Filed 7/28/26 Bedrossian v. Cal. State Personnel Bd. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

SYLVIA BEDROSSIAN, B349445

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCP00957)
v.

CALIFORNIA STATE
PERSONNEL BOARD,

Defendant and Respondent;

STATE COMPENSATION
INSURANCE FUND,

Real Party in Interest and
Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Theresa M. Traber, Judge. Affirmed.
Sylvia Bedrossian, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Michael J. Monteiro for Real Party in Interest and
Respondent.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
 Appellant Sylvia Bedrossian filed a writ petition challenging
an order of respondent, the State Personnel Board (SPB), affirming
Bedrossian’s five-day suspension from work at real party in interest
the State Compensation Insurance Fund (the Fund). The trial
court denied the petition. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Bedrossian’s Employment at the Fund
The Fund employed Bedrossian as a staff attorney
beginning in March 2004 and ultimately promoted her to
attorney IV. In the latter position, she was responsible for
litigating worker’s compensation cases involving “confidential
and sensitive information.” A “duty statement” Bedrossian
signed lists among her responsibilities as an attorney IV
“[m]aintain[ing] user mastery over [the Fund’s] computer-based
technology” and “communicat[ing] professionally and efficiently.”

B. Cybersecurity Training
The Fund “require[s] that all employees take
[cyber]security awareness and privacy training annually so
that they can recognize external threats such as phishing and
other social engineering tactics.” “Phishing” refers to the process
of sending emails purporting to be from a legitimate source and
encouraging the recipient to “click on . . . a malicious link” or
attachment or provide sensitive information. “If a phishing
email is successful, [it] can either steal data from the user,”
“compromise the user’s account,” or “compromise the entire
system” of an organization.
Over the course of her employment at the Fund, Bedrossian
participated in numerous training sessions on how to identify
and handle phishing emails. This training educated employees

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about “red flags” which should alert the reader that an email
is potentially dangerous, such as asking the recipient to click a
link to avoid a negative consequence. In 2019, the Fund began
automatically adding an “external sender notification” banner on
all emails from outside the Fund, which reminded the recipient in
yellow highlighted text that the email “was sent from outside [the
Fund]” and not to click on links or open attachments “unless you
recognize the source and know the content is safe.”

C. Phishing Email Tests
1. Phishing Email Test Campaign
In 2018, the Fund security department circulated a
memorandum to all employees announcing the Fund was starting
“organization-wide security phishing awareness tests . . . on a
regular basis to test [employees’] security awareness knowledge.”
These tests involved the Fund sending emails “to all 4000
[Fund] employees in a randomized fashion”—that is, in “groups
of employees at a time, at different dates and times.” The test
emails “mirrored what a real phishing email might look like.
When an employee clicked on links contained [therein] . . . ,
replied to the emails, or opened [an] attachment, [the employee
was] deemed to have ‘failed’ the test. Simply opening the
phishing test emails did not trigger a failure result, nor did
hovering over a link.” The memorandum informed employees
that those “who click on a phishing test email [would] receive
counseling and reinforcement training,” and that “[r]epeated
violations may result in formal disciplinary action.”

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 2. Bedrossian’s Failed Tests Resulting
in Additional Training Effort
Between December 2021 and December 2022, Bedrossian
failed three phishing tests. As a result of the first failed test, she
was required to participate in remedial cybersecurity training
sessions in the form of both “recorded trainings as well as
one-on-one coaching.” These training sessions failed to alleviate
the problem; Bedrossian failed two more tests, after which the
Fund suspended her for five days. That suspension is the subject
of the writ petition ruling before us on appeal.
On December 21, 2021, Bedrossian received a phishing
test email purporting to be authored by a Fund employee, but
from a non-Fund email address. It instructed the recipient
to click on a link and enter an email address and password.
Bedrossian opened the email with her Fund-issued mobile phone
and clicked the link.
The Fund issued her a memorandum “remind[ing] [her]
of the dangers of phishing attacks” and required her, inter alia,
to participate in a one-on-one security awareness training session
with a Fund security analyst. At the beginning of that February
2022 training session, the analyst informed Bedrossian that
the analyst was “solely there to provide training,” and “[a]ny
questions . . . in regards to the personnel actions” should
be directed to human resources or Bedrossian’s supervisor.
Bedrossian “became very abrupt, very rude, disrespectful, [and]
started . . . ask[ing] . . . all kinds of questions that had nothing
to do with the training,” “making accusations,” and “being very
belittling.” For example, Bedrossian asked the analyst “about the
number of employees who received the test emails, and whether
specific individuals were targeted to receive them. [Bedrossian]

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accused [the analyst] of not being a [Fund] employee and
of being improperly supplied with private information about
[Bedrossian].” The analyst felt she could not continue the session
and ended it “within the first few minutes.” Later that day,
Bedrossian emailed the analyst and the analyst’s supervisor
accusing the security department of trying to entrap employees
and unfairly targeting Bedrossian with the phishing test email.1
On May 11, 2022, Bedrossian received a phishing test email
purporting to be from state vehicle registration. It instructed
her to click on links to renew her license and registration in order
to avoid penalties. Bedrossian opened it on her Fund-issued
mobile phone and clicked the link. Bedrossian again received a
memorandum from her supervisor admonishing her about this
failed test.

1 The following is a representative excerpt from
Bedrossian’s February 11, 2022 email: “You are not on the
employee list and neither is your boss. You have private
information that . . . HR or IT is supplying you with in order to
‘catch the employees’. . . . You would not answer my questions
about how many employees you targeted on 12/21/21 at 3:50 p.m.
with the phishing email. You indicated that it was not done
through the whole 4000 employees. You said it was random and
yet you would not give me information how you knew that my
computer was having issues with hacking. When I asked about
your affiliation with IT or HR and your boss[’s] name you refused
to give me an answer and hung up on me. This is not proper
procedure. . . . Are you an independent vendor providing services
for [the Fund]. Are you hired by IT or HR to conduct these tests
on their behalf. I want to know your boss[’s] name. I want to
know how many people were on the mailing list on 12/21/21
at 3:50 p.m. How did you designate who will be on the specific
targeted email? Who is giving you the private information for
you to gear it to those people?”

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 On December 9, 2022, Bedrossian received a phishing test
email from wework@invite-workplace.com inviting her to accept
an invitation to a new WeWork account by clicking on a link. The
Fund does not use WeWork. Bedrossian opened the email and
clicked on the link.

D. Bedrossian’s Suspension and Appeal to the SPB
On March 1, 2023, the Fund served Bedrossian a notice
of adverse action (NOAA) formally notifying her that the Fund
was suspending her without pay for five days, effective on
March 13, 2023. As the basis for the suspension, the NOAA
described Bedrossian’s failed phishing tests and her interactions
with the security analyst and Fund personnel about the
December 2021 test. (See Gov. Code, § 19572, subds. (b), (d),
(e), (o) & (t).)
Bedrossian appealed the suspension to the SPB.2 The
SPB is charged with reviewing discipline imposed on a state
civil service employee, which Bedrossian is. (See Boren v.
State Personnel Board (1951) 37 Cal.2d 634, 638.) When a
state employee challenges “suspen[sion] without pay for five
days or less” the SPB may choose to investigate with or without
a hearing. (Gov. Code, § 19576.) The SPB chose to hold an
investigatory hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ).
At the hearing, Bedrossian’s counsel provided an opening
statement and closing argument, introduced exhibits, and
questioned witnesses. Both Bedrossian and the security

2 Bedrossian represents in her briefing—without
record support—that the Fund not only suspended her, but
also terminated her. Even if the Fund has since terminated
Bedrossian, her suspension is the only discipline imposed in the
SPB order that is the object of her writ petition and this appeal.

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analyst testified. The ALJ found Bedrossian not credible and
found the analyst credible. It thus resolved the analyst’s and
Bedrossian’s conflicting testimony on key points in favor of the
analyst’s version of events, finding “that during [Bedrossian’s]
training with [the analyst], appellant spoke to her in an
accusatory and condescending manner” and that Bedrossian
“clicked on the links contained in the phishing test emails sent
to her.” (Capitalization omitted.)
The ALJ issued a proposed decision upholding Bedrossian’s
suspension. The ALJ concluded the Fund had sufficiently
proven multiple “cause[s] for discipline” under Government
Code section 19572; namely, “inexcusable neglect of duty,”
“discourteous treatment of the public or other employees,”
“willful disobedience,” and “other failure of good behavior either
during or outside of duty hours which is of such a nature that
it causes discredit to the appointing authorities or the person’s
employment.” The ALJ dismissed the incompetency and
insubordination causes for discipline that the Fund had also
listed in the NOAA. After considering “the extent to which
[Bedrossian’s] conduct resulted in, or if repeated is likely to result
in [h]arm to the public service” “the circumstances surrounding
the misconduct and the likelihood of its recurrence,” the ALJ
found that the five-day suspension was the appropriate penalty.
(Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 218
(Skelly) [identifying these as the factors for determining
appropriateness of discipline under Government Code
section 19572].)
The SPB adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision and issued
an order upholding the suspension.

E. Bedrossian’s Writ Petition

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 Bedrossian filed a petition for a writ of administrative
mandamus with the Los Angeles County Superior Court
challenging the SPB’s decision upholding the suspension.
She argued the SPB “proceeded without or in excess of its
jurisdiction,” that she was “deprived of a fair trial” and that
the SPB decision reflected “a prejudicial abuse of discretion.”
The court denied the petition. The court stated Bedrossian
had forfeited some of her arguments as to how the SPB abused
its discretion—specifically, those based on “her First Amendment
right to free speech; federal phishing law; wire fraud; California
Penal Code section 502 (larceny); and entrapment”—because she
did not raise these before the SPB. It fully addressed all other
arguments Bedrossian raised in her petition. The court went
on to consider the merits of some of Bedrossian’s forfeited
arguments as well. It found them unpersuasive, explaining
that “ ‘entrapment is recognized as a defense to criminal charges
in order to discourage illegal police conduct’ (In re Foss (1974)
10 Cal.3d 910, 932 . . . ) . . . not a defense to the workplace
misconduct alleged against [Bedrossian][, and] [t]here are similar
defects in [Bedrossian’s] other newly raised defenses.”
This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION
A. Code of Civil Procedure Section 10853
Governs Bedrossian’s Petition
Bedrossian sought writ relief under section 1094.5. That
section permits writ review of a state or local administrative
agency disciplinary decision made “after a proceeding in which,”

3 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory
references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

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inter alia “by law, . . . a hearing is required to be given.” (Taylor
v. State Personnel Board (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 498, 502–503
(Taylor), italics omitted; see § 1094.5.) Because controlling
law permits, but did not require, the SPB to hold a hearing on
Bedrossian’s claims (see Gov. Code, § 19576; Taylor, supra, at
pp. 502–503), she could not seek recourse under section 1094.5.
(See Taylor, supra, at pp. 503–504; see also Keeler v. Superior
Court (1956) 46 Cal.2d 596, 599 [that an agency chose to hold
a hearing the law did not require it to hold does not support
entitlement to section 1094.5 review].)
“When a party petitions for a writ of administrative
mandamus, and such review is not applicable, it is the court’s
duty to” consider whether “traditional writ of mandate” review
is available under section 1085. (Taylor, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d
at p. 505.) Section 1085 provides for writ relief “ ‘to compel the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins.’ . . .
Ordinarily, mandamus does not lie to compel the doing of an act
in a particular manner where an agency has discretion to decide
on the manner of its performance.” (Taylor, supra, at p. 505;
Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 442
[“[m]andamus will not lie to control an exercise of discretion”].)
Rather, “[m]andamus will lie to correct an abuse of discretion
only where a petitioner clearly establishes his right to have
discretion exercised in a particular manner.” (Taylor, supra,
at p. 505, italics omitted; Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970)
3 Cal.3d 678, 685.)
The trial court concluded section 1085 writ review was
appropriate because if, as Bedrossian argued in her petition, “the
evidence was insufficient to justify disciplinary sanctions against
[her], the [SPB] had a legal duty to revoke the adverse action.”

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(Coelho v. State Personnel Bd. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 968, 971.)
Similarly, if, as Bedrossian’s argued, the SPB lacked jurisdiction
to review her challenge, or if she did not receive due process, the
SPB could not legally issue the order, and traditional writ relief
may be available. Accordingly, the trial court reviewed the
petition as a traditional writ under section 1085.
“In reviewing a judgment granting or denying a writ of
mandate petition [under section 1085], ‘ “we apply the substantial
evidence standard of review to the court’s factual findings . . . . ” ’
[Citations] . . . [Citation.] . . . [Citation.] On questions of law,
including statutory interpretation, the appellate court applies a
de novo review and makes its own independent determination.”
(Hayes v. Temecula Valley Unified School Dist. (2018) 21
Cal.App.5th 735, 746.)

B. Bedrossian Has Not Met Her Burden To Show
the Court Erred in Denying Her Petition
Bedrossian here challenges the court’s order on numerous
bases, none of which we find persuasive.

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Bedrossian appears to be contending that substantial
evidence does not support the SPB’s factual findings.4 To support
such an argument, she must cite evidence in the record and

4 Bedrossian’s briefing does not expressly challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the ALJ’s findings. Rather,
it contains several factual assertions that are contrary to the
ALJ’s factual findings, claims there is “no evidence of harm”
without addressing the evidence presented, and argues that
substantial evidence supports her version of events. (Boldface
& capitalization omitted.)

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explain its insufficiency. (See Verrazono v. Gehl Co. (2020)
50 Cal.App.5th 636, 652 [“ ‘[a]n appellant who fails to cite
and discuss the evidence supporting the judgment cannot
demonstrate that such evidence is insufficient’ ”].) Because
Bedrossian does not cite any record support for her arguments,
she has forfeited any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
(See ibid.; see also Shenouda v. Veterinary Medical Bd. (2018)
27 Cal.App.5th 500, 514 [“ ‘ “The appellate court is not required
to search the record on its own seeking error.” [Citation.] Thus,
“[i]f a party fails to support an argument with the necessary
citations to the record, . . . the argument [will be] deemed to have
been waived” ’ ”].)

2. Harm to Public Service
Citing Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d 194, Bedrossian argues we
must reverse and grant her petition because her failed phishing
tests did not harm, or create a risk of harm to, public service.
Skelly identifies “ ‘[h]arm to the public service’ ” from an
employee’s conduct, or risk thereof, as a key factor in assessing
whether discipline imposed for that conduct was excessive and
thus an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 218.) We need not consider
whether her actions actually resulted in harm, because we
agree with the trial court that Bedrossian’s clicking links in
emails containing red flags, “if repeated[,] is likely to result in,
‘[h]arm to the public service . . . ’ ” by compromising data the
Fund has a fiduciary obligation to protect. (Ibid.) In addition,
because “[c]ooperation among public employees is essential to the
smooth functioning of public service,” Bedrossian’s discourteous
behavior toward the security analyst harms the Fund’s public
service efforts as well. (Caveness v. State Personnel Board
(1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 617, 632; id. at pp. 631–632 [dismissal

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for repeated discourteous behavior not an abuse of discretion
because, inter alia, “refusing instruction in proper public service
[is] [an] obvious example[ ] of harm” and “[d]iscourtesy to a
supervisor generally injures the supervisor-employee relationship
and is thus harmful to the public service”].)

3. Arguments Bedrossian Failed To Raise
Before the SPB
Bedrossian next argues the discipline imposed was
unlawful because it was the result of fraud, entrapment, and
larceny, and constitutes an unconstitutional restriction on free
speech. We agree with the court below that Bedrossian forfeited
these arguments by not raising them before the SPB. (See
Moore v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 373, 383
[agency must have an opportunity to decide the issues, and issues
not raised before the agency are forfeited]; Dobos v. Voluntary
Plan Administrators, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 678, 688 [court
cannot properly grant relief on legal theory not presented in
administrative proceeding].) Bedrossian contends the February
2022 email she wrote the analyst and the analyst’s supervisor
accusing them of entrapping her was in evidence before the SPB,
and that this is tantamount to raising the issue before the SPB.
We do not agree. To avoid forfeiting a contention, a litigant must
explicitly bring it to the attention of the forum.5

5 We also do not address her related argument that “[t]he
ALJ . . . struck the evidence about” these forfeited arguments
because she does not identify what that evidence is or provide
any record support for this contention.

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 DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent State Compensation
Insurance Fund shall recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.

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