Filed 7/27/26 P. v. Gordon CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B346337
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24CJPC00966)
JOSHUA DECINCES GORDON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kerry L. White, Judge. Affirmed.
Deaven Rector for Defendant and Appellant.
Nathan J. Hochman, District Attorney, Cassandra Thorp
and Elizabeth Marks, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
_________________________________________
Joshua Gordon filed an appeal after the trial court found
him disqualified from holding a license to carry a concealed
weapon (Pen. Code, § 26206)1 and denied his motion to reconsider
the ruling. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant was issued a license to carry a concealed weapon
on April 11, 2024.
On November 23, 2024, appellant was arrested after the
following events, as related in the arrest report: While at a
McDonald’s drive-through, appellant got into an argument with
the employee taking his order, during which appellant stepped
out of his car, and the employee called appellant a “bitch ass [N-
word].” Appellant retrieved his firearm from his car and placed it
in his waistband beneath his shirt while he threatened, “I’m
going to show you what a real [N-word] is all about.” The
manager of the McDonald’s told the employee to back away from
the drive-through window, and she approached the window
herself to show appellant the phone number for the corporate
office where he could make a complaint. Appellant grabbed the
manager’s cell phone and threatened to keep it if the employee
did not come outside. He was ultimately arrested for grand theft.
Based on the arrest report, the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department determined appellant had “engaged in an
unlawful or reckless use, display, or brandishing of a firearm”
(§ 26202, subd. (a)(5)) and revoked his license.
Appellant requested a hearing to challenge the revocation
(§ 26206).
The trial court convened the hearing on February 25, 2025.
Appellant’s counsel argued that appellant had merely “concealed”
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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his weapon when he took it out of his car and placed it in his
waistband, which was “exactly what he was permitted to do by
law.” The court called this argument “ridiculous,” and found that
appellant’s conduct of grabbing his gun and placing it on his
person during a heated dispute was “reckless.” It therefore found
him disqualified from holding a license to carry a concealed
weapon and informed him that he could apply for the license
again in two years.
On March 11, 2025, appellant filed a letter on his own
behalf to request that the court reconsider its ruling. The letter
explains that appellant “simply noticed [his] car door was open
and [his] weapon was in plain sight,” so he “figured [he]’d secure
it.” It adds that appellant is suffering financially due to the loss
of his license because he can no longer accept certain jobs as a
security guard.
On May 13, 2025, the trial court convened a hearing, at
which it heard appellant’s arguments, noted the motion was
procedurally improper, and declined “to reconsider [its] decision.”
On May 20, 2025, appellant filed a notice of appeal,
indicating that a “motion was not granted in [his] favor and [he]
would like further consideration.”
DISCUSSION
1. Appealability and timeliness
A party affected by an order may move the trial court to
reconsider the order “based upon new or different facts,
circumstances, or law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).) Such
a motion must include an “affidavit,” explaining, among other
things, “what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are
claimed to be shown.” (Id., subd. (b).)
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“An order denying a motion for reconsideration [under]
subdivision (a) is not separately appealable. However, if the
order that was the subject of a motion for reconsideration is
appealable, the denial of the motion for reconsideration is
reviewable as part of an appeal from that order.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1008, subd. (g).) The parties do not dispute, and we
agree, that the trial court’s order is appealable.
The People assert that the appeal is untimely because
appellant had only “60 days after the rendition of the judgment or
the making of the order” to appeal under rule 8.308(a) of the
California Rules of Court. That rule is not applicable, however,
because it applies only to criminal appeals. In this matter,
appellant’s arrest did not result in a criminal conviction but had
“ ‘consequences outside the criminal context.’ ” (In re Grayden N.
(1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 598, 604–605 [noting that a driver’s license
suspension is not a penal sanction, but a measure to protect the
public from people who cannot be trusted with a license to drive].)
Relevant here is rule 8.104(a)(1), under which “a notice of
appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of” “(A) 60 days
after the superior court clerk serves on the party filing the notice
of appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a
file-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the date either was
served,” “(B) 60 days after the party filing the notice of appeal
serves or is served by a party with a document entitled ‘Notice of
Entry’ of judgment or a file-endorsed copy of the judgment,
accompanied by proof of service,” or “(C) 180 days after entry of
judgment.” The 60-day limit does not apply because neither the
court clerk nor the People served the kind of notice required to
trigger it. The clerk mailed the parties a copy of the minute
order, but that did not commence the 60-day period because it
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was neither file-endorsed nor entitled “Notice of Entry.” (Alan v.
American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 903; Huff
v. Interior Specialists, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 970, 979;
Hughey v. City of Hayward (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 206, 210.)
Thus, the operative appeal period is 180 days after the entry of
the order on February 25, 2025. Appellant filed his appeal on
May 20, 2025, which was well within this period.
2. Governing law
State law generally prohibits carrying a concealed firearm
in public (§ 25400), but there is an exemption for those who hold
a license (§ 25655). The local licensing authority—in this case
the sheriff’s department—“shall” revoke a license to carry a
concealed weapon “if at any time [it] determines” that the
licensee “has become a disqualified person” as set forth in section
26202. (§ 26195, subd. (b)(1)(C).) “Unless a court makes a
contrary determination pursuant to Section 26206,” an applicant
who “[h]as engaged in an unlawful or reckless use, display, or
brandishing of a firearm” shall be deemed to be a disqualified
person. (§ 26202, subd. (a) & (a)(5).)
When the sheriff revokes a license, it must issue a notice
stating the reasons and informing the disqualified person that
they may request a hearing for the court to review the revocation.
(§ 26202, subd. (a).) At the hearing, “[t]he People shall bear the
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
applicant is a disqualified person in accordance with Section
26202.” (§ 26206, subd. (e).) If the court finds the People have
met their burden, it “shall inform the person of their right to file
a subsequent application for a license no sooner than two years
from the date of the hearing.” (Id., subd. (g).)
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We review the trial court’s determination for substantial
evidence (Benetatos v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th
1270, 1281), but review issues of law de novo (Young v. California
Fish and Game Commission (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1192).
3. The trial court did not commit legal error
We reject appellant’s argument that the court “ignored the
statutory requirement that a firearm be displayed in a ‘rude,
angry, or threatening manner’ ” (§ 417, subd. (a)(2)) for the
simple reason that section 417 was not at issue in this
proceeding.
4. Substantial evidence supports the finding of
recklessness
The information in the arrest report—that appellant
grabbed his gun and placed it in his waistband during a heated
dispute at a McDonald’s drive-through—provides an ample basis
for the finding that appellant recklessly displayed his gun.
In urging us to conclude otherwise, appellant points to his
history as an “armed security professional”; argues that he
grabbed the gun to secure it and did not point it at anyone; urges
that the one eyewitness (the manager) was not “neutral” and
thus could not be trusted; and argues that the lack of criminal
charges necessarily means the evidence is insufficient. Aside
from this last point, for which appellant cites no authority, these
arguments ask us to reweigh the evidence and resolve credibility
issues. This falls outside our purview in our substantial-evidence
review. (People v. Veamatahau (2020) 9 Cal.5th 16, 36.)
5. Second Amendment
Appellant challenges the constitutionality of his license
revocation under the Second Amendment, citing New York State
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1 [142 S.Ct. 2111,
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213 L.Ed.2d 387] (Bruen). Because he did not raise this below,
we construe it as a facial challenge, requiring us to “ ‘consider
“only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the
particular circumstances of an individual.” ’ ” (People v. Anderson
(2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 577, 583–584 (Anderson) [facial challenge
may be raised for the first time on appeal]; accord, People v.
Richardson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1203, 1209.) This “is the
‘most difficult challenge to mount successfully,’ because it
requires a defendant to ‘establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the Act would be valid.’ ” (United States v.
Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. 680, 693 [144 S.Ct. 1889, 219 L.Ed.2d
351] (Rahimi).)
In 2022, Bruen held “the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a handgun for
self-defense outside the home.” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 10.)
It further clarified the test for assessing constitutionality under
the Second Amendment: “[W]hen the Second Amendment’s plain
text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution
presumptively protects that conduct.” (Id. at p. 17.) The
government must justify its regulation by demonstrating that it
is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation. (Ibid.) “[T]he appropriate analysis involves
considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with
the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” (Rahimi,
supra, 602 U.S. at p. 692.) Bruen held that New York’s
requirement that a person show “proper cause” to obtain a
firearm license was unconstitutional in that it prevented “law-
abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising
their right to keep and bear arms.” (Bruen, at pp. 12, 71.)
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In 2024, Rahimi upheld the constitutionality of a statute
that barred individuals from possessing a firearm who were
subject to a domestic violence order that included a finding that
he or she posed a threat to safety. (Rahimi, supra, 602 U.S. at
pp. 698–699 [distinguishing the regulation struck down in Bruen,
which applied to the public generally].) The court observed,
“From the earliest days of the common law, firearm regulations
have included provisions barring people from misusing weapons
to harm or menace others.” (Rahimi, at p. 693.) Surety laws and
“going armed” laws are two examples—the former, “provid[ing] a
mechanism for preventing violence before it occurred,” and the
latter, “a mechanism for punishing those who had menaced
others with firearms.” (Id. at p. 697.) These kinds of laws
“confirm what common sense suggests: When an individual
poses a clear threat of physical violence to another, the
threatening individual may be disarmed.” (Id. at p. 698.)
Appellant does not mention Rahimi, let alone discuss its
relevance. He merely asserts—without citing authority—that
“[t]here is no tradition of revoking a citizen’s rights to carry a
firearm based on a mere allegation—much less an allegation the
prosecuting authority reviewed and rejected.” His argument
ignores the procedural protections found in section 26206, which
entitle an individual to challenge his or her license revocation at
a hearing before the superior court, at which “[t]he People shall
bear the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence
that the applicant is a disqualified person in accordance with
Section 26202.” (§ 26206, subd. (e).) Appellant’s revocation is not
based on a mere allegation—it is based on the trial court’s finding
that appellant “engaged in an unlawful or reckless use, display,
or brandishing of a firearm” (§ 26202, subd. (a)(5)). (Cf. Rahimi,
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supra, 602 U.S. at pp. 698–699 [noting the statute at issue
“applies only once a court has found that the defendant
‘represents a credible threat to the physical safety’ of another,”
which “matches the surety and going armed laws”].) Sections
26202 and 26206 are plainly consistent with the historic tradition
of “prohibit[ing] . . . the possession of firearms by those found by
a court to present a threat to others.” (Id. at p. 698.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
RICHARDSON, J.
GOORVITCH, J.
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