Filed 11/9/26 Marriage of C.S. and B.W. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re the Marriage of C.S. and B.W. H053455
(Santa Cruz County
Super. Ct. No. 22FL00816)
C.S.,
Appellant,
v.
B.W.,
Respondent.
In this marital dissolution action, C.S. (mother), representing herself,
appeals from the trial court’s findings and order after evidentiary hearing
denying her request to renew a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO)
against B.W. (father) and entering orders for joint physical and legal custody
of the parties’ two minor children.1 Mother challenges both decisions as
1 Because this case involves proceedings under the Domestic Violence
Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.), we identify the parties by their
initials to safeguard the privacy interests of protected persons. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.90(b)(1), (11).) All further unspecified statutory references are
to the Family Code and unspecified rule references are to the California
Rules of Court.
legally erroneous and tainted by improper findings and procedures. Having
carefully considered the entirety of the record on appeal, we are not
persuaded by mother’s contentions of error. We affirm the order granting
joint custody and denying renewal of the DVRO.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Initial Custody and DVRO Proceedings
Father and mother married in 2018 and separated in 2022. They have
two minor children, born in June 2020 and August 2021, who at the time the
parties separated were ages two and less than one year old. Father moved
out of the family home in March 2022.
Initially after separation, mother and father agreed to a visitation
schedule that provided father with 49 hours of daytime visits with the
children (consisting of three days a week from 6:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., and one
day a week from 6:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.) at the family home. According to
father, this allowed him to be present when the children woke up, to spend
much of the day with them on the property where they continued to reside
with mother, and for mother to breastfeed the children when desired.
In August 2022, mother filed the petition for dissolution, requested sole
legal and physical custody of the children, and proposed that father have
visitation for six hours per week (Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays from
2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.). Approximately one week later, mother filed a request
for DVRO. Mother alleged that, although she had initially accommodated
father’s visits with the children at her home, she had more recently requested
that visitation occur elsewhere (at a park) because father would show up
“unannounced and uninvited” at the property (which was remote, with
“sporadic” cellular service), had become “physically intimidating,” and would
make “demands and threats and refuse[] to leave until” mother called the
2
police. Mother stated that father, having arrived at the home at the time
previously set for his visitation, reacted angrily and refused her proposal to
reset the visitation hours and location, resulting in a physical confrontation
in front of the children. Mother also described incidents in which she alleged
that father was physically and verbally abusive. She stated that he had
grabbed and wrenched her wrist during a disagreement over his failure to
properly secure one of the children in the stroller, called her “a ‘fucking
asshole’ ” in front of the children, moved intimidatingly toward her as she
was in a vulnerable position breastfeeding both children, and hovered near
her as she tried to make breakfast in their small kitchen, repeatedly blocking
her path out.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order and set the matter
for an evidentiary hearing. Father filed separate responses to the petition for
dissolution and request for DVRO. Father asserted that mother was using
the restraining order process in an attempt “to ‘gain the upper hand’ ” with
respect to the divorce and custody of the children, acknowledged that “neither
of us behaved as well as we could,” and suggested they would both benefit
from a “mutual non-CLETS civil restraining order” and coparenting
education. Father denied that he had physically or verbally abused or
threatened mother.
Following a hearing on the DVRO request in which both parties were
represented by counsel, the trial court found that “a violation of the Domestic
Violence Prevention Act ha[d] occurred and that [father] has been
occasionally physically abusive in touching [mother] against or without her
permission or consent.” The court also found evidence of verbal abuse. On
September 2, 2022, the court imposed a DVRO against father for a period of
two years with supervised visitation “at mother’s discretion as to frequency,
3
duration, and level of supervision” and referred the parties to family court
services for custody mediation. The court advised, “This is not about bad
people. You’re two good people in this case trying to raise two precious
toddlers with different views on how that should happen. [¶] And I would
encourage you to find a way to co-parent in a healthy way.”
The parties participated in “child custody recommend[ed] counseling”
through family court services but did not reach an agreement regarding
custody and visitation. In late October 2022, the trial court issued orders
adopting the custody counseling recommendations, awarding mother sole
legal and physical custody and establishing visitation for father of up to 12
hours per week, with one weekly visit professionally supervised and the other
visits supervised by an adult jointly selected by mother and father.
The DVRO and supervised visitation schedule remained in place while
the parties litigated issues related to the dissolution, including child support,
property, and custody modifications. In September 2023, the trial court
modified father’s visitation to add six hours per week of unsupervised visits
and ruled, following a hearing, that father had rebutted the presumption
under section 3044 related to child custody and domestic violence findings.
The court found that father, as the restrained party, had complied with the
terms and conditions of the DVRO and “ha[d] not committed any further acts
of domestic violence.”
Family court services thereafter submitted updated recommendations,
which summarized both parties’ conduct and concerns about custody, and
included the observations of the professional visit monitor. The trial court
adopted those recommendations, giving father shared joint legal custody of
the children (while mother retained sole physical custody) and increasing
father’s visitation time to a total of 18 hours per week. This change
4
eliminated professionally supervised visitation but required “another adult to
be present” for longer visits when both children were present.
At a hearing in March 2024, to ease the burden on court resources, the
parties agreed to use a parent coordinator. The trial court ordered additional
modifications to father’s visitation, to occur after another 45 days, extending
the number of father’s visitation hours. These changes included overnight
visits from Friday morning to Saturday morning, supervised by the children’s
paternal grandmother or another agreed-upon adult.
In May 2024, mother began representing herself. Father filed a motion
to modify the parenting plan to eliminate the requirement that he have a
second adult present for the weekly overnight visit. Father also requested
that the trial court adopt an order appointing the parenting coordinator that
he and mother had previously agreed to appoint (noting mother had not yet
completed the intake process to confirm the parent coordinator’s
appointment).
Prior to the June 2024 hearing on father’s motion, mother filed an ex
parte motion requesting sole legal and physical custody and professionally
supervised visits for father and alleging disclosures by the children that
appeared to indicate potential physical and/or sexual abuse by father. The
Santa Cruz Department of Family and Children’s Services (department)
undertook a Child Protective Services (CPS) investigation and drafted a
safety plan for the children (safety plan). Father filed a responsive
declaration denying any physical violence or inappropriate behavior with the
children and noting that mother’s ex parte request came “less than two weeks
before we are due back in court for a review of [the parties’] parenting plan
and on [father’s] request for an increased timeshare.”
5
The trial court issued temporary emergency orders for mother and
father to “follow the CPS safety plan and directives” and requiring visitation
to be “non-professionally supervised . . . pending the outcome of their
investigation.” At the June 2024 hearing, the court ordered the safety plan to
remain in effect until completion of the department’s investigation, and that
if the allegations were deemed unfounded or inconclusive, the parties would
revert to the prior timeshare order. The court also ordered mother to
complete the intake process for the parenting coordinator.
In early August 2024, the parents stipulated to appoint the agreed-
upon parent coordinator, who recommended a professional custody evaluation
pursuant to Evidence Code section 730. Father informed the trial court that
the department had concluded its investigation and found the abuse
allegations unsubstantiated.2 Father asked the court to remove the
supervision requirement for overnight visits.
Mother responded with concerns about the children having regressive
and more challenging behaviors. Mother attributed the children’s behaviors
to a lack of supervision in visits with father and asked the trial court to
modify the time share to daytime visits only, or, alternatively, to retain
supervision for overnight visits. After a hearing (in which mother was
represented by limited scope counsel), the court modified the parenting time
share to allow father unsupervised overnight visits with the children and set
a review hearing for December 2024.
On August 29, 2024, mother filed a request to renew the DVRO (which
was set to expire on September 1) under section 6345. Mother stated in her
2 Mother disputed father’s characterization of the CPS investigation
and stated in her declaration that the department had found the allegations
“ ‘inconclusive.’ ”
6
supporting declaration that she remained fearful of future abuse if the DVRO
lapsed because of “all the original reasons and additional issues that have
developed since.” She asserted, “[father] is angry and blames me for our
custody situation, a CPS investigation, and boundaries the court has seen fit
to impose. [Father] is ignoring boundaries and refusing to reduce contact,
while focusing his anger and frustration at me and the [children].” Father
opposed the DVRO renewal request.
In October 2024, with the DVRO renewal request pending, mother filed
an ex parte motion for temporary emergency custody and visitation orders
because of renewed concerns about abuse of the children. The trial court
temporarily suspended father’s visitation and ordered the parties to comply
with the department’s investigation and any safety plan, if issued.
Meanwhile, the parties stipulated to a child custody evaluation by Dr.
Elizabeth Lee, including psychological testing as deemed appropriate by Dr.
Lee. On October 24, 2024, the trial court ordered a “full custody evaluation”
by Dr. Lee under the statutory authority of section 3111, as agreed to by the
parties. The court continued the setting of a hearing on the DVRO renewal
request pending the custody evaluation.
At a hearing in November 2024, the trial court ordered that it would
hear mother’s DVRO renewal motion after receipt of the child custody
evaluation. The court reinstated father’s visitation after receiving an update
from the department on the CPS investigation finding the abuse allegations
unfounded.
B. Hearing on Custody Evaluation and DVRO Renewal
In February 2025,3 Dr. Lee submitted her confidential custody
evaluation report (custody report) to the court. Based on her observations,
3 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates were in 2025.
7
interviews, and the psychological testing she conducted, Dr. Lee
recommended in the report that mother and father share joint legal and
physical custody of the children following a “ ‘223’ schedule, which would
divide custody evenly” on a repeating, fortnightly schedule.
After the filing of the custody report, father filed witness disclosures
identifying Dr. Lee as an expert witness. On February 27, mother filed a
substitution of counsel, representing herself, followed by an ex parte request
to reschedule the evidentiary hearing. In an accompanying declaration,
mother explained that she was substituting her counsel because her former
attorney had not filed any paperwork for the upcoming hearing, and “[g]iven
the complexity and importance” of the custody report’s findings, mother
required additional time to review it, consult with new legal counsel, and
prepare responses or objections. Mother also withdrew from the parent
coordination process and informed the parent coordinator that she was
“actively pursuing a licensing board complaint” against her.
The trial court denied mother’s request for a continuance of the
hearing, and the evidentiary hearing proceeded over the course of six days
between March 4 and April 14.
On March 4, mother filed a request to disqualify the trial judge
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1. Mother orally renewed
her request for continuance, arguing her former counsel had failed to file
“motions and paperwork” after receipt of the custody report, and mother
needed time to orient herself in the case. The trial court struck the
disqualification request on grounds that it was untimely, unverified, and the
facts provided were not under penalty of perjury. The court nevertheless
granted mother a seven-day continuance and directed her to provide any
pretrial filings a day in advance of the continued hearing.
8
Mother filed motions in limine seeking to exclude Dr. Lee’s custody
report and testimony and challenging various elements of the report as
noncompliant with procedural and substantive rules. At the hearing on
March 11, the trial court denied mother’s motions but indicated that it would
permit her to object to the report and to Dr. Lee’s testimony as the evidence
unfolded at trial.
Dr. Lee testified under subpoena. Dr. Lee clarified that she was not
testifying about whether domestic violence previously occurred in the case
because there had been a “finding of domestic violence.” Dr. Lee also clarified
that offering an opinion on renewal of the DVRO was not the topic of her
report. Over mother’s objection that the document was “full of hearsay” and
“slanderous,” the trial court admitted the custody report into evidence.
Prior to the next hearing, mother filed additional objections and
briefing challenging the custody report recommendations and in support of
her five-year DVRO renewal request. Mother also filed a written report by
her retained expert witness, Dr. Catherine Barrett. The trial court noted the
submission of the expert report and other filings were untimely but permitted
them on the ground that “procedural due process necessitates that they be
considered.”
During Dr. Lee’s continued testimony, she opined that mother might be
“more likely” to see an unintended gesture or vocal intonation as threatening,
but this potential for “overreactivity” “does not negate the previous finding of
domestic violence.” In mother’s cross-examination of Dr. Lee, despite an
admonition by the court that mother “might be opening a door” and noting it
had “not heard an opinion from Dr. Lee” on the question of DVRO renewal,
mother sought to elicit Dr. Lee’s purported opinion about renewal of the
DVRO and the merits of the original DVRO. In response to mother’s cross-
9
examination, Dr. Lee denied she was “suggesting that the [c]ourt made a
mistake in issuing the restraining order.” Dr. Lee opined that both parents
have strengths and weaknesses, and the children would benefit from time
with both. She recommended a balanced time share so that the children
would not experience long periods of time without contact with either parent.
Dr. Lee acknowledged that she had received a call from father prior to being
retained in which he asked if she was available for an evaluation and she
quoted a fee retainer. Dr. Lee also recalled that mother’s and father’s parent
coordinator contacted her and told her that she was working on a case and
wanted Dr. Lee “to look at it.”
The trial court additionally heard testimony from mother’s expert
witness, Dr. Barrett, the children’s former therapist, Craig Clark, mother’s
sister, E.S., and mother’s father. The court did not permit testimony from
another witness, Rob Markel, whom mother sought to introduce to testify
about “safety concerns that he witnessed on the property in 2022.” The court
found the proffered testimony “cumulative” because the court “ha[s] heard a
lot about safety concerns” “in detail.”
Dr. Barrett testified as an expert witness on forensic analysis of Dr.
Lee’s report. Dr. Barrett observed that there were problematic statements
and representations in the custody report that, in her experience, suggested
ethical violations (utilizing statements of mother’s two older children without
evidence of their informed consent), incomplete analysis (such as relying on a
single psychological test, rather than an array of complementary tests) and
anchoring bias (presenting father’s narrative as truth rather than going back
and forth between the histories and narratives of both parties). Dr. Barrett
opined that Dr. Lee’s custody evaluation did not meet the standard of care
because it “did not objectively include information that was relevant of [sic]
10
both parties,” exhibited “anchoring bias,” lacked a “comprehensive
assessment of domestic violence,” and relied on collateral documents and
third party statements “to fit the narrative” that had been set for mother.
Mother testified that since the issuance of the original DVRO in
September 2022, father has engaged in “continued violations and behaviors
that have maintained or escalated [her] fear” for her safety and the safety of
the children. Mother described numerous incidents of inadequate
supervision by father of the children in the year and months leading up to the
original DVRO, times that father tried to “snatch one or both of the children”
from her arms, and incidents in which he entered her living space without
her consent and would stand in her way and refuse to leave when asked or
otherwise violate the boundaries that she tried to set. She further testified
that since the DVRO, father has shown “a clear and ongoing pattern of
disregard for court orders, emotional and physical intimidation and
concerning treatment of [their] children.” Mother recounted incidents in
which she alleged that father escalated physically or approached in an
intimidating manner during custody exchanges and described sexualized
behaviors the children had exhibited that made mother “very, very
concerned.” Mother stated that she remains fearful of father and for the
emotional and physical safety of the children.
Father testified regarding the parenting conflicts he and mother
experienced and the way in which the parenting coordinator tried to work
with them. During her cross-examination of father, mother sought to elicit
father’s testimony about the original DVRO, including his subjective beliefs
about whether he was “wrongly accused” of the acts outlined in the original
DVRO request, and whether the DVRO was “unjustified and unneeded.”
11
Father replied affirmatively that he believed the original restraining order
was unjustified and testified that he was not a threat to mother.
Father called a rebuttal witness, Mary Sullivan-White. Sullivan-White
testified regarding an incident in March at the CVS in Felton where she was
employed. Sullivan-White heard mother yelling at father about child support
money that he owed her and observed her advancing on him, while the
children stood by. Sullivan-White saw father backing away as mother moved
toward him and testified that mother did not appear to be afraid as she
approached father.
In her closing argument, mother emphasized that the DVRO was a
final judgment that cannot be relitigated in this proceeding. Mother argued
that, given father’s continued violations of the DVRO and lack of insight or
remorse, a reasonable person in her position would be afraid of future abuse
for herself and the children. Mother testified about the fear and concern she
had for the children based on their disclosures to her “about their father,”
asserted that she has striven not to jump to conclusions, and argued that Dr.
Lee’s custody report should be “struck entirely” as biased, ethically
compromised, and lacking in forensic integrity.
C. Ruling and Statement of Decision
On April 24, the trial court read its ruling on the record and indicated
that a statement of decision would be forthcoming. Neither party filed a
request for statement of decision specifying the controverted issues for the
court to address. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 632, subd. (a).) On May 27, the
court issued a written statement of decision.4
4 Mother filed her appeal from the statement of decision, which she
characterizes in her opening appellate brief as the trial court’s judgment and
order. It is unclear from the record on appeal whether the court subsequently
12
As to renewal of the DVRO, the trial court expressly found that
mother’s allegations concerning father’s behaviors (i.e., appearing from a
hidden location, silently walking up to her, staring at her, making aggressive
motions, and calling her names) were not credible. Specifically, the court
found that mother’s “asserted apprehension of future abuse [was not] that of
a reasonable person under similar circumstances.” The court further found
that the testimony of the CVS employee regarding mother’s conduct during a
recent custody exchange “undermined [mother]’s claim” that her fear of
father “was either actual or reasonable.” While the court found evidence of
the children exhibiting inappropriate, sexualized behaviors “credible and
corroborated,” it determined that mother’s attempts to attribute that conduct
to father was “not credible,” as further evidenced by “[a]pproximately five”
CPS investigations and the fact that one of the incidents occurred in mother’s
home and involved the children gaining access to a massage tool kept by
mother.
Applying its findings to the factors that courts consider for DVRO
renewal, the trial court found that (1) the initial DVRO “centered around
parenting issues, [father]’s living conditions and attentiveness to the
children, as opposed to acts of violence,” (2) since the DVRO, father had
significantly improved his living environment and the space available for
children, making “it easier for him to parent,” and had improved his
attentiveness of the children and appropriately corrected or redirected them,
entered a formal findings and order after hearing, though a proposed findings
and order was submitted by father’s counsel. We exercise our discretion to
treat the court’s statement of decision as an appealable order and, for
simplicity, hereafter refer to the statement of decision as the “order.” (See
Schwan v. Permann (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 678, 682, fn. 2; Hernandez v.
Rancho Santiago Community College District (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1187,
1192.)
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and (3) the seriousness and degree of risk was not a threat of physical
violence, while the burden on father as the restrained party was “significant.”
The court concluded that mother did not establish that she has a reasonable
apprehension of future harm, that a reasonable person in her circumstances
would fear repetition of the abuse if the order were to expire, or that it is
more probable than not that a sufficient risk of future abuse warrants a
judicial finding that her apprehension is genuine and reasonable. The court
denied mother’s request to renew the DVRO.
As to custody of the children, the trial court ruled that mother and
father would share joint legal and physical custody on the 2-2-3 schedule
recommended by the custody report. The court found father’s testimony
“more credible” than that of mother and found that he “answered questions in
a direct fashion” and “was not evasive.” It further found the neutrally
appointed Dr. Lee’s expert testimony credible, and the court “relied heavily”
on her custody report. The court observed that the testimony of mother’s
expert, Dr. Barrett, was “interesting and informative” but “did not effectively
refute the testimony of Dr. Lee or undermine its basis.” The court also took
judicial notice of the order on rebuttal of the presumption under section 3044.
Applying its findings to the factors under section 3011, subdivision (a),
for determining best interest of the child in dissolution proceedings, the trial
court ordered the 2-2-3 time share on an alternating schedule and outlined a
detailed parenting plan for the time and location of exchanges, vacation and
holidays, and therapy and coparenting classes (ordering mother to take a 10-
week coparenting class). The court ordered mother and father to engage in
civil and respectful communication, and prohibited substance use during
parenting time. At a separate hearing, the court denied mother’s request to
disqualify Dr. Lee.
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II. DISCUSSION
Mother raises multiple challenges to the trial court’s order. She
contends the court misapplied the legal standard for renewal of a domestic
violence restraining order under section 6345 and Ritchie v. Konrad (2004)
115 Cal.App.4th 1275 (Ritchie) and impermissibly minimized and
recharacterized the previously adjudicated DVRO. Mother also maintains
that procedural failings related to the custody report undermined Dr. Lee’s
neutrality and produced a defective report. In addition, mother asserts that
the court abused its discretion by admitting late-disclosed testimony,
excluding corroborative evidence, and denying her a continuance. Father
disputes each claim.
A. General Principles of Appellate Review
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court
judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609
(Jameson), citing Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
“To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal
analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the
record that support the claim of error.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
396, 408 (S.C.).) When an appellant asserts a point on appeal “ ‘but fails to
support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority’ ” (Nelson v.
Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862), this court may
treat the point as forfeited. We are not required to search the record for error
ourselves (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246), and “[w]e are
15
not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them.” (In re Marriage of
Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830 (Falcone & Fyke).)
B. Renewal of Domestic Violence Restraining Order
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, “a court may issue a
restraining order to prevent domestic violence or abuse if the party seeking
the order ‘shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act
or acts of abuse.’ ” (Melissa G. v. Raymond M. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 360,
367.) “ ‘[A]buse’ ” means intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to
cause bodily injury, committing sexual assault, placing a person in
reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or
to another, or engaging in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined
pursuant to section 6320. (§ 6203, subd. (a).) Abuse is not limited to the
actual infliction of physical injury or assault. (Id., subd. (b).) It may extend
to “disturbing the peace of the other party” (§ 6320, subd. (a)), referring “to
conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental
or emotional calm of the other party.” (Id., subd. (c).)
Section 6345, subdivision (a) provides that a DVRO, which may have an
initial duration of not more than five years, “may be renewed, upon the
request of a party, either for five or more years, or permanently, at the
discretion of the court, without a showing of further abuse since the issuance
of the original order.” The legal standard for renewal of a DVRO, first
articulated in Ritchie, “is whether the protected party entertains a reasonable
apprehension of future abuse.” (Michael M. v. Robin J. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
170, 179 (Michael M.).) In other words, “in contested cases, a court is only
justified in ordering an extension of such an order where it finds to do so will
advance the legislative purpose of preventing future abuse. This means it
16
must find evidence there is some reasonable risk, at least, such abuse will
occur sometime in the future if the protective order is not renewed.” (Ritchie,
supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1287.)
We generally review an order granting or denying a request to renew a
DVRO for abuse of discretion. (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 178.)
We review a trial court’s factual findings underlying the decision for
substantial evidence. (Bailey v. Murray (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 677, 684.)
Whether the court applied the correct legal standard in exercising its
discretion is a question of law that we review de novo. (Ibid.) “If the court’s
decision to deny a renewal request is influenced by an erroneous
understanding of the law, the court has not properly exercised its discretion
under the law.” (Michael M., at p. 179.)
2. Analysis
Mother contends that, while the trial court in this case accurately
stated the governing law, it failed to apply it in denying her request for
renewal of the DVRO. Mother maintains that the court focused on factors
more relevant to the custody determination than the DVRO, including
father’s “asserted compliance with the DVRO,” “perceived improvements in []
parenting and living circumstances,” and the “absence of new incidents,” and
impermissibly recharacterized the original DVRO as based upon parenting
issues rather than acts of violence. She asserts that the court ignored
evidence bearing on her reasonable apprehension and improperly weighed
the purported burden on father in denying mother’s renewal request.
As Mother’s arguments are closely interwoven, we address them
together. Beginning with the applicable law, there is no dispute that the trial
court cited the correct legal standard for renewal of the DVRO. The court
recognized that standard to be “whether the protected party entertains a
17
reasonable apprehension of future abuse” (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th
at p. 179), or, stated differently, whether “ ‘a reasonable person, in the
petitioner’s circumstances, would fear repetition of the abuse if the order
expired.’ ” (G.G. v. G.S. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 413, 421 (G.G.).) Although
mother asserts that the court failed to apply this standard in denying the
renewal request, we do not agree.
The record reflects that the trial court properly considered those factors
that California courts typically address in ascertaining whether the protected
party has a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. First, the court “should
consider the evidence and findings on which the initial DVRO was based.”
(Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 180.) These underlying findings and
evidence are relevant to “appraising the risk of future abuse should the
existing order expire.” (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290.)
Mother argues that the trial court misapplied this step by improperly
reframing the original DVRO as being centered around parenting issues and
father’s living conditions and inattentiveness to the children—drawing on the
issues addressed in Dr. Lee’s custody report—as opposed to the acts of
physical and verbal abuse that underlay the DVRO. However, the record
amply supports the court’s observations in this case, which followed its
detailed consideration of “the DVRO, its evidence, the minutes, the order[,]
and the parties’ testimony about it.” The court unequivocally accepted and
restated the prior findings, namely, that “[father] ha[d] been physically
abusive in touching [mother] without [mother]’s consent and [father] ha[d]
been verbally abusive to [mother].”
In describing the DVRO as being “centered around” coparenting
challenges and concerns about father’s living conditions and attentiveness,
the court did not reframe, recharacterize, or minimize the prior DVRO
18
findings, or the facts and circumstances that led to those findings. Rather,
the court recognized the context in which the physical and verbal abuse took
place, which the record shows happened at mother’s home, as the two parties
were attempting to negotiate visitation and custody exchanges following their
recent separation, and arose in connection with father’s failure to safely
supervise and secure the children, who were, respectively, a young toddler
and a baby. The judge’s comments following issuance of the original DVRO
reaffirmed that the findings of domestic violence did not stem from willful
violence but from “two good people . . . trying to raise two precious toddlers
with different views on how that should happen.”
The trial court’s identification of this context in reviewing the basis for
the initial DVRO is relevant to the task of ascertaining the protected party’s
reasonable apprehension of future abuse, including in relation to the second
and third factors considered by courts—whether there have been “ ‘any
significant changes in the circumstances surrounding the events justifying
the initial protective order’ ” (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 180,
quoting Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291) and “ ‘the seriousness and
degree of risk, such as whether it involves potential physical abuse, and the
burdens the protective order imposes on the restrained person’ ” (Michael M.,
at p. 180). The question of burden on the restrained party “ ‘may or may not’
be relevant, depending on whether there is a risk of physical abuse” (G.G.,
supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 422), since the protected party’s physical
security takes precedence over any burdens imposed by renewal. (Ibid.,
citing Ritchie, at pp. 1291–1292.)
Mother mischaracterizes the trial court’s findings on these factors as
having downgraded the prior findings of physical violence and mother’s
perceived risk of future abuse. She argues that by citing the third factor and
19
finding that the “DVRO has posed a significant burden on [father],” the court
improperly discounted the prior DVRO finding of physical abuse and recast
the DVRO as involving “lesser forms” of abuse.
These arguments fail to recognize the nature of the original DVRO
finding as to physical abuse, which was that father “ha[d] been occasionally
physically abusive in touching [mother] against or without her permission or
consent” and that there was also “evidence of verbal abuse.” The instances of
physical abuse described in the original petition and supporting the DVRO
findings each arose from an instance in which father had failed to assure safe
placement of a child in the bassinet or in the stroller, and had reacted to
mother’s intervention by grabbing her wrist, or grabbing for the child, and an
instance in which he stood in the middle of the kitchen and refused to move,
blocking her way as she tried to work around him. These findings of physical
(and verbal) abuse were serious enough to justify imposition of the two-year
DVRO. Nevertheless, a court is not “prohibited from looking behind the
[original DVRO] order itself when evaluating whether that order, often three
years old, should be extended another three years or even, . . . permanently.”
(Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290.) On the contrary, the court
“should consider the evidence and findings on which the original DVRO was
based, which will often be enough in themselves to support a renewal.”
(Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 181.)
The abusive incidents that gave rise to the DVRO in this case are not
acts of such extreme or intentional physical violence as would support a
conclusion, without more, that a continuing apprehension of future abuse is
objectively reasonable. We recognize that this is not true in all cases, where
the nature of physical violence threatened or perpetrated “could reasonably
be expected to give rise to a long-lasting fear of the perpetrator that could
20
continue for many years.” (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 181
[reversing the denial of the DVRO renewal request based on facts including a
“particularly disturbing” violation of the restraining order where the
defendant threw the victim to the floor multiple times while she held their
newborn baby, strangling her, and placing a knife to her throat].)
We also recognize that a history of physical violence is not required for
renewal, and “ ‘[t]he key consideration for the court is not the type or timing
of abuse, but whether the protected party has a reasonable fear of future
abuse.’ ” (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 180; see G.G., supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at p. 425 [clarifying that just as the “original order could be
issued based on reasonable fear of nonphysical abuse, . . . it can be renewed
on the same basis”]; id. at p. 426 [noting that the element of physical violence
is considered only under the third Ritchie factor “as a potential limitation on
the evidence offered in opposition to renewal”].)
Several factors support the trial court’s determination here.
Substantial evidence in the record shows the parenting supervision that
father received and his correlated progress in overseeing the safety of the
children since the issuance of the original DVRO. These affirmative steps
taken by father support the court’s finding that there were “changes in the
circumstances surrounding the events justifying the initial protective order”
(Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291) and that mother had failed to
show the risk of future abuse.
Furthermore, most, if not all, of mother’s claims of physical violence,
intimidation, and aggression by father in the original DVRO arose from
arguments over his unsafe parenting or supervision and from stressful
custody exchanges or overlaps while on mother’s property. The trial court’s
findings that, as of 2023, father had not committed any further acts of
21
domestic violence and had rebutted the section 3044 presumption, and that
he had obtained his own home with ample space and safety features for the
children, further reinforce the court’s findings on the changed circumstances
factor.
Mother argues that the trial court misapplied Ritchie’s changed
circumstances factor, because by embracing Dr. Lee’s recommended 2-2-3
timesharing schedule, the court has “institutionalize[d]” recurring, in-person
custody exchanges that mother maintains “are a locus of the adjudicated
conduct, not a neutral venue.” In other words, mother suggests that father’s
“changed circumstances” have not diminished but “enhance[d] the
opportunity and possibility of future abuse.” (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1291.)
This argument fails to recognize the trial court’s findings regarding
mother’s apprehension of physical abuse, aggression, intimidation, or
surprise at custody exchanges. It is significant that, after multiple days of
testimony and mother’s extensive documentation of father’s actions and her
concerns, the court found mother’s assertions of father’s renewed or
continued aggression and intimidation toward her during (and before or
after) custody exchanges in 2023 and 2024 lacked credibility. Unlike in G.G.,
this was not a determination based erroneously on a misconception of the
legal standard that treated the absence of subsequent restraining order
violations as dispositive. (G.G., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 427 [reversing
denial of DVRO renewal and remanding for application of the correct legal
standard because “[t]he trial court’s decision . . . was predicated on the
absence of intentional violations of the initial order” and “[u]se of such a
narrow focus prevented the court from exercising its discretion”].) Rather, it
22
was a conclusion drawn from the sum of the evidence relevant to ascertaining
mother’s apprehension, its genuineness, and its reasonableness.
Having considered the entire record, we perceive no error in the trial
court’s conclusion that mother did not establish a reasonable apprehension of
future abuse sufficient to warrant renewal of the DVRO. Because the court
in this case found mother’s apprehension of future abuse, including physical
abuse, was not reasonable, it could consider the burden imposed on father by
the DVRO. (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1292 [“[W]here the
protected party has a ‘reasonable apprehension’ of future physical abuse if
the current protective order expires, that order should be renewed despite
any burdens this inflicts on the restrained party.”].) Although she disagrees
with the court’s conclusion, mother has not demonstrated that finding was
factually unsupported or legally erroneous. The court did not err in weighing
the degree of the perceived risk to mother against the burdens on father if he
were subjected to a continuing protective order. (Ibid.)
In sum, mother has not shown that the trial court misapplied the legal
standard under section 6345 and Ritchie or impermissibly recharacterized
the previously adjudicated finding of domestic violence. While “a showing of
further abuse since the issuance of the original order” is not required (§ 6345,
subd. (a)), renewal must be based on mother’s reasonable fear of future harm,
in light on the evidence and testimony at trial. (Ritchie, supra, 115
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1290, 1291.) Given that the trial court did not find
credible mother’s testimony regarding present or future risk, we conclude
mother has not shown that the court erred in denying the DVRO renewal
request.
23
C. Custody Evaluation and Report
Mother contends the trial court committed “reversible due process and
procedural error” by relying on Dr. Lee’s custody report and failing to address
problems with the report’s scope and neutrality. (Capitalization & boldface
omitted.)
1. Additional Background
In the parties’ stipulated agreement, mother and father (then each
represented by counsel) agreed to “participate in a Level II Custody
Evaluation that includes psychological testing as deemed appropriate by the
[e]valuator,” Dr. Lee. Following the parties’ stipulation, the trial court
appointed Dr. Lee as a neutral expert pursuant to Evidence Code section 730,
and specifically as a child custody evaluator under the statutory authority of
section 3111. The court ordered “a full custody evaluation with Dr. Lee based
upon agreement of the parties.”
The order appointing Dr. Lee as the custody evaluator further
specified: “The scope of the evaluation is as determined to be appropriate and
necessary by Dr. Lee. It may include review of documents and filings,
interviews and observation of the parties and children, testing of the parties
and family as appropriate[,] and the production of a written set of
recommendations for the [c]ourt. [¶] The purpose of the evaluation is to
determine the parenting plan that meets the best interests of the children
and advise the parties and [c]ourt.”
At the evidentiary hearing, mother filed motions in limine seeking to
exclude the custody report and Dr. Lee’s testimony based on what she
characterized as procedural and due process violations. The trial court
denied mother’s motions but permitted her to object to the custody report and
questions posed to Dr. Lee during the hearing.
24
2. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Evidence Code section 730 authorizes the appointment of neutral
experts by the trial court “to investigate, to render a report as may be ordered
by the court, and to testify as an expert at the trial of the action relative to
the fact or matter as to which the expert evidence is or may be required.” In
contested proceedings involving child custody or visitation, section 3111,
subdivision (a), authorizes the appointment of “a child custody evaluator to
conduct a child custody evaluation in cases where the court determines it is
in the best interest of the child.” The child custody evaluation must be
conducted in accordance with standards adopted by the Judicial Council.
(Ibid.) In cases where the court has directed the custody evaluator to file a
written confidential report, the report “may be received in evidence on
stipulation of all interested parties and is competent evidence as to all
matters contained in the report.” (Id., subd. (c).)
Rule 5.220 sets forth the standards governing child custody evaluators
appointed pursuant to Evidence Code section 730. (In re Marriage of Adams
& Jack A. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1543, 1563 (Marriage of Adams).)
A child custody evaluation assists the court “in determining the health,
safety, welfare, and best interests of children with regard to disputed custody
and visitation issues.” (Rule 5.220(b).) The rules define a “ ‘full evaluation’ ”
as “a comprehensive examination of the health, safety, welfare, and best
interest of the child.” (Rule 5.220(c)(4).) By contrast, a “ ‘partial evaluation’ ”
is a similar assessment “that is limited by court order in either time or
scope.” (Rule 5.220(c)(5).) The court-appointed evaluator must “[m]aintain
objectivity, provide and gather balanced information for both parties, and
control for bias.” (Rule 5.220(j)(1); see Marriage of Adams, supra, 209
Cal.App.4th at p. 1563.) Additionally, the evaluator may not engage in ex
25
parte communication with a party’s counsel or with the court, except in
limited circumstances, such as is necessary to schedule appointments. (Rule
5.235(c), (e)(1).)
A trial court’s local rules provide additional guidance and specify the
complaint procedure for raising concerns with the evaluator. The Superior
Court of Santa Cruz County, Local Rules, rule 3.3.03(f) states, “Complaints
concerning the evaluator will not be considered by the [c]ourt until after the
evaluation is completed, at the hearing on receipt of recommendations.
Complaints must be submitted to the [c]lerk’s [o]ffice no later than 15
calendar days before the hearing with copies to the evaluator and all other
parties or their attorneys. The evaluator shall submit a written response to
all issues raised in the complaint at least 2 calendar days before the hearing.
The judge will address the complaint at the time of the hearing. If the party
submitting the complaint objects to the bench officer’s resolution of the
complaint, the complaint shall become an issue at trial.”
Mother asserts that the trial court’s compliance with statutory
procedures governing custody evaluations and its exercise of nondelegable
judicial duties presents questions of law that we review de novo. We agree.
While we ordinarily review a trial court’s rulings on the admission of expert
witness testimony for abuse of discretion (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v.
University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773 (Sargon)), we
review mixed questions of law and fact de novo. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994)
8 Cal.4th 791, 801.)
3. Analysis
Mother asserts that the trial court failed to define the scope and
purpose of the evaluation and improperly delegated that authority to Dr. Lee
(who exceeded it). She also contends the court failed to address procedural
26
violations—including pre-appointment communications between father, the
parenting coordinator, and Dr. Lee—in the statement of decision.
Father counters that mother forfeited any challenge to the custody
report by failing to comply with the trial court’s local rules requirement to
submit any complaints regarding the report 15 days before the hearing.
(Super. Ct. Santa Cruz County, Local Rules, rule 3.3.03(f).) He further
maintains that mother’s arguments are without merit.
We recognize that mother did not comply with the complaint
procedures required by the Santa Cruz Superior Court Local Rules, rule
3.3.03(f). Nevertheless, mother did orally assert complaints concerning Dr.
Lee’s procedural processes to the trial court and alleged due process
violations and filed motions in limine before the start of the evidentiary
hearing. The trial court ruled on those motions, admitted the custody report,
order appointing Dr. Lee, and Dr. Lee’s agreement signed by each party, and
allowed objections to be raised by mother during trial. Although the issues
raised by mother at trial are not identical to those raised on appeal, in light
of mother’s self-represented status prior to and throughout the evidentiary
hearing and her partial articulation in the trial court of the objections she
raises on appeal, we decline to hold that mother forfeited her claims of error
related to the custody evaluation.
Mother contends that the trial court bears a nondelegable duty to
define the scope of the child custody evaluation, the issues to be examined,
and the purpose for which the evaluation was conducted. She argues that the
language of the order appointing the custody evaluator improperly allowed
Dr. Lee to decide the scope of the evaluation, the issues proper for and subject
to investigation, and any limits on subject matter or constraints on the
evaluator’s authority. Mother relies on In re Marriage of Seagondollar (2006)
27
139 Cal.App.4th 1116 (Seagondollar), in support of her argument that an
evaluation conducted outside of the framework defined by court, or by an
evaluator whose neutrality is compromised, cannot serve as the basis for a
custody determination.
We disagree that the order appointing Dr. Lee as the neutral child
custody evaluator failed to define the scope and limits of the evaluation or
impermissibly delegated this authority to Dr. Lee. The trial court’s
appointment order expressly provided for a “full custody evaluation.” Rule
5.220(c)(4) defines a “ ‘full evaluation’ ” as “a comprehensive examination of
the health, safety, welfare, and best interest of the child.” Furthermore, the
appointment order specified the purpose of the evaluation “to determine the
parenting plan that meets the best interests of the children and advise the
parties and [c]ourt.”
These specifications set clear boundaries around the evaluation as
pertaining to the best interest of the children in relation to a parenting plan
and affording a “comprehensive examination” for that purpose. The
authorization in the order for Dr. Lee to determine the scope as “appropriate
and necessary” for the evaluation was followed by a nonexhaustive list of
evaluative devices that could be included within that scope, including a
review of documents and filings, interviews and observation of the parties
and the children, psychological testing of the parties “as appropriate,” and
the production of a written recommendations for the court. Thus, the
appointment order did not give Dr. Lee carte blanche but appropriately
enabled her to determine—within the authorized scope of inquiry—what
issues to investigate and which evaluative tools to use. This was consistent
with the requirements of section 3111 and rule 5.220.
28
Seagondollar is factually distinguishable because, in that case, the trial
court appointed an evaluator to conduct a “ ‘limited’ ” evaluation but did not
define any limitations. (Seagondollar, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1122.)
The order appointing the evaluator further “fail[ed] to specify the purpose
and scope of the evaluation.” (Id. at p. 1132.) In Seagondollar, this failing
was prejudicial because the custody issues before the court were in flux, and
although the court at the time of the appointment stated that the case was
“not a move-away case,” the evaluator addressed that very issue and made
custody recommendations based on the mother moving across the country.
(Ibid.) By contrast, the order appointing Dr. Lee specified the scope of the
evaluation was “full” (a term carrying a defined meaning), stated its purpose,
and identified the evaluative tools that could be utilized by the evaluator in
the exercise of her discretion to carry out the court’s order.
Nothing in the record suggests that Dr. Lee exceeded the scope of the
trial court’s order in conducting her evaluation. The record does not bear out
mother’s assertion that Dr. Lee opined on matters outside the scope of the
custody evaluation, including whether domestic violence had occurred, the
credibility of the abuse allegations, mother’s reasonable apprehension of
future harm, and opinions bearing on mother’s request to renew the DVRO.
Mother points to Dr. Lee’s observations about father’s parenting progress and
change in circumstances since the issuance of the DVRO as evidence of Dr.
Lee’s purportedly improper opinion. However, father’s evolving parenting
skills and the environment in which the children would live during father’s
custody time were issues squarely within the scope of the “comprehensive
examination of the health, safety, welfare, and best interest of the child” (rule
5.220(c)(4)) mandated by the court’s order for a “full” custody evaluation and
consistent with the purpose of determining “the parenting plan that meets
29
the best interests of the children.” That the observations were also relevant
to the factors considered in deciding the DVRO renewal does not render Dr.
Lee’s work outside the mandate of the custody evaluation.
The same is true with respect to Dr. Lee’s testimony regarding mother’s
and father’s personal histories and how their individual experiences might
influence their parenting and impact their perceptions of the other’s motives.
While mother interpreted this testimony to be “relitigating the original
DVRO,” this evidence was directly relevant to the court’s directive to Dr. Lee
to make recommendations on custody and a parenting plan. The evidence
also was relevant to mother’s repeated expressions of concern about the
children’s physical and emotional safety when in father’s custody.
Contrary to mother’s assertion that Dr. Lee’s opinions were improper or
outside the scope of her mandate, Dr. Lee explicitly declined to opine on the
original DVRO, explained that her findings do not negate prior legal findings
of domestic violence, and clarified that offering an opinion on renewal of the
DVRO was not the subject of her report. Mother emphasizes that Dr. Lee’s
report improperly treated adjudicated facts as allegations by referring, inter
alia, to “ ‘[a]lleged physical spousal abuse’ ” and “ ‘[a]lleged emotional
abuse.’ ” However, the custody report’s characterization of events raised by
mother in the original DVRO as “allegations”— even if arguably erroneous—
is not determinative either of Dr. Lee’s opinion or of the adjudicated facts.
Moreover, based on the record of the DVRO, the court’s findings that father
had been “occasionally physically abusive in touching [mother] against or
without her permission or consent” suggests findings based on a subset of the
allegations mother made at that time. Dr. Lee’s general references in the
custody report to “allegations” covering all of mother’s allegations (including
those postdating the issuance of the DVRO) were not improper.
30
Mother also challenges Dr. Lee’s neutrality based on “pre-appointment
communications” that occurred several months before her appointment by the
trial court. The evidence at trial established that father contacted Dr. Lee in
July 2024, to inquire about her availability. Dr. Lee confirmed that father
called her “one time” to ask about her availability for an evaluation. She
quoted a retainer fee and did not recall speaking with father after that. Dr.
Lee similarly recalled speaking with mother’s and father’s then-parenting
coordinator who called to tell her that she had a case and wanted Dr. Lee to
look at it. A text message from father to mother using the “Our Family
Wizard” app in July 2024, referred to this contact, stating under the heading
“ ‘Parenting Plan Evaluation’ ” and “next steps”: “Elizabeth Lee-local,
available, talked with [parenting coordinator] about our case.” Mother
contends that these undisclosed, unilateral communications with one party
before appointment defeated the neutrality required for the appointment of a
neutral expert under Evidence Code section 730. She maintains that “[o]nce
impressions are formed outside the court’s supervision, neutrality cannot be
retroactively restored.”
Mother is correct that the rules governing court appointed custody
evaluators contain express provisions to protect neutrality (rule 5.220(j)(1)–
(11)) and prohibit the court appointed evaluator from engaging in ex parte
communication with counsel or the court, except for scheduling or other
specified purposes (rule 5.235 (c), (e)(1); see also § 216, subd. (a)).
However, mother has not shown that the brief conversations described
above violated any of these provisions, mother’s right to due process, or
constituted structural error. There is no evidence that the participants
disclosed any substantive information or had any meaningful discussion
beyond the existence of a custody case and potential need for evaluation.
31
On cross-examination by mother, Dr. Lee agreed that premature
exposure to one side’s narrative can significantly influence a conclusion and
explained that, for that reason, she does not allow the party making contact
to “go into details.” The trial court found Dr. Lee’s testimony credible.
Mother points to the “Our Family Wizard” text message from father to
mother as evidence that Dr. Lee “had spoken with the parenting coordinator
‘about our case’ nearly four months before her appointment.” But that
message merely reinforces the context for the contact—that Dr. Lee was
“local” and “available.” That Dr. Lee spoke with the parenting coordinator
about their case in that context does not, without more, support an inference
that the conversation was substantive or would have conveyed bias for or
against either parent.
Nor is there evidence of prohibited ex parte communications between
either counsel for the parties and Dr. Lee. By contrast, in Seagondollar, the
appellate court observed that in addition to the failure of the court to define
the scope of the evaluation in its order, there was evidence of ex parte
communications between the children’s counsel and the court appointed
evaluator, “including several telephonic conferences and a personal meeting.”
(Seagondollar, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133.)
On this record, we are not persuaded that Dr. Lee’s pre-appointment
contacts with father and the parenting coordinator—both of which were brief
and directed at ascertaining Dr. Lee’s availability to serve as an evaluator in
the case—violated mother’s right to due process or constituted reversible
error in the admission of the custody report and testimony of Dr. Lee.
Mother also asserts error with respect to the trial court’s statement of
decision about Dr. Lee’s credibility. Mother complains that the statement of
decision omitted any discussion or explanation regarding evaluator neutrality
32
as a “principal controverted issue” at trial. Mother relies on statutory
authority requiring the statement of decision to “explain[] the factual and
legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at
trial upon the request of any party appearing at the trial.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 632, subd. (a), italics added.)
Mother’s reliance on Code of Civil Procedure section 632 is misplaced.
Mother never invoked the statutory framework for requesting the statement
of decision or identified the “principal controverted issues” that she desired
the court to address in its written decision. (Id., subd. (a).) The statute
requires the request for a statement of decision to “be made within 10 days
after the court announces a tentative decision” and for it to “specify those
controverted issues as to which the party is requesting a statement of
decision.” (Ibid.) A statement of decision’s failure to resolve a controverted
issue when “the omission . . . was brought to the attention of the trial court”
has consequences on appeal related to the doctrine of implied findings. (Id.,
§ 634.)
It is this statutory framework that mother relies upon to argue the
statement of decision was deficient. However, there is no deficiency where
mother never made the predicate request to obtain a statement of decision,
which request also would have identified the principal controverted issues
that mother now seeks to challenge. “Operation of this rule, . . . is
conditioned on (1) an initial request that adequately ‘specif[ies]’ the ‘principal
controverted issues’ as to which the requesting party seeks a statement of
decision (Code Civ. Proc., § 632 . . .); (2) a failure by the statement to ‘resolve’
the ‘controverted issue’ thus specified, or an ambiguity in its resolution ([id.,]
§ 634); and (3) a record showing that ‘the omission or ambiguity was brought
to the attention of the trial court’ (ibid.).” (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA
33
Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 558.) Mother never invoked her
claim to a statement of decision addressing the principal issues at trial and
cannot now establish error on that ground.
D. Witness Testimony and Trial Procedure
Mother asserts that the trial court committed reversible error by
admitting “late-disclosed, non-rebuttal testimony without notice or
continuance,” and “excluding [m]other’s corroborating witness without proper
evidentiary balancing.” Mother further maintains that the court relied on
the “distorted record” created by these rulings to deny renewal of the DVRO,
and in so doing, exceeded the bounds of discretion and deprived her of a fair
hearing in violation of due process.
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“ ‘It is . . . well established that courts have . . . inherent power to
control litigation before them. [Citation.] . . . “ . . . That inherent power
entitles trial courts to exercise reasonable control over all proceedings
connected with pending litigation . . . in order to insure the orderly
administration of justice.” ’ ” (Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th
1337, 1351, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re
Marriage of Swain (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 830, 840.) “ ‘The state’s strong
interest in prompt and efficient trials permits the non-arbitrary exclusion of
evidence.’ ” (Guardianship of A.H. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 155, 159 (A.H.).)
“ ‘We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under
an abuse of discretion standard.’ ” (A.H., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 160.)
“The trial court’s ‘discretion is only abused where there is a clear showing [it]
exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.’ ”
(Meeks v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, 861.) “A ruling that
constitutes an abuse of discretion has been described as one that is ‘so
34
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’ ”
(Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
So, too, “ ‘[t]he decision to admit rebuttal evidence rests largely within
the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of demonstrated abuse of that discretion.’ . . . The trial court may
permit counsel to call a rebuttal witness to contradict testimony on direct
examination even where the rebuttal is impeachment on a collateral fact.”
(Green v. Healthcare Services, Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 407, 420 (Green).)
2. Rebuttal Witness
Mother contends that the trial court erred in permitting father to call
as a rebuttal witness Sullivan-White, who testified about a March 2025
confrontation between mother and father at the CVS in Felton. Mother
asserts that the confrontation was not part of her case-in-chief, arose only
because of father’s cross-examination, and thus was not a proper subject of
rebuttal testimony.
As an initial matter, we reject father’s assertion that mother forfeited
this argument by failing to object on this basis to Sullivan-White’s testimony.
Mother objected to the testimony by questioning if Sullivan-White was
properly disclosed and whether she was a rebuttal witness. These
statements were sufficient to preserve mother’s objections on appeal.
Nevertheless, mother has not shown that the trial court abused its
discretion by permitting Sullivan-White’s testimony. On direct examination,
mother testified extensively about what she described as “[p]hysical safety
and intimidation since the DVRO,” stating that father “escalated physically
during exchanges” on multiple occasions, “charged” at her or blocked her
movement toward the children on other occasions, and “disregard[ed]” the
instructions and boundaries for child exchange procedures.
35
On cross-examination, father asked mother whether she had “ever
confronted [father] in an aggressive way” at the custody exchanges, to which
she responded, “Not aggressive way. I’ve confronted him about not paying
child support when my – when my bank account was below zero and he was
late on his support.” Mother did not object to this line of questioning, which
constituted part of her case in chief. In rebuttal, father called Sullivan-
White, whose testimony about mother’s behavior during the custody
exchange at the CVS in Felton arguably impeached mother’s assertion about
her conduct in that exchange.
A rebuttal witness may be called to “contradict testimony on direct
examination even where the rebuttal is impeachment on a collateral fact”
(Green, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 420). Sullivan-White’s testimony was
admissible to rebut mother’s testimony about her manner of confronting
father. The authorities mother cites as support for her argument that
Sullivan-White’s rebuttal testimony was beyond the scope of mother’s case-in-
chief are inapposite because they address rebuttal evidence arising in a
criminal matter under a specific procedural rule limiting rebuttal evidence.
(People v. Carter (1957) 48 Cal.2d 737, 753; cf. People v. Orabuena (1976) 56
Cal.App.3d 540, 543–544 [permitting rebuttal evidence that the prosecution
could have introduced as part of the case in chief when it is presented to
respond to an alibi defense]; see Pen. Code, § 1093, subd. (d) [establishing the
order of procedure and generally limiting the parties, after presentation of
the prosecution and defense cases, to “rebutting testimony only”].) Nor would
the application of the principles stated in these cases to the facts adduced in
Sullivan-White’s testimony necessarily render the trial court’s admission of
the testimony an abuse of discretion.
36
We conclude that mother has not demonstrated that the trial court
acted arbitrarily or exceeded the bounds of reason in allowing Sullivan-
White’s testimony.
3. Exclusion of Mother’s Corroborating Witness
Mother challenges the trial court’s exclusion of her witness Rob Markel,
whom she states was “disclosed, present, sworn, and offered firsthand
testimony relevant to safety and conduct.” She asserts that the court failed
to weigh the probative value of evidence under Evidence Code section 352,
provided only a “conclusory reference to ‘cumulativeness’ ” as the basis for
excluding Markel, and that his exclusion represented an “asymmetry” in the
trial by denying mother a meaningful opportunity to present her case.
We review the trial court’s decision to exclude mother’s additional
witness for abuse of discretion. (A.H., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 160.)
When asked for an offer of proof as to the subject of Markel’s testimony,
mother stated that he would testify “[t]o safety concerns that he witnessed on
the property in 2022.” The court noted that mother already presented her
safety concerns “in detail” and ruled that Markel’s testimony about safety
concerns was “cumulative.”
The year 2022 was when the parties separated and father’s custody
time with the children took place on mother’s property. It was the year that
the original DVRO issued, before the months of supervised visitation and
other changes in circumstances relevant to the trial court’s consideration of
the DVRO renewal and custody contest. By the time of the evidentiary
hearing in 2025, there had been an intervening decision in September 2023
by the trial court that father had rebutted the section 3044 presumption
against him and finding (as of that time) that he had committed no further
acts of domestic violence.
37
Given the passage of time, changes in circumstances, and salience of
more recent evidence pertaining to the children’s safety and well-being, it is
unclear what relevance Markel’s testimony would have had for the issues
before the trial court. What is more, the court had already heard testimony
from both mother and mother’s sister about safety concerns dating back to
2022, rending the testimony cumulative.
We conclude the trial court’s decision was well within its broad
discretion to control the proceedings and assess whether the probative value
of the evidence in relation to it being cumulative of evidence already
admitted. (See, e.g, Maricela C. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th
1138, 1147 [“The due process right to present evidence is limited to relevant
evidence of significant probative value to the issue before the court.”]; Evid.
Code, § 352.) The court was not required to explicitly reference Evidence
Code section 352 or state its reasoning in deciding that the evidence, though
admissible, was cumulative. The court’s balancing of the probative value of
the evidence against its cumulative or time consuming effect may be inferred
from the record. (See People v. Alvarez (2025) 18 Cal.5th 387, 464.) Absent
evidence to the contrary (and there is none on this record) we presume the
court understood and followed the law. (Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P.
(2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426, 440; see Evid. Code, § 664.)
Mother has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion
in deciding not to permit mother’s proffered “corroborating” testimony.
4. Denial of Continuance and Due Process Claims
Mother further contends that, because Sullivan-White was disclosed on
the same day that she testified and mother was not offered a continuance,
she did not have a meaningful opportunity to respond to Sullivan-White’s
testimony. Mother argues that the prejudice of the late-disclosed rebuttal
38
witness was exacerbated because she “lost counsel days before trial” and was
denied a continuance at that time to prepare for trial. (Capitalization &
boldface omitted.)
Mother’s arguments do not establish error. She asserts generally that
the trial court’s actions in permitting the testimony of Sullivan-White,
without offering a continuance, deprived mother of “any meaningful
opportunity to investigate the witness, prepare impeachment, or present
responsive evidence.” However, mother cites no legal authority that would
have required the court to enforce an advance disclosure requirement for
rebuttal evidence, nor any authority that would require the court, sua sponte,
to offer a continuance so mother could be afforded more time to prepare.
By failing to present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations
to authority that are relevant to her claim on appeal, mother fails to
demonstrate reversible error. (S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
Furthermore, “[c]ontinuances are granted only on an affirmative showing of
good cause requiring a continuance” (Falcone & Fyke, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th
at p. 823, citing rule 3.1332(c)), and “[r]eviewing courts must uphold a trial
court’s choice not to grant a continuance unless the court has abused its
discretion in so doing.” (Falcone & Fyke, at p. 823.)
The trial record in this case belies mother’s claims of procedural
unfairness, asymmetry in the opportunity for her to present her case, or
distortion of the record. Mother emphasizes her lack of counsel, whom she
asserts “withdrew on February 26, 2025 just days before trial commenced on
March 4, 2025.” Mother argues that, as a result, she was forced to proceed
through a complex trial without counsel or legal assistance, and that this
circumstance—especially without a continuance—“transformed what might
otherwise have been curable evidentiary issues into structural unfairness.”
39
These representations fail to reflect what the record establishes, which
is that mother released her counsel days before the scheduled hearing
because her attorney “was not representing [her]” and had “not filed any
paperwork” for the hearing and in response to the custody report after it was
filed. Mother immediately filed an ex parte request to reschedule the
evidentiary hearing by 30 days, citing “exceptional circumstances” based on
her substitution of attorney. The trial court denied the requested relief on
grounds that mother had not shown a basis for ex parte relief and the request
was untimely. Nevertheless, on the first day of the hearing the court granted
mother a one-week continuance to allow her more time to prepare her case,
including by allowing her to file any pleadings and witness disclosures up to
the day before the hearing. Mother’s assertions that she “lost” her counsel
and received no continuance in consideration of her self-represented status
are therefore inaccurate.
In addition, the record establishes the trial court’s efforts throughout
trial to accommodate mother and provide leeway in light of her self-
represented status, as well as ensure that she was given a full and fair
opportunity to make her case. The court accepted late-filed pleadings during
trial, over father’s objection, including mother’s declaration and
memorandum of points and authorities objecting to the child custody
evaluator recommendations, her declaration and memorandum of points and
authorities in support of the request to renew the DVRO, and her expert
witness declaration. At the continued hearing, the court set a continuation
date specifically to accommodate the availability of mother’s expert witness,
Dr. Barrett, and ensure her ability to testify. The court permitted mother to
testify in support of a declaration she had filed, over father’s objection, to
describe her reaction to certain disclosures by the children that invoked in
40
mother fear and concerns about sexual abuse and gave her “leeway” in
recounting these instances as part of her closing statement. These are but a
few of many examples of the efforts made by the court to afford mother a fair
opportunity to present her evidence and make her case at trial.
In sum, the record amply reflects the trial court’s reasonable exercise of
discretion to manage the litigation efficiently and fairly. None of the issues
raised by mother support her claims of procedural unfairness or deprivation
of due process.
We recognize mother’s deep discontent with the recommendations of
the custody report and the outcome of the trial. However, mother has not
shown that the trial court committed error warranting the reversal of either
the court’s decision on the DVRO renewal or the joint custody ruling. We
therefore affirm the challenged orders. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at
pp. 608–609.)
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying mother’s request to renew the DVRO and granting
the parties joint legal and physical custody of the children is affirmed.
Father is entitled to his reasonable costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(1), (2).)
41
______________________________________
Danner, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
____________________________________
Adams, J.
H053455
C.S. v. B.W.