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Fisher v. International Coffee & Tea

Fisher v. International Coffee & Tea
11:27:2012





Fisher v












Fisher v. International Coffee & Tea































Filed 10/29/12 Fisher v. International Coffee
& Tea CA2/8

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>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115>.









IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA



SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT



DIVISION
EIGHT




>






GERALD FISHER,



Plaintiff and Appellant,



v.



INTERNATIONAL COFFEE & TEA,
LLC,



Defendant and Respondent.




B237127



(Los Angeles
County

Super. Ct.
No. BC 456878)








APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Los Angeles
County, Deirdre H. Hill, Judge. Reversed.



Law Offices
of Peter B. O’Brien, Peter B. O’Brien and Kelly L. Duenckel for
Plaintiff and Appellant.



Freeman,
Freeman & Smiley, Dawn B. Eyerly and Joel G. Weinberg for
Defendant and Respondent.



* * * * * *



In this personal injury action, plaintiff Gerald Fisher
appeals from an order of dismissal entered after the court sustained the demurrer
of defendant International Coffee & Tea, LLC (ICT)href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] without leave to amend. The trial court sustained ICT’s demurrer on
res judicata and other grounds, based on an earlier federal class action
lawsuit, Pizarro v. International Coffee
& Tea, LLC
(C.D. Cal. Case No. CV 06-7448) (Pizarro). We conclude that
the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer and reverse. At the same time, resolution of this matter
requires interpretation of the Pizarro
settlement agreement and final
approval order. Because the federal
court reserved exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the settlement
agreement and order, the appropriate course is to stay all proceedings in this
action until the Pizarro court
resolves the interpretation and enforcement issues.

factual and procedural history

1. >Allegations
of Fisher’s Complaint


Fisher
filed a complaint against ICT and three unrelated defendants on March 8, 2011. The complaint alleges as follows. On or about March 9, 2010, Fisher was at the Coffee Bean & Tea
Leaf location at 6922 Hollywood Boulevard,
which was owned and operated by ICT.
Fisher was in a wheelchair. He
fell from a raised platform that was outside a door to the premises. There was no ramp, properly marked steps,
warning signs, or alternate routes of exit to accommodate those with
disabilities and in wheelchairs. The
exit, platform, and step were known to ICT and its staff as dangerous and
needing repairs, further warnings, and/or ramps or exit protocols. ICT was negligent and had a duty to construct
and maintain the platform and step so as to protect against a dangerous and
defective condition for wheelchair bound patrons. Prior to Fisher’s fall, ICT knew that the
exit, step, and platform from which he fell were defective to such an extent as
to pose a danger to those wheelchair bound patrons who needed to use them.

Fisher
alleges causes of action against ICT for negligence
and premises liability
. He is seeking
general damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees and costs. He also alleges causes of action for medical
neglect and violation of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection
Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.) against the hospital, nursing
home, and doctor that treated him after his fall. Those causes of action are not at issue and
those defendants are not parties to this appeal.

2. >Pizarro
Action


The >Pizarro lawsuit was a putative class
action brought in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California. The named plaintiffs brought
the action on behalf of themselves and a class consisting of mobility
impaired/wheelchair bound persons and hearing and visually impaired persons. The plaintiffs filed the second amended class
action complaint on March 20, 2007, against ICT and alleged violations of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act) (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq.),href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] California’s Disabled Persons Act (DPA) (§ 54
et seq.), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) (42 U.S.C. §
12101 et seq.). They sought href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">injunctive relief and statutory damages.

The >Pizarro complaint alleged that ICT
discriminated against people who are disabled in ways that blocked them from
equal access to and use of ICT’s Coffee Bean & Tea Leaf stores, in
violation of the ADA, DPA, and
Unruh Act. The Coffee Bean & Tea
Leaf location at 6922 Hollywood Boulevard
was one of the premises at which there were barriers to equal access.

>a. >Pizarro
Settlement Agreement

On November 16, 2007, the parties in >Pizarro filed a settlement agreement
with the court. The pertinent terms were
as follows:

·
The agreement applied to all Coffee Bean &
Tea Leaf stores in California,
including the one at 6922 Hollywood Boulevard.

·
The agreement defined the settlement class as
all persons who were represented by the named plaintiffs and who, at any time
from October 24, 2005,
through the term of the agreement, were mobility impaired and used wheelchairs,
or were vision or hearing impaired, and who patronized any Coffee Bean &
Tea Leaf store.

·
The term of the agreement expired 30 months
after the court granted final approval of the settlement.

·
ICT agreed to bring its Coffee Bean & Tea
Leaf Stores into compliance with the standards for accessibility under the ADA,
Unruh Act, and DPA, and maintain the premises in operable and working condition
under those standards.

·
ICT agreed to pay $500,000 to settle all claims
for “Statutory Minimum Damages” in the complaint. The agreement defines statutory minimum
damages as any minimum damages available under section 52 (for violations of
the Unruh Act) and section 54.3 (for violations of the DPA), and any other
statute, code, or law providing for minimum damages for violations of these
statutes.

·
Any potential settlement class member could opt
out of the class for purposes of monetary relief only. No potential settlement class member could
opt out of for purposes of injunctive relief.

·
Released Damages Claims: The settlement class members agreed to
release their injunctive relief claims and their statutory minimum damages
claims. The released statutory damages
claims were “any and all claims, rights, demands, charges, complaints, actions,
suits, causes of action, and liabilities of any kind, whether known or unknown,
suspected or unsuspected, accrued or unaccrued, for Statutory Minimum Damages
based upon conduct preceding Final Approval of this Agreement that were
brought, could have been brought or could be brought now or in the future that relate
in any way to the accessibility of Coffee Bean Stores or Closed Coffee Bean
Stores to persons who are mobility impaired, who use wheelchairs or scooters
for mobility, or who are vision or hearing impaired.”

·
The released statutory minimum damages claims
also included claims based on conduct that occurred after final approval and
during the term of the agreement.

·
The released damages claims did >not include “any claims, rights,
demands, charges, complaints, actions, causes of action or liabilities for any
damages other than Statutory Minimum Damages.”

·
Covenant Not to Sue: The settlement class members “covenant[ed]
and agree[d] never to file or institute against any of the Coffee Bean Parties
any claim, right, demand, charge, complaint, suit, cause of action, action,
liability or proceeding of any kind or nature whatsoever, whether at law, in
equity or otherwise, in or before any court, administrative agency, arbitral
panel or other tribunal wherever situated, asserting, directly or indirectly,
any Released Damages Claim or any
claim, demand, cause or right of action of any kind or nature whatsoever,
whether known or unknown, contingent or absolute, suspected or unsuspected,
disclosed or undisclosed, hidden or concealed, based upon or arising out of the
Released Damages Claim.”

·
Waiver of Section 1542 Rights:href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">[3] The settlement class members expressly agreed
“that this AGREEMENT extends to all claims of every nature and kind, known or
unknown, suspected or unsuspected, past, present, or future, arising from or attributable
to any conduct of the Coffee Bean Parties, whether known by the Releasing
Parties or whether or not any Releasing Party believes he or she may have any
claims, and that any and all rights granted to the Releasing Party under
Section 1542 of the California Civil Code or any analogous state law or federal
law or regulations, are hereby expressly WAIVED . . . .”

·
Reservation of Jurisdiction: The settlement agreement provided: “[T]he Final Judgment and Order shall attach
this Agreement as an exhibit and shall provide that the Court retains
jurisdiction through the Term of this Agreement in order to enforce this
Agreement.” It also provided: “The Parties agree that the United States
District Court for the Central District of California shall have continuing
jurisdiction throughout the Term of this Agreement to interpret and enforce
this Agreement.”

>b. >Approval of the Pizarro Settlement

On December 11, 2007, the court in >Pizarro entered an order preliminarily
approving the settlement and approving the parties’ plan to provide notice to
the potential settlement class members.
The court held the final approval hearing on May 19, 2008.
It filed the final approval order and judgment on the same date. It found the notice provided to potential
settlement class members to be the best notice practicable under the
circumstances and compliant with the applicable law. No class members had requested exclusion from
or objected to the settlement.

As provided
for in the settlement agreement, the court certified a class of all persons
who, at any time from October 24, 2005, through the term of the agreement
(approximately December 2010),href="#_ftn4"
name="_ftnref4" title="">[4] were mobility impaired and used wheelchairs,
or who were vision or hearing impaired, and who patronized any Coffee Bean
& Tea Leaf store, or who alleged they would have patronized a store, had
they not been denied access. The court
approved the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Consistent
with provisions of the settlement agreement, the final approval order decreed
that the court had “jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Action, the
Lead Plaintiff, the other Members of the Settlement Class, and the
Defendants.” Further, the court
“reserve[d] exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the Action, the Lead
Plaintiff, the Class and the Released Persons for the purposes of: (1)
supervising the implementation, enforcement, construction, and interpretation
of the Agreement, the Plan of Allocation, and this Final Order and Judgment;
(2) hearing and determining any additional application by Lead Counsel for an
award of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses; and (3) supervising the
distribution of the Settlement Fund.”
The order also decreed: “The
court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement.”

3. >ICT’s
Demurrer in the Instant Action


ICT
demurred to Fisher’s complaint on several grounds and requested judicial notice
of the second amended complaint and settlement documents in >Pizarro.
The Pizarro settlement
documents consisted of the settlement agreement and exhibits filed with the
court, the preliminary approval order, and the final approval order and
judgment. The court granted judicial
notice of the Pizarro documents and
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, ruling:

“This action is barred by res judicata --
both cases [the Pizarro case and this
case] involve a complaint that plaintiff suffered barriers to accessibility at
the same Coffee Bean store, wherein he was injured. The prior class action proceeding resulted in
a final judgment and the party against whom the doctrine is being asserted was
a party with plaintiff, a Class member, to the prior proceeding. Further, in the Settlement Agreement, as a
Class member, plaintiff released any damage claims that could be brought in the
future that relate in any way to the accessibility of Coffee Bean stores. Plaintiff’s claims relate to the
accessibility of a Coffee Bean store.
Plaintiff also agreed that the Settlement Agreement ‘extends to all
claims of every nature and kind, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected,
past, present, or future, arising from or attributable to any conduct of’
ICT. The Court finds the waiver is
operative to exclude plaintiff from pursuing claims related to barriers to
accessibility in the instant action.
Plaintiff’s incident occurred on 3/9/10, during the time frame of the
Settlement Agreement. Further, the
parties agreed that the U.S. District Court shall have continuing jurisdiction
to interpret and enforce the Settlement Agreement.”

The court
filed an order of dismissal of the two causes of action against ICT for
negligence and premises liability on September 7, 2011. Fisher timely filed a notice of appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“On appeal
from a judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer without leave
to amend, [t]he reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable
interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts
properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however, assume the truth
of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.]
The judgment must be affirmed ‘if any one of the several grounds of
demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]
However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the
plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory.” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist.
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.)
“Additionally, dismissal on res judicata grounds presents a question of
law, which we review de novo.” (Louie
v. BFS Retail & Commercial Operations, LLC
(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1544,
1553.)

In
reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a demurrer, we also consider
matters which may be judicially noticed.
(Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “We review the trial court’s ruling on the request
for judicial notice for abuse of discretion.”
(Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256,
264.)

discussion

Fisher
contends that the court erred in sustaining ICT’s demurrer without leave to
amend and that the court erred in taking judicial notice of the >Pizarro documents. ICT contends that there were several
meritorious grounds for sustaining the demurrer, including: (1) the Pizarro
judgment is res judicata; (2) Fisher expressly released the instant claims
in the Pizarro settlement; (3) the
state court lacks jurisdiction over this suit because the federal court in >Pizarro has exclusive jurisdiction; and
(4) Fisher’s admission in the complaint that the alleged dangerous condition of
the platform was “obvious” bars his suit.

We disagree
with Fisher that the court erred in taking judicial notice of the >Pizarro documents, but agree that the
court erred in sustaining ICT’s demurrer.
ICT’s res judicata argument and the argument that an admission of
obviousness bars the suit are not well taken.
As to ICT’s final two arguments, we lack jurisdiction to resolve the
argument that Fisher released his claims in the Pizarro settlement, because the federal court reserved exclusive
jurisdiction of the issue. We conclude
that the appropriate course is not a dismissal of this action, but a stay to
permit the federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction.

>1.
>The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
in Taking Judicial Notice of the Pizarro
Documents


A court may
take judicial notice of the records of any court of this state. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).) Fisher asserts, however, that the >Pizarro documents are hearsay
allegations, and the “court cannot
take judicial notice of hearsay >allegations as being true, just because
they are part of a court record or file.”
(Day v. Sharp (1975) 50
Cal.App.3d 904, 914.) Fisher
mischaracterizes the effect of taking judicial notice of the documents. The court did not consider the allegations of
the documents for the truth of the matters asserted. It considered the documents as evidence of
the claims asserted and evidence of the existence of the releases agreed to by
the parties. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564-1565.) This is a routine application of judicial
notice when a litigant contends a prior action bars a present action under the
doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel. (E.g., Western
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Yamamoto
(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1485; >Bistawros v. Greenberg (1987) 189
Cal.App.3d 189, 192.)

Fisher also
contends that the court erred because ICT did not introduce certified copies of
the documents until the hearing on the demurrer, depriving him of sufficient
time to prepare to meet the request. We
find this argument specious. Well before
the hearing, ICT served its notice of demurrer and request for judicial notice,
attaching copies of the Pizarro
documents. Those documents initially
served were not certified copies of the Pizarro
documents. That was the only difference
between those documents and the Pizarro documents
introduced on the day of the hearing. As
such, ICT did not deprive Fisher of sufficient time to review the documents and
meet the request. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of them.

>2.
>The Pizarro Judgment Is Not Res Judicata

ICT
contends that the Pizarro judgment is
res judicata and completely bars this action.
We disagree.

The
doctrine of res judicata “precludes parties or their privities from
relitigating a cause of action that has been finally determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction.” (Gamble v.
General Foods Corp.
(1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 893, 898.) The prerequisite elements for applying the
doctrine to a cause of action are (1) a cause of action raised in the present
action is identical to a cause of action litigated in a prior proceeding, (2)
the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits, and (3) the
party against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a party or in privity
with a party to the prior proceeding. (Brinton
v. Bankers Pension Services, Inc.
(1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 550, 556.) A prior judgment is res judicata on causes of action that were raised or >could have been raised, despite the fact
that they were not expressly urged. (Warga
v. Cooper
(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 371, 377-378.) But the party against whom res judicata is
asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the same cause
of action in the former action. (>Mark v. Spencer (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th
219, 229; >Roos v. Red (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 870,
879.)

Here, res
judicata does not apply because Fisher’s causes of action are not identical to
those asserted in the Pizarro action,
nor could he have asserted his claims in Pizarro. California follows a primary right theory of
res judicata. Under this theory, “a
cause of action consists of 1) a primary right possessed by the plaintiff, 2) a
corresponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant, and 3) a delict or
wrong done by the defendant which consists in a breach of such primary right
and duty.” (Gamble v. General Foods
Corp.
, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at
p. 898.) “The most salient
characteristic of a primary right is that it is indivisible: the violation of a
single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of action.” (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th
666, 681.) When “an action is filed in a
California state court and the defendant claims the suit is barred by a final
federal judgment, California law will determine the res judicata effect of the
prior federal court judgment on the basis of whether the federal and state
actions involve the same primary right.”
(Gamble v. General Foods
Corp.
, at p. 898.)

“As far as
its content is concerned, the primary right is simply the plaintiff’s right to
be free from the particular injury suffered.
[Citation.] It must therefore be
distinguished from the legal theory on which liability for that injury
is premised: ‘Even where there are
multiple legal theories upon which recovery might be predicated, one injury
gives rise to only one claim for relief.’ [Citation.] The primary right must
also be distinguished from the remedy sought: ‘The violation of one primary right
constitutes a single cause of action, though it may entitle the injured party
to many forms of relief, and the relief is not to be confounded with the cause
of action, one not being determinative of the other.’” (Crowley v. Katleman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 681-682.)

ICT asserts
that Pizarro and this action involve
the same primary right. At issue in
both, ICT urges, is the right to be free from “barriers to accessibility.” It further urges that in both actions, Fisher
complains (either in his own right or as an absent settlement class member)
that he suffered barriers to accessibility at the Coffee Bean & Tea Leaf
and, as a result, he was damaged.

ICT
misidentifies the primary right involved here.
This is not merely a case of Fisher pursuing a different legal theory or
different remedy for violation of the same primary right as in >Pizarro.
Fisher’s claims for negligence assert the primary right to be free from
personal injury. (Slater v. Blackwood (1975) 15 Cal.3d 791, 794-795 [primary right
alleged to have been violated in negligence cause of action was “plaintiff’s
right to be free from injury to her person”]; Panos v. Great Western Packing Co. (1943) 21 Cal.2d 636, 639
[negligence cause of action is “based upon the primary right of the plaintiff
to be free from injury to his person or property and a violation by the
defendant of that right through his failure to use proper care”].) Premises liability is a form of negligence
“and is described as follows: The owner
[or possessor] of premises is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the
management of such premises in order to avoid exposing persons to an
unreasonable risk of harm. A failure to
fulfill this duty is negligence.” (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d
1611, 1619; see also Fitch v. LeBeau
(1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 320, 324.)
Accordingly, like negligence, the primary right asserted in such a claim
is the right to be free from personal injury.

As ICT
concedes, this was not the primary right at issue in Pizarro. ICT acknowledges
that Pizarro concerned the right of
disabled persons to be free from barriers to equal access. This is apparent when one examines the
statutes providing the basis for the Pizarro
claims. The Unruh Act “‘“is a public
accommodations statute that focuses on discriminatory behavior by business
establishments . . . .”’
[Citation.] The purpose of the
[Unruh] Act is ‘“to compel recognition of the equality of all persons in the
right to the particular service offered by an organization or entity covered by
the act.”’” (Ramirez v. Wong (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1485.) “The DPA is ‘intended to secure to disabled
persons the “same right as the general public to the full and free use” of
facilities open to the public.’” (>Turner v. Association of American Medical
Colleges (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1412.) The DPA, in particular, while offering a
private right of action for damages, is not intended “to provide a cause of
action for disabled persons who have
suffered physical injury
but to persons who have been denied the same
access to public facilities as persons without a
disability. . . . ‘[T]he
impediments to the physically handicappeds’ interaction in community life is
the inequity which [the DPA] . . . seek[s] to prevent.’” (Urhausen
v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc.
(2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 254, 264, fn.
omitted.) And the purpose of the ADA is
“to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” (42 U.S.C.S. § 12101, subd. (b)(1).) In sum, these are anti-discrimination
statutes. The primary right involved in >Pizarro was the right to be free from
discrimination based on a disability, or as ICT puts it, to be free from
barriers to equal access.

The thrust
of Fisher’s complaint is not that he was denied access as a wheelchair bound
patron. The thrust is that the only
access available to him, the platform, was negligently maintained and
constituted a dangerous condition, and as a result, he fell and injured
himself. Even if it is discovered that
ICT’s premises fully complied with the ADA, DPA, and Unruh Act by providing the
appropriate access to disabled patrons, this does not preclude the possibility
that the platform was defective or negligently constructed or maintained. Statutory compliance is not necessarily a
complete defense to tort liability. (See
Myrick v. Mastagni (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th
1082, 1087, 1089 [“Generally courts have not looked favorably on the use of
statutory compliance as a defense to tort liability.”]; see also >Ramirez v. Plough, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th
539, 547-548.) These two cases, >Pizarro and the instant action, do not
involve the same primary right, and therefore the causes of action are not
identical.

Additionally,
Fisher’s causes of action here could not have been raised in >Pizarro.
His causes of action did not accrue until March 2010, when he fell and
was injured. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806
[“Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at ‘the time when the cause of
action is complete with all of its elements.’”].) This was
several years after the court entered the final approval order and judgment in >Pizarro.
He could not have possibly had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
his present claims during the pendency of the Pizarro action. ICT contends
that res judicata bars the claims even if they could not have been presented in
Pizarro. The law holds the exact opposite, however --
that res judicata bars only those claims which could have been presented. (Warga
v. Cooper
, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th
371, 377-378.) ICT relies on cases
holding that a settlement agreement
may release claims that were not brought or could not have been brought in the
action. The effect of a release
agreement, as opposed to res judicata, is a separate issue, which we discuss in
a following part.

In
conclusion, the Pizarro judgment is
not res judicata. An essential element
of res judicata is lacking because the causes of action asserted here and in >Pizarro are not identical, and
furthermore, Fisher could not have asserted his claims in Pizarro.

>3.
>The Complaint’s Allegation That the
Dangerous Condition Was Obvious Does Not Bar This Action


ICT
contends Fisher admitted in his complaint that the alleged dangerous condition
was obvious, and because of this admission, he cannot sue for negligence or
premises liability. We disagree.

The
complaint alleges that ICT had actual and/or constructive notice of the
dangerous condition on its premises (the platform) and knew, or should have
known, of the dangerous condition.
Further, “the dangerous condition existed for such a period of time and
was [of] such an obvious nature that it should have been discovered” by ICT.

This bare
allegation does not provide a complete defense to ICT. The law regarding the obviousness of a danger
is not so simple. Statements to the
effect “that a contractor or possessor of land cannot be liable for an injury
caused by an obvious or observable danger [are] erroneous statements of the
law, veritable shoals in the murky sea of duty, because they purport to set forth a rule of liability without reference
either to duty or to foreseeability of injury.”
(Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104,
121, italics omitted.) “[A]lthough the
obviousness of a danger may obviate the duty to warn of its existence,
if it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite the fact
that it is obvious (e.g., when necessity requires persons to encounter it),
there may be a duty to remedy the danger, and the breach of that duty
may in turn form the basis for liability, if the breach of duty was a proximate
cause of any injury.” (>Id. at p. 122.) Thus, even if the alleged dangerous condition
was obvious, questions of fact regarding foreseeability would remain. The allegation is thus not dispositive.

>4.
>The Federal Court Has Exclusive Jurisdiction
to Interpret and Enforce the Pizarro Settlement
Agreement and Final Approval Order


ICT
contends that this action is barred because the courts of this state lack
jurisdiction over this action. It
contends that the federal court in Pizarro
has exclusive jurisdiction over the action pursuant to the >Pizarro settlement agreement and final
approval order. We disagree that the
federal court has exclusive jurisdiction over this entire action, but we find
that it has exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the >Pizarro settlement agreement and final
approval order. ICT’s defense has
implicated the Pizarro settlement and
final approval order. The appropriate
resolution, however, is not a dismissal of this entire action.

“Enforcement
of a settlement agreement ‘is more than just a continuation or renewal of [the
dismissed suit], and hence requires its own basis for jurisdiction.’ [Citation.]
Such a basis for jurisdiction may be furnished ‘by separate provision
(such as a provision “retaining jurisdiction” over the settlement agreement [in
a court’s order or final judgment]) or by incorporating the terms of the
settlement agreement in the order.’” Flanagan
v. Arnaiz
(9th Cir. 1998) 143 F.3d 540, 544, quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America (1994) 511 U.S. 375,
378, 381].) When a federal court
expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce a federal court settlement, that
jurisdiction is exclusive, even if the court’s order retaining jurisdiction
does not say so. (Flanagan v. Arnaiz,
at p. 545.)

Here, the
federal court in Pizarro validly
retained exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the settlement
agreement. The final approval order
stated that the court was reserving exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over
the action, the lead plaintiff, the class, and the released persons for
purposes of, inter alia, enforcing, construing, and interpreting the settlement
agreement and the final approval order.

ICT
contended below and contends on appeal that the Pizarro settlement agreement provides a complete defense to this
action because Fisher was part of the class, and as such, he released the
claims at bar. This argument should be
distinguished from the res judicata argument.
If, as part of the settlement class, Fisher contracted to release the
instant claims in the settlement agreement, that is a bar to this action
separate and apart from res judicata.

As
discussed and quoted in the Factual and Procedural History part, >ante, the Pizarro settlement contained broad releases of claims, including
certain damages claims and unknown, unaccrued claims, as well as a waiver of
rights under section 1542. The final
approval order also contained a waiver of rights under section 1542 and a
description of “Settled Claims,” and decreed that the settlement class members
had released those claims. Fisher was
arguably part of the settlement class because he was mobility impaired and used
a wheelchair, and he patronized a Coffee Bean & Tea Leaf store during the
term of the agreement. Whether Fisher’s
claims fall within the scope of the Pizarro
settlement agreement and final approval order requires interpretation,
construction, and possibly enforcement of the releases in the agreement and
order. Inasmuch as the federal court has
reserved exclusive jurisdiction over these issues, neither we nor the trial
court can determine them or resolve the action as of yet.

Assuming
the federal court determines that this action does not fall within the scope of
the releases and is not barred thereby, the trial court otherwise has subject
matter jurisdiction over the action and can resolve the action. (Serrano
v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc.
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1029
[“The California Constitution confers broad subject matter jurisdiction on the
superior court.”].) For this reason, we
think it appropriate not to dismiss the action against ICT as the trial court
did, but to stay the action pending resolution of the issues by the >Pizarro court.

DISPOSITION

The
judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the superior court with
directions to (1) vacate its order of dismissal as to ICT and its ruling
sustaining ICT’s demurrer without leave to amend, (2) enter a new order
overruling ICT’s demurrer, (3) direct the parties to take any and all action
necessary to obtain from the Pizarro
federal court an order determining whether Fisher’s claims are barred by the
releases in the Pizarro settlement
agreement and/or final approval order, and (4) stay all proceedings in this
action until these Pizarro federal
court issues are resolved. The parties
are to pay their own costs on appeal.





FLIER,
J.

WE CONCUR:





BIGELOW, P. J.





GRIMES, J.









id=ftn1>

href="#_ftnref1"
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Fisher erroneously sued ICT as Coffee Bean & Tea Leaf Inc.

id=ftn2>

href="#_ftnref2"
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] All further statutory references are to the Civil Code unless
otherwise stated.

id=ftn3>

href="#_ftnref3"
name="_ftn3" title="">[3] Section 1542 provides:
“A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not
know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the
release, which if known by him or her must have materially affected his or her
settlement with the debtor.”

id=ftn4>

href="#_ftnref4"
name="_ftn4" title="">[4] The final approval order became final and nonappealable on
or around June 19, 2008, 30 days after its entry.
(Fed. Rules App. Proc., rule 4(a)(1).)
The parties agreed the term of the settlement agreement would be 30
months after that, which was approximately December 19, 2010.








Description In this personal injury action, plaintiff Gerald Fisher appeals from an order of dismissal entered after the court sustained the demurrer of defendant International Coffee & Tea, LLC (ICT)[1] without leave to amend. The trial court sustained ICT’s demurrer on res judicata and other grounds, based on an earlier federal class action lawsuit, Pizarro v. International Coffee & Tea, LLC (C.D. Cal. Case No. CV 06-7448) (Pizarro). We conclude that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer and reverse. At the same time, resolution of this matter requires interpretation of the Pizarro settlement agreement and final approval order. Because the federal court reserved exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the settlement agreement and order, the appropriate course is to stay all proceedings in this action until the Pizarro court resolves the interpretation and enforcement issues. factual and procedural history
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