Filed 7/27/26 In re Tre. C. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re TRE. C. et al., Persons Coming B348705
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP02622
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
F.B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Syna N. Dennis, Judge. Affirmed in part
and dismissed in part.
Law Offices of Vincent W. Davis & Associates and Vincent
W. Davis, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Maternal great-aunt F.B. challenges the juvenile court’s
order declining to place her grandnieces, seven-year-old Tre. C.
and five-year-old Tri. C., in her care. We dismiss this appeal to
the extent maternal great-aunt challenges the summary denial of
her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition asking to
be considered for placement, as no such order exists.
(Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.) That petition was granted. We affirm the
order declining to place the children in maternal great-aunt’s
care because the juvenile court properly weighed the relevant
factors set forth in section 361.3, subdivision (a), to conclude the
children’s continued placement with their current caregiver was
in their best interests.
I.
In January 2024, the juvenile court declared Tre. and Tri.
dependents of the court based on mother’s failure to protect them
from an unknown perpetrator’s physical abuse and her failure to
provide them with proper care and supervision. A month later,
and at mother’s request, the Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) placed the children with their current caregiver,
non-relative Y.W.
In March 2025, a month after mother’s reunification
services were terminated, and nearly eight months after father’s
reunification services were terminated, maternal great-aunt filed
a section 388 petition asking the juvenile court to consider
placing the children in her care under section 361.3 and to grant
her visitation with the children. Following a hearing held in May
2025, the juvenile court granted the section 388 petition,
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scheduled a section 361.3 hearing, and ordered the introduction
of gradual visitation with the maternal great-aunt.
The section 361.3 assessment hearing occurred in July
2025. After receiving evidence and hearing arguments, the
juvenile court found “changing [the children’s] placement would
be contrary to [their] best interest[s] and well-being” and,
therefore, declined to place them with maternal great-aunt. As
discussed further in part III, below, the court explained how the
factors set forth in section 361.3, subdivision (a), guided its
ruling.
Maternal great-aunt filed a notice of appeal from “[a]ll
findings and orders made by the court on 8/6/25, including but
not limited to denial of Petitioner’s 388 Petition pursuant to
361.3.” Although the juvenile court made no orders relating to
those statutes on that date, it is reasonably clear from the notice,
as well as the record prepared for this appeal, that maternal
great-aunt sought to challenge the order denying her request for
placement. DCFS briefed these issues without objection. We
discern no prejudice to DCFS arising from the notice’s
misidentification of the order disputed on appeal. We, therefore,
liberally construe the notice of appeal and treat it as taken from
the July 2025 denial of maternal great-aunt’s request for
placement under section 361.3. (See In re R.M. (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 119, 129, fn. 2 [liberally construing notice of
appeal misidentifying the date and type of orders at issue when
the notice was “reasonably clear” as to which orders appellant
“intended to appeal from” and the appellate court “perceive[d] no
prejudice to [respondent] from any ambiguity in the notice”].)
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II.
Before challenging the juvenile court’s section 361.3
analysis, maternal great-aunt argues the court erred by
summarily denying her section 388 petition without holding an
evidentiary hearing. But this summary denial did not occur. As
noted above, in May 2025, the court granted her section 388
petition after holding a hearing. Thus, to the extent maternal
great-aunt challenges a nonexistent order, her appeal must be
dismissed. (See People v. Burnham (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 836,
838 [appeal from nonexistent order denying motion for new trial
dismissed]; see also Shpiller v. Harry C’s Redlands (1993)
13 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1180 [“[B]ecause cross-complainant did not
appeal from an existing appealable order, we dismiss the
appeal”].)
III.
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by finding
continued placement with Y.W. was in the children’s best
interests and declining to place the children with maternal great-
aunt.
“Section 361.3 gives ‘preferential consideration’ to a request
by a relative of a child who has been removed from parental
custody for placement of that child. ‘ “Preferential consideration”
means that the relative seeking placement shall be the first
placement to be considered and investigated.’ ” (In re M.H.
(2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1296, 1302–1303, quoting § 361.3, subd.
(c)(1).) Accordingly, “preferential consideration under section
361.3 ‘does not create an evidentiary presumption in favor of a
relative, but merely places the relative at the head of the line
when the court is determining which placement is in the child’s
best interests.’ ” (Alicia B. v. Superior Court (2004)
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116 Cal.App.4th 856, 863 (Alicia B.).) In general, “[t]he
preference applies at the disposition hearing and thereafter
‘whenever a new placement of the child must be made.’ ” (In re
M.H., at p. 1303.)1
In assessing a relative’s request for placement, DCFS and
the juvenile court consider eight nonexclusive factors set forth in
section 361.3, subdivision (a). (§ 361.3, subd. (a).) As relevant
here, those factors include the best interest of the child, including
the child’s special physical, psychological, educational, medical,
or emotional needs (id., subd. (a)(1)); the wishes of the parent, the
requesting relative, and the child, if appropriate (id., subd.
(a)(2)); the Family Code provisions regarding relative placement,
including the preference for relative placement under Family
Code section 7950 (id., subd. (a)(3)); the relative’s good moral
character, including whether the relative has a history of
criminal violence, child abuse, or neglect (id., subd. (a)(5)); the
nature and duration of the child’s relationship with the relative,
as well as the relative’s desire to care for, and provide legal
permanency for, the child if reunification is unsuccessful (id.,
subd. (a)(6)); and the relative’s ability to provide a safe, stable,
and secure environment for the child, meet the child’s needs,
protect the child from their parents, and facilitate visitation with
the child’s other relatives (id., subd. (a)(7), (8)). Ultimately,
however, “[t]he linchpin of a section 361.3 analysis is whether
1 Because we address maternal great-aunt’s section 361.3
argument on the merits, we need not consider DCFS’s contention
that “the relative placement preference did not apply” because
the children “were not actually in need of a new placement” when
maternal great-aunt filed her section 388 petition.
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placement with a relative is in the best interests of the minor.”
(Alicia B., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 862–863.)
If the juvenile court declines to place the child with a
relative considered for placement under section 361.3, the court
must “state for the record the reasons placement with that
relative was denied.” (§ 361.3, subd. (e).)
We review the juvenile court’s determination regarding a
child’s placement under section 361.3 for abuse of discretion.
(Alicia B., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 863.) “ ‘ “The appropriate
test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the
bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably
be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to
substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re
Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.)
Maternal great-aunt contends the juvenile court failed to
analyze the section 361.3 factors in denying her request for
placement. Had the court done so, she argues, “it is likely a
different result would have occurred” because the factors
“weighed heavily in [her] favor . . . .”
Maternal great-aunt’s contention fails. In denying her
request for placement, the juvenile court analyzed the relevant
section 361.3 factors in detail and explained its reasons for
finding continued placement with Y.W. was in the children’s best
interests. It noted the children had a strong, secure attachment
to Y.W., who has provided them with a stable, loving home and
consistently met their needs for well over a year, and the children
would likely suffer emotional harm if required to reside with
maternal great-aunt, with whom they had no relationship.
Further, the court expressed concern with maternal great-aunt’s
ability to provide a safe and stable environment for the children.
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It noted she is already the legal guardian of twins with special
needs and had four previous child welfare referrals in the past
four years. Thus, the juvenile court reasoned, although the
parents and maternal great-aunt wished to have the children
placed in the latter’s care, the section 361.3 factors “strongly
support[ed]” the children’s continued placement with Y.W.
The record supports the juvenile court’s analysis of the
section 361.3 factors and demonstrates the court did not
“ ‘ “exceed[ ] the bounds of reason” ’ ” in denying maternal great-
aunt’s request for placement. (In re Stephanie M., supra,
7 Cal.4th at pp. 318–319.)
Although mother recently expressed a desire to have her
children placed with maternal great-aunt, she initially identified
Y.W. as the preferred caregiver for her children. The children
have lived with Y.W. for over a year. DCFS observed from its
monthly visits with the children that they have developed a
strong attachment to Y.W. According to DCFS, maintenance of
that bond was “critical to the children’s emotional well-being and
sense of stability,” and the children’s relocation to the home of a
“relative they do not know could result in emotional distress and
potentially disrupt their sense of security and attachment.”
In contrast with Y.W., maternal great-aunt had no
relationship with Tre. and Tri. Prior to filing her section 388
petition, maternal great-aunt had never met the children. And
although her brother informed her of the children’s initial
placement in foster care “years ago,” maternal great-aunt did not
seek their placement in her care at the time.
The children’s limited relationship with maternal great-
aunt was apparent during their visits with her. They preferred
to interact with the DCFS social worker monitoring the visits
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who, on multiple occasions, had to redirect them to spend time
with their family. While Tre. was more open to interacting with
maternal great-aunt, Tri. showed signs of emotional distress,
preferring to sit with the DCFS social worker and frequently
expressing a preference to stay with Y.W. over maternal great-
aunt. Maternal great-aunt interacted with the children when
approached but was often preoccupied with her cellphone and
conversations with others.
Maternal great-aunt’s home has been RFA-approved for
two children since 2019. She has legal guardianship of nine-year-
old twins, one of whom has autism, the other of whom has
ADHD, and both of whom have been diagnosed with fetal alcohol
syndrome. According to maternal great-aunt, the twins exhibit
“ ‘chaotic’ ” behaviors. Her resource family support (RFS) social
worker opined that, although maternal great-aunt is attentive to
the twins’ needs, caring for two more children would be
challenging and difficult for her, as she has, on occasion, become
overwhelmed in dealing with the twins’ behavioral challenges.
On this point, the RFS social worker noted that, in 2024, DCFS
received a referral based on a report that maternal great-aunt
“ ‘had snatched one of the kids in the store,’ ” which required the
twins’ brief relocation to a different placement. Further, the RFS
social worker related maternal great-aunt has sought DCFS’s
assistance in seeking respite care and only has an adult son who
lives primarily in Las Vegas to support her.
Tre. has been diagnosed with Borderline Intellectual
Functioning and Phonological (Articulation) Disorder and has
been classified in the “[e]xtremely [l]ow” range of intellectual
functioning, experiencing “major difficulty” on tasks assessing
her verbal reasoning skills, knowledge of general factual
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information, nonverbal logical reasoning, problem solving, short-
term visual memory, and processing speed. (Italics omitted.)
Tre. requires support in daily living skills, such as dressing
herself, and may have challenges with other areas of “adaptive
functioning,” such as communication and socialization. She has
been referred to the Regional Center and has an Individualized
Education Program.
On this record, we conclude the juvenile court reasonably
found the section 361.3 factors demonstrated continued
placement with Y.W., as opposed to placement with maternal
great-aunt, was in the children’s best interests. The court,
therefore, did not abuse its discretion by denying maternal great-
aunt’s request for placement.
DISPOSITION
We dismiss the appeal from the nonexistent order
summarily denying maternal great-aunt’s section 388 petition.
We affirm the order declining to place the children in maternal
great-aunt’s care.
SCHERB, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J. VIRAMONTES, J.
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