. This
easement, known as the ‘JJ McSorley (Parcel D-1) and Lower House (Parcel C-3)
Easement’, shall be appurtenant to Parcels C-3 and D-1 and solely for the purpose for
providing ingress and egress to Parcel C-3 and D-1 for pedestrians, street-legal registered
vehicles, construction equipment or persons on horseback. The easement shall allow
access to Parcel D-1 and Parcel C-3 in the area between Parcel D-1 and C-3. Said
easement shall include, as an accessory use, two ‘back-up areas’ which shall include an
approximately 15’ square dirt area immediately south/southeast of the Blacksmith Shop
building and an approximately 15’ square area immediately south/southwest west of the
Barn as shown on EXHIBIT E-3 for backing up and turning around vehicles using the JJ
McSorley/D-1 and Lower House/[C]-3 Roadway Easement. These ‘back-up areas’ may
not be used for parking by Parcels C-3 or D-1.
[¶] [¶] [¶] [¶]
“g. North C-1 Vineyard Roadway Easement. A deeded 20-foot roadway
easement for ingress and egress on an existing roadway located on Parcel C-2 to Parcel
C-1 as shown on EXHIBIT E-3. This easement, known as the ‘North C-1 Vineyard
Roadway Easement,’ shall be appurtenant to Parcel C-1 and solely for the purpose for
providing ingress and egress to Parcel C-1 for pedestrians, street-legal registered
vehicles, construction equipment or persons on horseback. The ‘North C-1 Vineyard

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Roadway Easement’ shall run north from the intersection of the ‘Main House Roadway
Easement’ and ‘JJ McSorley (Parcel D-1) and Lower House (Parcel C-3) Roadway
Easement’ and shall overlay in part the CPUD Water Easement. It shall allow access to
Parcel C-1 only at and through a new gate to be constructed at its termination at Parcel C-
1 near the CPUD water line access point. Nothing in this easement shall prevent the
fencing of any part of the boundary between Parcels C-1 and C-2.”
Notably, the Settlement did not provide for an easement between Parcels C-1 and
D-1 over Parcel C-3. Thus, without permission from Parcel C-3’s owner (Debra), the
owner of Parcels C-1 and D-1 (defendant) would not be able to travel between those
discontinuous parcels without using the Easements over Parcel C-2.
Pursuant to the Settlement, defendant and Debra drafted easements using the
language from the Settlement. Each deed explicitly conveyed to the easement holder a
“perpetual,” “non-exclusive,” and “appurtenant” easement on the existing roadway
located on Parcel C-2 “solely for the purpose of providing ingress and egress to [the
benefitted property] for pedestrians, street-legal registered vehicles, construction
equipment or persons on horseback.”
Trial Exhibit Nos. 441 and 442 show the approximate position of each Easement
and how they relate to the existing roadway on Parcel C-2. Consistent with the existing
roadway, the three Easements meet at a spot near the barn on Parcel C-2, which the
parties refer to as the “ ‘intersection.’ ” From there, the Main House Roadway Easement
goes straight along the path of the roadway to the Main House on Parcel C-1; the JJ
McSorley/Lower House Easement veers right to Parcels C-3 and D-1; and the Vineyard
Roadway Easement veers left to the gate on Parcel C-1.
2. The Licenses
In addition to the Easements and lot line adjustments, the parties to the Settlement
also agreed to various licenses, three of which we will discuss here. First, a “Blacksmith
Shop Building Access License” (boldface and underline omitted) granted the Family

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Member Owners and their families access to the Blacksmith Shop to visit or work on the
building at any time. Should the Family Member Owners fail to maintain the Blacksmith
Shop Building and create a nuisance or hazard, the building may (after notice and
opportunity) be deemed abandoned to the owner of Parcel C-2.
Second, a “[Parcel] C-2 Gravel Turnaround” license, granted any lineal
descendant (of Raymond and Mary Jane) who owns one of Parcel C-1, C-3, or D-1, a
right to temporarily use the gravel turnaround area in Parcel C-2 for the
loading/unloading and turnaround of commercial vehicles and trucks/trailers when there
is not sufficient parking on Parcels C-1, C-3, or D-1, or when the vehicles are unable to
navigate the driveways to such parcels.
Finally, a “Large Group Temporary Parking” (underline omitted) license granted
the lineal descendants a limited right to use the gravel turnaround for temporary large-
group private family events.

B. Easement Disputes
Distribution of the Trust occurred on November 22, 2019, and the Easements were
recorded the same day. Not long after distribution, disputes arose between plaintiffs
(owners of Parcel C-2) and defendant (owner of Parcels C-1 and D-1) regarding the scope
or uses of the Easements.
The chief dispute concerned whether the Easements, which were granted “solely
for the purpose for providing ingress and egress” to Parcels C-1, C-3, and D-1, included
the right to travel directly between the parcels. Plaintiffs (and their mother Celeste) took
the position that because the Easements were granted solely for “ingress and egress,”
defendant may use the Easements only for travel to/from Highway 49, and for no other
purpose. Defendant may not use the Easements to travel directly between Parcel C-1 and
Parcel D-1 or to travel directly between one of those parcels and Parcel C-3. Thus, in
plaintiffs’ view, if defendant wishes to travel from one parcel to another, she must first

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travel along the roadway all the way to Highway 49, exit the property, re-enter, and then
travel back up the roadway to the other parcel. Plaintiffs argued that using the roadway
to travel directly between parcels was overburdening the Easements.
In addition, plaintiffs maintained that defendant (and her tenant)3 were
unreasonably burdening the servient estate by treating the Easements as an extension of
their private property and using them for non-travel related purposes. In particular,
plaintiffs complained that defendant was improperly using the Easements (1) for
recreational activities (such as biking, walking the dogs, or giving property tours); (2) for
parking; (3) as a place to “loiter” or linger; and (4) as an open area for dogs to wander
and children to play.
Another dispute related to whether defendant had the right to pass along the
Easements free of obstructions. Beginning in October 2020, plaintiffs closed and locked
two gates situated across the roadway Easements—the main entrance gate to the property
and a newly-installed gate near the barn—and demanded that defendant keep the gates
closed and locked whenever they were not being used. When defendant failed to comply,
plaintiffs claimed this was yet another unfair burden on their property rights.
Defendant’s position was that she had the legal right to use the Easements to travel
between Parcels C-1, D-1, and C-3 free of the restrictions that plaintiffs sought to impose.
Defendant argued that plaintiffs were unreasonably interfering with her use and
enjoyment of the Easements by (1) prohibiting her from travelling directly between the
parcels; (2) imposing unreasonable restrictions on the use of the Easements by children,
pets, etc.; (3) installing and maintaining locked gates across the Easements and
demanding that defendant keep the gates closed and locked; (4) posting “no trespassing”

3 Defendant’s daughter initially lived in the JJ McSorley House on Parcel D-1. In
June 2020, the daughter moved to North Carolina, and defendant leased the house to a
tenant, Catherine (Cathy) Bourland. For convenience, unless the context indicates
otherwise, we will refer to defendant and her tenant collectively as “defendant.”

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signs on the Easements; (5) photographing and video recording defendant’s use of the
Easements; and (6) harassing/intimidating defendant and her guests.

C. Procedural History
Plaintiffs sued defendant in February 2021. The operative complaint alleges
claims for nuisance, trespass, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, and declaratory relief, among other claims. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant
breached the Settlement and overburdened the Easements by traveling between parcels,
using the Easements for non-travel purposes, and refusing to close and lock the gates.
Plaintiffs requested injunctive relief, damages, interest, punitive damages, and attorney’s
fees.
Defendant responded with an amended cross-complaint seeking a declaration of
her rights, including her right to (1) travel between parcels free of the restrictions that
plaintiffs sought to impose, (2) use the Easements free of harassment, intimidation, and
surveillance by plaintiffs, (3) use the Easements without the obstruction of locked gates
and free of any obligation to close and lock the gates, (4) compel plaintiffs to remove the
“no trespassing” signs they installed on the property, including at the main entrance
gate.4 Defendant also asserted a nuisance claim, alleging that plaintiffs’ conduct was part
of a scheme to harass defendant and prevent her from enjoying her property.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, a motion to strike
defendant’s amended cross-complaint, and a motion for summary adjudication, all of
which were denied.

4 In response to plaintiffs’ complaint that defendant was required to pay a share of
the costs of fencing that plaintiffs constructed, defendant sought a declaration that she
was not required to contribute to the cost of fencing. The trial court ruled that defendant
was responsible for a portion of the cost of the fencing, and that portion of the ruling does
not appear to be an issue on appeal. Accordingly, our decision omits any discussion of
the fencing issue.

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 Trial began on March 20, 2023. The parties stipulated to try their declaratory
relief claims first. The parties’ identified the following issues for trial: (1) whether the
Easements allow travel between Parcels C-1, D-1, and C-3, or only allow travel between
Parcel C-1, D-1, or C-3 and Highway 49; (2) whether the Easements allow recreational
uses (e.g., walking, biking, jogging, exercise, yoga, dog walking), loitering,
unaccompanied children or pets, and parking of vehicles; (3) whether defendant has a
right to use the Easements free of plaintiffs’ surveillance; (4) whether defendant can be
compelled to close and lock the gates or instead has the right to use the Easements
without obstruction; and (5) whether plaintiffs may maintain the “no trespassing” signs
on their property, including at the main entrance gate.
Celeste testified for plaintiffs, as did the parties themselves. Defendant, James,
Robert, Mary Anne’s tenant (Cathy Bourland), and Mokelumne Hill Fire Protection
District Chief Michael Ray Dell’Orto testified for defendant. The testimony of the
witnesses is summarized below.
1. Travel Between Parcels
Regarding travel between parcels, plaintiffs’ witnesses testified that defendant
repeatedly used the Easements to travel directly between Parcels C-1 and D-1 or C-3,
without first proceeding to Highway 49 and turning around. Celeste sought to quantify
the number of times that this occurred. Based on her review of security camera footage,
Celeste calculated that during the period from October 2020 to October 2022, there were
approximately 600 instances when defendant (or her guests) drove directly from one
parcel to another (and back) and approximately 55 instances when defendant (or guests)
walked directly from one parcel to another (and back).
Defendant did not dispute this testimony and, in fact, stipulated that she and her
guests used the Easements in tandem to travel directly between parcels. Defendant
testified that before the distribution she routinely traveled directly between the Main
House and JJ McSorley House and believed that she could continue to do so under the

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Easements. There is no evidence that she communicated this belief to plaintiffs prior to
the Settlement.
2. Use of the Easements for Non-travel Purposes
Plaintiffs’ witnesses further testified that they observed (personally or through
security camera photographs/videos) multiple instances in which defendant (or her
guests) used the Easements for purposes other than ingress or egress. The “unauthorized”
uses included recreational activities (e.g., dog walking, group tours), loitering/lingering,
parking, and permitting unaccompanied children and dogs to wander or play on the
Easements. Celeste testified that she observed unaccompanied dogs on the Easements on
at least 82 occasions between 2019 and 2022. She observed people “milling about” on
the Easements on about ten occasions, and she observed defendant using the Easements
to give “ ‘tours’ ” of the property on four occasions.
Defendant did not dispute that the Easements were sometimes used by children
and dogs, but she did not believe the Easements prohibited children or dogs. Defendant
testified that the purpose of the Easements was to allow her and her guests “to come and
go” from the parcels. She believed that plaintiffs were imposing restrictions on the use of
the Easements as a form of harassment.
3. The Gates
Plaintiffs’ witnesses testified that the main entrance gate, which predated
distribution of the Trust, historically had been kept closed and “at times” locked. The
witnesses claimed that closing and locking the gate was necessary to prevent
unauthorized persons from entering the property, to protect against theft, and to control
livestock during periods of active grazing. Thus, beginning in October 2020, plaintiffs
began locking the main gate with a chain and padlocks. Plaintiffs provided all users
(including defendant) with keys and combinations to the locks and demanded that they
keep the gate closed and locked at all times. Plaintiffs also provided keys and/or
combinations to other family members, the fire department, and the utility company.

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 Plaintiffs also erected another gate—the “barnyard gate”—that had once been
installed on the property between the barn and the blacksmith shop. Plaintiffs claimed
that closing and locking the barnyard gate was necessary to protect the barn and its
contents; to contain any stray livestock; and to prevent persons authorized to use only the
Main House Roadway Easement from using the JJ McSorley/Lower House Easement.
As with the main entrance gate, plaintiffs provided keys and/or combinations to all users,
including defendant, and demanded that the barnyard gate be kept closed and locked
whenever it was not in use. Defendant complied with plaintiffs’ request to close and lock
the gates for about six weeks. Thereafter, defendant rarely closed the gates and almost
never locked them.
Plaintiffs asserted that defendant, as the owner of the dominant tenement, has a
duty to keep the gates closed and locked. Plaintiffs asserted that the burden of closing
and locking the gates is minimal, less than a minute per gate.
Defendant’s witnesses testified that historically the gates were never locked and
were closed only when moving cattle. The lone exception was the period after her
mother died, when the gates were temporarily kept closed because no one was living on
the property. Defendant initially complied with plaintiffs’ request to close and lock the
gates because of plaintiffs’ letter. However, after consulting with counsel, defendant did
not believe that she had any legal obligation to close or lock the gates. Nevertheless, as
an accommodation, defendant and her tenant agreed that they generally would try to close
the main gate at night and lock the main gate if they both were going to leave the Ranch
for more than four hours.
Defendant did not feel safe locking the main gate at night because it might prevent
her from evacuating quickly in the event of an emergency. Defendant’s tenant testified
that it was unduly burdensome for her to close and lock the gates because it takes her
about four minutes and thirty seconds to get through the gates every time she leaves the
property. Defendant testified that closing and locking the gates interfered with her use

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and enjoyment of her property because it inconvenienced her and her guests, discouraged
visitors, and prevented her from receiving deliveries. Defendant believed that plaintiffs’
insistence on closing and locking the gates was a form of harassment.
Michael Dell’Orto, the Mokelumne Hill Fire Protection District Chief, testified
that locked gates could pose a safety hazard in the event of a fire or medical emergency.
He testified that a manual gate had never prevented fire crews from responding to a fire
but noted that gates add to the response time and, in an emergency, “every little minute
counts.”
4. The Surveillance Cameras
Celeste testified that she installed security cameras in various locations around
Parcel C-2. The cameras were “wildlife” cameras that captured images (or videos) when
triggered by a motion sensor. When activated, the cameras would transmit an image to a
cell phone, while retaining the photo/video on a memory card within the camera. The
cameras were positioned to monitor what plaintiffs considered the “high-risk areas” of
their property, which included the barn and the Main House Roadway Easement and JJ
McSorley/Lower House Easement. The purpose of the cameras was to protect the
property from theft, and to “document [defendant’s] trespass and easement violations.”
As plaintiffs’ agent, Celeste was primarily responsible for monitoring the security
cameras and reviewing the photos/videos. Plaintiffs produced over 255,000 security
camera images during pre-trial discovery. The images included numerous photos of
defendant (or her tenant or guests) walking or standing on the Easements, as well as
photos of dogs on the Easements. In addition to the security cameras, plaintiffs or their
agents occasionally used a handheld camera or a cell phone to photograph or video record
defendant or her guests while they were using the Easements.
Defendant testified that the security cameras and the surveillance by plaintiffs
made her and her guests uncomfortable. Defendant testified that she never consented to
the security cameras and believed the surveillance was an invasion of her privacy.

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 5. The “No Trespassing” Signs
In addition to the security cameras, plaintiffs posted multiple “no trespassing”
signs throughout their property, including on the main entrance gate, at the intersection of
the Easements, and the barn. A “no trespassing” sign was positioned near every security
camera so that visitors would encounter the cameras and signs together. Each sign reads:
“NO TRESPASSING[.] [¶] Violators will be Prosecuted. [¶] Right to pass by
permission and subject to control of owner. [¶] CPC § 602 | CC § 1008.” Below that,
each sign includes the name “GARAMENDI McSORLEY RANCH, LLC,” and a
telephone number that belonged to Katherine. The signs did not refer to defendant or
provide any contact information for her. At trial, plaintiffs’ witnesses testified that the
purpose of the signs was to preserve plaintiffs’ ability to enforce trespass violations, not
to harass defendant.
Defendant admitted that plaintiffs have a right to post “no trespassing” signs on
their property, but defendant argued that plaintiffs should not be allowed to post “no
trespassing” signs on the Easements, especially at the main entrance gate. Defendant
testified that posting “no trespassing” signs on the Easements discouraged visitors and
interfered with her use of the Easements. Defendant considered the signs to be another
form of harassment.
D. Trial Court’s Ruling
After the trial, the trial court issued a tentative decision, which was mostly in
defendant’s favor. Plaintiffs lodged numerous objections. The court held a hearing on
the objections and thereafter issued its Statement of Decision.
The Statement of Decision generally holds that (1) the Easements may be used to
travel directly between Parcel C-1 and Parcels D-1 and C-3; (2) the Easements may be
used by pedestrians accompanied by dogs, by unaccompanied children, and for
“recreational” activities, temporary parking, and incidental/transitory stops; (3) closing
and locking the gates is an undue burden on the dominant estates and therefore plaintiffs

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may not obstruct the Easements by closing and locking the gates (except that plaintiffs
may close the gates when necessary to control livestock or horses); (4) plaintiffs may use
security cameras to monitor their property, but plaintiffs may not retain images of
defendant, her tenant, her family members, or known invitees unless plaintiffs believe, in
good faith, that the images provide evidence of a trespass or other violation of rights; (5)
cell phones, handheld cameras, and other electronic recording devices may not be used to
photograph defendant, her tenant, her family members, or her known invitees while they
are lawfully using the Easements; (6) plaintiffs’ “no trespassing” signs are misleading
and potentially a deterrence to defendant’s visitors and therefore plaintiffs may post such
signs anywhere on their property except the Easements. The remainder of the Statement
of Decision relates to the cost of fencing issue, which is not at issue in this appeal.
The parties subsequently stipulated to dismiss the remaining causes of action and
allow judgment to be entered on the Statement of Decision. The trial court entered
judgment on May 10, 2024. The Judgment specifically provides, in relevant part:
“a. [Defendant], her tenant(s), and their invitees are entitled to travel along the
Main House Roadway Easement and the JJ McSorley (Parcel D-1) and Lower House
(Parcel C-3) Roadway Easement … whatever distance is appropriate to her or their
purposes, and may travel along one easement to reach another easement and then travel
along that easement for whatever distance is appropriate to her or their purposes. They
have the right to use both roadways and may use them in tandem to reach any property
[defendant] owns or any location to which she holds access rights (including, without
limitation, the Main House, the JJ McSorley House, the Blacksmith Shop, the North C-1
Vineyard, her mailbox, or Highway 49). That includes the right to use part or all of an
easement appropriate to their purposes of travel. They are not required to traverse the
entire length of an easement or to exit to Highway 49 when ingressing or egressing from
a location.

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 “b. [Defendant], her tenant(s), and their invitees are not prohibited from using [the
Easements] for recreational purposes….
“c. [Defendant], her tenant(s), and their invitees are not prohibited from
temporarily stopping, ceasing to move, or ‘loitering’ as [p]laintiffs have characterized
that term, (i.e., stopping or ceasing to move for purposes other than for an emergency,
mechanical problem, disability, or to open or close gates) on [the] Easements.
“d. [Defendant], her tenant(s), and [their] invitees may be accompanied by dogs
while utilizing the [E]asements but may not allow dogs to roam onto portions of Parcel
C-2 over which [defendant] does not have easement or access rights.
“e. Children of [defendant], her tenant(s), or their invitees may ingress or egress
over [the] Easements or any portion thereof, whether accompanied or supervised by an
adult or not.
“f. [Defendant], her tenant(s), and [their] invitees may stop or park their vehicles
on [the] Easements while visiting the Blacksmith Shop and may otherwise park
temporarily on those [E]asements to effectuate the purpose of a visit that is permitted by
the [E]asement.
“g. [ … ] Plaintiffs may close the gates only when their or their tenant’s livestock
or horses are present and then only when necessary to control them.… Other than that,
[d]efendant and her invitees are entitled to the use of the easements unburdened by closed
or locked gates and Plaintiff may not close or lock the gates.
“h. Plaintiffs may continue to use their security cameras. However, whenever
those cameras capture images of [defendant], her tenant(s), their family members, or
persons known to be her invitees, the [p]laintiffs and their agents must … retain only
those [images] that they believe, in good faith, provide evidence of a trespass or other
violation of their rights…. Plaintiffs and their agents may not use cell phones, cameras,
or other handheld electronic devices to photograph or record [defendant], her tenant(s),

16
their family members, or their known invitees while they are engaged in lawful use of
[the] Easements.
“i. [Defendant’s] invitees’ travel over [the] Easements is neither by permission
nor subject to the control of Plaintiffs, and (contrary to the signs posted by [p]laintiffs)
her invitees may not be prosecuted for using those [E]asements consistent with this
judgment. Plaintiffs may post their property by placing signs anywhere on Parcel C-2
except the easements. They may not post such ‘no trespassing’ signs on the
[E]asements…. Any such signs on the [E]asements must be removed and not replaced.”
After judgment, the trial court found defendant to be the prevailing party and
awarded her costs and attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial was denied.
Plaintiffs filed timely notices of appeal of the judgment, the order denying plaintiffs’
motion to tax costs, and the award of attorney’s fees.
DISCUSSION
I
Legal Principles and Standard of Review
A. General Rules of Contract Interpretation
The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly construed the terms of
the parties’ Settlement agreement and resulting easements. We interpret these
instruments under the same rules of construction that apply to contracts generally. (See
Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165 [settlement agreement] (Winet); Zissler
v. Saville (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 630, 639 [easement] (Zissler).)
The fundamental goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the mutual
intention of the parties at the time of contract formation. (Civ. Code, § 1636.) To
ascertain that intent, we look first to the language of the contract, construing the words in
the context of the instrument as a whole and the circumstances under which it was made.
(Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange
(2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 549, 567; Civ. Code, §§ 1639, 1641, 1647.) We give words their

17
ordinary and popular meaning, unless the words are used in a technical sense or a special
meaning is given to them by usage. (Dameron Hospital Assn., at p. 567; Civ. Code,
§ 1644.) If contractual language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity,
it will be followed. (Dameron Hospital Assn., at p. 567; Civ. Code, § 1638.) But if the
language is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be admissible to explain or interpret the
agreement. (See Wolf v. Superior Court (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1350 (Wolf).)
“The test of whether [extrinsic] evidence is admissible to construe an ambiguity is
not whether the language appears to the court to be unambiguous, but whether the
evidence presented is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language is ‘reasonably
susceptible.’ ” (Winet, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165, citing Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Company (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 37.)
When the meaning of a contract is disputed, the decision whether to admit
extrinsic evidence involves a two-step process. First, the court provisionally receives any
proffered extrinsic evidence to determine whether the language of the contract is
“reasonably susceptible” to the interpretation urged. (Wolf, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1351.) If the court decides that it is, the extrinsic evidence is admitted to aid in the
second step, which involves interpreting the contract. (Ibid.)
The mutual intention of the parties is determined by their objective manifestations
of intent. (In re Marriage of Minkin (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 939, 948; G & W Warren’s,
Inc. v. Dabney (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 565, 575, 577.) A party’s unexpressed subjective
intent is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language. (G & W
Warren’s, Inc., at pp. 575,577; Salehi v. Surfside III Condominium Owners’ Assn. (2011)
200 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1159.)
The threshold determination of ambiguity is a question of law, subject to our
independent review on appeal. (Wolf, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) The
interpretation of a contract also presents a question of law when no extrinsic evidence is
introduced, or when the competent extrinsic evidence is not conflicting. (Ibid.; Winet,

18
supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 1166; see Hess v. Ford Motor Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 516, 527
[where the evidentiary facts are not in conflict, and only the inferences to be drawn
therefrom are disputed, review is de novo].) However, if the interpretation of a contract
turns on the credibility of conflicting extrinsic evidence, the resolution of that conflict is a
question of fact and must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. (Wolf, at
p. 1351; Winet, at p. 1166; see ASP Properties Group, L.P. v. Fard, Inc. (2005)
133 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1266-1267.)
B. California’s Parol Evidence Rule
We also must consider the impact of California’s parol evidence rule. The rule,
codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1856, prohibits the introduction of extrinsic
evidence to vary or alter the terms of an integrated written contract. (Casa Herrera, Inc.
v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336, 343; see Civ. Code, § 1625.) An integrated agreement
is broadly defined as a writing intended to serve as the “final expression” of the terms of
an agreement. (Hayter Trucking, Inc. v. Shell Western E&P, Inc. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th
1, 13.) However, application of the parol evidence rule differs depending on whether the
parties intended the writing to be a fully integrated agreement or only a partially
integrated agreement. (Kanno v. Marwit Capital Partners II, L.P. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th
987, 999-1000 & fn.2 (Kanno).)
When parties intend a writing to be a “final expression” of certain terms, but not to
serve as a comprehensive expression of their agreement, the agreement is said to be
partially integrated. (See Kanno, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 999-1000; Founding
Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc.
(2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 953.) For a partially integrated agreement, the parol
evidence rule prevents the use of extrinsic evidence to contradict the express terms of the
agreement, but allows evidence of consistent additional terms to explain or supplement
the agreement. (Kanno, at pp. 999-1000; Founding Members of the Newport Beach
Country Club, at p. 953.)

19
 In contrast, when the parties intend the writing to be a “complete and exclusive
statement” of the terms of their agreement—i.e., a fully integrated agreement—its terms
cannot be supplemented or explained by evidence of consistent additional terms. (Kanno,
supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 1000.) The parol evidence rule prohibits the introduction of
extrinsic evidence, whether oral or written, to vary, alter, or augment the terms of a fully
integrated agreement. (Kanno, at p. 1000.)
Yet even in the context of a fully integrated agreement, the parol evidence rule
does not exclude “evidence of the circumstances under which the agreement was made or
to which it relates, … or to explain an extrinsic ambiguity or otherwise interpret the terms
of the agreement,” provided such evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the
language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1860, 1856,
subd. (g); Civ. Code, § 1647; Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 522;
accord, Epic Communications, Inc. v. Richwave Technology, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th
1342, 1354-1355; Rosenfeld v. Abraham Joshua Heschel Day School, Inc. (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 886, 897-898; Lonely Maiden Productions, LLC v. GoldenTree Asset
Management, LP (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 368, 376.)
C. The Law of Easements
An easement is a nonpossessory interest in the land of another that gives the
easement holder the right to use the land of another or to prevent the property owner from
using his or her land. (Beyer v. Tahoe Sands Resort (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1472.)
An easement differs from a license in that, while both confer the right to use another’s
land, a license confers no interest in the premises and is generally revocable at will. (See
Guerra v. Packard (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 272, 285; Fisher v. General Petroleum Corp.
(1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 770, 776; cf. Belmont County Water Dist. v. State of California
(1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 13, 17 [discussing irrevocable licenses].) In contrast, an easement
creates an incorporeal right to enter and use land in the possession of another and
obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement.

20
(Rest.3d Property, Servitudes, § 1.2(1); Moylan v. Dykes (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 561,
568.) Further, while a license may be created through an oral agreement or by any act of
the licensor sufficient to show his assent, an easement can be created only by grant
(express or implied) or by prescription. (Eastman v. Piper (1924) 68 Cal.App. 554, 560-
561; Batta v. Hunt (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 295, 305; Cushman v. Davis (1978)
80 Cal.App.3d 731, 735.)
Easements are classified as either appurtenant or in gross. (Moylan v. Dykes,
supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 568.) “ ‘An easement is appurtenant when it is attached to
the land of the owner of the easement, and benefits him as the owner or possessor of that
land. The land to which it is attached is called the dominant tenement, and the land
which bears the burden, i.e., the land of another which is used or enjoyed, is called
the servient tenement. [Citations omitted.] [¶] An easement in gross is not attached to
any particular land as dominant tenement, but belongs to a person individually.’ ” (City
of Anaheim v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d
763, 767.) This distinction becomes important when the owner of an easement conveys
his property. (Moylan, at p. 568.) Because an easement appurtenant attaches to the
dominant tenement, it passes with a transfer of the land, unlike an easement in gross,
which does not. (Ibid.)
Where an easement has been created by grant, the scope and extent of the
easement is to be determined by the terms of the grant. (Schmidt v. Bank of America,
N.A. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1499; Keeler v. Haky (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 471,
474; Civ. Code, § 806.) If the grant is clear and specific in its terms, it is decisive of the
limits of the easement. (Wilson v. Abrams (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 1030, 1034.) If the
easement is not specifically defined, its scope will be construed to include whatever is

21
reasonably necessary and convenient for the purpose for which it was created.5 (Ibid.;
accord, Pear v. City and County of San Francisco (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 61, 75.)
Consideration may be given not only to actual uses being made at the time of the grant,
but also to future uses within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of
the conveyance. (Maywood Mutual Water Co. No. 2 v. City of Maywood (1972)
23 Cal.App.3d 266, 270-271; Pear, at p. 71.)
In construing an instrument conveying an easement, the rules applicable to the
construction of deeds generally apply. (Scruby v. Vintage Grapevine, Inc. (1995)
37 Cal.App.4th 697, 702 (Scruby); Civ. Code § 1066.) As with any other contract, the
primary object is to ascertain and carry out the intention of the parties. (City of
Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 232, 238.) The intention of the
parties is to be gathered, if possible, from the instrument itself. (Norris v. State (1968)
261 Cal.App.2d 41, 46.) If the language in the conveyance is clear and explicit, there is
no occasion for the use of extrinsic evidence to show the nature and extent of the rights
acquired. (Scruby, at p. 702; Van Klompenburg v. Berghold (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 345,
349.) However, if the language is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be used as an aid
to interpretation, unless such evidence imparts a meaning to which the instrument
creating the easement is not reasonably susceptible. (Van Klompenburg, at p. 349; Wolf,
supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1350-1351.) In cases of doubt, not removed by other rules
of construction, Civil Code section 1069 declares that an affirmative grant of easement is
to be liberally construed in favor of the grantee. (City of Manhattan Beach at pp. 242-
243; Norris, at pp. 46-47; Los Angeles v. Howard (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 538, 545.)

5 Every easement includes “secondary easements” consisting of the right to do acts
that are reasonably necessary for the full enjoyment of the easement itself. (Bernstein v.
Sebring (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1264, 1270; see Rye v. Tahoe Truckee Sierra Disposal
Co., Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 84, 92 [where an easement is founded upon a grant,
only the interests expressed in the grant and those necessarily incident thereto pass from
the owner of the fee].)

22
 “ ‘ “The rights and duties between the owner of an easement and the owner of the
servient tenement … are correlative. Each is required to respect the rights of the
other. Neither party can conduct activities or place obstructions on the property that
unreasonably interfere with the other party’s use of the property.” ’ ” (Inzana v. Turlock
Irrigation Dist. Bd. of Directors (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 429, 444-445.) “Thus, the
easement holder must exercise his or her right so as not to impose an unnecessary burden
on the servient tenement, and the owner of the servient tenement may make any use of
the property that does not [interfere unreasonably] with the easement.” (12 Witkin,
Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2018) Real Property, § 426; Scruby, supra,
37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 702-703, 706; accord, Thorstrom v. Thorstrom (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1422; see Locklin v. City of Lafayette (1994) 7 Cal.4th 327, 356,
fn. 17 [property laws forbid unreasonably overburdening an easement or servitude].)
Whether a particular use of property constitutes an unreasonable interference with the
rights of the dominant or servient tenement presents a question of fact to be resolved by
the trier of fact, whose determination will be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial
evidence. (Scruby, at pp. 703, 705-706; Jordan v. Worthen (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 310,
327.)
D. Right of Way Easement
A right-of-way is a type of easement that may be created by grant. (Vieira
Enterprises, Inc. v. McCoy (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1075; Civ. Code, § 802) At its
most basic level, a right of way is an easement that confers a right to pass over another’s
land. (Beyer v. Tahoe Sands Resort, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1472, fn. 16; Miro v.
Superior Court (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 87, 96.) When a right-of-way is granted in broad,
unrestricted terms, the easement ordinarily will be construed as creating a general right-
of-way capable of use for all reasonable roadway purposes. (Zissler, supra,
29 Cal.App.5th at pp. 634, 640-641; Scruby, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 703; Wall v.
Rudolph (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 684, 692.) However, the scope of the easement

23
ultimately is determined by the terms of the grant. (Van Klompenburg v. Berghold,
supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 349.) When the language of the easement is clear and
explicit, it will be followed. (Id. at pp. 349-350; Wilson v. Abrams, supra, 1 Cal.App.3d
at p. 1034.)
II
Admission of Extrinsic Evidence
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting
extrinsic (parol) evidence to assist in interpreting the Settlement agreement and
Easements. We find no reversible error.
A. Additional Background
Before trial, plaintiffs moved in limine to exclude extrinsic evidence offered to
explain the meaning of the Settlement and related Easements. Among other things,
plaintiffs argued that the language of the Settlement was clear and unambiguous and
therefore extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to alter or vary its terms.6 The trial court
deferred ruling on the motions pending trial.
At the end of trial, plaintiffs filed a renewed motion in limine to exclude specific
testimony relating to historical uses of the property and the parties’ subjective
understandings of the Settlement. The post-trial motion argued the evidence was
inadmissible, either because it did not support an interpretation to which the Settlement
was reasonably susceptible, or because the witness’s unexpressed, subjective
understanding of the agreement was irrelevant. Notably, the post-trial motion did not
argue that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible because the Settlement is a fully integrated
agreement that expressly bars use of extrinsic evidence to explain its terms. When

6 Plaintiffs’ third motion in limine referenced the Settlement agreement’s
integration clause in the “background” (capitalization and underline omitted) section of
the motion but did not discuss it in the “argument” (capitalization and underline omitted)
section of the motion.

24
plaintiffs tried to raise that issue at the hearing on the motion, defendant objected that the
issue had not been briefed and therefore was not properly before the court.
After the hearing, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion in part. The court
struck certain testimony but otherwise denied the motion. In announcing its ruling, the
trial court added that it would “take care not to use any of [the] evidence to add to or vary
the terms of the [E]asements.” The trial court did not address the Settlement’s integration
clause in ruling on the motion or in its subsequent Statement of Decision. Plaintiffs did
not raise the integration clause as an issue in their objection to the trial court’s tentative
decision or in their motion for a new trial.
B. Analysis
Plaintiffs contend the trial court should not have considered evidence relating to
the historical use of the Ranch property; the relationships between the family members;
the circumstances surrounding the Settlement; or the parties’ unexpressed, subjective
beliefs about the meaning of the Settlement agreement. Plaintiffs contend that such
evidence is barred by the Settlement’s integration clause, the parol evidence rule, and
general rules of contract interpretation.
1. The Integration Clause
As a threshold matter, we address plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court should
not have admitted any extrinsic evidence because of language in the Settlement’s
integration clause stating that “no extrinsic evidence whatsoever may be introduced in
any judicial proceeding … involving this [a]greement.” We conclude that whatever merit
this argument might have, plaintiffs forfeited the contention by failing to adequately raise
it before the trial court. The reason for the forfeiture rule is self-evident. It would be
unfair, both to the trial court and the opposing party, to permit a change of theory on
appeal. (Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corporation (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 548.)
Here, plaintiffs’ post-trial motion did not mention the integration clause, and their attempt
to raise it at the hearing on the motion came too late. (Starzynski v. Capital Public Radio

25
(2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 33, 38, fn. 2.) Accordingly, we deem this argument—which the
trial court did not address—as forfeited. (SCI California Funeral Services, Inc. v. Five
Bridges Foundation (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 549, 564 [evidentiary objection must raise
precise ground asserted on appeal]; Platzer v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (2002)
104 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1260 [same]; People v. Rivera (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 353, 361
[same]; Walker v. Nitzberg (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 359, 365 [same]; see also Christ v.
Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 452 [renewal of objection is required when the court
has not finally ruled on it]; People v. Ennis (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 721, 736 [same].)
This renders it unnecessary for us to decide whether the parties intended to render
extrinsic evidence inadmissible for any reason, as plaintiffs contend, or merely intended
to invoke the stricter version of the parol evidence rule that applies to fully integrated
agreements. (See Rosenfeld v. Abraham Joshua Heschel Day School, Inc., supra,
226 Cal.App.4th at p. 897; Casa Herrera v. Beydoun, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 343;
Continental Baking Co. v. Katz, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 522.)
2. Extrinsic Evidence to Resolve an Ambiguity
We next turn to plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court erred in admitting
extrinsic evidence because the Settlement/Easement language was clear and
unambiguous (i.e., the proffered evidence was not relevant to prove a meaning to which
the language was reasonably susceptible). (Winet, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165.)
Plaintiffs argue that the extrinsic evidence was inadmissible because the Easements are
not reasonably susceptible to an interpretation allowing non-travel related uses such as
recreation, parking, etc. We agree in part.
To determine whether an express easement is ambiguous, we begin with the
language of the grant deed. If the language in the conveyance is clear and explicit, there
is no need to resort to extrinsic events to show the nature and extent of the rights
acquired. (Scruby, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 702.)

26
 Here, the relevant portion of the grants for the Main House Roadway Easement
and Vineyard Roadway Easement provide that they are “solely for the purpose for
providing ingress and egress to Parcel C-1 for pedestrians, street-legal registered
vehicles, construction equipment or persons on horseback.” Likewise, the JJ
McSorley/Lower House Easement provides that it is “solely for the purpose for providing
ingress and egress to Parcel C-3 and D-1 for pedestrians, street-legal registered vehicles,
construction equipment or persons on horseback.”
Plaintiffs argue that the phrase “ingress and egress” is clear and unambiguous and
therefore extrinsic evidence cannot be used to augment or vary its terms. In general, we
agree that there is no ambiguity about the meaning of an easement for “ingress and
egress.” An easement for ingress and egress gives the easement holder the right to use
another’s land to enter and leave its property. (Zissler, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at pp. 639-
640; see Rest.3d Property, Servitudes, § 4.10, com. d.) Thus, as applied to the facts of
this case, defendant unambiguously has the right to use the Easements for the purpose of
entering and exiting her properties.
The addition of the phrase “for pedestrians, street-legal registered vehicles,
construction equipment or persons on horseback” is a qualification of, or limitation on,
that right, specifying the allowable means of travel. (See Schmidt v. Bank of America,
N.A. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1500.) It does not expand the permissible uses or
alter the underlying purpose of the Easements. (Ibid.; Zissler, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at
p. 640.) Accordingly, extrinsic evidence generally was not required to ascertain the
intent of the parties. Whether the defendant’s uses of the roadway are allowed under the
Easements should have been determined by asking whether those uses are reasonably
necessary for and consistent with the purpose for which the Easements were granted,
which is “ingress and egress.” (Zissler at p. 641; Bernstein v. Sebring, supra,
116 Cal.App.5th at p. 1270; Rye v. Tahoe Truckee Sierra Disposal Co., Inc., supra,
222 Cal.App.4th at p. 92.) We discuss this point more fully infra.

27
 However, we find that the Easements are ambiguous in one respect, namely, about
whether they permit defendant to use the Easements in tandem to travel directly between
her properties, as defendant contends, or whether they only allow her to travel to/from
Highway 49, as plaintiffs contend. The language of the Easements is reasonably
susceptible to both interpretations. Indeed, this very ambiguity is the genesis of this
lawsuit. Hence, we conclude the trial court properly admitted and considered extrinsic
evidence to assist it in ascertaining the intention of the parties on this issue.
3. Evidence of Subjective, Unexpressed Beliefs or Intent
To the extent plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by considering
defendant’s unexpressed, subjective beliefs about the meaning of their agreement, we
conclude plaintiffs have forfeited the contention by failing to support it with meaningful
legal analysis and proper citations to the record. “An appellant has the burden to
demonstrate reversible error with reasoned argument and citation to authority.
[Citations.] When an appellant asserts a point but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as forfeited.” (Tellez v. Rich Voss
Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1066.) It is not our responsibility to comb
the record for facts, or to conduct research in search of authority, to support an
appellant’s contentions on appeal. (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 657, 684.) Plaintiffs failed in their opening brief to identify the specific
testimony on which the trial court allegedly relied, nor have they explained how any such
errors were prejudicial. Accordingly, we treat the argument as forfeited and decline to
consider it further.
4. Harmless Error
Defendant argues that even if the trial court erred by considering extrinsic
evidence as an aid to the interpretation of the Easements, the error was harmless. We
agree. Excluding the evidence relating to the route of travel, the extrinsic evidence relied
upon by the trial court consisted of the following: evidence that the Easements were

28
negotiated in the context of a family dispute; evidence that plaintiffs knew defendant had
children and grandchildren; and evidence that plaintiffs knew defendant and her family
had dogs. The probative value of this evidence was minimal. Accordingly, we do not
find it reasonably probable that a result more favorable to plaintiffs would have been
reached in the absence of the error. (Red Mountain, LLC v. Fallbrook Public Utility Dist.
(2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 333, 348.)
III
Plaintiffs’ Overburdening Claims
We now turn to the question of whether the trial court correctly interpreted the
Easements and denied plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory relief regarding alleged
overburdening of the Easements. We conclude that the trial court correctly interpreted
the Easements as allowing travel directly between parcels, but erred in interpreting the
Easements to permit recreational, parking, loitering/lingering, and open space uses. We
also conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in declining to grant
declaratory relief regarding the presence of unsupervised dogs on the Easements.
A. Travel Between Parcels
Plaintiffs argue the Easements do not allow defendant to travel directly between
parcels. In plaintiffs’ view, because the “sole” purpose of each Easement is to provide
ingress and egress for a particular benefitted parcel, the Easements only allow travel
between Highway 49 and that benefitted parcel.
In its Statement of Decision, the trial court disagreed. It concluded that the
Easements may be used to travel directly between parcels and do not restrict the
defendant to traveling from/to Highway 49. In reaching this conclusion, the court
considered the language of the Easements, the surrounding circumstances (including
historical use of the roadway and the characteristics of the dominant and servient
tenements), and the requirements of the grantee. The court also considered the statutory
requirement that, in doubtful cases, a deed grant is to be interpreted in favor of the

29
grantee.7 (Civ. Code, § 1069; Walton v. City of Red Bluff (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 117,
124.) Regarding travel between Parcels C-1 and D-1/C-3, the court concluded that
defendant essentially has two rights: “the right to ingress and egress along the Main
House Roadway Easement” and “the right to ingress and egress along the [JJ
McSorley/Lower House Easement].” Thus, if defendant wishes to go from her house on
Parcel C-1 to her house on Parcel D-1, she may egress from Parcel C-1, travel along the
Main House Roadway Easement, then turn left and ingress to Parcel D-1 along the JJ
McSorley/Lower House Easement. The court found nothing in the language of either
Easement that would require defendant to “travel the full length of the [E]asement to use
it.”
Because the material facts are not in dispute, we do not defer to the trial court’s
interpretation and we independently construe the Easements. (Winet, supra,
4 Cal.App.4th at p. 1166, fn. 3; Wolf, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) Nevertheless,
in our independent judgment, the trial court’s interpretation is correct.
As the trial court observed, at the time of the Settlement, all parties understood
that defendant would own houses on both Parcel C-1 and D-1 and that the only way to
travel between her properties (without permission from Parcel C-3’s owner) would be to
use the Easements. Since there is nothing in the Easements requiring the easement
holders to travel the length of the Easement to/from Highway 49, it simply is not
reasonable to read the Easements as prohibiting defendant from travelling directly
between her properties, as occurred before the Settlement. Indeed, it would be

7 Plaintiffs argue that this statutory requirement is counterbalanced by the rule that,
in cases of uncertainty, the interpretation of a written instrument should be construed
most strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist. (Civ. Code, § 1654.)
We disagree that Civil Code section 1654 has any application here since all the parties
were involved in negotiating and drafting the Settlement, which dictated the language of
the Easements. Defendant cannot be said to have “caused” the uncertainty in the
language, even if she served as the scrivener for the Easements.

30
impossible for defendant to use the Vineyard Roadway Easement without also using at
least one of the other Easements in tandem.
Plaintiffs argue that their interpretation is compelled by language in the Main
House Roadway Easement—but not the other Easements—stating, “This easement shall
allow access to Parcel C-1 only at and through a gate at its termination at Parcel C-1 at
the base of the hill and shall not allow access to C-1 at any other point along the roadway
easement.” We disagree. As the trial court held, this language merely describes where
defendant may access Parcel C-1 from the Main House Roadway Easement. It means
only that when defendant returns to Parcel C-1 along the Main House Roadway Easement
she must access her property through the gate at the base of the hill, and not at any other
point along the easement.
In sum, we hold that the most reasonable interpretation of the Easements is that
they permit the dominant tenement owners to use the Easements together to “egress”
from one parcel and “ingress” to another, without first making a pointless diversion to
Highway 49.8 The trial court properly denied plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief that
the Easements are only for purposes of travel to/from Highway 49.
We note, however, that the judgment declares defendant has the right to travel
along the Easements “whatever distance is appropriate to her … purposes,” without any
language qualifying or limiting such “purposes.” As a result, we find this part of the
judgment to be overbroad. Accordingly, we shall remand this matter for the trial court to
either strike the offending language or modify it to make clear that defendant may only
use the Easements for purposes of “ingress and egress.”

8 Although we have relied on extrinsic evidence in reaching this conclusion, our
interpretation would have been the same even if it were based solely on the face of the
written instruments.

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 B. Non-travel Uses
Plaintiffs also requested declaratory relief that defendant is prohibited from using
the Easements for non-travel related purposes, by which they mean recreational activities,
loitering/lingering, unauthorized parking, and use by unaccompanied children or pets (the
“challenged uses”).
In deciding whether these challenged uses are permitted by the Easements, we
have not considered any extrinsic evidence as an aid to interpret the Easements. We ask
only whether the challenged uses are reasonably necessary for the purpose for which the
Easements were granted (i.e., ingress and egress), a question of law. (Zissler v. Saville,
supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 641; Bernstein v. Sebring, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 1270;
Rye v. Tahoe Truckee Sierra Disposal Co., Inc., supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 92; Faus v.
City of Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 350, 361.)
Before turning to the merits, however, it is important to note that plaintiffs’ claims
were made in the context of their argument that the Easements only permit travel to/from
Highway 49. For example, plaintiffs did not contend that defendant could not walk her
dog from Parcel C-1 to Highway 49. Instead, plaintiffs argued that defendant could not
use the Easements to walk her dog from Parcel C-1 directly to Parcel D-1 without first
diverting to Highway 49 and could not walk her dog on the Easements for a non-
ingress/egress purpose, such as exercise. In plaintiffs’ view, the Easements must be used
solely for the purpose of travelling from the benefitted parcel to/from Highway 49, and
for no other purpose. Because we disagree with the premise of plaintiffs’ claim regarding
travel to/from Highway 49, it is unnecessary to address any arguments that rely on that
premise. We need only decide whether the challenged uses are permitted by the
Easements as we (and the trial court) have interpreted them, as allowing travel directly
between parcels.
In denying plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief, the trial court reasoned that the
roadway is “more equivalent” to a “driveway” than a thoroughfare, and therefore

32
defendant may engage in any of the challenged uses after “egressing her property.” In
short, the court isolated “egress” from “ingress and egress” and determined that “[o]ne
can egress” a property for many reasons. The trial court ruled that any uses not expressly
prohibited by the Easements are necessarily allowed. Thus, the court ruled that defendant
“can egress her property” for the purpose of “stretching her legs,” “adding to her step
count,” or merely “to observe the stars,” among other uses.
Plaintiffs complain that the practical effect of the trial court’s decision is to rewrite
the Easements to include recreational, parking, and open space uses. We agree.
By their terms, the Easements were intended to grant non-exclusive easements
appurtenant to the benefitted property “for ingress and egress over, across and through”
the burdened property. (Italics added.) This language creates a right to pass or travel
over the burdened property for ingress and egress, not a right to control that property or
to linger on the property for recreational, pleasure-seeking, or other purposes. (Zissler,
supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at pp. 634, 640; see Coleman v. Forister (Tex. 1974) 514 S.W.2d
899, 903; see also Beyer v. Tahoe Sands Resort, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1472, fn.
16.)
This does not mean that defendant is necessarily prohibited from engaging in
recreational or pleasure-seeking activities while she is on the Easements, but it does mean
that such activities are permissible only if and when defendant is using the Easements for
ingress and egress. The trial court’s ruling ignores this important distinction, allowing
defendant to use the Easements for “recreational purposes,” including “any activity
undertaken for exercise, relaxation, diversion, sport, or pleasure,” regardless of whether
defendant is using the Easements for ingress and egress. This was an error.9

9 While our decision means unaccompanied children do not have a right to use the
Easements as a recreational play area, we agree with the trial court that nothing in the
Easements prohibits unaccompanied children from using the Easements for ingress and
egress.

33
 The same is true regarding defendant’s alleged right to “ ‘loiter’ ” or linger on the
Easements. The trial court ruled that upon egressing from the dominant estate, nothing
prohibits defendant from “ ‘stopping or ceasing to move’ ” on the Easements. Not so.
The words “ingress and egress” indicate an inherent right to pass over or through the
servient estate, but do not imply a right to stop and linger, except as may be reasonably
necessary and consistent with the purpose of ingress and egress. (Zissler, supra,
29 Cal.App.5th at p. 641.) The trial court erred in suggesting that the Easements give
defendant a right to stop and linger on the Easements indefinitely for any lawful purpose,
such as to “observe the stars.”
Whether defendant has a right to temporarily park on the Easements is a closer
question. Some courts have construed an easement for “road” or “roadway” purposes as
embracing a right to use the easement for temporary parking provided it does not unduly
interfere with the rights of the landowner. (See Pear v. City and County of San
Francisco, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 78; Heath v. Kettenhofen (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d
197, 204; see also Keeler v. Haky, supra, 160 Cal.App.2d at p. 476.) Whatever the merit
of these cases, we think this case is distinguishable.
First, although the distinction may be subtle, we believe there is a difference
between an easement granted for “roadway purposes” and an easement granted along an
existing roadway “solely for the purpose of providing ingress and egress.” While a
general roadway easement reasonably might encompass temporary parking as an
incidental use, we hold that an easement granted “solely” for “ingress and egress”
conveys a more circumscribed right, one of passage. (See Scruby, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th
at p. 703; see also Marra v. Simidian (N.Y.App.Div. 1981) 79 A.D.2d 1046, 1047.)
Second, there is language supporting the view that a right to temporary parking
was not intended to be included in the Easements. Namely, the JJ McSorley/Lower
House Easement provides that it shall include, “as an accessory use, two ‘back-up
areas[,]’ ” which may be used for “backing up and turning around vehicles,” but

34
expressly “may not be used for parking by Parcels C-3 or D-1.” This shows that the
parties considered parking along the JJ McSorley/Lower House Easement and elected not
to include it as one of the uses expressly permitted by the Easement.
Third, as the trial court observed, the Easements in question concern “private,
little-used, rural roads,” and there is no evidence that the Easements are wide enough to
accommodate parking along their length while remaining passable to other vehicles.
Fourth, the trial court’s reliance on the Blacksmith Shop Building Access License
is misplaced. Even if we construe the Blacksmith Shop license as granting an implied
right to park near the building for purposes of visiting or working on it—which is not
unreasonable—that right would constitute an implied parking license granted to the
“Family Member Owners,” not an implied right under the Easements. (See Bomberger v.
McKelvey (1950) 35 Cal.2d 607, 618.) In sum, we conclude that temporary parking is
not reasonably necessary for ingress and egress to the benefitted properties, and therefore,
the trial court erred in interpreting the Easements to permit that use.10
In contrast, we find no error in the trial court’s decision regarding the presence of
dogs on the Easements. In the judgment, the trial court held that defendant and her tenant
and invitees “may be accompanied by dogs while utilizing the [E]asements but may not
allow dogs to roam onto portions of Parcel C-2 over which [defendant] does not have
easement or access rights.” The trial court also observed in its Statement of Decision that
there is a county ordinance generally prohibiting dogs from roaming “ ‘at large.’ ”
Plaintiffs sought a declaration that unaccompanied dogs are prohibited on the Easements,
but we find the trial court was within its discretion in deciding that the requested
declaratory relief was not necessary or proper under the circumstances. (Code Civ. Proc.,

10 Incidental or temporary stops or parking of vehicles is allowed if reasonably
necessary for full enjoyment of the Easements, i.e., for ingress and egress.

35
§ 1061; D. Cummins Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (2016)
246 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1490.)
IV
Defendant’s Unreasonable Interference Claims
We now turn to the portion of the judgment addressing defendant’s unreasonable
interference claims, which relate to the use of locked gates, recording devices, and “no
trespassing” signs on the Easements.
As discussed, the general rule is that “[e]very incident of ownership not
inconsistent with the easement and the enjoyment of the same is reserved to the owner of
the servient estate.” (Scruby, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 702.) Thus, the owner of the
servient estate may make any use of the land so long as it does not interfere unreasonably
with the easement. (Id. at pp. 702-703.) Whether a particular use by the servient owner
is an unreasonable interference with the dominant owner’s easement is a question of fact,
and a finding upon conflicting evidence must be upheld if supported by substantial
evidence. (Id. at p. 703.) In assessing whether substantial evidence exists, we view the
record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every
reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor. (Thorstrom v. Thorstrom,
supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1417.)
A. Locked Gates
The trial court ruled in defendant’s favor on the gate issue, finding that closing and
locking the gates unreasonably interfered with defendant’s use and enjoyment of
the Easements (except that plaintiffs may temporarily close the gates when necessary to
control livestock or horses). In support of its conclusion, the trial court found that (1)
historically the gates were not locked and were closed only when animals were present;
(2) nothing in the Easements authorizes plaintiffs to erect and maintain locked gates; (3)
defendant and her tenant testified credibly about the unreasonable burden opening/closing
and unlocking/locking the gates imposes on them and their guests, contractors, and

36
vendors, especially at night and in inclement weather; (4) the benefit to plaintiffs of
closing and locking the gates was minimal since plaintiffs do not live on the property, the
barn contains only a modest amount of property, and plaintiffs could better protect the
barn by other means; (5) plaintiffs failed to show the gates are reasonably necessary to
prevent livestock from straying onto their property or Highway 49; and (6) the gates
present a safety hazard because they could impede evacuation and/or delay the arrival of
emergency personnel. Based on these findings, the court declared that plaintiffs cannot
lock the gates and may close the gates only when necessary to control livestock or horses.
Plaintiffs complain that instead of applying the unreasonable interference test, the
trial court simply balanced the burden of locked gates against their benefits and
concluded that the balance tips in favor of unobstructed passage. We are unpersuaded.
The Statement of Decision leaves no doubt that the trial court applied the unreasonable
interference test. (See, e.g., Statement of Decision, p. 37 [“Whether plaintiffs’ gates
‘unreasonably interfere’ is the question to be decided here”]) Thus, plaintiffs’ argument
is but a thinly-veiled attempt to have us reweigh the evidence and reach a different
factual conclusion, which is something we cannot do. (Pope v. Babick (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246.)
Our authority begins and ends with a determination whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, in support of the judgment.
(Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630-631.) Here, we cannot say
the trial court abused its discretion in crediting the testimony of defendant’s witnesses
regarding the burden of closing and locking the gates and the safety risk posed by
keeping the gates closed and locked. Thus, based on the record before us, we are
satisfied that there is substantial evidence to support the court’s determination that
closing and locking the gates unreasonably interfered with defendant’s use of the
Easements. (See Howard, at p. 631 [judgment must be upheld on appeal if it is supported

37
by substantial evidence, even if there is also substantial evidence to support a contrary
conclusion].)
We also reject plaintiffs’ argument that the decision should be reversed because
the trial court erroneously considered extrinsic evidence regarding the historical use of
the gates. To begin, the Statement of Decision shows the trial court used the extrinsic
evidence not to interpret the Easements, but to evaluate whether the gates unreasonably
interfered with the Easements. In any event, plaintiffs have not shown that the court’s
consideration of such evidence was prejudicial, i.e., that it is reasonably probable a result
more favorable to plaintiffs would have been reached if such evidence had not been
considered. (Red Mountain, LLC v. Fallbrook Public Utility Dist., supra,
143 Cal.App.4th at p. 348.)
B. Surveillance of the Defendant
Defendant claimed that plaintiffs’ surveillance of her using automated security
cameras and handheld devices was part of a campaign of harassment and an unreasonable
interference with her Easement rights. Defendant sought declaratory relief that she has
the right to use the Easements “free of harassment, oppression, intimidation, [and]
surveillance” by plaintiffs. The trial court granted the relief in part, concluding that it is
reasonable and permissible for plaintiffs to use the security cameras to monitor their
property, but not reasonable for plaintiffs to retain images of defendant unless plaintiffs
believe the images provide evidence of a violation of their property rights. Therefore, the
court ruled that plaintiffs may continue to use security cameras, but plaintiffs must delete
any images of defendant (or her tenant, family members, or known invitees) unless
plaintiffs “believe, in good faith, that the images provide evidence of a trespass or other
violation of their rights.” The court also ruled that plaintiffs may not use cell phones,
handheld cameras, or other handheld electronic devices to photograph defendant or her
tenant, family members, or known invitees while they are lawfully using the Easements.
The court noted defendant’s belief that the use of the security cameras was part of a

38
campaign of harassment, and the court found “some reason to [conclude defendant’s
belief] is correct,” but the court did not make any findings that plaintiffs were using the
cameras to harass or intimidate defendant.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial erred in restricting their right to use handheld
recording devices and in requiring them to delete security camera images of defendant
(and her guests) unless they are believed to contain evidence of a violation. Plaintiffs
argue that the retention of security camera images was not an issue raised at trial, and that
there is no legal basis for prohibiting them from retaining images of defendant or from
using handheld recording devices. Plaintiffs’ argument has merit.
The issue before the trial court was whether the use of the surveillance cameras
unreasonably interfered with defendant’s use of the Easements. The court answered that
question negatively, concluding it was reasonable for plaintiffs to use cameras to monitor
their property, including the Easements, notwithstanding defendant’s desire not to be
photographed. In light of that ruling, we fail to see any legal basis for the court to
prohibit handheld recording devices or to require plaintiffs to review and delete images of
defendant. If it is reasonable for plaintiffs to photograph/record the Easements using the
security cameras—and we agree that it is—then it is equally reasonable for plaintiffs to
retain the images that are captured by those cameras. Likewise, if it is not unreasonable
interference for plaintiffs to record defendant using stationary security cameras, we find it
is not unreasonable interference for plaintiffs to record defendant using handheld cameras
or cell phones. The trial court’s ruling, while perhaps well-intended, is not supported by
the evidence or legal authority. Defendant’s remedy, if she feels she is being harassed, is
to seek a civil restraining order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (b)(3); Bookout v.
Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1136, 1141.) We shall reverse the portions of the
judgment requiring plaintiffs to delete security camera images and restricting plaintiffs’
use of handheld recording devices.

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 C. No Trespassing Signs
Defendant’s cross-complaint sought a declaration that plaintiffs are prohibited
from posting the “no trespassing” signs on their property in light of the provision in
Exhibit F-1 to the Settlement, providing: “It is understood and agreed that the only sign
or signage at the entry to Parcel C-2 off of Highway 49 shall remain and be limited only
to ‘Garamendi-McSorley Ranch.’ ” At trial, defendant further argued that because the
“no trespassing” signs are misleading—suggesting that permission to pass must be
obtained from plaintiffs—maintaining the signs unreasonably interfered with defendant’s
rights under the Easements. The trial court ultimately concluded that posting the “no
trespassing” signs on Parcel C-2 was not a violation of the Settlement. However, the
court held that the signs are misleading and posting the signs along the Easements was a
potential deterrence to defendant’s visitors and therefore an unreasonable interference
with the Easements. Accordingly, the court declared that plaintiffs may post the “no
trespassing” signs “anywhere on [P]arcel C-2 except the [E]asements.”
Plaintiffs contend that the prohibition on posting “no trespassing” signs on the
Easement was an error and should be reversed because the signs are necessary to prevent
trespass and prescriptive claims, and there is no evidence that the signs have caused any
actual interference with the Easements. We agree in part.
While we agree that plaintiffs have a right to post signs to prevent trespass and
prescriptive claims (see Pen. Code, § 602; Civ. Code, § 1008), this does not give
plaintiffs the right to post misleading signs that discourage visitors and thereby interfere
with defendant’s use of the Easements. The “no trespassing” sign posted at the main
entry was misleading because it was posted on the roadway that serves as the only means
of access for four properties, with three different owners, but the sign only includes
contact information for one owner (Garamendi McSorley Ranch, LLC). The sign
misleadingly suggests that the right to pass for each property is “by permission” and
“subject to control of” Garamendi McSorley Ranch, LLC, and that “[v]iolators will be

40
[p]rosecuted” for trespass. In actuality, the holders of the Easements also may give
permission to guests, contractors, and vendors, to use the roadway Easements to access
their properties. Thus, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding
that posting the “no trespassing” sign on the roadway unreasonably interfered with
defendant’s use of the Easements. (See, e.g., Norris v. State, supra, 261 Cal.App.2d at
pp. 44, 49; Brearton v. Fina (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1956) 3 Misc.2d 1, 10 [155 N.Y.S.2d 399,
408].)
Nonetheless, the judgment went too far in declaring that plaintiffs are prohibited
from posting any “no trespassing” signs on the Easements. Plaintiffs may post “no
trespassing” signs on the Easements provided the signs are not so misleading that they
unreasonably interfere with the Easements. Thus, the portion of the judgment pertaining
to the “no trespassing” signs shall be reversed and remanded for modifications consistent
with this opinion.
V
Costs And Attorney’s Fees
Plaintiffs argue that if we reverse the judgment in favor of defendant, the award of
costs and attorney’s fees to defendant as the prevailing party should also be reversed.
Because we are partially reversing the trial court’s judgment, we will remand for
reconsideration of the prevailing party determination and award of fees and costs as
appropriate.

41
 DISPOSITION
The portion of the trial court’s judgment declaring that defendant has the right to
use the Easements in tandem and that she is not required to traverse the entire length of
an easement or to exit to Highway 49 when ingressing or egressing from a location is
affirmed. The portion of the judgment declaring that defendant may travel along the
easements “whatever distance is appropriate to her … purposes” is reversed and
remanded for clarification consistent with this opinion.
The portions of the judgment pertaining to defendant’s right to use the Easements
for recreational activities, loitering/lingering, and parking are reversed, and the matter is
remanded with directions to modify the judgment in a manner consistent with this
opinion.
The portions of the judgment declaring that (1) plaintiffs must delete any images
of defendant (or her tenant, family members, or known invitees) unless plaintiffs believe,
in good faith, that the images provide evidence of a violation, and (2) that plaintiffs may
not use cell phones, handheld cameras, or other handheld electronic devices to
photograph/record defendant or her tenant, family members, or known invitees while
they are lawfully using the Easements, are reversed with directions to enter a new
judgment granting plaintiffs declaratory relief on this issue.
The portion of the judgment finding that the “no trespassing” signs posted by
plaintiffs are misleading and unreasonably interfere with defendant’s easement rights is
affirmed, but the portion of the judgment suggesting that plaintiffs are prohibited from
posting any “no trespassing” signs on the Easements is reversed with directions to modify
the judgment in a manner consistent with this opinion.
The order awarding costs and attorney’s fees is reversed and remanded for
reconsideration of the prevailing party determination and award of fees and costs in light
of this opinion.

42
 In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Each party shall bear its own costs
on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(3), (5).)

\s\
KRAUSE, J.

We concur:

\s\
EARL, P. J.

\s\
MAURO, J.

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