Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

P. v. Mendoza CA5

Filed 11/20/26 P. v. Mendoza CA5
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/20/26 P. v. Mendoza CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F090454
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. VCF452891A)
v.

JOSE ELIAS MENDOZA,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Melinda
Myrle Reed, Judge.
Matthew J. Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and Justin
Pedroso, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant and Appellant Jose Elias Mendoza (appellant) pled no contest to
unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (Pen. Code, § 261.5, subd. (c)).1 The trial court
granted appellant’s request to represent himself at the sentencing hearing. Pursuant to the
plea agreement, appellant was sentenced to two years of felony probation and 364 days in
custody. Appellant thereafter sought to revoke the waiver of his right to counsel and
requested modification of his probation terms the day before he was scheduled to go into
custody. The court denied appellant’s request to reappoint counsel. Appellant argues on
appeal that the court erred in denying his request for counsel. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 28, 2024, the Tulare County District Attorney’s Office filed a felony
complaint charging appellant with one count of sodomy of a person under 18 years old
(§ 286, subd. (b)(1); count 1). The complaint further alleged as to count 1 that appellant
committed the offense with knowledge he had an acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS) and knowledge that he carried antibodies to the human immunodeficiency virus
(§ 12022.85), the victim was particularly vulnerable (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(3))2, appellant occupied a position of leadership, dominance, and induced
others to participate in the commission of the crime (Rule 4.421(a)(4)), and appellant
engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society (Rule 4.421(b)(1)).3
On May 21, 2024, appellant requested his appointed attorney be discharged and a
new attorney substituted pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
The trial court denied appellant’s motion.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
3 The complaint also charged appellant’s co-defendant with crimes, which we do
not address because they are not the subject of this appeal.

2.
On August 2, 2024, appellant’s attorney declared a conflict, and he was appointed
a new attorney.
On November 15, 2024, appellant filed another Marsden motion. Appellant asked
for his current counsel to be relieved and new counsel appointed. The trial court denied
appellant’s request.
On January 23, 2025, appellant filed a third Marsden motion that the trial court
denied and held appellant to answer to the charges in the criminal complaint at the
preliminary hearing.
On February 5, 2025, the Tulare County District Attorney’s Office filed an
information charging appellant with the same allegations as the felony complaint.
On May 27, 2025, at a pretrial hearing, appellant, who was represented by counsel,
entered a plea agreement with the People. Appellant pled no contest to unlawful
intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5, subd. (c)) in exchange for two years of felony
probation and a 364-day lid.
On June 25, 2025, appellant’s counsel declared a conflict, and a new attorney was
appointed.
On July 1, 2025, appellant relinquished his right to counsel and requested to
represent himself. After executing a valid waiver, the trial court granted appellant’s
request. On the same day, the court sentenced appellant pursuant to the plea agreement
as follows: two years of felony probation and 364 days in custody. The court suspended
execution of his sentence for 30 days to allow appellant time to contact the sheriff’s
office to determine if he was eligible for a program other than serving 364 days in
custody.
On July 31, 2025, the day before appellant was scheduled to go into custody, he
appeared before the trial court as a walk-in without a scheduled hearing and requested the
court reappoint counsel. Appellant also asked the court to modify the terms and
conditions of his probation. The court denied appellant’s request.

3.
DISCUSSION4
I. Request to Withdraw Pro Per Status and Reappoint Counsel
Appellant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing his request to
withdraw his pro per status and to have counsel reappointed. The People respond that
appellant was not entitled to counsel because he was not at a critical stage of the
proceedings. The People further maintain that even if appellant had been entitled to
counsel, there was no error, and any presumed error was harmless.
We conclude appellant was not in a critical stage of the proceedings. However,
assuming appellant was in a critical stage and entitled to counsel, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s untimely request to revoke his waiver of his
right to counsel, and any presumed error is harmless.
A. Additional Background
Appellant reached an agreement with the prosecution and pled no contest to
unlawful intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5, subd. (c)) in exchange for two years felony
probation and a lid of 364 days in custody. Appellant was represented by counsel at the
time he executed the plea agreement who discussed the charges, appellant’s rights,
defenses, and the consequences of his plea. Appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently agreed to the terms of the plea. Appellant does not contest on appeal the
validity of the plea agreement.
At the sentencing hearing, appellant requested to represent himself. The trial court
informed appellant that he had a right to counsel, and that it is “almost always wise not to
represent yourself when you are dealing with criminal proceedings because a lawyer can
do and say things for you that you may not have knowledge of, and a lawyer may receive
benefits for you that you are unable to receive because you are unaware of them.”

4 Because this appeal raises no issues concerning the facts of the underlying
offenses, we omit a statement of facts. (See People v. White (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 914,
916, fn. 2.)

4.
Appellant confirmed he understood and requested to be sentenced without counsel. The
court granted appellant’s request to proceed without counsel.
Appellant made arguments that appeared to be for a lesser sentence, however, the
trial court sentenced appellant pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement. The court
provided appellant 30 days to determine if he was eligible to apply for an alternative
program other than serving time in custody.
The day before appellant was scheduled to go into custody, he appeared in the trial
court without a scheduled hearing and requested reappointment of counsel. Appellant
also sought modification of his probation conditions, claiming he did not agree to the
plea. He further stated that his mother was ill and requested a lighter sentence so he
could care for her. Appellant informed the court that he was denied alternative
programming that would substitute for time in custody.
The trial court reminded appellant that he entered a plea agreement and was
previously sentenced. The court denied appellant’s request to reappoint counsel as
untimely. The court stated, “You requested that you proceed on your own, and I [am]
not inclined to now grant [reappointment of counsel]. This matter had been terminated
by way of pronouncement of judgment. You are here as a walk-in … request[ing] …
modification of [probation] restrictions.”
B. Right to Counsel
“The federal constitutional right to counsel ‘applies at all critical stages of a
criminal proceeding in which the substantial rights of a defendant are at stake.’ ” (People
v. Bauer (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 150, 155; see Mempa v. Rhay (1967) 389 U.S. 128,
134.) “[A] critical stage is one ‘in which the substantial rights of a defendant are at stake’
[citation], and ‘the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant’s basic
right to a fair trial.’ ” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 465.)
Plea negotiations and sentencing are critical stages to which the constitutional right to
counsel attaches. (Gardner v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2019) 6 Cal.5th 998,

5.
1005.) This applies even when “sentencing is deferred and a hearing is not conducted
until after probation is revoked.” (People v. Freeman (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 126, 134;
see also People v. Bauer (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 150, 155.) A probation revocation
hearing requires appointed counsel because a probationer faces a significant loss of
liberty when probation is revoked. (See People v. Bauer, at p. 156, fn. 2 [“the right to
counsel at probation revocation hearings is consistent with the principle that the due
process clause imposes procedural and substantive limits on the revocation of the
conditional liberty created by probation”].)
The People argue appellant was not entitled to appointed counsel because he was
not in a critical stage in the proceedings citing People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th
858. There, the Second District found there was “no federal constitutional right to
counsel in connection with a postconviction habeas corpus petition attacking the validity
of a judgment.” (Id. at p. 865.) The court reasoned that the Secretary’s request for recall
and resentencing is only an invitation for the court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction; it
did not provide any statutory entitlement to relief. (Ibid.) However, once the defendant’s
sentence was recalled, the resentencing hearing was a critical stage at which the
defendant enjoyed the right to due process and counsel. (Id. at p. 866.)
Our case does not involve a postconviction request for the trial court to exercise its
equitable jurisdiction. Appellant requested the trial court modify the terms of his
probation because he did not qualify for programming, was faced with 364 days in
custody, and his mother was ill. Thus, our case presents a different issue that Frazier
does not address.
In appellant’s reply, he contends the hearing was in a critical stage because it was
adversarial in nature, relying on authority that states a trial court generally has the power
to modify terms and conditions of probation. (People v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091,
1095 [“A change in circumstances is required before a court has jurisdiction to extend or
otherwise modify probation”].) Appellant ends the inquiry there. While the court has the

6.
power to modify the terms and conditions of probation, this does not necessitate
entitlement to counsel at the hearing.
The court in United States v. Silver (9th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 289, held that a hearing
extending probation does not result in “a liberty interest [being] so infringed as to require
[the] court to call for additional protections as per the Due Process Clause.” (Id. at
p. 292.) The Third District followed the Ninth Circuit and held that “the procedural due
process protections applied by the Supreme Court … to parole and probation revocation
proceedings do not apply to probation extension proceedings.” (People v. Minor (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 1, 17.) The Minor court reasoned, “[n]ot only is the liberty issue at
stake in an extension proceeding different in degree from that involved in revocation of
probation, the nature of the factual inquiry also differs.” (Id. at p. 16.) In a probation
revocation hearing, the probationer can contest the violation allegation, however, in a
modification hearing, the trial court is given greater discretion, and the court need not
find that a violation occurred. (Ibid.)
Like Minor, the significant liberty interest implicated in a critical stage, such as at
sentencing or a parole revocation hearing, is not at issue in this case. Appellant entered a
plea agreement and was sentenced. He then requested leniency regarding the terms of his
probation. The court refused to modify the terms. We also find noteworthy the reason
appellant made the modification request was because he was denied programming the
court offered and was faced with serving a period in custody.
The denial of appellant’s request to have counsel present at the hearing on his
request to modify probation did not violate the Sixth Amendment; this was not a critical
stage in the proceedings since there was minimal risk that his counsel’s absence might
infringe upon a liberty interest protected by due process. However, even assuming
appellant was in a critical stage, the court did not err.

7.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
A criminal defendant has the right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to
waive the right to counsel and to represent himself. (Faretta v. California (1975)
422 U.S. 806, 819.)
“When a criminal defendant who has waived his right to counsel and elected to
represent himself under Faretta … seeks, during trial, to revoke that waiver and have
counsel appointed, the trial court must exercise its discretion under the totality of the
circumstances, considering factors including the defendant’s reasons for seeking to
revoke the waiver, and the delay or disruption revocation is likely to cause the court, the
jury, and other parties.” (People v. Lawrence (2009) 46 Cal.4th 186, 188 (Lawrence).)
The following factors may be considered when the trial court exercises its
discretion to grant a defendant’s request for self-representation: “(1) defendant’s prior
history in the substitution of counsel and in the desire to change from self-representation
to counsel-representation, (2) the reasons set forth for the request, (3) the length and stage
of the trial proceedings, (4) disruption or delay which reasonably might be expected to
ensue from the granting of such motion, and (5) the likelihood of defendant’s
effectiveness in defending against the charges if required to continue to act as his own
attorney.” (People v. Elliott (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 984, 993–994.) “[U]ltimately the trial
court’s discretion is to be exercised on the totality of the circumstances, not strictly on the
listed factors.” (Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 192.) “The standard is whether the
court’s decision was an abuse of its discretion under the totality of the circumstances
[citation], not whether the court correctly listed factors or whether any one factor should
have been weighed more heavily in the balance.” (Id. at p. 196; see also People v.
Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1006 [“a trial court’s denial of a Faretta revocation
request is reviewed for abuse of discretion”].)
In Lawrence, the defendant’s request for revocation of his Faretta waiver, who
was being tried jointly with a codefendant, was not heard until after the jury had been

8.
selected and sworn and after testimony from the prosecution’s first witness began.
(Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 188.) Our Supreme Court held, “considering all the
circumstances, especially [the] defendant’s failure to articulate a compelling reason for
revoking his Faretta waiver and the likely delay and disruption that continuing a joint
trial after the jury was empaneled would cause, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the revocation request.” (Ibid.) The Lawrence court reasoned that because
the defendant was properly told and confirmed his understanding of “the risks and
disadvantages of self-representation before he waived counsel” this showed that he did
not suddenly learn he would be at a disadvantage at trial but that he “had simply
reweighed the pros and cons of self-representation and changed his mind as to the best
course.” (Id. at p. 195.) The court further found that the defendant had “no compelling
reason” to revoke his in propria persona status, and granting his request would cause
“serious disruption to the administration of justice….” which strongly supported the trial
court’s denial of his request. (Id. at p. 196.)
After considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in failing to grant appellant’s request for reappointment of
counsel. Significantly, appellant showed no compelling reason to revoke his in pro per
status. (See, Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 195 [there was a “lack of either
definiteness or urgency” in the defendant’s reason for requesting representation].)
Appellant vaguely asserted he wished to revoke his right to self-representation, stating
that he “did [not] agree to the plea….” Appellant then asked the court to reconsider his
probation restrictions and consider a lighter sentence because of his mother’s “gravely
ill” condition and the fact that he is her “sole caregiver.” Appellant failed to explain the
reason he needed representation, essentially only asking for appointment of counsel so
that he could seek a modification of the probation terms and conditions that he previously
agreed to while he was represented. Appellant did not demonstrate that any aspect of the
proceedings proved to be harder to manage than he expected or “that he had suddenly

9.
learned he would be at a disadvantage in the trial.” (Ibid.; Cf. People v. Hill (1983)
148 Cal.App.3d 744, 760–762 [the defendant’s request to revoke self-representation was
made before jury selection and trial began, there was no showing of disruption or delay,
and the trial court’s errors in addressing the defendant’s prior requests for substitution of
counsel and self-representation led to error in denying his request to revoke his counsel
waiver].) It appears that appellant, after receiving his sentence and preparing to turn
himself into custody, “had simply reweighed the pros and cons of self-representation and
changed his mind as to the best course.” (Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 195.)
It is also notable that appellant’s request to revoke his waiver of his right to
counsel was untimely. Appellant’s request occurred after the plea agreement and
sentencing occurred, without a scheduled hearing, only one day before he was due to be
taken into custody. Appellant’s calculated delay in making his request weighed against
granting it. (See People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 164 [trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the defendant’s midtrial request for appointment of counsel,
where the “request came late in the guilt phase trial, after a substantial part of the
prosecution case had been presented, and after [he] had a chance to perceive that things
were not proceeding as smoothly as he had envisioned”]; see also People v. Gonzalez
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 724, 743 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
defendant’s request to reappoint counsel, where his ability to defend against the charges
was not implicated, as he had been represented by appointed counsel throughout his trial,
and he made the request the day after the court denied his request for a continuance and
the victim’s family was present at the sentencing hearing].)
Appellant’s prior history of substituting counsel weighed against granting his
request. Appellant made numerous Marsden motions and declarations concerning his
conflict with his court-appointed counsel. The trial court appointed new attorneys to
represent appellant on two different occasions. Moreover, as the court pointed out,
appellant had requested self-representation. Appellant was fully apprised of the

10.
difficulties associated with representing oneself. He was told that self-representation is
not advised, and that counsel may receive benefits that he may not be able to obtain on
his own because he is not aware of them. Appellant chose to waive his right to counsel
and represent himself anyway. This history militates against appellant’s request to
represent himself. (See, e.g., Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 196 [“a defendant’s
proclivity to seek changes in counsel status will generally weigh against finding an abuse
of discretion”]; see also People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 150 [a defendant’s
history of substituting counsel supported the trial court’s ruling denying his request for
representation by counsel].)
The risk of delay to the proceedings did not weigh in appellant’s favor. The trial
court stayed the execution of appellant’s sentence for 30 days after he voluntarily
relinquished his right to counsel and was sentenced. Appellant’s untimely request on the
day before he was scheduled to turn himself into custody would only result in further
unnecessary delay.
Finally, to the extent appellant argues he would be a “poor substitute” for
appointed counsel and could not effectively represent himself, we reject the contention.
As we discussed, appellant was amply warned by the trial court before his Faretta
waiver. “Because defendant had been fully advised before he chose self-representation,
his later change of mind properly bore less weight in the trial court’s discretionary
decision on the revocation request.” (Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 195–196.)
Moreover, a “defendant’s asserted ineffectiveness at self-representation does not
demonstrate an abuse of discretion. [The] [d]efendant was untrained in the law and may
not have been especially experienced in court procedures, but the same could be said of
many, if not most, in propria persona criminal defendants. That [the] defendant’s defense
would have been more effectively presented (or a better sentence obtained through a
negotiated plea) had he been represented is likely. But if that fact were determinative,
virtually all self-representing defendants would have the right to revoke their counsel

11.
waivers at any time during trial. That is not the law.” (Id. at p. 196.) Here, appellant
was represented by counsel when he negotiated his plea agreement. Appellant fails to
recognize that at the time he requested reappointment of counsel, he had already been
sentenced. There was no portion of the proceedings remaining for him to effectively
represent himself.
Appellant contends the trial court failed to establish a record based on the relevant
factors and therefore did not comply with its duty. However, as the Supreme Court
stated, no one factor “is necessarily determinative.” (Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th at
p. 196; People v. Gonzalez, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 743 [“the trial court need not
review on the record each factor….”].) Rather, the standard “is whether the court’s
decision was an abuse of its discretion under the totality of the circumstances.”
(Lawrence, at p. 196.) While no one factor is determinative, the record amply supports
the conclusion that each factor weighed against appellant obtaining counsel.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying appellant’s request for a change from self-representation to that of
counsel-representation.
D. Even Assuming Error, There Was No Prejudice
Appellant argues that the trial court would have granted his request to modify the
terms of his probation and imposed a shorter sentence had counsel been reappointed. We
disagree.
The issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant appellant’s request to
reinstate counsel is reviewed under the state law harmless error standard set out in People
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (People v. Sampson (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1409,
1418; see also People v. Elliott, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at p. 998 [an abuse of discretion
error on behalf of the court in not permitting a defendant to retract a Faretta waiver is not
of constitutional dimension].) Appellant voluntarily requested that he represent himself
at sentencing, ignoring the trial court’s encouragement that he remain represented by

12.
counsel. At the last possible moment before appellant was scheduled to turn himself into
custody, he appeared before the court without a scheduled hearing to request a
modification of the terms and conditions of his probation because he claimed that he did
not agree to the restrictions and his mother was ill. However, the record reflects
appellant was sentenced pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement that he executed and
agreed to while represented by counsel. Appellant argues that reappointed counsel would
have more clearly set forth the basis for his modification request. But this does not show
that a result more favorable to appellant was reasonably probable if the trial court had
reappointed counsel. (See People v. Ngaue (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1126–1127.)
Thus, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to appellant would
have been reached had the trial court granted appellant’s request to reappoint counsel.
Any presumed error was harmless. (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

SANDHU, J.
WE CONCUR:

HILL, P. J.

DESANTOS, J.

13.

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