Filed 7/24/26 P. v. Shaw CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B340024
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. XWESA104553-03)
JIBRIL CORY SHAW,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lauren Weis Birnstein, Judge. Affirmed.
Jeralyn Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Colleen
M. Tiedemann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
_________________________
A jury convicted Jibril Shaw of murder and attempted
premeditated murder. At his trial, the court admitted Shaw’s
Instagram records, including posts by users unidentified by their
real names. On appeal, Shaw contends that while his own posts
were admissible, posts by unidentified users were not because
they were unauthenticated and were inadmissible hearsay.
We disagree and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. Evidence at trial
Shaw and Keyshawn Isom were jointly tried for the murder
of Francisco Calderon and attempted murder of Diego Garcia.
A. The shooting on March 4, 2021
India Williams-Houston began dating Isom in March 2021.
He was a Venice Shoreline Crips gang member known as
Newborn, and she was a member of another gang. Isom had
a silver Chevy Malibu.
On the day of the murder, March 4, 2021, Isom picked up
Williams-Houston and her friend Christina Walker in the
afternoon, and they went to a party in Oakwood Park. Williams-
Houston left the party with Walker, Isom, and Shaw, who was
a Venice Shoreline Crips gang member known as Killa Dev.
Isom said he did not want Williams-Houston to drive, but Shaw
said to let her. Shaw had Williams-Houston drive to a wall
“in somebody’s hood,” and Shaw and Isom tagged the wall.
After Shaw and Isom finished tagging the wall, Williams-
Houston drove for a few blocks, and parked. Shaw and Isom
got out of the car and ran down the street. Williams-Houston
then saw Hispanic men running, and, a few minutes later, Shaw
and Isom returned.
2
Williams-Houston drove back the way they came, but
she saw two Hispanic men running, and Shaw told her to stop
in the middle of the street. Williams-Houston put on the car’s
hazard lights. Shaw said, “ ‘That’s him,’ ” and he and Isom got
out of the car again.1 Shaw then ran down an alley, but Isom
stood in front of the car. Shaw passed out of William-Houston’s
view, and she heard four gunshots. Shaw and Isom returned
to the car. Both had guns. Williams-Houston drove them away.
The shooting occurred at about 10:24 p.m. Around that
same time, victims Garcia and Calderon were on Slauson,
en route to Calderon’s apartment. Garcia was walking and
Calderon was on a bicycle. Garcia saw a white car with its lights
flickering. He then heard gunshots, turned, and saw Shaw.
After hearing those first gunshots, Garcia heard seven or eight
more.2 A bullet grazed Garcia’s head. Garcia ran to Calderon’s
house. Not long after, Calderon arrived on his bike but collapsed.
Calderon died, having been shot twice.
B. The investigation
Law enforcement officers obtained surveillance footage
from the crime scene that showed two people exiting a car,
the victims, and muzzle flashes from a gun. Law enforcement
officers also recovered 14 bullet casings, all the same caliber,
from the crime scene.
1
Williams-Houston previously testified that Isom made
this statement.
2
At the preliminary hearing, Garcia testified that he saw
Shaw with a gun.
3
Garcia identified Shaw from a photographic line-up,
writing that they “never g[o]t along.” Garcia explained that
Shaw used to gang bang on Garcia when they were in high school
together.
An analysis of a cell phone associated with Isom showed
that it travelled to the locations Williams-Houston testified
about, including where the shooting occurred.
Williams-Houston testified that Isom’s Instagram user
name was newbkorn2xtraz. Shaw’s Instagram user name was
700_kiilladev2x3k. Law enforcement obtained, via a search
warrant, the contents of the Instagram accounts associated with
Isom and Shaw, and the social media company’s custodian of
records produced the records with a certificate of authenticity.
The prosecution introduced group chats from these accounts
from the day of and after the shooting. On March 4, 2021, at
11:16 p.m., about one hour after the shooting, Shaw messaged
the group, “Watch yall ass SL loVe yall bkiitches,” followed by,
“SL iim the niigka.” A gang expert testified that “SL” stands
for Shoreline, and that “[w]atch yall ass” meant “expect
retaliation[, b]e careful while you’re out and about.” “[I]im the
niigka” meant that “ ‘I’m the man. I just did something for a
status and I feel great. I’m that person.’ ” Just after midnight on
March 5, 2021, Shaw posted, “C1 no more shells my bkad ii LoVe
u cuz.” A gang expert explained that “shells” refers to bullets.
II. Verdict and sentence
A jury convicted Shaw of the murder of Calderon (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and the attempted premeditated
murder of Garcia (id., §§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 2). The jury
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also found true allegations as to both counts that Shaw
personally used a gun (id., § 12022.5, subd. (a)).3
On July 26, 2024, the trial court sentenced Shaw to 25
years to life on count 1, plus four years for the gun enhancement.
The trial court imposed a concurrent sentence on count 2.
DISCUSSION
I. General principles
A writing must be authenticated before it may be admitted
into evidence. (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266;
People v. Valdez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1434–1435
[authentication applies to social media posts].) “Authentication
of a writing means (a) the introduction of evidence sufficient
to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent
of the evidence claims it is or (b) the establishment of such facts
by any other means provided by law.” (Evid. Code, § 1400.)
Proper authentication of a writing, however, does not
overcome other evidentiary rules, such as hearsay. (People
v. Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 266 [writing must be
authenticated and not subject to exclusionary rule to be
admissible].) “[A] hearsay statement is one in which a person
makes a factual assertion out of court and the proponent seeks
to rely on the statement to prove that assertion is true. Hearsay
is generally inadmissible unless it falls under an exception.”
(People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 674.)
There is an exception to the hearsay rule for business
records. (See, e.g., People v. Hall (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1077,
1096.) The business records exception provides, “Evidence of
a writing made as a record of an act, condition, or event is not
3
The jury acquitted Isom of all offenses.
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made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered to prove
the act, condition, or event if: [¶] (a) The writing was made in
the regular course of a business; [¶] (b) The writing was made
at or near the time of the act, condition, or event; [¶] (c) The
custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity
and the mode of its preparation; and [¶] (d) The sources of
information and method and time of preparation were such
as to indicate its trustworthiness.” (Evid. Code, § 1271.)
The rule of completeness in Evidence Code section 356
creates another hearsay exception, although it is not labeled
as such. (See People v. Pic’l (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 824, 863,
fn. 13, disapproved on another point in People v. Kimble (1988)
44 Cal.3d 480, 496 & fn. 12.) Evidence Code section 356 thus
provides, in relevant part, that “when a detached act, declaration,
conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act,
declaration, conversation, or writing which is necessary
to make it understood may also be given in evidence.” The
rule prevents using selected aspects of an act, declaration,
conversation, or writing to create a misleading impression on
the subject addressed. (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522,
599–600.) The remainder of the conversation need only have
“ ‘ “ ‘ “some bearing upon, or connection with, the admission or
declaration in evidence.” ’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 600; accord, People v.
Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 861, overruled on other grounds
in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 [courts do not draw
narrow lines around exact subject of inquiry].)
We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Kovacich (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 863, 884.)
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II. Analysis
Shaw agrees that his Instagram records were
authenticated and admissible. But he disagrees that individual
posts or messages of unidentified users were authenticated and
admissible. As we now explain, the trial court properly found
that the prosecution authenticated the posts and that they were
not inadmissible hearsay.
First, the Instagram records were authenticated. Detective
Crystal Davis testified that she identified accounts associated
with Shaw and Isom, obtained a search warrant for them, and
uploaded the search warrant to law enforcement’s portal for the
social media company. The social media company then forwarded
the contents of defendants’ Instagram accounts—direct messages,
photos, and postings—to law enforcement, with certificates
of authenticity. Further, Williams-Houston said that Shaw
was known as Killa Dev, which was similar to the Instagram
user name on the account associated with him. This evidence
established that the writing was what the prosecution claimed
it to be: Shaw’s Instagram account, which included posts in
group chats.
Shaw cites no authority showing that the prosecution had
to further “authenticate” posts made in his account by obtaining
the actual names of unidentified users. He instead cites Griffin
v. State (2011) 419 Md. 343. In that case, the State sought to
introduce what it urged was the murder defendant’s girlfriend’s
MySpace profile with a posting stating that “snitches get
stitches.” (Id. at p. 348.) To authenticate the writing, the State
relied on a photo of the defendant’s girlfriend posted on the
account, that the date of birth on the account matched hers,
and the threatening post said, “Free Boozy,” the defendant’s
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nickname. (Id. at pp. 350–351.) Concerned with the possibility
that anyone can access a user’s profile, the court held that this
was insufficient to show that the defendant’s girlfriend posted
the threatening comment. (Id. at pp. 357–358.) Two justices
dissented, finding that the majority’s “technological heebie-
jeebies” went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
(Id. at p. 367.)
Even if we agreed with the Griffin majority, the case is
distinguishable. As we have said, a detective identified accounts
associated with Isom and Shaw, and the social media company
produced the records subject to a search warrant and provided
certificates of authenticity. Shaw also stipulated that the
writings were business records. If he wanted to introduce
evidence that posts made in the group chat were somehow “fake,”
then he could have done so. But that had nothing to do with
whether the writings were in Shaw’s Instagram account.
Second, Shaw forfeited any hearsay objection below and
on appeal. Ordinarily, failing to object to evidence at trial forfeits
an appellate claim that the evidence was improperly admitted.
(Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1,
7.) At an initial hearing on the admissibility of the Instagram
records, Shaw’s counsel said he did not have a “particular
objection” to them “other than, if it is a business record, it’s still
hearsay and unreliable.” The trial court then explained that
business records are hearsay, but “[t]hat’s why we have the
affidavit [of authenticity]” and “[t]hat’s why we have [Evidence
Code section] 1561.” The trial court added that counsel’s
objection was valid if he thought this was not Shaw’s account,
to which counsel said he would “leave it to cross-examination”
and “to the weight.” All counsel then stipulated to the admission
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of the Instagram records as business records. Shaw therefore
never raised the specific hearsay objection he raises on appeal,
that the posts of unidentified users are hearsay, and he instead
agreed they are not hearsay under the business records
exception.
Also, on appeal, Shaw does not explain why any post is
hearsay; that is, how it was offered for the truth of the matter.
We have no obligation to make arguments for an appellant.
(See, e.g., Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [arguments unsupported by reasoned
argument and authority are forfeited]; Paterno v. State of
California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 [appellate court is
not required to examine undeveloped claims or make arguments
for parties].)
Moreover, it appears that Shaw withdrew any objection
to the posts below. At a hearing about the Instagram records,
Isom’s counsel objected that messages or posts from users other
than Isom and Shaw in the group chat were “confus[ing].” The
trial court responded that the posts were admissible under the
rule of completeness, explaining that the complete group chat
gave context to Shaw’s statements. Shaw’s counsel then said,
“I’ll reverse myself.” Although not entirely clear, Shaw’s counsel
thus appears to have agreed that posts in the group chat were
admissible under the rule of completeness. Indeed, the trial court
instructed the jury it could consider a particular Instagram
message as evidence against only the defendant who posted it,
but “if you believe it is part of a group chat, you may consider the
messages or photos to understand a response by any participant.”
Shaw did not, below or on appeal, object to this instruction.
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In any event, the one post Shaw identifies on appeal as
inadmissible was instead clearly admissible under the rule of
completeness or to give context to Shaw’s statement. The day
after the shooting, chvmp2x posted in the chat: “If niggas don’t
play def tomorrow bk ready Saturday to get DPEd.” Immediately
preceding this post was Shaw’s post asking, “Who comiin out here
2xmarro?” And after chvmp2x’s post, other users posted similar
messages, including Shaw asking, “Sooo who’s comiin outside
2xdvy?” The gang expert testified that this chat was about
preparing for possible retaliation, being “there in the
neighborhood to pretty much hold it down.” Chvm2x’s post
thus gave context to Shaw’s posts. (See, e.g., People v. Davis
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 536 [“out-of-court statement is admissible
if offered solely to give context to other admissible hearsay
statements”].)
Finally, we reject Shaw’s contention that admission of the
Instagram group chat messages violated his constitutional rights
to a fair trial. The admission of evidence, even if erroneous under
state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the
trial fundamentally unfair. (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th
428, 439.) As we have said, the trial court did not err by
admitting the Instagram records, and therefore Shaw was not
deprived of his constitutional rights to a fair trial. (See generally
People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 229–230
[evidence admitted must “ ‘ “be of such quality as necessarily
prevents a fair trial” ’ ”].)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ASHWORTH, J.*
We concur:
ADAMS, Acting P. J.
HANASONO, J.
*
Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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