Filed 7/27/26 In re M.M. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re M.M., B351668

a Person Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP02765)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

L.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.
 Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, Brian Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________

Appellant L.M. (Mother) challenges the juvenile court’s
order under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26
terminating parental rights to her daughter M.M. (born 2022).
Mother limits her challenge to the adequacy of the inquiry
pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25
U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law (Cal-ICWA;
§ 224 et seq.) concerning whether M.M. is an Indian child. The
child’s father, Oscar G. (Father), is not a party to this appeal.
We affirm the order terminating Mother’s parental rights
as the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the ICWA-
related inquiry as to M.M. adequate, and substantial evidence
supports that ICWA did not apply.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We limit our factual and procedural summary to ICWA-
related compliance issues presented by Mother’s current appeal.
A. Dependency Proceedings Before M.M.’s Birth
On May 19, 2020, before M.M. was born, the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
filed a section 300 petition alleging that Mother’s history of

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2
substance abuse placed M.M.’s siblings G.G. and L.G. at
substantial risk of serious physical harm. The petition also
alleged that Father had a history of substance abuse. On
August 31, 2020, the court found all allegations in the operative
petitions true and took jurisdiction over G.G. and L.G. (In re
G.G. (June 30, 2026, B349076) [nonpub. opn.].)2
B. DCFS Files a Section 300 Petition as to M.M.
In February 2022, Mother gave birth to M.M.
In March 2022, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on behalf
of M.M. based on domestic violence between Mother and Father
and Mother’s substance abuse. On June 2, 2022, the juvenile
court sustained an amended petition and asserted jurisdiction
over M.M. while also continuing to assert jurisdiction over her
siblings.
C. ICWA-related Inquiry
1. ICWA Inquiry of Maternal Relatives
Between March 2020 and September 2023, DCFS asked
Mother three times whether her children possibly had Native
American ancestry. Mother consistently denied any such
ancestry. She also filed parental notification of Indian status
(Judicial Council ICWA-020) forms with the court indicating she
did not have a reason to believe ICWA applied to M.M.
In April and May 2023, maternal grandmother C.M.
(MGM) and maternal aunt Maria Cecilia M. denied any Native

2 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5),
the parties’ briefing incorporates by reference their briefing in
this related prior appeal which also involved M.M. We
accordingly rely upon our opinion in that appeal. (Id., rule
8.1115(b)(1).)

3
American ancestry. MGM also stated that maternal grandfather
(MGF), who had passed away 19 years ago, had no known Native
American ancestry. Mother points to nothing indicating that
members of Mother’s family had lost touch with MGF before he
died.
During a September 27, 2023 hearing, Mother stated for
the first time that MGM was in an unspecified tribe.
In October 2023, DCFS twice spoke with maternal aunt
E.M. and once with MGM. In each instance, they denied Native
American ancestry.
On November 1, 2024, DCFS again asked Mother about
any possible Native American ancestry. Mother declined to
answer, stating she wanted to make the social worker’s job
difficult. However, on December 10, 2024, Mother denied that
she or any known family member had Native American ancestry.
On July 30, 2025, DCFS inquired of maternal cousin
Gerardo M. about Native American ancestry. He reported that
Mother was Mexican and deeply rooted in ancient Mexican
traditions, but not Native American.
On August 1, 2025, DCFS again asked maternal aunt E.M.
about possible Native American ancestry, and she denied any.
On August 1, 2025, DCFS attempted to ask maternal
cousin Julio F. about any possible Native American ancestry. He
did not answer the call. DCFS left a voicemail and sent a text
message requesting a call back but did not hear from Julio.
2. ICWA Inquiry Relating to Father
On May 22, 2020, Father filed Judicial Council ICWA-020
forms with the court in which he denied having Native American
ancestry.

4
 On July 6, 2020, DCFS spoke with Father about his family.
During that conversation, Father described that paternal
grandfather (PGF) had been born in another country, although
Father did not identify the country, and indicated PGF was not a
United States citizen.
On April 6, 2022, DCFS contacted the paternal
grandmother Maria D. (PGM) and asked her about Native
American ancestry. PGM reported that her family does not have
Native American ancestry and were born in Jalisco, Mexico.
On April 14, 2023, Father again informed DCFS that he did
not have Native American ancestry. Mother also twice denied
any knowledge that Father had any Native American ancestry.
During a May 25, 2023 hearing, the court asked Father
whether he had information about PGF. Father stated that PGF
was alive, but Father did not have his or paternal aunt’s contact
information. The court ordered DCFS to follow up with Father to
discover any information regarding Native American ancestry of
paternal relatives.
DCFS obtained PGF’s first and last name and date of birth
and asked Father for contact information for PGF. Father
reported that he did not have contact with PGF or a telephone
number for him.
On August 23, 2023, Father’s attorney advised the court
that Father had told him that his uncle (paternal great uncle)
and a paternal cousin once removed had some tribal affiliation.
Father did not have any contact information or dates of birth for
these relatives but could provide their names. The court ordered
DCFS to investigate Father’s possible Native American heritage.

5
 During a September 27, 2023 hearing, Father informed the
court that paternal great uncle and paternal cousin once
removed’s tribal affiliation was Navajo.
On October 12, 2023, DCFS spoke with Father to obtain
contact information for paternal cousin once removed, Tracy C.,
and paternal great uncle, Angel C. Father stated he did not have
their contact information, that he would attempt to get it, and
would provide it to DCFS. DCFS followed up with Father on
October 18, 24, and 25, but Father did not have any contact
information. DCFS again contacted Father on October 26, 2023,
but Father did not respond.
On October 19, 2023, DCFS spoke with PGM to inquire
about PGF’s contact information and whereabouts. PGM stated
that she was not in communication with PGF and did not know
where he was. DCFS asked PGM if her daughter (i.e., paternal
aunt) might have that information. PGM responded that her
daughter might know where PGF was but that PGM could not
provide her daughter’s telephone number to DCFS without her
daughter’s consent. PGM never provided the requested contact
information to DCFS.
On November 22, 2023, DCFS spoke with Father about his
family’s possible Native American ancestry. Father stated that
he believed his father’s lineage included Navajo. When asked to
explain the basis for that belief, Father said his paternal family
lived in Arizona and when he was young his paternal uncle Angel
C. took Father to “pow wows” in Los Angeles. DCFS asked
Father whether any relatives may have more information.
Father reported that PGF might, but Father did not have contact
information for PGF. Father also stated that paternal great
uncle Angel C. (PGF’s brother), paternal cousin once removed

6
Tracy C. (daughter to paternal great uncle Angel C.), or paternal
great-great-grandmother Maria M. might have information about
his Father, but he did not have contact information for any of
them. Father also told DCFS that he had not heard of anyone in
his family living on a reservation or receiving any services from
the Navajo tribe. Father denied any Native American ancestry
on PGM’s side and stated that they are Mexican.
On November 29, 2023, DCFS again asked PGM if she had
any information for PGF. She denied knowing any information
such as his birthday, age, “or any ICWA information.”
As of February 1, 2024, Father had not provided any
additional ICWA information to DCFS. DCFS reported that
Father, paternal aunt Maria S., and paternal aunt Nora G. lived
with PGM in PGM’s home. PGM had five children, but the other
two were not identified in the record. DCFS asked PGM for
contact information for paternal aunts, but PGM declined to
provide that information.
On February 4, 2025, Father stated, “The court found that
there is no ICWA, but I have East Navajo, my father Francisco
G[.] use[d] to take me to the [p]ow-wow as a child and my uncle,
Jesse C[.] . . . told me we were from the East Navajos, but I have
never received medical treatment at an Indian health clinic.”
This was the first time Father identified PGF as taking him to
pow-wows or provided the name of paternal uncle as “Jesse”
instead of “Angel.” Father stated that he did not attend an
Indian school or receive a membership card and is not registered
with the tribe. Father lost contact with PGF and paternal uncle
when he was young. DCFS also reported, “The [paternal uncle]
stated that he has previously provided the information above to
the [c]ourt and it was determined that there was no ICWA,” but

7
DCFS did not provide further information about this statement.
Father agreed to provide new information to the court if he
received any. As of March 24, 2025, Father had not provided any
additional information.
On July 30, 2025, DCFS contacted Father to again inquire
about Native American ancestry, but Father did not respond.
On August 27, 2025, Father denied having any knowledge
that he had Native American ancestry. Father provided no
explanation for his flip-flop on this issue.
3. The Court’s ICWA Findings
Throughout the proceedings, the court made interim ICWA
findings that there was no reason to believe M.M. was an Indian
child as it received additional information on the issue.
4. Order Terminating Parental Rights to M.M.
On December 2, 2025, and January 9, 2026, the juvenile
court held a section 366.26 hearing. A report prepared for the
section 366.26 hearing contained approximately four single-
spaced pages summarizing the ICWA-related inquiry performed
by DCFS. The juvenile court found that M.M. was adoptable,
found the parental-benefit exception did not apply as to either
parent, and terminated parental rights as to M.M., freeing the
child for adoption. The court made no statement regarding ICWA
compliance during either day of the hearing.
DISCUSSION
Mother claims that DCFS and the court failed to
adequately inquire as to whether M.M. was an Indian child under
ICWA and Cal-ICWA. This claim is properly before us given the
appeal of the order terminating Mother’s parental rights. (In re
Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 10.) Given the efforts by DCFS to

8
inquire into whether M.M. was an Indian child (which it reported
to the court), and the court’s prior findings regarding ICWA, the
record reflects an implicit finding by the juvenile court that
ICWA did not apply as of the time of the section 366.26 hearing.
(In re E.W. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 396, 404-405.)
A. Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Congress enacted ICWA “ ‘to protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum
Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive
homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.’ ”
(In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1128-1129.) An “ ‘Indian
child’ ” is “[a]ny unmarried person who is under age 18 years of
age and who is either of the following: [¶] (A) A member or
citizen of an Indian tribe. [¶] (B) Eligible for membership or
citizenship in an Indian tribe and is a biological child of a
member or citizen of an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.1, subd. (b)(1).)
Under Cal-ICWA, the juvenile court and DCFS “have ‘an
affirmative and continuing duty’ in every dependency proceeding
to determine whether ICWA applies by inquiring whether a child
is or may be an Indian child.” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 1131-1132.) “This continuing duty can be divided into three
phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry,
and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.” (In re D.F. (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.)
The initial inquiry includes asking the child’s family,
including extended family members, whether the child is, or may

9
be, an Indian child.3 (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) Extended family
members include adults who are the child’s “grandparent, aunt or
uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or
nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd.
(c)(1).)
“Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that this duty of
initial inquiry does not require interviewing ‘every’ extended
family member; rather, where the juvenile court’s finding that
[DCFS] conducted an adequate inquiry and that ICWA does not
apply is ‘supported by sufficient evidence,’ conditional reversal is
not required ‘even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who
has an interest in the child.’ ” (In re Bella L. (2026) 117
Cal.App.5th 1284, 1290, citing In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 1140-1141.)
The duty of further inquiry arises when the agency has
“reason to believe” that an Indian child is involved. (§ 224.2,
subd. (e); In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132.) Reason to
believe is statutorily defined as “information suggesting that
either the parent of the child or the child is a member or citizen,
or may be eligible for membership or citizenship, in an Indian
tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) “Further inquiry includes
‘(1) interviewing the parents and extended family members;
(2) contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and State
Department of Social Services; and (3) contacting tribes the child
may be affiliated with and anyone else that might have

3 Effective September 27, 2024, the Legislature amended
section 224.2 to require DCFS to conduct its initial inquiry of
extended family members upon its first contact with them. (Id.,
subd. (b)(1); Stats. 2024, ch. 656, § 3.) The instant matter was
pending both before and after this amendment.

10
information regarding the child’s membership or eligibility in a
tribe.’ ” (In re Claudia R. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 76, 85; see
§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)-(C).)
The juvenile court may find ICWA does not apply to a
child’s proceeding if it finds DCFS’s “inquiry and due diligence
were ‘proper and adequate,’ and the resulting record provided no
reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (In re Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134; see § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) The
juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply “ ‘ “implies that
. . . social workers and the court did not know or have a reason to
know the children were Indian children and that social workers
had fulfilled their duty of inquiry.” ’ ” (In re Josiah T. (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 388, 401.)
We review for substantial evidence the juvenile court’s
factual finding that ICWA does not apply. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
“[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry
is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially
discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a deferential standard
of review.” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) “ ‘On a
well-developed record, the court has relatively broad discretion to
determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate,
and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case. However, the
less developed the record, the more limited that discretion
necessarily becomes.’ ” (In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087,
1101-1102.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supported the Court’s Finding
that ICWA Did Not Apply on Mother’s Side
Mother argues that DCFS failed to conduct an adequate
ICWA inquiry as to the maternal side of her family because
DCFS had had contact with the following relatives during the

11
pendency of the matter but did not ask them about possible
Native American heritage: (1) maternal aunt Maria Montoya M.,
(2) maternal aunt Maria Guadalupe M., (3) maternal aunt Maria
del Carmen J., (4) maternal first cousin once removed Kenneth
M., and (5) maternal nephew Julio F. Mother does not contest
the adequacy of the ICWA inquiry of her paternal relatives.
Preliminarily, we observe that Mother’s citations to the
record do not support her claim that DCFS spoke to a maternal
aunt named “Maria Montoya M[.]” or that Mother has a relative
by that name. Rather, the record indicates that DCFS spoke
with a maternal aunt named “Maria M[.]” and that there are
three maternal aunts named Maria: Maria Guadalupe M., Maria
del Carmen J., and Maria Cecilia M. The maternal family’s
surname is M[.], meaning that in referring to “Maria M[.],” DCFS
could have been referring to any of the three Maria sisters.
Mother has not cited record evidence that she has a relative
named Maria Montoya M. or that DCFS failed to conduct an
adequate ICWA inquiry as to this person.
As to DCFS’s failure to inquire of maternal aunt Maria
Guadalupe M., maternal aunt Maria del Carmen J., maternal
first cousin once removed Kenneth M., and maternal nephew
Julio F., DCFS’s investigation was adequate and substantial
evidence supported the court’s finding that as to maternal
relatives, it had no reason to know or believe that M.M. was an
Indian child.
Notwithstanding the facial requirements of section 224.2,
courts do not read the statute that an initial inquiry be made of
every single member of the child’s extended family. (In re
Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1005-1006, disapproved
on another ground in In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152,

12
fn. 18; see In re Dezi C., supra, at p. 1140 [the statute “does not
require reversal in all cases in which every possible extended
family member has not been asked about the child’s Indian
ancestry”].) DCFS “is not required to ‘cast about’ for information
or pursue unproductive investigative leads.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 1041, 1053.)
Here, Mother, MGM, two maternal aunts, and a maternal
cousin all denied that their family had any Native American
heritage. MGM also stated that MGF, who had passed away 19
years earlier, had no known Native American ancestry. Because
MGM denied any Native American ancestry on her or MGF’s
behalf, the court could reasonably conclude that asking the two
other maternal aunts, cousin, or nephew would be unnecessary
absent some indication these relatives’ knowledge of the family
ancestry was superior to MGM’s knowledge. (In re C.R. (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 793, 802.)
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Finding
that ICWA Did Not Apply on the Paternal Side
Mother argues that DCFS failed to inquire of paternal
aunts Maria S. and Nora G., and failed to inquire with the BIA or
the Navajo Nation about PGF’s possible Native American
ancestry.
As to Father’s maternal relatives, DCFS’s inquiry was
adequate. PGM stated she had no Native American ancestry and
that her family was from Mexico. Nothing suggests that paternal
aunts (PGM’s daughters) would have had superior knowledge as
to PGM’s own possible Native American heritage than PGM
herself had. (In re C.R., supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 802.)
We also conclude DCFS’s inquiry was adequate as to
Father’s paternal lineage. PGM denied having any ICWA

13
information about PGF. Father initially denied any Native
American ancestry and asserted PGF was born in another
country and not a United States citizen. Although Father later
claimed a paternal great uncle and paternal cousin once removed
might have some tribal affiliation, he later went back to denying
any of his paternal relatives had Native American ancestry.
DCFS sought information to contact PGF directly from
several sources; none was provided. Father had no contact
information for the paternal great uncle or paternal cousin once
removed that he sometimes claimed (and sometimes did not
claim) had Navajo ancestry. Nor did Father have contact
information for other relatives he claimed might have PGF’s
contact information.
In these circumstances, DCFS’s inquiry was adequate. We
recognize that “as a result of forced assimilation policies, ‘younger
generations lack[] knowledge of their Native American ancestry
which may only be reclaimed by conducting [a] proper ICWA
inquiry with extended family members and others more
knowledgeable.’ ” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1139.)
But the failure to contact certain extended family members does
not require automatic reversal; DCFS needs to contact those
relatives “reasonably available to help the agency with its
investigation.” (Id. at p. 1140.)
DCFS concedes it spoke with Maria S. and Nora G. early in
the proceedings but did not ask at that time about the family’s
possible Native American heritage. But the record also shows
that DCFS later attempted to reach out to paternal aunts to ask
ICWA-related questions by asking PGM (who was at that time
responsive to DCFS) for the paternal aunts’ current contact
information. PGM declined to provide their current contact

14
information and then stopped cooperating. For his part, Father
was unable to provide contact information for additional inquiries
of relatives. This indicates either that he did not have it, or that
any relatives he did contact refused to permit him to share their
information with DCFS.
Because the facts did not provide any reason to believe that
PGF was a tribal member or eligible for enrollment in a Native
American tribe, DCFS was not required to contact the Navajo
Nation or the BIA about PGF. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2).) Father was
not an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation. Even accounting
for potential generational loss of memory, Father knew that PGF
was not born in the United States and was not a citizen. Father
claimed only that PGF’s brother and cousin once removed might
have tribal affiliation, before then retracting that claim and
saying he had no Native American ancestry. PGM also denied
PGF had Native American ancestry before she stopped
cooperating with DCFS. In these circumstances, the court did
not abuse its discretion in impliedly finding that DCFS’s inquiry
was adequate, and substantial evidence supports the court’s
finding that ICWA did not apply.

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 DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights as to M.M. is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

M. KIM, J.

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