Filed 7/28/26 Dillon v. City of Los Angeles CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

GRADY DILLON, B339538
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. 19STCV14977)

CITY OF LOS ANGELES
ACTING BY AND THROUGH
THE LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT OF WATER
AND POWER and MANUEL
MIGUEL MEDINA,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Graciela L. Freixes, Judge.
Affirmed.
Panish | Shea | Ravipudi, Robert S. Glassman, Jonathan
H. Davidi, Thomas A. Schultz; Downtown L.A. Law Group, Farid
Yaghoubtil, Nina Sargsyan; and Esner, Chang, Boyer & Murphy,
Holly N. Boyer, Kiran R. Iyer for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Everett Dorey, Seymour B. Everett, III, Samantha E.
Dorey, and Christopher D. Lee for Defendants and Appellants.
 This is a personal injury lawsuit arising from a motor
vehicle accident. The main issue on appeal is whether the
evidence compels a finding that plaintiff’s negligence was a
substantial factor in causing the accident as a matter of law. We
hold that the evidence does not compel such a finding.
Plaintiff Grady Dillon sustained serious injuries after his
motorcycle collided with a Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power (LADWP) van driven by Manuel Miguel Medina. Video
footage of the accident shows Medina making an unprotected left
turn across two lanes of southbound traffic and failing to yield to
Dillon’s oncoming motorcycle.
Dillon sued Medina and LADWP (collectively, defendants)
for motor vehicle and general negligence causes of action. After a
three-week jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
Dillon. The jury found that Dillon and Medina were both
negligent—based on Medina’s failure to yield to oncoming traffic
and Dillon’s excessive speed—but that only Medina’s negligence
was a substantial factor in causing the accident.
On appeal, defendants do not challenge the jury’s findings
that Medina was negligent and his negligence was a substantial
factor in causing the accident. Instead, defendants contend the
jury’s finding that Dillon’s negligence was not a substantial factor
in causing the accident is unsupported by substantial evidence.
As we shall explain, defendants apply the wrong standard of
review. To prevail, defendants must meet the nearly impossible
burden of showing that the evidence compels a finding that
Dillon’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the
accident.
Defendants also contend a new trial is warranted for
various other reasons, including: (1) the trial court abused its

2
discretion in denying defendants’ motion for new trial; (2) the
trial court abused its discretion by precluding defendants’ counsel
from referencing certain evidence in closing argument;
(3) plaintiff’s counsel committed prejudicial attorney misconduct;
and (4) the noneconomic damages award was excessive. Finally,
defendants argue the trial court abused its discretion in granting
Dillon’s motion for attorneys’ fees based on defendants’ denial of
two requests for admission.
We reject defendants’ arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

On the morning of April 12, 2019, Dillon was riding his
motorcycle down Main Street in Los Angeles heading south.
Medina was waiting to turn his LADWP van left (northbound)
onto Main Street from a stop sign on College Street. Dillon had
the right of way and no traffic signal or stop sign in front of him.
A surveillance video admitted at trial showed Medina’s van
pulling onto Main Street directly in front of Dillon and Dillon’s
motorcycle colliding with the van.
Dillon was traveling at approximately 59 miles per hour in
a 35 miles per hour zone when he was 580 feet from the collision.
Dillon testified he accelerated to pass a box truck. After passing
the box truck, he decelerated to approximately 51 miles per hour,
before “hard braking” when Medina’s van entered Main Street.
Dillon’s motorcycle crashed into the van at around 38 miles per
hour.
Dillon sustained serious injuries as a result of the accident.
He was taken to the hospital after the accident, where he
underwent several surgeries. Since the accident, according to
Dillon, he is always in “excruciating pain.”

3
 On April 30, 2019, Dillon sued LADWP and Medina for
motor vehicle and general negligence causes of action.
Defendants generally denied the allegations in the complaint
and, as an affirmative defense, asserted that Dillon was
comparatively at fault for any damages sustained.
Trial began in February 2024. In Dillon’s case in chief, his
counsel read excerpts of Medina’s deposition to the jury, wherein
Medina testified that both he and Dillon were at fault for the
accident. Medina explained that he “failed to yield the right of
way” to Dillon. At trial, however, Medina recanted his admission
of fault, stating that he had since “seen the video” of the accident.
But Medina continued to acknowledge that he failed to yield the
right of way. Consistent with Medina’s testimony, the video of
the accident—which was repeatedly played for the jury—shows
Medina’s van pulling out across the two lanes of traffic without
giving way to Dillon’s motorcycle.
Both the plaintiff and defense called accident
reconstruction experts. Plaintiff’s expert, Steven Anderson,
testified that Dillon passed the box truck at “a little over 59 miles
an hour” and then decreased speed once he passed the box truck.
He further testified the van became an “obvious hazard” to Dillon
when it “accelerated and moved into the roadway” 1.7 seconds
before the accident. At that point, Dillon’s motorcycle was “121
feet away” traveling about 54 miles per hour. Anderson
explained that when something becomes an obvious hazard “then
you begin to react to it. . . . Before you do anything in reaction to
another vehicle, you have to perceive it.” The trial court
sustained defendants’ counsel’s objection to Anderson’s
explanation of an “obvious hazard” on the ground it was “beyond
the scope” of his expertise.

4
 During a sidebar in chambers, the court stated that
Anderson could not give perception reaction time (PRT) analysis
because he had not been designated as a human factors expert.
But the court stated Anderson could “give an opinion based on
distance and speed as to when something became a hazard or
whether collision could have been avoided by either side.”
Anderson then testified again, without objection, that the van
presented itself as a hazard to the motorcycle when the
motorcycle was “120 feet away from the crash.” In response to
counsel’s question regarding the distance it would have taken for
Dillon to stop if he was going 35 miles per hour (i.e., the speed
limit) from 121 feet away from the crash, Anderson responded:
“[T]he braking distance itself would be about 68 feet. But that’s
not everything involved in stopping.” Anderson concluded, “to a
reasonable degree of mechanical engineering certainty,” if Dillon
had been going 35 miles per hour when he was 121 feet away
from when the van presented itself as an imminent hazard,
Dillon still would not have been able to avoid the crash.
Defendants’ accident reconstruction expert, Henricus
Jansen, disagreed with Anderson’s opinion that Medina started
his left turn when Dillon’s motorcycle was only 121 feet from the
crash. Jansen testified Medina “[took] off” and started to
“execute his left turn” when the motorcycle was still 280 feet
away from the crash, which was “more than enough [space] for
[Medina] to make his left turn” if Dillon was traveling at the
speed limit. Jansen therefore opined that Dillon’s speed was the
sole cause of the accident.
Defendants then called their human factors expert, David
Krauss. Krauss testified that “human factors” is “the study of
how people take in information, process it, and respond to it.” He

5
further explained: “So light hits our eye, that light gets
transferred to our brain, our brain does some processing on it,
and then we generate some response to that information.” With
respect to driving specifically, Krauss explained PRT as follows:
“This is what has to happen in your brain and in your body before
the vehicle does anything. So something happens in front of you.
Before your foot slams on the brake or you initiate a steer, your
brain has to tell your body to do that.” It is the time someone
“detects a hazard to the time they respond to it.”
Krauss noted studies showing that motorcyclists confronted
with an unexpected hazard generally have a PRT of “1 to 2-and-a-
half seconds.” The trial court permitted Krauss to publish a
chart showing that with a PRT of 1, 1.5, 2, or 2.5 seconds, a
vehicle’s stopping distance at a speed of 35 miles per hour is 110
feet, 135 feet, 161 feet, and 187 feet respectively. Relying on
Jansen’s testimony that “the van started pulling out at 3.9
seconds before impact when Dillon was 280 feet from the crash,
and Dillon began braking around 1-and-half seconds to impact,”
Krauss then opined that “if we give [ ] Dillon a 2-and-a-half
second perception-response time, again, which is about what he
had, it would have taken him 187 feet to stop at the speed limit,
and that was available to him.”
In closing argument, Dillon’s counsel argued that, based on
Anderson’s testimony and Krauss’s testimony, the crash would
have still happened even if Dillon was not speeding:
“[Defendants] say that Mr. Dillon was presented with a hazard
from the van when Mr. Dillon was 280 feet away so that they can
prove to you that . . . the accident would not have happened if he
was going 35 miles per hour. But that’s what Mr. Anderson
talked about, that Mr. Dillon wasn’t presented with a perceptible

6
immediate hazard until he was about 121 feet away from where
the van is. And that’s when the perception-reaction time starts.
That’s when you decide to brake, and that’s when you brake. And
as we walk through, if you’re going 35 miles per hour when you’re
121 feet away from where the accident is and you’re quick and
you brake as soon as that hazard is presented to you, you are still
going to crash. You are still going to crash. And Dr. Krauss’s
chart that we’re going to go through later demonstrates that.”
The jury returned a verdict on March 22, 2024. It found
Dillon and Medina were both negligent but only Medina’s
negligence was a substantial factor in causing the accident. The
jury awarded Dillon $1,545,000 in economic damages, $3,000,000
for past non-economic loss from the date of the accident until
judgment was entered, and $6,500,000 for future noneconomic
loss for the next 34 years (Dillon’s expected remaining years of
life). On April 10, 2024, the court entered judgment for Dillon
and against defendants.
Defendants then moved for a new trial and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). After a hearing, the trial
court denied both motions.
Dillon moved for attorneys’ fees and costs under Code of
Civil Procedure section 2033.420, subdivision (a) based on
defendants’ failure to admit the truth of certain requests for
admission. The trial court granted the motion in part, concluding
defendants unreasonably denied Dillon’s request that they admit
the “fail[ure] to yield to Plaintiff.” It then awarded fees in the
reduced amount of $52,500.
Defendants timely appealed from the judgment, and the
order denying their new trial and JNOV motions, and granting in
part plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees.

7
 DISCUSSION

I. The Evidence Does Not Compel a Finding that
Dillon’s Negligence Was a Substantial Factor in
Causing the Accident as a Matter of Law
A. Standard of Review
“ ‘We generally apply the familiar substantial evidence test
when the sufficiency of the evidence is at issue on appeal.’ ”
(Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc.
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465.) But where, as here, “the trier
of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with
the burden of proof failed to carry that burden and that party
appeals, the substantial evidence test does not apply.” (Petitpas
v. Ford Motor Co. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 261, 302 (Petitpas).)
Instead, the question becomes “ ‘whether the evidence compels a
finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.’ ” (Ibid.)
“Specifically, the question becomes whether appellant’s evidence
was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ”
(LaFace v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 388, 409.)
This burden is “ ‘almost impossible’ ” to meet. (Garcia v.
Stoneledge Furniture LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 41, 53.)
In their opening brief, defendants incorrectly frame the
issue as whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding
that Dillon’s negligence was not a substantial factor in causing
the accident. In their reply, however, defendants do not dispute
that Dillon applies the correct standard of review, i.e., whether
the evidence compels a finding in favor of defendants as a matter
of law. Rather, they argue “[u]nder either formulation of the
standard of review, the admissible evidence compels a finding of

8
comparative fault as a matter of law.” For the reasons discussed
below, we disagree.
B. Analysis
Defendants have not met their burden on appeal to show
the evidence compels a finding that Dillon’s negligent speed was
a substantial factor in causing the accident. As we shall discuss
below, the jury was entitled to disbelieve the testimony of Jansen
and Krauss (defendants’ experts), which was contradicted by
Anderson (plaintiff’s expert). Thus, the issue boils down to
whether the testimony of plaintiff’s expert, Anderson, compels a
finding that Dillon’s speed was a substantial factor in causing the
accident. It does not. While we acknowledge Anderson’s
testimony is imprecise at times—especially regarding the exact
point in time that Dillon started hard braking in an attempt to
avoid the collision—the testimony certainly does not compel a
finding that Dillon would have avoided the collision if he was
traveling at the speed limit.
We begin with defendants’ experts’ testimony. Jansen
testified there would have been no collision had Dillon been
traveling within the speed limit at the moment Medina started
his turn. Jansen’s opinion rested on his theory that Medina
started to execute his turn 3.9 seconds before the collision when
the motorcycle was still 280 feet away from the collision. And
Krauss relied on Jansen’s testimony in concluding Dillon would
have avoided the collision had he been traveling at 35 miles per
hour.
Anderson, plaintiff’s expert, “disagree[d] very
substantially” with Jansen’s conclusion that the “van [took] off
3.9 seconds prior to the collision” because the van’s speed showed
a “very low level of acceleration” at that point and “[i]f [Medina]

9
had accelerated hard at 3.9 seconds, he would have . . . risk[ed] a
crash with [the] left-turning car” in front of him. According to
Anderson, Medina had not accelerated and moved into the
roadway until 1.7 seconds from the crash when the motorcycle
was 121 feet away, which is when the van “presented” as a
hazard. Anderson also contradicted Jansen’s conclusion that
Dillon started “hard braking . . . about 93 feet prior” to impact
because it “[a]bsolutely does not match the physical evidence at
the scene.”
Accordingly, not only was Jansen’s testimony contradicted,
but it also was not “ ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no
room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to
support a finding.’ ” (Petitpas, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 304.)
The jury was properly instructed that it could “believe all, part,
or none of an expert’s testimony.” The jury was, therefore,
entitled to reject the contested premise underlying Jansen’s
opinion—that the van became a hazard at 280 feet—and
therefore reject Krauss’s opinion based on that premise.
Without the testimony of Jansen and Krauss, we are left
only with Anderson’s testimony. Defendants argue that even if
the jury disbelieved Jansen and Krauss, Anderson’s own
testimony compels a finding of comparative fault as a matter of
law. In making this argument, however, defendants rely on a
misreading of the expert testimony.
Defendants first correctly state Anderson testified that at
1.7 seconds before impact, Dillon was 121 feet from the accident,
traveling at 54 miles per hour. But they then incorrectly claim
that “according to Anderson, ‘at 2.5 seconds . . . [the van is]
obvious to the motorcyclist at this point in time.’ ” Based on this
incorrect reading of the record, defendants argue that 2.5 seconds

10
was the “perception” time, and Dillon reacted .8 seconds later
(i.e., 1.7 seconds before the accident and 121 feet from the
accident). It follows, according to defendants, that because
Anderson testified the braking time was only 68 feet if traveling
at 35 miles per hour (i.e., less than 121 feet), the accident would
not have occurred if Dillon was traveling within the speed limit.
The premise on which defendants’ argument rests is not
accurate when viewing Anderson’s testimony in context and in a
light most favorable to the judgment. On direct examination,
Anderson testified as follows:

Q: Mr. Anderson, when we left, we were talking about this
hazard point based on speed and distance. Can you continue?

A: Yes. What I was saying previously is it was the point
where the van becomes an obvious hazard to the motorcyclist.
Because for one thing, the left-turning car is trying to clear. The
van speed is picked up from a walking pace to 7 miles an hour
and it’s entering the roadway.

Q: Okay. So at this point in time about 1.7 seconds away
from crash when the motorcyclist is 120 feet away, this is when
the van actually starts to go at 7.4 miles per hour?
[¶]. . . [¶]

A: Yeah, it’s going 7.5 miles an hour at this point in time.

Q: It’s your opinion this is the point where the van has
committed to going out into the southbound lanes to make the
left turn?

11
 A: The van committed slightly earlier, probably at 2.5
seconds, but it’s obvious to the motorcyclist at this point in time.
[¶]. . . [¶]

Q: Okay. So based on the speed and distance of both the
van and the motorcycle, it’s this point in time about 1.7 seconds
from crash and 120 feet away from the crash by the motorcyclist
where you believe the van presents itself as a hazard to the bike?

A: That’s what I said, yes.

It is clear from the testimony above that, according to
Anderson, Dillon first perceived the motorcycle as a hazard 1.7
seconds before the crash when he was 121 feet from the crash,
and not 2.5 seconds as defendants contend. A reasonable trier of
fact could thus conclude that Dillon took some time to react to
this perception and started hard breaking after his car was 121
feet from the point of collision.
Despite Anderson repeatedly testifying that the van
“presented” itself as a hazard when Dillon was 121 feet from the
accident, defendants argue the jury was compelled to find that
Dillon “reacted” at that time. We are unpersuaded. While
Anderson did testify that Dillon’s “motorcycle speed has
continued to drop at this point in time [referring to when he is
121 feet from the accident], doing about 54 miles an hour,”
Anderson did not testify he began hard braking in reaction to the
hazard. Decelerating is not the same as hard braking in an
attempt to avoid a collision. Indeed, Anderson also testified that
“we can’t actually necessarily see the start of the braking event”

12
 and “I don’t think we’ve got a really hard front brake application
initially.” And, as noted above, Anderson testified that he
disagreed with Jansen’s conclusion that Dillon started hard
braking about 93 feet before the accident because it “ [a]bsolutely
does not match the physical evidence at the scene.” Thus, when
read as a whole, nothing in Anderson’s testimony compels a
finding by the jury that Dillon started hard braking at the 1.7
second mark—when the motorcycle became an “obvious
hazard”—to stop before crashing into the van even if he had been
traveling at 35 miles per hour.
Defendants have not met their burden of showing the
evidence compels a finding that Dillon’s negligence was a
substantial factor in causing the accident.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion By
Denying Defendants’ Motion for New Trial
Defendants next contend the trial court abused its
discretion by denying their motion for new trial because it
“applied the incorrect legal standard.” The trial court clearly
stated reasons for denying defendants’ sufficiency of the evidence
challenge demonstrate otherwise.1
“A trial court evaluating a new trial motion on [the
insufficient evidence ground] sits ‘as a thirteenth juror,’ asking
whether ‘the weight of the evidence appears to be contrary to the
jury’s determination’; in so doing, the court is free to ‘ “disbelieve
witnesses, reweigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences
therefrom contrary to those of the trier of fact.” ’ ” (Licudine v.

1 Defendants moved for a new trial on several grounds, but
their argument on appeal regarding the denial of their new trial
motion is limited to the ground of insufficient evidence to support
the jury’s no comparative fault finding.

13
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 881, 900.) The
trial court must be “ ‘satisfied that the evidence, as a whole, was
sufficient to sustain the verdict’ ”; if not, the court must grant a
new trial. (Barrese v. Murray (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 494, 503.)
The trial court properly applied these principles. At the
hearing on the new trial motion, the trial court stated: “[I]n
assessing the merits of defendants’ motion, the court undertook
the task of determining whether there was sufficient credible
evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict weighing the evidence and
assessing the credibility of the witnesses. In so doing, the court
considered the probative force of the evidence in order to be
satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict.
Having undertaken this inquiry including an assessment of the
credibility of the parties and witnesses that testified and after
reviewing plaintiff and defense counsels’ cited authorities as well
as the extensive documentation attached by each to the
declarations in support of their respective positions, this court is
not of the opinion that the weight of the evidence is contrary to
the findings of the jury. [¶] Accordingly, defendants’ motion for
new trial is denied.”
Ignoring the trial court’s statements above, defendants
argue the court “abdicat[ed] [its] judicial duty” by failing to
reassess the actual evidence and, instead, “simply stat[ed] that
the jury was properly instructed that argument of counsel is not
evidence and the jury can weigh and choose to disbelieve the
testimony of experts.” But the trial court appropriately made
this comment—after it expressly applied the correct standard—in
response to defendants’ counsel’s assertion that plaintiff’s counsel
committed prejudicial misconduct in closing argument. In
addressing that contention, the court stated: “As to Mr.

14
Anderson’s testimony, [a]s to [plaintiff’s counsel’s] reference to it
during his closing with regard to improper calculation of speed,
as you know the jurors are instructed, number one, the
arguments of counsel are not evidence, and that if there is a
difference of [opinions] between the experts, they’re to weigh the
opinions and decide which has the greater weight. So if we—and
we certainly had differences of opinion on the experts here. The
jurors are instructed ‘disregard an opinion that seems
unreasonable, that is contradicted, that you don’t find fits into
the evidence.’ If [plaintiff’s counsel] wants to refer to opinions in
his closing argument claiming that they were stated to be such,
the jurors had the ability to refer to the actual testimony to
determine whether [plaintiff’s counsel] is misrepresenting what
was the actual testimony of the witness.” This correct statement
of the law in no way demonstrates the trial court misunderstood
the new trial standard it expressly applied.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Precluding Defendants’ Counsel from Referencing
Certain Impeachment Evidence in Closing Argument
A. Background
Dillon called his girlfriend, Lisa Valenzuela, to testify about
his condition before and after the accident. Valenzuela testified
that Dillon is in constant, excruciating pain and while he was
once adventurous, extroverted and confident, he is now a
different man—he was a “happy-go-lucky” guy, but now his
“light” is gone.
Defendants then sought to impeach Valenzuela’s testimony
that Dillon was a “happy-go-lucky guy” prior to the accident by
introducing a declaration signed by Valenzuela two years before
the accident, filed in support of her application for a temporary

15
restraining order against Dillon. Over defendants’ objection on
Evidence Code section 352 grounds, the trial court permitted
defendants to use the declaration to impeach Valenzuela’s
testimony, stating that defendants’ counsel could generally bring
up the grounds for the restraining order application including
that Dillon “aggressively forc[ed] her into intimacy” and that he
“physical[ly] abuse[d]” her. The court reasoned this “certainly
would show that he was angry” before the accident. The trial
court was “concerned,” however, that [the declaration] is
“substantially more prejudicial than probative” and “to read from
[the declaration] would be extraordinarily prejudicial.” It
therefore stated it could only be “brought in generally, not
necessarily the gory specifics.”
On cross-examination, defendants’ counsel asked Valenzuela
about detailed allegations in the declaration, including, for
example, that Dillon “forced himself upon [her] to have sex
during a camp trip in front of [her] young child”; “punched [her]
and pushed [her] to the ground in the past”; “punched [her] in the
stomach when [she was] pregnant with [her] child”; he was “very
violent and aggressive towards [her] and [her] pets”; and he “put
a towel on [her] face and lit it on fire.” In later proceedings
outside the presence of the jury, Dillon objected to the cross-
examination of Valenzuela on the ground that defendants’
counsel inquired about specific details in the declaration, which
went beyond the scope of the trial court’s ruling that the
declaration could only be brought in “generally.” The trial court
stated it would not strike the testimony at that time, and if
plaintiff’s counsel wanted “to get the transcript, [the court would
then] revisit the transcript.”

16
 After Dillon’s counsel reviewed the transcript of the
cross-examination of Valenzuela, Dillon moved for a mistrial
based on the questioning about the declaration and the fact that
the temporary restraining order “wasn’t even granted.” The
court denied the mistrial motion but invited both sides to draft a
curative instruction for the court’s consideration.
Later in the trial, the court gave a curative instruction, the
language of which the defendants agreed was “appropriate”: “In
this trial, Ms. Lisa Valenzuela was questioned about prior
statements she made. These prior statements were admitted for
the limited purpose of impeachment and may only be considered
by you to evaluate this witness’ testimony at trial and shall not
be used for any other purpose, this includes determining the
issues of negligence, causation, and allocation of fault. You also
shall not speculate or discuss whether the events she described
occurred or not.”
On the morning of March 21, 2024, before defendants’
counsel continued his closing argument, the court held a meeting
with the parties’ counsel in chambers. The court explained that
defendants’ counsel could mention the temporary restraining
order declaration “generally” but “at the end of the day, the
minimal value of you impeaching Ms. Valenzuela, who is not a
party to the action, is—everyone agrees—I think that is
outweighed by focusing on those acts, and that’s what I’m
concerned about.” The court further stated: “What you can use is
a general comment that what she described in terms of what he
was like before and what he’s like now is a result of the injuries
that he suffered in the accident—that that was actually not quite
accurate. I mean you impeached her with some of that. But I
just don’t want the jury to focus on those acts [specifically

17
detailed in the declaration], because at the end of the day, I don’t
believe that they are pivotal to anybody’s claim.”
When defendants’ counsel continued his closing argument,
he noted Valenzuela’s testimony that Dillon was a “caring father
and partner” before showing a slide addressing her
“impeachment.” The appellate record does not contain the slide,
but defense counsel described “the impeachment” as “despicable,
disgusting, awful.” Defendants’ counsel continued: “That’s
impeachment. That’s your job to weigh the evidence and
determine what is truthful, to consider what she said on direct
examination versus what she said on cross-examination. And I’m
not going to repeat it. Disgusted – disgusting, despicable, awful;
right? . . . You were instructed by the court not to consider
whether or not those acts actually happened . . . . But you do
weigh the evidence, and you determine what is impeachment,
what she said on direct examination, what she said on
cross-examination.”
B. Analysis
Defendants contend the trial court abused its discretion by
precluding them from reciting specific details from Valenzuela’s
declaration in closing argument. We conclude the trial court did
not exceed its broad discretion.
“A trial court ‘is given great latitude in controlling the
duration and limiting the scope of closing’ argument.” (People v.
Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 743.) The “trial court retains
discretion to impose reasonable time limits and to ensure that
argument does not stray unduly from the mark.” (People v.
Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 854– 855 (Marshall).) We review
the trial court’s decision to limit closing argument for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 147.) Under

18
this standard, we do not disturb or reverse a trial court’s ruling
unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a
miscarriage of justice. (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 26.)
Here, the trial court concluded that “generally” describing
what Valenzuela “agreed was true” in her declaration was
sufficient to address the inconsistency in her testimony, which
was the “purpose” for admitting the impeachment evidence. The
trial court further reasoned that permitting defendants’ counsel
to repeat the specific details in the declaration risked
undermining the curative instruction and could “draw the jury’s
focus away from the instant case.” (See Marshall, supra, 13
Cal.4th at p. 855.) In other words, the trial court balanced
competing factors by allowing defendants to make their central
point about Valenzuela’s truthfulness without permitting
defendants to describe specific, unduly prejudicial, allegations
regarding domestic violence. This was not an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd ruling. (See People v. Farley (2009)
46 Cal.4th 1053, 1131 [precluding argument describing details of
other murders, but permitting argument about the “central
point” that murder was not the “worst of the worst”].)
Defendants have not shown an abuse of discretion.
IV. Defendants Forfeited Their Attorney Misconduct
Claim and Their Arguments Fail on the Merits
Defendants further contend that the trial court erred by
denying their motion for a new trial on the ground that Dillon’s
counsel committed prejudicial misconduct. They argue counsel
improperly: (1) referred to precluded evidence and violated in
limine rulings; (2) made a golden rule argument; (3) argued who
will be responsible to pay any judgment; and (4) made personal

19
attacks against defendants’ counsel and experts. As discussed
below, defendants forfeited these arguments by not objecting to
any of the instances of purported misconduct. Moreover, even if
not forfeited, our review of the record demonstrates that most of
the alleged statements by Dillon’s counsel, when viewed in
context, were not improper. And while we agree with defendants
that certain statements by Dillon’s counsel were either
inappropriate or pushed the boundary of permissible argument,
defendants cannot show that any potential misconduct was so
pervasive or egregious that it prevented the jury from rationally
considering the evidence admitted at trial.
We begin with forfeiture. Generally, “ ‘[t]o preserve for
appeal an instance of misconduct of counsel in the presence of the
jury, an objection must have been lodged at trial and the party
must also have moved for a mistrial or sought a curative
admonition.’ ” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th
276, 295 (Bigler-Engler).) “The purpose of these requirements is
to allow the trial court an opportunity to remedy the misconduct
and avoid the necessity of a retrial; a timely objection may
prevent further misconduct, and an admonition to the jury to
disregard the offending matter may eliminate the potential
prejudice.” (Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1412.)
“Raising the issue for the first time in a posttrial motion is
insufficient because the trial court has no ability to correct the
misconduct at that point.” (Bigler-Engler, at p. 295.) The failure
to timely object and move for a mistrial or request an admonition
forfeits any claim of error “unless the misconduct was so
persistent that an admonition would have been inadequate to
cure the resulting prejudice.” (Ibid.) “Attorney misconduct is
incurable only in extreme cases.” (Rayii, at p. 1412.)

20
 Here, defendants did not timely object to any of Dillon’s
counsel’s closing statements. Nor did they move for a mistrial or
request an admonition. Because defendants have not shown this
is one of those “extreme cases” in which the purported misconduct
was incurable, we conclude defendants failed to preserve their
attorney misconduct argument.
Even if not forfeited, defendants’ argument fails on the
merits. First, defendants assert that Dillon’s counsel violated in
limine rulings and argued based on Anderson’s precluded and
stricken testimony about causation. As noted above, Anderson
was precluded from testifying about human factor opinions. He
was permitted, however, to “give an opinion based on distance
and speed as to when something became a hazard or whether
collision could have been avoided by either side.”
In support of their argument that Dillon’s counsel
repeatedly violated the trial court’s orders, defendants include a
string of citations to the reporter’s transcript. Those cites include
several pages of the direct examination of Anderson, some of
which include sustained objections by defendants on the grounds
of “beyond the scope” and “lacks foundation.” Critically, almost
all of the cited testimony is before the sidebar held in chambers in
which the court clarified the permitted scope of Anderson’s
testimony. Defendants then claim, without any citations to the
record, that based “on such improper and precluded testimony,”
Dillon’s counsel argued to the jury that Dillon’s negligence was
not a substantial factor in causing the accident. Defendants have
not met their burden of showing attorney misconduct.
Defendants also argue Dillon’s counsel improperly argued
in rebuttal closing argument that “the jury should not worry
about giving a verdict against Medina because LADWP will be

21
the one paying any judgment.” But defendants leave out the
context. In his opening statement, defendants’ counsel noted
Medina was married, a grandparent to one grandchild with
another grandchild on the way, and a Gulf War veteran. To
rebut defendants’ attempt to make the jury “feel sympathetic” to
Medina, Dillon’s counsel read a stipulated jury instruction. This
instruction provided that “LADWP is responsible for any harm
caused by Medina’s negligence” and told the jury that, despite
defendants’ implication to the contrary, “Medina is not going to
be left holding the bag.” In these circumstances, Dillon’s rebuttal
argument was not improper.
Defendants next argue Dillon’s counsel committed
misconduct in closing argument by making a golden rule
argument. A “golden rule argument” is an argument “in which
counsel asks jurors to put themselves in the plaintiff’s shoes and
ask what compensation they would personally expect.” (Cassim
v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 797 (Cassim).) “An
attorney’s appeal in closing argument to the jurors’ self-interest
is improper and thus is misconduct because such arguments
tend to undermine the jury’s impartiality.” (Ibid.)
Defendants contend plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly violated
the prohibition against golden rule arguments by: (1) asking the
jury to imagine making the turn2; (2) asking the jury to imagine if

2 Dillon’s counsel argued: “When you’re turning left, you
know that the immediate hazards are coming from your left. So
it’s a very dangerous thing to do, to look right last before you
start going. . . . If you’re sitting there, you’re about to make a left
turn, and then you look right, and that’s the last direction you
look in, and then you proceed forward after looking right without
looking left again—that’s scary. It’s dangerous.”

22
they lost their ability to live their normal life because of an
injury3; and (3) “asking the jury how much they would charge to
undergo the alleged injuries and pain by asking them to imagine
a van, full of millions of dollars, offered in exchange for suffering
the injuries and pain, with the flimsiest premise of the offer being
made to Dillon.” Dillon counters that his counsel’s comments
were proper because: (1) the use of the impersonal “you” did not
ask the jury to imagine being Medina, but rather made clear that
any driver would not make that unsafe turn; (2) counsel prefaced
his statements to the jury about losing their ability to live a
normal life by stating that “everyone’s quality of life is different”
and Dillon’s “life before is different than all of yours”; and
(3) counsel’s “van analogy” did not ask jurors to put themselves in
plaintiff’s position, but merely made clear that plaintiff would not
choose to suffer those injuries in exchange for payment.
We are not entirely satisfied by Dillon’s explanation. A
juror could reasonably interpret at least some of the statements
as urging—or, at a minimum, implying—that they put
themselves in Dillon’s position. That is improper. (See Cassim,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 797.) In this case, however, even if some
of the statements were improper, defendants have not shown any
misconduct resulted in prejudice. They claim the statements
“inflamed the jury to come to a verdict based on passion and

3 Defendants do not quote the exact excerpt from the
transcript, but on the pages they cite, Dillon’s counsel argued:
“But what everyone values is their own version of what’s
normal. . . . And everyone might have different interests, and
everyone might have different hobbies, but what each of you like
to do—that’s worth a lot to you. [¶] But if it’s suddenly taken
away from you . . . that’s worth a lot. That’s—that’s quality of life
that you can’t replace.”

23
prejudice and not the evidence[,]” but, as discussed below in
section V, the verdict was supported by substantial evidence, and
the statements were not so “egregious and pervasive.” (See
Pilliod v. Monsanto Co. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 591, 636 [holding
defendant did not show prejudice where “some of counsel’s
conduct was clearly improper” but “the record shows these were
isolated and relatively minor incidents that occurred in the
course of a complex six-week trial, not egregious and pervasive”].)
Finally, defendants argue Dillon’s counsel made
inflammatory personal attacks on their counsel and experts.
Defendants fail to cite specific statements. Instead, they provide
a string of citations to several pages of the reporter’s transcript.
Several of those citations are to a hearing on the parties’ motions
in limine before trial began, and thus, were not in the presence of
the jury. Most of the other citations do not include any improper
personal attacks.
We acknowledge that there were instances when Dillon’s
counsel went too far in rebuttal closing argument and crossed the
line between zealous advocacy and incivility. For example,
Dillon’s counsel inappropriately suggested, without any basis,
that defendants’ counsel urged Medina to lie on the stand: “That
was before [defense counsel] got him up into his building a couple
months ago and he told him to change his testimony on the
stand.” Dillon’s counsel also inappropriately stated: “And so
[defense counsel], once again, came up on cross-examination and
misled you by insinuating that we’re the bad guys.” Dillon’s
counsel also made a potentially offensive remark, which is
unbecoming of an officer of the court: “I can’t believe [defense
counsel] just said that you should ask yourselves, ‘What would
[defense counsel] do?’ I mean, what is he? Jesus? I mean, that’s

24
what—what does that mean, what would he do?” While we do
not condone such conduct, defendants have not demonstrated
that these isolated incidents resulted in any prejudice. (See
Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 805 [misconduct during closing
argument did not result in prejudice considering its “brevity and
indirect nature”].) Thus, the trial court did not err in
determining there was no prejudicial attorney misconduct.4
V. The Jury’s Award of Noneconomic Damages Was Not
Excessive
Defendants lastly contend they are entitled to a new trial
because the jury’s award of $3,000,000 for past noneconomic loss
and $6,500,000 for future noneconomic loss “ ‘shock[ed] the
conscience and suggest[ed] passion or prejudice on the part of the
jury.” We are unpersuaded.
Our “review of the jury’s determination of noneconomic
damages is ‘ “very narrow. ” ’ ” (Phipps v. Copeland Corp. LLC
(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 319, 343.) “ ‘The amount of damages is a
fact question, first committed to the discretion of the jury and
next to the discretion of the trial judge on a motion for new trial.
They see and hear the witnesses and frequently . . . see the injury
and the impairment that has resulted therefrom. As a result, all
presumptions are in favor of the decision of the trial court
[citation]. . . . An appellate court can interfere on the ground that
the judgment is excessive only on the ground that the verdict is
so large that, at first blush, it shocks the conscience and suggests

4 In denying defendants’ motion for new trial, the trial court
stated at the hearing: “And it’s my opinion, based on having
observed all of it and having an opportunity to go back and read
much of it, that the verdict was not the result of conduct by
[Dillon’s counsel] during his closing argument.”

25
passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury.’ ” (Bigler-
Engler, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 299.)
“Accordingly, ‘[w]e review the jury’s damages award for
substantial evidence, giving due deference to the jury’s verdict
and the trial court’s denial of the new trial motion.’ ” (Burchell v.
Faculty Physicians & Surgeons etc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 515,
527.) “ ‘There are no fixed or absolute standards by which an
appellate court can measure in monetary terms the extent of the
damages suffered by a plaintiff as a result of the wrongful act of
the defendant. The duty of an appellate court is to uphold the
jury and trial judge whenever possible. [Citation.] The amount
to be awarded is “a matter on which there legitimately may be a
wide difference of opinion” [citation].’ ” (Bigler-Engler, supra, 7
Cal.App.5th at p. 299.)
Applying these principles, we conclude substantial evidence
supported the award. Defendants assert “Dillon experienced
orthopedic injuries and some residual discomfort and pain, but he
returned to independent living, he denied any cognitive
impairment, and he presented no evidence of permanent
disfigurement or debilitating chronic pain.” This is a gross
simplification of the evidence presented at trial and fails to fairly
summarize the evidence supporting noneconomic damages.
Among other evidence, Dillon testified he was in “excruciating
pain, yelling, screaming, crying” after the accident and felt
“paralyzed” while “bedridden” in the hospital; after leaving the
rehabilitation facility, he “felt helpless” because he could not do
“anything for himself”; it is still “hard for [him] to be able to get
out of bed” because he is “always in . . . excruciating pain”; he
cannot do “day-to-day” functions, such as “opening a bottle” or
playing soccer with his son; the accident has “changed [his]

26
life . . . in a really bad way” and made him “stressed” and
“anxious”; and he worries his pain is not going to get better.
Multiple orthopedic surgeons also testified that Dillon will need
further surgeries and will likely suffer from chronic pain for the
rest of his life. And Dillon’s life care planner, Dr. Neil Ghodadra,
testified that Dillon will “require . . . medical care, management,
and treatment for the remainder of his life.” Thus, on this record,
we cannot conclude the noneconomic damages award is so large
that “ ‘it shocks the conscience and suggests passion, prejudice or
corruption on the part of the jury.’ ” (Bigler-Engler, supra, 7
Cal.App.5th at p. 299.)
We also reject defendants’ attempt to invalidate the verdict
by simply comparing this case to other verdicts. Defendants
assert that, in their motion for new trial, they presented
examples of amounts awarded in prior cases for similar injuries,
ranging from $1.4 to $4.5 million in noneconomic damages. But
“[c]omparing verdicts” is “of limited utility.” (Fernandez v.
Jimenez (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 482, 491.) That is because “ ‘each
case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Such
examination demonstrates that such awards vary greatly.
[Citations.] Injuries are seldom identical and the amount of pain
and suffering involved in similar physical injuries varies widely.’
” (Ibid.) Moreover, defendants’ citation to LexisNexis alerts
summarizing jury verdicts in three “orthopedic fracture injur[y]”
cases is of limited persuasive value given that we do not have a
record of the evidence admitted at those trials. (Bigler-Engler,
supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 303.)
Accordingly, we conclude defendants have not
demonstrated the jury’s award of noneconomic damages—which

27
was approximately 36% of the $26,000,000 sought by plaintiff’s
counsel in closing argument—was excessive.
VI. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Awarding Costs of Proof
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420, “[i]f a
party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth
of any matter when requested to do so . . . , and if the party
requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of
that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting
the admission may move the court for an order requiring the
party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable
expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable
attorney’s fees.” (Id., subd. (a).)
The court “shall make this order” unless it finds one of the
exceptions listed in Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420,
subdivision (b) applies. As relevant here, one exception is if “[t]he
party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to
believe that that party would prevail on the matter.” (Id., subd.
(b)(3).) The party seeking to benefit from an exception listed in
subdivision (b) bears the burden of establishing the exception.
(Spahn v. Richards (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 208, 216.) We review
the trial court’s order granting a motion for costs of proof for
abuse of discretion. (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs
v. Macia (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1024.)
Here, on February 24, 2021, Dillon served LADWP with
requests for admission that it (1) was “the cause of the [accident]”
and (2) “failed to yield to Plaintiff.” On May 24, 2021, LADWP
responded to both requests that “[a]ssuming this request is
intended to include [its] employee Medina, responding party
states: deny.”

28
 After the jury found Medina’s negligence was the sole cause
of the accident, Dillon moved for attorneys’ fees under Code of
Civil Procedure section 2033.420, subdivision (a) for “time
expended in proving these facts.” Dillon sought $516,000, which
included $258,300 of attorneys’ fees and a lodestar multiplier of
2.0, and $227,751.76 in costs. Defendants opposed the motion,
arguing they had a good faith belief that Dillon’s excessive speed
was the sole cause of the accident.
After a hearing on the motion, the trial court concluded it
was not “reasonable for the defense to deny that Mr. Medina
failed to yield to plaintiff.” The court focused on the second
request—i.e., the failure to yield request—stating that the
videotape made it “crystal clear” that Medina failed to yield to
plaintiff. In assessing the appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees,
the trial court noted that “only expenses incurred in proving the
matters denied by defendant” are authorized, and observed that
“plaintiff’s counsel has included herein trial preparations which
extend well beyond the issue of negligence in failing to yield.”
Thus, after a comprehensive review of the attorneys’ declarations
and exhibits submitted in support of the motion for fees and
costs, the court concluded plaintiff was only entitled to “attorney
fees for 105 hours of attorney time [as opposed to the 369 hours
claimed by plaintiff] which is reasonably attributable to proving
liability for the accident on the part of the defendants.” With
respect to plaintiff’s claim for costs in the amount of $227,751.76,
the trial court concluded: “Because plaintiff has failed to provide
the court with documentation from any of the vendors listed to
assist the court in assessing which, if any, of the costs listed are
associated only with proving liability and failure to yield, the

29
court has no evidence on which to base reimbursement for those
costs. Accordingly, payment for costs is not ordered.”
Defendants have not met their burden on appeal to
demonstrate an abuse of discretion. They first argue, without
citation to the record, that “[i]t is clear” defendants had a good
faith belief and were reasonable in denying that they caused the
accident and failed to yield. But as the trial court stated at the
hearing on the motion, “the videotape of the incident left no doubt
that Medina failed to yield to the plaintiff who had the right-of-
way.” The trial court further explained that “it was reasonable in
light of the videotape that in my opinion shows Mr. Medina going
out, not stopping at all until you can see the impact to the van
caused by the motorcycle. But there was no yielding whatsoever.
So the plain language admit that you failed to yield to plaintiff, I
don’t think it was disputed that plaintiff had the right-of-way and
that Mr. Medina was entering the intersection against plaintiff’s
right-of- way.” After reviewing the videotape, we agree with the
trial court’s assessment. We discern no abuse of discretion.
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining
the appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees. Defendants argue
“Dillon’s counsel only submitted a two-page vague accounting”
and it was “not divided into just proof of the requests, but many
of the categories expressly include ‘tasks performed’ for work
related to ‘liability and damages.’ ” They completely ignore,
however, the trial court’s careful analysis of the attorneys’ fees
sought to ensure only those related to proving liability, i.e.,
failure to yield, were awarded. The transcript of the hearing is
replete with examples of the court combing through the
declarations and awarding fees for only those hours it found
plaintiff’s counsel reasonably expended in proving Medina failed

30
to yield to plaintiff. For instance, the court stated: “Plaintiff lists
four hours of time spent concerning the deposition of John
Gardiner, who is a biomechanics’ expert that testified regarding
the impact forces applied to plaintiff’s body relative to the
injuries sustained. This testimony concerns causation of injuries
and not liability. This time will be discounted.” The trial court
further noted: “Of the 25 witnesses presented during this trial,
only five witnesses testified concerning the cause of the accident
and defendants’ failure to yield . . . . These liability witnesses
equate to 20 percent of all witnesses present at trial.
Accordingly, of the 305 hours of trial preparation and trial time
claimed by plaintiff, the court determines that 61 hours is
reasonably attributable to proving the matters denied by
defendant.”
Thus, the trial court properly excluded any claimed
expenses to the extent they related to issues outside the scope of
the requests for admission. Defendants do not point to anything
in the record demonstrating otherwise.

31
 DISPOSITION
The judgment and order are affirmed. Dillon is awarded
his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

TAMZARIAN, J.

We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

MORI, J.

32