Filed 11/10/26 StarNet Ins. Co. v. CPM Wolverine Proctor CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STARNET INSURANCE COMPANY,
F089577
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. VCU295263)
v.
CPM WOLVERINE PROCTOR LLC,
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
Defendant and Respondent. AND DENYING REHEARING
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
TREEHOUSE CALIFORNIA ALMONDS, LLC,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. VCU295264)
v.
CPM WOLVERINE PROCTOR LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S OF
LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY
NUMBER B0702CM306120,
(Super. Ct. No. VCU305097)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CPM WOLVERINE PROCTOR LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on October 14, 2026, be modified in the
following particulars:
1. On page 24, at the end of the second full paragraph under the subheading
“A. Pennsylvania Law,” following the parenthetical citation of “(Phillips v. Cricket
Lighters (Pa. 2003) 841 A.2d 1000, 1005; § 402A, com. l.),” add as footnote 14 the
following footnote, which will require renumbering of all subsequent footnotes:
14
CPM argues this court should follow the approach
set forth in Johnson v. Toll Brothers, Inc., supra, 303 A.3d
471, wherein an intermediate Pennsylvania appellate court
engaged in a “gist of the action” analysis to assess whether a
strict products liability cause of action before it sounded in
contract or tort. (Id. at pp. 475–476.)
The problem with following the Johnson approach that
CPM advocates for is that it runs counter to the categorical
statements of Pennsylvania’s highest court that a strict
liability cause of action “sounds in tort,” and “involves breach
of duties ‘imposed by law as a matter of social policy.’ ”
(Tincher, supra, 104 A.3d at p. 400.) In making those
categorical statements, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
recognized the cause of action “implicates the social and
economic policy” of Pennsylvania (id. at p. 385), and that a
manufacturer may be held liable for damages caused by
defective products the manufacturer has placed in the stream
of commerce. (Ibid.)
2.
There is no change in the judgment.
Respondent CPM Wolverine Proctor LLC’s petition for rehearing is denied.
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
FRANSON, J.
HARRELL, J.
3.
Filed 10/14/26 StarNet Ins. Co. v. CPM Wolverine Proctor CA5 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STARNET INSURANCE COMPANY,
F089577
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. VCU295263)
v.
CPM WOLVERINE PROCTOR LLC,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
TREEHOUSE CALIFORNIA ALMONDS, LLC,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. VCU295264)
v.
CPM WOLVERINE PROCTOR LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S OF
LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY
NUMBER B0702CM306120,
(Super. Ct. No. VCU305097)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CPM WOLVERINE PROCTOR LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. David C.
Mathias, Judge.
Grotefeld Hoffmann, Adam M. Romney and Jocelyn S. Metsch; Engstrom,
Lipscomb & Lack, Andrew M. Jacobson, Sydney Desman; Webb Daniel Friedlander and
Laurie Webb Daniel for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Kahana & Feld, Michelle Martin, Kirk C. Jenkins, Donald L. Hall III, and Julie
Ritchie for Defendant and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Plaintiff and appellant Treehouse California Almonds, LLC (Treehouse), and its
insurers, plaintiffs and appellants StarNet Insurance Company (StarNet) and Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London Subscribing to Policy Number B0702CM306120
(Lloyd’s) (collectively, plaintiffs) appeal from a judgment entered in favor of defendant
and respondent CPM Wolverine Proctor LLC (CPM) after the trial court granted CPM’s
motion for summary judgment.
2.
Treehouse and CPM entered into a purchase agreement that contained, in pertinent
part, a limitation of actions provision and an exclusion of damages provision. CPM
moved for “summary judgment or, in the alternative … summary adjudication” (boldface
& capitalization omitted) challenging the complaints and the causes of action for strict
products liability, ordinary negligence, and gross negligence. The summary judgment
motion challenged the complaints on the ground they were each filed beyond the time
limit of the purchase agreement’s limitation of actions provision. The summary
adjudication motion challenged the causes of action on the ground they were each subject
to the exclusion of damages provision of the purchase agreement.
The trial court granted CPM’s motion for summary judgment finding the
complaints were filed beyond the time limit delineated in the limitation of actions
provision. It did not rule on CPM’s motion for summary adjudication.
We conclude the strict products liability causes of action are not subject to the
limitation of actions provision in the purchase agreement and so we reverse the trial
court’s ruling on summary judgment.
On the motion for summary adjudication, we conclude (1) the strict liability
causes of action may or may not be subject to the exclusion of damages provision
depending on factual determinations that were not made in the trial court, (2) the gross
negligence causes of action are not subject to the exclusion of damages provision in the
purchase agreement, and (3) the ordinary negligence causes of action are subject to the
exclusion of damages provision.1
1 Because CPM limited its summary adjudication motion to grounds based on the
exclusion of damages provision, we do not address whether summary adjudication would
be appropriate as to any cause of action based on the limitation of actions provision.
3.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Treehouse, and its insurers, StarNet and Lloyd’s, each filed separate lawsuits
against CPM and other defendants,2 seeking damages suffered in connection with a fire at
Treehouse’s warehouse in Earlimart, California (sometimes, the subject incident or
subject fire). Plaintiffs allege the fire was caused by an almond roaster (hereafter the
almond roaster) that malfunctioned. CPM sold the almond roaster to Treehouse, and is
alleged to have “designed, manufactured, and supervised [its] assembly.” Plaintiffs
allege causes of action against CPM for strict products liability, ordinary negligence, and
gross negligence.
I. Factual Background
A. The purchase agreement.
For approximately 10 months prior to entering into the agreement to purchase the
almond roaster, Treehouse representative Carl Tristao and CPM representative Chuck
Kovacs communicated with each other concerning the proposed purchase and sale of the
almond roaster and discussed certain attributes that Treehouse desired in the almond
roaster including, without limitation, the number of roasting zones that were desired and
2 Other defendants named in each of plaintiffs’ respective complaints include
Beeler Industries, Inc., which is alleged to have “unloaded and unpackaged” “sections of
the [almond roaster]” and “designed, manufactured, and installed additional [almond
roaster] components not designed or manufactured by CPM”; Brother’s Welding Services
Inc, which is alleged to have “provided welding services … necessary to assemble the
[almond roaster]” and “installation support”; Rockwell Automation, Inc., doing business
as Allen-Bradley PLC, which is alleged to have “manufactured the … Control System
with starters and burner management, which failed in use and failed to safely regulate the
temperature in the roasting chamber”; and California Boiler, Inc., which is alleged to
have “serviced, repaired, and/or periodically maintained” the almond roaster. Lloyd’s
also named Rutter Armey, Inc., as a defendant in its complaint and the register of actions
shows Rutter Armey, Inc., was substituted in as a defendant in place of a fictitiously
named defendant. The register of actions and, more broadly, the record on appeal, do not
identify the specific complaint(s) to which Rutter Armey, Inc., was added as a party
defendant.
4.
whether a warming zone would be beneficial. Ultimately, the parties agreed that the
almond roaster would have two roasting zones and one ambient cooling zone.
On or about March 20, 2015, CPM submitted a proposal to Treehouse for the
purchase of “[o]ne (1) Wolverine Proctor Roaster rated for 4,400 lbs./hr of Whole
Natural Almonds” (i.e., the almond roaster). On March 25, 2015, Treehouse accepted the
proposal in writing (the Purchase Agreement).
The Purchase Agreement provided, in part, that the almond roaster components
would be “shipped in pre-assembled sections” and that “[c]irculating fans, gas burners
and conveyor will be installed at the job site.” CPM agreed that the almond roaster’s gas
burning equipment would have a “[c]ombustion safeguard system [that] will consist of a
safety shut-off valve, gas pressure switches, high temperature limit switches, solenoid
valves in gas pilot lines and [a] Honeywell or equivalent flame detection system.” CPM
also agreed “[t]he gas burning equipment [will] include[] features of NFPA [i.e., National
Fire Protection Association, hereafter NFPA] design and the necessary safety devices as
recommended by NFPA regulations. If local regulations require additional devices or
design changes, these may be included at additional cost.”
The Purchase Agreement specified that certain work and materials were to be
furnished by Treehouse unless the Purchase Agreement provided otherwise. Under the
Purchase Agreement, Treehouse was to furnish the “[n]ecessary sprinkler system as may
be required by insurance or governmental authorities.” The Purchase Agreement further
provided:
“Equipment Safety. Purchaser acknowledges that it is fully familiar with
the products to be processed in the equipment and the methods and
procedures used in processing said products. When product(s) to be
processed are of a flammable or combustible nature Purchaser must
properly clean the equipment in order to prevent hazardous build-up of
flammable or combustible material. Purchaser should also provide an
adequate fire suppression system on the equipment in situations where
flammable or combustible material may build up in the equipment.”
5.
and
“Purchaser agrees to maintain all necessary guards and other safety features
with respect to the Equipment. Purchaser further agrees to supply any
guard and other safety equipment required for the safe operation of the
Equipment not required to be supplied by the Company pursuant to this
Agreement.”
The Purchase Agreement also contained several provisions that are of particular
relevance to the appeal. First, the Purchase Agreement contains a choice of law provision
that reads:
“Pennsylvania law applies to this Agreement, and governs its construction
and interpretation. Disputes arising under this Agreement may be resolved
in federal or state court in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The parties
stipulate and agree that the Equipment and any repair or component parts
thereto are ‘goods’ as that term is defined by [section ]2-105 of the
Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code, and that the Pennsylvania
Uniform Commercial Code applies to this transaction,” (the choice of law
provision).
Next, the Purchase Agreement contains a limitation of actions provision that reads:
“Any action against the Company for breach of this Agreement or of any
guarantee or warranty granted herein by the Company must be commenced
within 12 months of the date of the occurrence of such breach,” (the
limitation of actions provision).
In addition, the Purchase Agreement contains an exclusion of damages provision that
reads:
“EXCLUSION OF DAMAGES, THE COMPANY SHALL NOT BE
LIABLE FOR PROXIMATE, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL OR
OTHER DAMAGES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
ERECTING EXPENSES AND DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF PROFITS OR
PRODUCTION OR INJURY TO PERSON OR PROPERTY WHETHER
ARISING IN CONTRACT OR TORT INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE,
STRICT LIABILITY OR OTHERWISE,” (the exclusion of damages
provision).
In the Purchase Agreement, CPM “warrant[ed] the Equipment against defects in
materials and workmanship for a period of twelve months” limited to “replacement or
6.
repair … of any defective parts manufactured by [CPM].” The Purchase Agreement
stated that “warranties of merchantability or of fitness for a particular purpose … are
specifically excluded” and “there are no warranties expressed or implied which extend
beyond the description of the equipment contained in [the Purchase Agreement].”
(Capitalization omitted.)
B. Additional facts.
In interrogatory responses, Treehouse indicated its purpose in purchasing the
almond roaster was to roast almonds “on a commercial level which equated to running
the roaster in twelve hour shifts twice per day, often six days a week.”
The almond roaster components designed and manufactured by CPM were
assembled at the Treehouse facility by defendant Beeler Industries, Inc., under CPM’s
supervision, and the almond roaster was put into operation in May 2016. On May 25,
2016, Treehouse notified CPM that the almond roaster needed to be serviced because
“fans in zone one [were] out of balance, vibrating, and wobbling.” CPM sent an engineer
out to troubleshoot the issue and a local contractor, defendant Rutter Armey, Inc.,
rebalanced all six fans in June 2016.
The almond roaster was in operation for nearly five years before the subject
incident. During that time, the almond roaster experienced occasional performance
issues and Treehouse contracted with defendant California Boiler, Inc., to keep the
almond roaster running safely.
II. Procedural Background
A. Treehouse’s complaint.
On January 17, 2023, Treehouse filed its complaint against CPM and the other
named defendants in connection with an alleged fire that occurred nearly two years
7.
earlier, on January 18, 2021 (the Treehouse lawsuit).3 According to the complaint, the
fire started “when the [almond roaster] [it purchased from CPM] failed to operate as
intended which led to an overheating event [that] caused over 4,000 pounds of raw
California almonds to reach their auto-ignition temperature and ignite.” Treehouse
alleged “the [almond roaster’s] impeller fan blade assembly failed” and, as a result, the
fan blade could not perform its “intended function of circulating the hot air” generated
within the roaster, thereby causing “runaway high temperatures,” the “autoignition of the
almonds,” and a “catastrophic fire.”
Treehouse alleged CPM “had a duty to provide a functioning combustion
safeguard system which included a functioning safety shutoff valve, functioning gas
pressure switches, functioning high temperature limit switches, functioning solenoid
valves in gas pilot lines, a functioning flame detection sensing system, and a functioning
internal fire extinguishment system within the [almond roaster].” The alleged absence of
“an internal fire suppression system with the [almond roaster] allowed the fire to breach
the [almond roaster’s] roasting chamber.”
Treehouse alleged its employees attempted to, but could not, put out the fire, and
had to “evacuate the area, fearing for their safety and lives.” Treehouse alleged the fire
“caused significant damage to the building which housed the [almond roaster] and
destroyed everything within that same building.”
Treehouse alleged causes of action against CPM, for strict products liability,
ordinary negligence, gross negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, breach
of contract and negligent misrepresentation.
3 The Treehouse lawsuit was assigned Tulare County Superior Court case
No. VCU295264.
8.
B. StarNet’s complaint.
On the same day Treehouse filed its complaint, January 17, 2023, StarNet filed its
complaint in subrogation against CPM and the other named defendants, alleging that,
during all times relevant, StarNet insured Treehouse’s “real and personal business
property” at the location where the almond roaster was assembled, and Treehouse’s
“economic interests” (the StarNet lawsuit).4 StarNet’s allegations against CPM largely
mirrored the allegations Treehouse lodged against CPM. As Treehouse’s subrogee,
StarNet alleged causes of action against CPM, for strict products liability, ordinary
negligence, gross negligence, breach of contract and express warranties, and negligent
misrepresentation.
C. Lloyd’s complaint.
On January 12, 2024, nearly one year after Treehouse and StarNet filed their
respective complaints and nearly three years after the subject fire, Lloyd’s filed a
complaint against CPM, and other named defendants, alleging that, during all times
relevant, Lloyd’s had also insured Treehouse’s real business property, which was
damaged in the fire (the Lloyd’s lawsuit).5 The allegations of Lloyd’s complaint largely
mirrored those of Treehouse’s and StarNet’s complaints. Lloyd’s alleged causes of
action against CPM for strict products liability, ordinary negligence, gross negligence,
and breach of express warranties.
The trial court consolidated the Treehouse, StarNet and Lloyd’s lawsuits upon the
stipulation of the parties, and for good cause. The StarNet lawsuit was designated the
lead case.
4 The StarNet lawsuit was assigned Tulare County Superior Court case
No. VCU295263.
5 The Lloyd’s lawsuit was assigned Tulare County Superior Court case
No. VCU305097.
9.
D. CPM’s demurrer and plaintiffs’ dismissal of contract claims.
On May 12, 2023, CPM filed a demurrer to StarNet’s complaint on grounds the
action was filed outside the one-year limitation period that the parties had contractually
agreed to “ ‘for breach of [the Purchase Agreement] or of any guarantee or warranty’ ”
contained in the agreement. That same day, StarNet dismissed, without prejudice, its
cause of action for breach of contract and express warranties.
In its demurrer, CPM contended the limitation period applied to all StarNet’s
stated causes of action—which were largely the same as Treehouse’s and Lloyd’s stated
causes of action. The trial court overruled the demurrer as to StarNet’s first, second and
third causes of action for strict products liability, ordinary negligence and gross
negligence. The court found “the demurrer moot as to the dismissed fourth cause of
action” for breach of contract and express warranties, and sustained the demurrer to
StarNet’s fifth cause of action for negligent misrepresentation “with leave to amend.”
On August 7, 2023, StarNet dismissed, without prejudice, its cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation. Similarly, on May 19, 2023, Treehouse dismissed, without
prejudice, its causes of action for breach of express and implied warranties, and breach of
contract, and, on August 8, 2023, dismissed, without prejudice, its cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation. Finally, on October 28, 2024, Lloyd’s dismissed, without
prejudice, its cause of action for breach of express and implied warranty.
When the dust settled, the only causes of action asserted by each plaintiff against
CPM were for strict products liability, ordinary negligence, and gross negligence.
E. CPM moves for summary judgment and summary adjudication.
On August 19, 2024, CPM moved for summary judgment against each plaintiff.
The motion was “made on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ Complaints were filed after the one
year limit specified in the Purchase Agreement entered into by … Treehouse. The
subrogation Complaints of … StarNet and Lloyd’s are derivative and the one year suit
time limit agreed to by Treehouse applies to those consolidated subrogation Complaints.”
10.
In the alternative, CPM moved for summary adjudication of each plaintiffs’ causes of
action for strict products liability, ordinary negligence, and gross negligence on the
ground the exclusion of damages provision “specifies that CPM shall not be responsible
for damages including damages for lost profits and damages [for] injury to property
arising in tort.”6
In its separate statement of material facts, CPM set forth 11 facts that it contends
entitles it to summary judgment.7 Those facts are summarized, as follows: (1) Treehouse
is a commercial almond processor that freely negotiated the terms of the Purchase
Agreement; (2) the Purchase Agreement contains the choice of law provision; (3) CPM’s
main office is in Pennsylvania; (4) the Purchase Agreement contains the limitation of
actions provision; (5) the Purchase Agreement contains the exclusion of damages
provision; (6) the Purchase Agreement contains a provision excluding certain
warranties8; (7) Treehouse’s production manager signed the Purchase Agreement under a
provision that stated he affirmed that he read and understood all terms and conditions on
the contract including the exclusion of warranties provision and intended to be legally
bound by the Purchase Agreement’s terms; (8) plaintiffs alleged the subject incident
occurred on January 18, 2021; (9) Treehouse and StarNet filed their lawsuits on
6 CPM also moved for summary adjudication of Lloyd’s cause of action for breach
of express warranty. However, Lloyd’s dismissed its breach of warranty cause of action
prior to the trial court ruling on the motion.
7 CPM asserts some combination (but not all) of these same 11 facts in seeking
summary adjudication of each of plaintiffs’ three causes of action for strict products
liability, negligence, and gross negligence. In addition, CPM asserts the following
additional fact in seeking summary adjudication of each of those causes of action:
“Plaintiffs are seeking damages for lost profits and damage to property.”
8 This asserted fact was only relevant to the extent CPM’s summary adjudication
motion was directed toward Lloyd’s cause of action for breach of contract and express
warranties, which, at the time, was the only remaining cause of action for breach of
warranties asserted by any plaintiff, and which cause of action Lloyd’s dismissed after
CPM filed its motion. (See fn. 6, ante.)
11.
January 17, 2023; (10) Lloyd’s filed its lawsuit on January 12, 2024; and (11) the
lawsuits are consolidated for all purposes.
On October 31, 2024, plaintiffs filed a consolidated opposition to CPM’s motion
for summary judgment/adjudication. Plaintiffs asserted additional material facts in
opposition to the motion but, with the notable exception of plaintiffs’ complaints, the
Purchase Agreement itself, and evidence submitted by CPM, the record on appeal does
not include most of the evidence plaintiffs relied on in its opposition.9
On November 6, 2024, CPM filed its reply paperwork in support of its motion.10
Although many of the additional facts asserted by plaintiffs were not disputed, CPM
argued in their response to plaintiffs’ separate statement that they were irrelevant.
On December 9, 2024, the trial court issued its ruling. The court granted the
motion for summary judgment on the grounds the one-year statute of limitation in the
Purchase Agreement applied, and that the complaints of Treehouse, StarNet, and Lloyd’s
were barred because they were “filed beyond one year from the occurrence” of the fire.
9 “An appellant has the burden to provide a record sufficient to support its claim of
error.” (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 655, 678.)
10 Included among CPM’s reply paperwork were CPM’s objections to evidence
submitted by plaintiffs in opposition to CPM’s summary judgment/adjudication motion.
It appears the trial court did not rule on the objections and CPM has not renewed its
objections on appeal. As a result, we treat the objections as having been properly
overruled. (Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 838,
849 [“In the context of a summary judgment motion, ‘if the trial court fails to rule
expressly on specific evidentiary objections, it is presumed that the objections have been
overruled, the trial court considered the evidence in ruling on the merits of the summary
judgment motion, and the objections are preserved on appeal.’ [Citation.] However, ‘the
burden [is] on the objector to renew the objections in the appellate court.’ ” (Italics
omitted.)].)
12.
The trial court “decline[d] to rule on the other issues and theories raised by the parties in
the motion and opposition.”11
In granting the motion, the trial court reasoned that Pennsylvania law applies to
the Purchase Agreement and to plaintiffs’ causes of action by virtue of the choice of law
provision. The court applied the choice of law analysis set forth in Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v.
Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 459, 465–466 (Nedlloyd), discussed post and determined
Pennsylvania has a substantial relationship to CPM by virtue of the fact CPM maintains
its principal place of business in Pennsylvania—thus justifying the parties’ choice of law.
It further determined that Pennsylvania law allows parties to contractually agree upon a
shorter limitations period for claims, and that California does as well, so long as the
shorter period is reasonable.
The trial court determined that Pennsylvania’s “gist of the action doctrine” is
comparable to California’s “gravamen of the complaint” analysis—both of which are
used to determine the applicable statute of limitations and whether a cause of action
sounds in contract or tort—and concluded use of the “gist of the action doctrine” is not
contrary to a fundamental policy of California law. It then utilized that doctrine to
determine that plaintiffs’ causes of action sound in contract and, therefore, are barred as
untimely under the limitation of actions provision.
F. Judgment.
On January 24, 2025, the trial court issued its “Judgment by Court Under Code of
Civil Procedure Section 437c on [CPM’s] Motion for Summary Judgment” (boldface &
some capitalization omitted) (the judgment) in favor of CPM and against each plaintiff.
11 On March 30, 2026, we issued an order requesting the parties file supplemental
briefs addressing the merits of CPM’s argument on summary adjudication that plaintiffs’
causes of action for strict products liability, negligence and gross negligence are barred
by the exclusion of damages provision in paragraph 2.(f) of the Purchase Agreement.
Plaintiffs and CPM filed supplemental briefs and supplemental reply briefs in compliance
with the order.
13.
G. Motion for reconsideration.
Prior to entry of the judgment, on December 23, 2024, plaintiffs filed a
consolidated motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s summary judgment ruling.
CPM opposed the motion for reconsideration. On February 20, 2025, the court heard the
motion and, in a minute order of the same date, denied the motion. No party has
challenged the court’s ruling on the motion for reconsideration.
H. Appeal.
On April 1, 2025, each plaintiff filed timely notices of appeal of the judgment.
Additional facts and factual allegations are detailed, as necessary, in the discussion
section of this opinion.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
A trial court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. (Samara v. Matar
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 338.) “We consider all the evidence offered in connection with the
motion, except that which the trial court properly excluded.” (Salas v. Department of
Transportation (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1067.) “Evidence presented in opposition
to summary judgment is liberally construed, with any doubts about the evidence resolved
in favor of the party opposing the motion.” (Regents of University of California v.
Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.) “The court’s stated reasons for granting
summary judgment are not binding on us because we review its ruling, not its rationale.”
(Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1168.)
“In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court must make its own
independent determination of the construction and effect of the papers submitted…. The
reviewing court applies the same three-step analysis as that of the trial court:
(1) identification of issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determination of whether the
moving party has established facts which negate the opponent’s claim [or demonstrates a
complete defense] and justify a judgment in movant’s favor; and (3) determination of
14.
whether the opponent demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”
(Varni Bros. Corp. v. Wine World, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 880, 886–887; accord,
Bashi v. Wodarz (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1318.) “[T]he party moving for summary
judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and
that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)
II. Pennsylvania Law Applies to the Determination of Whether the Provisions of
the Purchase Agreement Mandate Summary Judgment or Summary
Adjudication
First, plaintiffs contend “there is no evidence that would support the conclusion
that the parties intended the Purchase Agreement’s choice of law provision to apply
Pennsylvania law to Treehouse’s products liability claims.” We are not persuaded. Not
only do the express terms of the agreement state that “Pennsylvania law applies to this
Agreement, and governs its construction and interpretation,” but the agreement provides
contractual defenses to CPM (the limitation of actions provision and the exclusion of
damages provision) suggesting the parties intended Pennsylvania law to apply to those
defenses.
Second, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by employing the “two-part choice
of law test” articulated in Nedlloyd, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pages 465 through 466, instead of
the “governmental interest test” articulated in Chen v. Los Angeles Truck Centers, LLC
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 862 (Chen) in determining that Pennsylvania law applied. Plaintiffs
argue that, had the court correctly applied the Chen test, it would have concluded that
California law and Pennsylvania law are not in conflict, and that California law should
apply. We conclude the trial court used the correct test.
In Nedlloyd, the court “consider[ed] the effect of a choice-of-law clause in a
contract between commercial entities.” (Nedlloyd, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 462.) There, the
Supreme Court held: “In determining the enforceability of arm’s-length contractual
15.
choice-of-law provisions,” which is the case here, “California courts shall apply the
principles set forth in Restatement [Second of Conflict of Laws,] section 187, which
reflects a strong policy favoring enforcement of such provisions.” (Id. at pp. 464–465.)
Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws, section 187 (hereafter Section 187) provides, in
relevant part: “The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied …. [¶] … unless either [¶] (a) the chosen state has no
substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable
basis for the parties choice, or [¶] (b) application of the law of the chosen state would be
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the
chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of
[Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws, section] 188,[12] would be the state of the
applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.”
12 Section 188 of the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws reads: “(1) The
rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the
local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant
relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles stated in [Rest.2d Conf.
of Laws,] § 6. [¶] (2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see
§ 187), the contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of [Rest.2d Conf.
of Laws,] § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include: [¶] (a) the place of
contracting, [¶] (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, [¶] (c) the place of
performance, [¶] (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and [¶] (e) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties. [¶] These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue. [¶] (3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the
place of performance are in the same state, the local law of this state will usually be
applied, except as otherwise provided in [Rest.2d Conf. of Laws,] §§ 189–199 and 203.”
In the absence of an effective choice of law provision, we are of the opinion that
California law would apply. CPM’s representative met with Treehouse’s representative
in California and Treehouse’s negotiations occurred in California. The product was
shipped to California, assembled in California under the supervision of a CPM
representative, and was put to use in California. In addition, warranty work was
performed in California. (See Rest.2d Conf. of Laws, § 188.)
16.
Chen involved a “tort action arising out of a fatal tour bus accident in Arizona.”
(Chen, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 864.) “The bus passengers were 10 Chinese tourists and
their tour guide.” (Ibid.) Two of the passengers were killed and the remaining eight
passengers were injured after the driver “drove the bus around a curve at a high rate of
speed and lost control” and the “bus rolled over twice.” (Ibid.) “[T]he eight passengers
and survivors of the two passengers who were killed” sued the California owner and
operator of the bus company, the California distributor who sold the bus to its owner, and
the Indiana manufacturer of the bus. (Id. at p. 865.) The trial court concluded Indiana
law applied to the case. (Ibid.) Before trial, however, the Indiana manufacturer settled.
The Supreme Court “granted review to determine if the trial court should have
reconsidered [its] previous choice of law ruling after [the] Indiana defendant was no
longer a party.” (Id. at p. 864.)
Unlike Nedlloyd and the case at bar, no contractual choice of law provision was at
issue in Chen. Our high court affirmed that, under the circumstances presented in Chen,
the governmental interest test was the correct test to apply to determine which
jurisdiction’s law would apply. (Chen, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 867, 870.)13
Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, our Supreme Court did not abandon the
Nedlloyd test in favor of the governmental interest test articulated in Chen. In support of
their contention, plaintiffs cite to Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. (2006) 39
13 The Chen court described the governmental interest test, as follows: “ ‘First,
the court determines whether the relevant law of each of the potentially affected
jurisdictions with regard to the particular issue in question is the same or different.
Second, if there is a difference, the court examines each jurisdiction’s interest in the
application of its own law under the circumstances of the particular case to determine
whether a true conflict exists. Third, if the court finds that there is a true conflict, it
carefully evaluates and compares the nature and strength of the interest of each
jurisdiction in the application of its own law “to determine which state’s interest would
be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state”
[citation], and then ultimately applies “the law of the state whose interest would be the
more impaired if its law were not applied.” ’ ” (Chen, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 867–868.)
17.
Cal.4th 95, 107–108. However, Kearney and the cases it relied on in applying the
governmental interest test did not involve a contractual choice-of-law provision.
(Kearney, at pp. 99, 107–115 [unauthorized recording of telephone calls], discussing
Reich v. Purcell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 551 [wrongful death action]; Offshore Rental Co. v.
Continental Oil Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 157 [personal injury action]; Bernhard v. Harrah’s
Club (1976) 16 Cal.3d 313 [personal injury action], superseded by statute on other
grounds; Hurtado v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 574 [wrongful death action].)
Our Supreme Court put the issue to rest in Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior
Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, explaining that “California has two different analyses for
selecting which law should be applied in an action. When the parties have an agreement
that another jurisdiction’s law will govern their disputes, the appropriate analysis for the
trial court to undertake is set forth in Nedlloyd, supra, 3 Cal.4th 459, which addresses the
enforceability of contractual choice-of-law provisions. Alternatively, when there is no
advance agreement on applicable law, but the action involves the claims of residents from
outside California, the trial court may analyze the governmental interests of the various
jurisdictions involved to select the most appropriate law.” (Id. at pp. 914–915, italics
added.)
The trial court did not err in selecting and applying the Nedlloyd test.
A. Pennsylvania has a substantial relationship to the parties or to the
transaction.
Under Nedlloyd, we consider whether Pennsylvania has a substantial relationship
to the parties or the transaction. (Nedlloyd, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 465.) Plaintiffs have
admitted that CPM’s principal office is located in Pennsylvania. This is sufficient to
satisfy the first prong of the Nedlloyd test. (Id. at p. 467 [“ ‘If one of the parties resides in
the chosen state, the parties have a reasonable basis for their choice.’ ”]; Pinela v. Neiman
Marcus Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 227, 257 [the defendant’s headquarters
18.
located in Texas sufficient to demonstrate “the chosen state, Texas, has a substantial
relationship to the parties”].)
B. Application of Pennsylvania law is not contrary to a fundamental policy of
California law.
1. Pennsylvania law does not conflict with California’s economic loss
rule.
On appeal, plaintiffs have not offered an analysis of the choice of law provision
utilizing the Nedlloyd test. Rather, they have only offered an analysis utilizing the Chen
test. In doing so, however, plaintiffs have identified the economic loss doctrine as one
relevant fundamental policy of California that “would be impaired through the
application of Pennsylvania law.”
California’s economic loss rule is explained in detail in Rattagan v. Uber
Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1 (Rattagan). “The economic loss rule is a device,
among others, that courts have developed to address and protect the often elusive
boundary line between tort and contract law.” (Id. at p. 19.) “ ‘Whereas contract actions
are created to enforce the intentions of the parties to the agreement, tort law is primarily
designed to vindicate “social policy.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “As a result of this distinction between
contract and tort claims, parties injured solely by a contractual breach have a narrower set
of remedies compared to those available to litigants who suffered tortious injury.
‘Contract damages are generally limited to those within the contemplation of the parties
when the contract was entered into or at least reasonably foreseeable by them at that time;
consequential damages beyond the expectations of the parties are not recoverable.’ ” (Id.
at pp. 19–20.)
Conversely, the measure of damages for the breach of an obligation not arising
from contract, unless otherwise provided in the Civil Code, “ ‘is the amount which will
compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been
anticipated or not.’ ” (Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 20, some italics omitted; accord,
19.
Civ. Code, § 3333.) In addition, there is the potential for the recovery of punitive
damages in a tort action under specific circumstances. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a);
Rattagan, at p. 20.) “But ‘punitive damages “ ‘are never recoverable for breach of
contract, no matter how willful or malicious, except where the wrongful act is also a
tort.’ ” ’ ” (Rattagan, at p. 20.)
“[T]he economic loss rule was developed to ensure that the law of contract would
not ‘drown in a sea of tort.’ [Citation.] ‘The rule itself is deceptively easy to state: In
general, there is no recovery in tort for negligently inflicted “purely economic losses,”
meaning financial harm unaccompanied by physical or property damage.’ ” (Rattagan,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 20.) “ ‘[T]he economic loss rule requires a [contractual party] to
recover in contract for purely economic loss due to disappointed expectations, unless [the
party] can demonstrate harm above and beyond a broken contractual promise.’ ” (Ibid.)
The high court explained that “under the economic loss rule, tort recovery for
breach of a contract duty is generally barred … unless two conditions are satisfied. A
plaintiff must first demonstrate the defendant’s injury-causing conduct violated a duty
that is independent of the duties and rights assumed by the parties when they entered the
contract. Second, the defendant’s conduct must have caused injury to persons or property
that was not reasonably contemplated by the parties when the contract was formed.”
(Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 20–21.)
Notably, Pennsylvania also adheres to the economic loss rule. (See, e.g., Johnson
v. Toll Brothers, Inc. (Pa. Super. Ct. 2023) 303 A.3d 471, 474–475.) In Johnson, the
court wrote: “ ‘The general rule of law is that economic losses may not be recovered in
tort (negligence) absent physical injury or property damage.’ [Citation.] In a product
liability action, a plaintiff cannot recover damages under tort theories such as negligence
because a ‘contract action … is perfectly suited to providing an adequate remedy for such
losses and recognizes the parties’ ability to structure their relative liabilities and
expectations regarding the product’s performance by setting the terms of their contractual
20.
bargain.’ [Citation.] ‘[W]here various components of a product are provided by the
same supplier as part of a complete and integrated package, even if a defect in one
component damages another, there is no damage to “other property” of the plaintiff.’ ”
(Ibid.)
Pennsylvania law does not conflict with California law.
2. A 12-month limitation of actions provision is reasonable and so does
not violate any fundamental policy of California law.
The trial court concluded that it was appropriate to consider Pennsylvania law in
determining whether plaintiffs’ claims sounded in contract or in tort. In doing so, the
court correctly observed that Pennsylvania’s Commercial Code allows parties to
contractually agree upon a shortened limitation period of not less than one year. (13 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann., § 2725.) Similarly, California allows parties to agree upon a shorter
limitation period, provided it is reasonable. (Moreno v. Sanchez (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th
1415, 1430.) “ ‘Reasonable’ in this context means the shortened period nevertheless
provides sufficient time to effectively pursue a judicial remedy.” (Ibid.)
The 12-month limitation on actions is reasonable.
3. Pennsylvania’s gist of the action doctrine does not violate a
fundamental policy of California law.
The trial court concluded Pennsylvania’s “gist of the action” doctrine to determine
whether a claim sounds in contract or tort was the functional equivalent of the “gravamen
of the complaint” test in California used for the same purpose and, as a result, does not
violate a fundamental policy of California.
In California, “ ‘[t]o determine the statute of limitations which applies to a cause
of action it is necessary to identify the nature of the cause of action, i.e., the “gravamen”
of the cause of action. [Citations.] “[T]he nature of the right sued upon and not the form
of action nor the relief demanded determines the applicability of the statute of limitations
under our code.” ’ (Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 22–23.) ‘In
21.
determining whether an action is on the contract or in tort, … it is the nature of the
grievance rather than the form of the pleadings that determines the character of the
action. If the complaint states a cause of action in tort, and it appears that this is the
gravamen of the complaint, the nature of the action is not changed by allegations in
regard to the existence of or breach of a contract. In other words, it is the object of the
action, rather than the theory upon which recovery is sought that is controlling.’ ” (Vera
v. REL-BC, LLC (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 57, 64–65.) To determine the nature of a
plaintiff’s claim, it is necessary to examine the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint.
(See id. at p. 65.)
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania described its gist of the action doctrine as
follows: “The general governing principle which can be derived from our prior cases is
that our Court has consistently regarded the nature of the duty alleged to have been
breached, as established by the underlying averments supporting the claim in a plaintiff’s
complaint, to be the critical determinative factor in determining whether the claim is truly
one in tort, or for breach of contract. In this regard, the substance of the allegations
comprising a claim in a plaintiff’s complaint are of paramount importance, and, thus, the
mere labeling by the plaintiff of a claim as being in tort, e.g., for negligence, is not
controlling. If the facts of a particular claim establish that the duty breached is one
created by the parties by the terms of their contract—i.e., a specific promise to do
something that a party would not ordinarily have been obligated to do but for the
existence of the contract—then the claim is to be viewed as one for breach of contract.
[Citation.] If, however, the facts establish that the claim involves the defendant’s
violation of a broader social duty owed to all individuals, which is imposed by the law of
torts and, hence, exists regardless of the contract, then it must be regarded as a tort.”
(Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co. (Pa. 2014) 106 A.3d 48, 68, fn. omitted.)
On appeal, plaintiffs concede that “Pennsylvania’s ‘gist of the action’ doctrine
serves the same general purpose as California’s economic loss doctrine.” Plaintiffs quote
22.
eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Advertising, Inc. (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) 811 A.2d 10, as follows:
“ ‘the [gist of the action] doctrine is designed to maintain the conceptual distinction
between breach of contract claims and tort claims’ ” and “ ‘[a] claim should be limited to
a contract claim when the parties’ obligations are defined by the terms of the contracts,
and not by the larger social policies embodied by the law of torts’ ” (see id. at p. 14).
Aside from arguing the trial court applied the wrong choice of law test, an
argument we have rejected, plaintiffs do not provide us with an argument that
demonstrates Pennsylvania’s gist of the action doctrine conflicts with California’s
gravamen of the complaint test. They criticize the court for not considering “whether
California’s interest in enforcing its fundamental public policy embodied by the
economic loss doctrine would be impaired” and argue use of the gist of the action
doctrine entirely abandons “California’s long-standing jurisprudential emphasis on the
pursuit of damage to ‘other property’ in tort.” Yet, as mentioned, plaintiffs have
conceded that the Pennsylvania doctrine “serves the same general purpose as California’s
economic loss doctrine” and, as we have stated, both jurisdictions recognize the
economic loss rule.
The “gist of the action” doctrine employed in Pennsylvania is comparable to the
“gravamen of the complaint” test employed in California. The “gist of the action”
doctrine does not violate a fundamental policy of California.
III. We Reverse the Trial Court’s Ruling on Summary Judgment Because the
Strict Products Liability Causes of Action Are Not Subject to the Limitation
of Actions Provision in the Purchase Agreement
We first consider whether plaintiffs’ strict products liability causes of action sound
in contract or tort, and whether they are subject to the limitation of actions provision
which sets a 12-month limitation period for “breach of [the Purchase] Agreement or of
any guarantee or warranty granted [therein] by [CPM].”
23.
A. Pennsylvania law.
In Webb v. Zern (Pa. 1966) 220 A.2d 853, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
adopted the language of Restatement Second of Torts, section 402A (1965) (Section
402A) as the law of Pennsylvania. (Webb v. Zern, at p. 427.) It reads, as follows:
“ ‘(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the
business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. [¶] (2) The rule
stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the
product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.’ ” (Ibid., accord,
§ 402A.)
Under Pennsylvania law, “the strict liability cause of action sounds in tort.”
(Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc. (Pa. 2014) 104 A.3d 328, 400 (Tincher).) “[T]he notion of
‘defective condition unreasonably dangerous’ is the normative principle of the strict
liability cause of action ….” (Ibid.) “It is important to remember that the action sounds
in tort, i.e.[,] the cause involves breach of duties ‘imposed by law as a matter of social
policy,’ rather than contract ….” (Roverano v. John Crane, Inc. (Pa. 2020) 226 A.3d
526, 540, some italics added.) Privity of contract is not a requirement to maintain a cause
of action for strict liability. (Phillips v. Cricket Lighters (Pa. 2003) 841 A.2d 1000, 1005;
§ 402A, com. l.)
B. California law.
California law is consistent in concluding a strict liability claim sounds in tort. In
Barrett v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1176, the court wrote: “It is accepted
law that the conduct which forms the basis for liability for damages under the theory of
strict products liability is tortious in nature. A tort is ‘ “any wrong, not consisting in
24.
mere breach of contract, for which the law undertakes to give to the injured party some
appropriate remedy against the wrongdoer.” ’ [Citations.] A cause of action based on
strict products liability is one which sounds in tort: ‘A manufacturer is strictly liable in
tort when an article he [or she] places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.’
[Citation.] Strict products liability is ‘a new tort … which extend[s] liability for defective
product design and manufacture beyond negligence but short of absolute liability.’ ” (Id.
at pp. 1187–1188, original italics omitted, italics added; see Elmore v. American Motors
Corp. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 578, 586 [“the doctrine of strict liability may not be restricted on
a theory of privity of contract”]; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59
Cal.2d 57, 63 (Greenman) [“[strict] liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by
law”]; McClaflin v. Bayshore Equipment Rental Co. (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 446, 451 [“a
plaintiff can enforce strict liability in the absence of any contractual relation or privity of
contract with the purveyor”].)
Plaintiffs’ claims for strict products liability do not depend on any alleged breach
of provisions of the Purchase Agreement. They are premised on allegations that CPM
sold the almond roaster in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition to the user
resulting in injury to other property owned by plaintiffs, that CPM is engaged in the
business of selling industrial furnaces or ovens (in this case, the almond roaster), that it
was expected to reach Treehouse without substantial change in the condition in which it
was sold. (See § 402A, subd. (1).) The duty allegedly breached is one that arises from
social policy—not the breach of the Purchase Agreement.
C. Conclusion.
Because there does not appear to be conflict between Pennsylvania law and
California law on the nature of a strict products liability cause of action, and because
Pennsylvania’s high court (like the Court of Appeal in Barrett) has declared that such
25.
causes of action sound in tort, we conclude the gist of the cause of action is for tort and is
not subject to the limitation of actions provision in the Purchase Agreement.14
The strict products liability causes of action are not subject to the limitation of
actions provision in the purchase agreement.
IV. Whether CPM Is Entitled to Summary Adjudication of the Strict Products
Liability Causes of Action Because of the Exclusion of Damages Provision of
the Purchase Agreement Depends on Factual Determinations Not Made in the
Trial Court
Plaintiffs contend strict products liability waivers violate both California and
Pennsylvania public policy. We disagree. Neither California law, nor Pennsylvania law,
prohibit commercial entities from agreeing to exclude damages for strict products
liability under certain circumstances.
A. California Law.
Plaintiffs cite to the following cases for the proposition that manufacturers cannot
disclaim strict products liability—Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th
1715 (Westlye); Greenman, supra, 59 Cal.2d 57, and Seely v. White Motor Co. (1965) 63
Cal.2d 9 (Seely).
In Westlye, the plaintiff “fell while snow skiing and was injured, allegedly due to
defective ski equipment rented” from the defendant ski shop. (Westlye, supra, 17
Cal.App.4th at p. 1723.) The plaintiff sued on a number of theories including strict
products liability. (Ibid.) The trial court granted the defendants’ summary adjudication
motion of the strict products liability claim and other claims “concluding that the claims
were barred by a written agreement in which [the] plaintiff accepted the equipment ‘as is’
and expressly assumed the risk of injury.” (Ibid.) Judgment in favor of the defendants
was entered following trial on the plaintiff’s remaining claims. (Ibid.) On appeal, the
14 Our conclusion should not be interpreted as precluding CPM from arguing that
Treehouse assumed responsibility for correcting whatever defects, if any, Treehouse may
ultimately prove. However, we express no opinion on the validity of such an argument.
26.
Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and determined the plaintiff’s strict liability claim
was not barred. (Ibid.)
The Westlye court stated, “[t]he doctrine of strict liability in tort has served to
avoid contractual provisions by which product suppliers sought to disclaim responsibility
for injuries caused by defective products.” (Westlye, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1743.)
“ ‘The consumer’s cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his contract with
the person from whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected by any disclaimer or
other agreement, whether it be between the seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to
and accompanying the product into the consumer’s hands.’ ” (Id. at p. 1745, quoting
§ 402A, com. m., p. 356.) The court wrote: “There is a public policy in this state to
protect consumers from injuries caused by defective products” and “a strong policy
against allowing product suppliers to disclaim liability for injuries caused by defects in
products they place on the market.” (Westlye, at p. 1747.) The court concluded the
contractual disclaimer and express assumption of risk did not shield the defendant ski
shop from strict products liability. (Id. at pp. 1746, 1747.)
In Greenman, a plaintiff brought a cause of action for injuries sustained when a
combination power tool his wife purchased for him malfunctioned and struck him on the
forehead. (Greenman, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 59.) The plaintiff submitted substantial
evidence that the tool was defectively designed. (Id. at p. 60.) The defendant
manufacturer argued that the plaintiff did not give timely notice of any breach of
warranty. (Ibid.) In affirming judgment against the manufacturer, the Supreme Court
wrote: “to impose strict liability on the manufacturer under the circumstances of this
case, it was not necessary for [the] plaintiff to establish an express warranty …. A
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing
that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being.” (Id. at p. 62, fn. omitted.) “The purpose of such liability is to
insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
27.
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves. Sales warranties serve this purpose fitfully at
best.” (Id. at pp. 63–64.) The court stated, “Although in these cases strict liability has
usually been based on the theory of an express or implied warranty running from the
manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between
them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law
[citations], and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own
responsibility for defective products [citations] make clear that the liability is not one
governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.” (Id. at
p. 63, italics added.)
In Seely, supra, 63 Cal.2d 9, the high court stated, “[Strict] liability could not be
disclaimed, for one purpose of strict liability in tort is to prevent a manufacturer from
defining the scope of his responsibility for harm caused by his products.” (Id. at p. 17,
citing Greenman, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 63.)
Each of the aforementioned cases involved individual consumers in a
noncommercial setting harmed by products they purchased or rented. CPM argues,
“[w]hen the strict liability claim is between two commercial entities, however, the waiver
will be evaluated under the [California Uniform Commercial Code] and such waivers
have been found valid,” citing Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1989)
214 Cal.App.3d 1, 33 (Appalachian). Plaintiffs argue that Appalachian stands for the
principle that “[d]isclaimers of strict products liability are only enforceable ‘when
commercial entities and a business loss are involved’ because the economic loss doctrine
bars tort recovery when the defective product damages only itself,” citing Appalachian, at
page 33.
In Appalachian, the owner of a telecommunications satellite sought to launch its
satellite into orbit from the space shuttle. (Appalachian, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 7.)
“To launch satellites from the space shuttle’s parking orbit into higher orbits, each
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satellite needed its own upper stage rocket.” (Id. at p. 8.) The satellite’s owner
purchased an upper stage rocket from one of the defendants but the rocket failed and the
satellite did not reach a suitable orbit. (Id. at pp. 7, 8.) The owner’s insurers treated the
satellite as a total loss, paid the owner, and then sued the defendant manufacturer and its
subcontractors for negligence and strict products liability. (Id. at p. 7.)
The plaintiffs in Appalachian contended that a provision exculpating the
defendants from strict products liability was unenforceable.15 (Appalachian, supra, 214
Cal.App.3d at p. 32.) The court observed “that there are cases holding strict tort liability
cannot be contractually disclaimed.” (Ibid.) However, the court concluded the argument
“rest[ed] on the faulty premise that strict liability theory applies in [the] commercial
setting [before it].” (Ibid.) The court wrote: “Strict liability theory was adopted because
sales warranty theory, developed to meet the needs of commercial transactions and
requiring a showing of privity, was inadequate to protect consumers. (Kaiser Steel Corp.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 737, 746–747.) ‘The doctrine of
manufacturers’ and suppliers’ strict liability in tort was developed primarily to protect
individual consumers, users, and, to some extent, bystanders who are in no position to
protect themselves from defective products’ rather than to protect commercial entities.
(U.S. Financial v. Sullivan (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 5, 18, italics added.) In accord with the
underlying purpose of the strict liability doctrine (to provide a remedy for injuries to
consumers injured by defective products when contractual theories were inadequate), it
has been held strict liability cannot be contractually disclaimed in the consumer context.”
(Appalachian, at pp. 32–33.)
15 We conclude the exclusion of damages provision is exculpatory. As written,
Treehouse’s remedies are essentially limited to either receiving the benefit of its bargain
(through a warranty claim or notice of nonconformance) or a refund. The exclusion of
damages provision effectively excludes all claims for damages under any cause of action.
29.
The Appalachian court did find, consistent with plaintiffs’ contention, that “when
a lawsuit over a defective product arises in a commercial setting and involves only a
business loss, the courts hold strict liability theory is not available.” (Appalachian,
supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 33.) Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, the court did not say
that a strict liability waiver is only valid under such circumstances. The court went on to
say, that “[t]he cases reason strict liability theory should not apply to a commercial
transaction because: commercial entities are not ‘ “in such a vulnerable position” ’ as are
consumers (see Sumitomo Bank v. Taurus Developers, Inc. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 211,
227; U.S. Financial v. Sullivan, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d [at pp.] 18–19); commercial
entities can bargain for ‘a product designed to negotiable specifications and not furnished
off the shelf’ (see Kaiser[, supra,] 55 Cal.App.3d [at p.] 748); and because application of
a strict liability theory ‘would improperly invade rules of law adopted by the Legislature
in the California Uniform Commercial Code’ when the California Uniform Commercial
Code regulates ‘the various aspects of [the] plaintiff’s purchase of [the product] from
[the] defendant, including liability for defects based on express and implied warranties’ ”
(Appalachian, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 33.) The court wrote, “Since liability for
defective products when commercial entities and a business loss are involved is governed
by the California Uniform Commercial Code which allows disclaimers of warranties (see
Cal. U. Com. Code, § 2316) and by the parties’ agreement, liability for defects may be
disclaimed; the tort theory of strict liability does not apply and thus does not bar the
disclaimer.” (Appalachian, at p. 33.)
The notion that strict products liability may not apply to commercial entities was
discussed in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 737
(Kaiser), superseded by statute on an unrelated point as stated in Billings v. Edwards
(1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 238, 243–244, cited frequently in Appalachian. In Kaiser, the
plaintiff purchased an electric motor from the defendant manufacturer for use in the
plaintiff’s steel mill. (Kaiser, at p. 740.) When the motor failed it caused a portion of the
30.
plaintiff’s steel manufacturing plant to shut down. (Id. at p. 742.) The plaintiff sued the
defendant on several theories of liability including strict products liability. (Id. at p. 740.)
In concluding the trial court had properly granted the defendant’s motion for
nonsuit as to the strict products liability claim, the court wrote: “The case at bench
presents a situation in which the statutory principles of sales warranties work well so that
to apply the tort doctrines of products liability will displace the statutory law rather than
bring out its full flavor. The plaintiff-buyer and [the] defendant-seller are commercial
enterprises contracting from positions of relatively equal bargaining power for a product
designed to negotiable specifications and not furnished off the shelf. Privity is no
artificial barrier to recovery. Since the specifications of the product are negotiable, the
tort doctrine of products liability as between the buyer and seller is no inducement to
design and produce a safe product. Since the manufacturer and buyer have bargained in a
commercial setting not only for the product but also for the measure and mode of
reimbursement for defects in the product, any societal interest in loss shifting is absent.
Whether the loss is thrust initially upon the manufacturer or customer, it is ultimately
passed along as a cost of doing business included in the price of the products of one or
the other and thus spread over a broad commercial stream.” (Kaiser, supra, 55
Cal.App.3d at pp. 747–748, fn. omitted.)
Thus, the Kaiser court, applying California law, “conclude[d] that the doctrine of
products liability does not apply as between parties who: (1) deal in a commercial
setting; (2) from positions of relatively equal economic strength; (3) bargain the
specifications of the product; and (4) negotiate concerning the risk of loss from defects in
it.” (Kaiser, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at p. 748.) “Subsequent decisions have held that
actual bargaining about risk allocation would not be required; it would be enough if the
parties were so situated that they could have bargained on the issue.” (North American
Chemical Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 764, 780, original italics, citing
International Knights of Wine, Inc. v. Ball Corp. (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 1001, 1007,
31.
fn. 1 (International Knights), abrogated on unrelated issue, and S. A. Empresa, etc. v.
Boeing Co. (9th Cir. 1981) 641 F.2d 746, 754.)
Plaintiffs contend “it is not clear that the [Kaiser decision] has ever been the law
even within the State of California” due to the fact that the California Supreme Court
“has never adopted its reasoning.” (Boldface & italics omitted.) Plaintiffs observe that
the only time Kaiser was cited by the Supreme Court was in a dissent and on a different
point of law.16 Notwithstanding, Kaiser still has precedential value and plaintiffs have
not provided us a compelling reason to disregard it.
Plaintiffs contend a separate panel in the same Court of Appeal ruled differently in
International Knights. We disagree.
In International Knights, a plaintiff wine merchant purchased bottled wine from a
wine producer to market under the merchant’s label. (International Knights, supra, 110
Cal.App.3d at pp. 1003–1004.) The wine was ruined due to corroded metal caps that
sealed the bottles. (Id. at p. 1003.) The plaintiff sued the wine producer, and various
defendants involved in the manufacture and distribution of the caps on counts of
negligence, breach of implied warranty, and strict liability. (Id. at pp. 1003–1004.) The
trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendants as the strict
liability claim “on the ground that cause was inappropriate to the suit.” (Id. at p. 1004.)
On appeal, the judgment rendered on the pleadings was reversed. (Id. at p. 1007.)
The International Knights court acknowledged the holding in Kaiser but
concluded that, in the case before it, the four criteria set forth in Kaiser were not met.
(International Knights, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1006–1007.) The court, in
distinguishing Kaiser, held that recovery in strict liability could extend to “all plaintiffs
within the structure of the market place who were ‘powerless to protect themselves.” (Id.
16 Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627, 655 (conc. & dis. opn. of George,
C. J.).
32.
at p. 1006.) The court posited that a different result would have been reached in Kaiser if
the plaintiff “was unable to negotiate concerning the risk of loss from defects.” (Id. at
p. 1007.) It clarified, however, that actual negotiation of the risk of loss was not
necessary and that it was sufficient if the strict liability the plaintiff “could have
negotiated so as to remove from himself the risk of loss from defective products.” (Id. at
p. 1007, fn. 1.) The court was persuaded that “strict liability in tort is intended to operate
in favor of any person or entity, corporate or otherwise, having no significant bargaining
power respecting the manufacturing process and which is thereby best calculated to be its
victim.” (Id. at p. 1006.)
Plaintiffs also cite to Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp. (1981) 120
Cal.App.3d 842 for the proposition that “[w]hen ‘at least one of the Kaiser criteria
appears to be absent, strict products liability remains a question of fact to be resolved by
a jury.’ ” (Italics added; see id. at p. 855.) Plaintiffs contend the undisputed facts show
that “Treehouse and CPM did not bargain over the terms of the [P]urchase [A]greement
as equals”; that “CPM ultimately dictated the terms of the Purchase Agreement”;
“Treehouse had no capacity to alter the technical specifications of the almond roaster
beyond three sets of pre-defined ‘optional equipment’ ”; and that “Treehouse did not
even possess the technical expertise required to meaningfully negotiate over the design or
component parts of the impeller fan blade assembly which ultimately failed.”
Plaintiffs also contend that the Kaiser decision should be distinguished on the
basis that only economic damages were at issue. However, plaintiffs have not offered a
compelling argument as to why that is a distinction with a difference.
Plaintiffs further argue that Kaiser and the cases following it have been
“narrowed” by the United States Supreme Court in East River S. S. Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (1986) 476 U.S. 858 (East River) and Saratoga Fishing Co.
v. J. M. Martinac & Co. (1997) 520 U.S. 875 (Saratoga Fishing), by “permitting
33.
commercial entities to recover on strict products liability claims for damage to ‘other
property.’ ” We disagree.
East River and Saratoga Fishing involved admiralty law and did not involve
California law or Pennsylvania law. (East River, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 859; Saratoga
Fishing, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 876.) Contrary to plaintiffs’ claim neither East River nor
Saratoga Fishing purported to “narrow” the principles of Kaiser relevant to California or
Pennsylvania law.
In East River, a shipbuilder manufactured four oil-transporting supertankers
pursuant to contract. (East River, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 859.) A “high-pressure turbine
malfunctioned” in one of the tankers and it was discovered that a turbine ring was
installed improperly, damaged, and caused additional damage to the turbine. (Id. at
p. 860.) As a result of these problems, the other supertankers built pursuant to the
contract were inspected and similar problems were discovered in two of them and a
unique problem was discovered in the third. (Id. at pp. 860–861.) The petitioners who
had entered into long-term charters of the tankers sued the manufacturer in tort, including
four counts of strict liability. (Id. at p. 861.)
The East River court framed the issue before it, as follows: “In this admiralty
case, we must decide whether a cause of action in tort is stated when a defective product
purchased in a commercial transaction malfunctions, injuring only the product itself and
causing purely economic loss.” (East River, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 859.) The court
acknowledged the applicability of strict liability to general maritime law (id. at p. 865)
and held “a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a
negligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself” (id.
at p. 871). Thus, in essence, the East River court adopted the economic loss rule
discussed ante for purposes of admiralty law. East River did not consider whether it
should adopt the four factors leading to an exception from the strict liability doctrine that
was considered in Kaiser. “ ‘[I]t is … “axiomatic that a decision does not stand for a
34.
proposition not considered by the court[].” ’ ” (People v. Nash (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th
1041, 1078.)
In Saratoga Fishing, the defendant shipbuilder sold a ship to an initial purchaser
who then outfitted it with additional equipment used for tuna fishing. (Saratoga Fishing,
supra, 520 U.S. at p. 877.) The initial purchaser then sold the ship to the plaintiff. (Ibid.)
Approximately 13 years later, the ship sank due to an engine room fire and flood. (Ibid.)
The plaintiff then sued the manufacturer in tort. (Id. at p. 876.)
The district court found that a defective hydraulic system originally installed in the
ship by the manufacturer caused the accident. (Saratoga Fishing, supra, 520 U.S. at
p. 877.) The court awarded the plaintiff damages which included compensation for the
additional equipment that was later added to the ship. (Id. at pp. 877–878.) “The Ninth
Circuit held that the District Court should not have awarded damages for the added
equipment.” (Id. at p. 878.) The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held the
added equipment was “ ‘other property’ ” and that “admiralty’s tort rules permit
recovery” of the added equipment, “assuming other tort law requirements are satisfied.”
(Id. at p. 877.) Saratoga Fishing, like East River, did not consider the question of
whether it should adopt the four factors leading to an exception from the strict liability
doctrine that was considered in Kaiser.
We conclude California law does not prohibit commercial entities from agreeing
to exclude damages for strict liability under circumstances outlined in Kaiser.
B. Pennsylvania Law.
In General Public Utilities Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1982) 547
F.Supp. 842 (General Public) [applying Pennsylvania law], the utility company that
operated a nuclear electric generating facility and other plaintiffs sued the manufacturer
of the nuclear system after the nuclear reactor suffered a partial meltdown, alleging the
manufacturer “fail[ed] to warn them of known safety hazards in the nuclear steam supply
system.” (Id. at p. 843.) The plaintiffs alleged five different tort claims including a claim
35.
for strict liability. (Ibid.) The district court granted the defendant’s summary judgment
motion on the strict liability claim. (Id. at p. 844.) In doing so, the district court wrote:
“The strict liability doctrine evolved for the following reasons: the lack of
contractual privity between manufacturer and ultimate user, [citation]; the
relatively unequal strengths of buyer and seller at the bargaining table,
[citation]; the difficulty faced by a consumer in proving negligence on the
part of the manufacturer where the consumer is several steps down the
distribution chain and the evidence of negligent production is exclusively
within the control of the manufacturer, [citation]; the ability of the
manufacturer to more efficiently distribute the risk of loss among all of its
purchasers, [citation]; and the deterrent value of placing the risk of loss on
the manufacturer because it is ‘better able to … correct flaws that pose
danger’ before those flaws cause accidents. [Citation.] Absent such a
legally mandated allocation of risk, an unwitting purchaser, in spite of the
fact that he plays no part in the design and assembly of the product—such
as an automobile—he purchases, must bear the entire loss in the event he is
unable to prove negligence.” (Ibid.)
In concluding that Pennsylvania law would not recognize a strict liability claim
against the manufacturer the court referred to the five criteria referenced in the quotation
above. It found that (1) the parties were in contractual privity and had the opportunity to
allocate risk; (2) the parties were large corporations with relatively equal bargaining
strength; (3) the plaintiff’s knowledge and expertise in running the plant and its
participation in drafting specifications for the facility did not put it at a disadvantage to
prove negligence; (4) the utility company was in a better position to distribute risk than
the manufacturer; and (5) the utility company’s participation in the design of the facility
and its operation put it in the same position as the manufacturer to “recognize and correct
danger producing flaws” (General Public, supra, 547 F.Supp. at p. 845). (See id. at
pp. 844–845.)
In Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (9th Cir. 1970) 422
F.2d 1013 (Southwest) [applying Pennsylvania law], the plaintiff purchased a 25,000
kilowatt turbine generator from the defendant for use in the plaintiff’s pulp and paper
mill. (Id. at p. 1014.) The plaintiff alleged that defects in the generator led the plaintiff’s
36.
business to experience slowdowns and shutdowns and resulted in “ ‘lost time, labor,
materials, and loss of business’ ” (ibid.). (See id. at pp. 1014–1015.) The plaintiff sued
for negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability in tort. (Id. at p. 1015.) The
defendant moved for partial summary judgment on two claims, including on the strict
liability claim and arguing, as to the latter, “the rationale of the doctrine was inapplicable
to the situation” before the court. (Ibid.) The trial court granted the defendant’s motion.
(Id. at p. 1017.)
With regard to the strict liability claim, the Southwest court stated the trial court
was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant. (Southwest, supra,
422 F.2d at p. 1020.) The Southwest court agreed with the following discussion of the
strict liability doctrine by the trial court: “ ‘the principles underlying the doctrine of strict
liability in tort for defective products were not applicable. All damages sought by [the
plaintiff] in this case are consequential damages. The turbine generator is a highly
specialized, custom-built piece of machinery, built to particular specifications and tested
in the factory before delivery, under supervision of engineers representing both parties.’ ”
(Ibid.) The court continued: “The circumstances of this case do not bring the plaintiff
within that class of consumers, type of transaction, or damages suffered that created the
need for relief based on strict liability in tort. Neither the philosophy nor the theory of
the doctrine of strict liability in tort nor the actual holdings of the cases involved support
an extension of the doctrine of strict liability.” (Ibid.)
In Kalumetals, Inc. v. Hitachi Magnetics Corp. (W.D.Pa. 1998) 21 F.Supp.2d 510
(Kalumetals) [applying Pennsylvania law], the plaintiff was retained by the defendant “to
dry a grinding swarf comprised of fine metallic grindings and grinding fluid.” (Id. at
p. 512.) The plaintiff had performed this task for the defendant on prior occasions
without incident. (Ibid.) Subsequently, the plaintiff received drums of material that it
believed consisted of the same or similar swarf previously processed by it but the drums
contained flammable and hazardous product and were not labeled to warn of the danger.
37.
(Id. at p. 513.) An explosion occurred during the drying process causing damage to the
plaintiff’s facility and equipment. (Ibid.) The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant
alleging strict liability and other claims. (Id. at p. 512.)
In rejecting the defendant’s argument “that strict liability is unavailable to [the]
plaintiffs because [the parties] were operating with equal bargaining power in a
commercial setting,” the court stated, “questions of material fact exist concerning
whether the parties considered the allocation of the risk of loss due to defects in the
product” and “the manufacturer’s duty to refrain from selling unreasonably dangerous
products under [section] 402A is based on safety factors rather than merely ensuring the
consumer the benefit of the bargain. As such, and absent a Pennsylvania Supreme Court
ruling to the contrary, we believe that section 402A is applicable even where the parties
operate in a commercial setting and maintain equal bargaining power.” (Kalumetals,
supra, 21 F.Supp.2d at p. 517.) In so holding, the Kalumetals court distinguished
General Public and other case law writing: “The cases cited by [the] defendant involve
parties which either explicitly negotiated the allocation of the risk of loss based on
product defects (see Dep’t of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles v. ABB Power
T & D Co., 902 F.Supp. 1178, 1185 (C.D.Cal. 1995)), or were otherwise in a position to
negotiate and distribute such risk. See General Public[, supra,] 547 F.Supp. [at p.] 844
…. In the instant case, the record lacks any reference to the allocation of risk between
the parties. There is also no evidence of record by which we could determine whether the
parties were dealing from positions of relatively equal economic strength, or whether the
parties bargained for a product which was designed to negotiated specifications. As such,
we find that issues of material fact preclude summary judgment.” (Kalumetals, at
p. 517.)
We have not been presented with any Pennsylvania Supreme Court authority that
either authorizes or prohibits disclaimers of strict products liability in the commercial
context. As stated by the court in Tincher, “[s]trict liability in tort for product defects is a
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cause of action which implicates the social and economic policy of this Commonwealth.”
(Tincher, supra, 104 A.3d at p. 385.) Although we agree with plaintiffs that strict
products liability is available to individual consumers and users as well as commercial
entities, we are persuaded by the reasoning in General Public that the policy underlying
strict products liability may give way in the commercial context so long as safeguards are
in place.
If presented with the question, we believe the Pennsylvania high court would
likely allow such disclaimers subject to certain safeguards such as those discussed in
General Public. That case protects a commercial entity from the effects of a strict
products liability disclaimer if they have insufficient knowledge or expertise to properly
evaluate whether a product is likely to be flawed or defective—for example, by having
sufficient knowledge and understanding of the design of the product (whether by
participating in the design or through other means). Consequently, we believe the
Pennsylvania high court would adopt the rationale of General Public.17
C. Conclusion.
In summary, we believe the trial court must consider (1) whether there is
contractual privity such that the parties are in a position to allocate risk; (2) whether the
parties have sufficient bargaining strength to negotiate risk of loss under a theory of strict
products liability; (3) the extent to which the ability to prove negligence is made difficult
due to the product being in the exclusive control of the manufacturer; (4) whether there is
a significant or substantial difference in the ability of the parties to efficiently distribute
the risk of loss; and (5) the “deterrent value of placing the risk of loss on the
manufacturer because it is ‘better able to … correct flaws that pose danger’ before those
flaws cause accidents.’ ” (General Public, supra, 547 F.Supp. at p. 844.)
17 We do not mean to suggest, that the trial court must make the same specific
findings that were made in General Public, since those findings were case specific. (See
General Public, supra, 547 F.Supp. at pp. 844–845.)
39.
Here, the evidence on summary judgment is insufficient for us to conclude that the
above considerations militate toward enforcing the exclusion of damages provision as it
relates to plaintiffs’ strict products liability causes of action. In particular, but without
limitation, we are unable to conclude, based on the evidence before us, that Treehouse
had sufficient knowledge or expertise to determine whether the design of the almond
roaster was flawed such that it had the ability to identify or correct any alleged defect.18
V. CPM Is Not Entitled to Summary Adjudication of the Gross Negligence
Causes of Action As They Are Not Subject to the Exclusion of Damages
Provision of the Purchase Agreement
A. California law.
Both parties acknowledge that, in City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007)
41 Cal.4th 747 (Santa Barbara), the court concluded “public policy generally precludes
enforcement of an agreement that would remove an obligation to adhere to even a
minimal standard of care.” (Id. at p. 777.) The court determined that “no published
California case has upheld, or voided, an agreement purporting to release liability for
future gross negligence” but that some cases “have stated, in dictum, that such a release
is unenforceable” while others have “specified that liability for ‘ordinary’ or ‘simple’
negligence generally may be released (that is, so long as doing so is consistent with
Tunkl[ v. Regents of University of California (1963)] 60 Cal.2d 92)—thereby implicitly
differentiating gross negligence from the class of conduct as to which liability generally
may be released.” (Id. at p. 758.) The court further acknowledged that Witkin has stated,
without citation to relevant case authority, that “ ‘[t]he present view is that a contract
exempting from liability for ordinary negligence is valid where no public interest is
involved .… [¶] But there can be no exemption from liability for intentional wrong [or]
18 We reiterate that our conclusion should not be interpreted as precluding CPM
from arguing that Treehouse assumed responsibility for correcting whatever defects, if
any, Treehouse may ultimately prove. However, we express no opinion on the validity of
such an argument.
40.
gross negligence.’ ” (Santa Barbara, at p. 758, quoting 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law
(10th ed. 2005) Contracts, § 660, pp. 737–738, italics added by Santa Barbara.) The
court also “consider[ed] the law of other jurisdictions” and found “the vast majority of
decisions state or hold that such agreements generally are void on the ground that public
policy precludes enforcement of a release that would shelter aggravated misconduct.”
(Santa Barbara, at p. 760.)
After considering cases and authority from California and other jurisdictions and
the arguments of the parties and amici curiae, the court wrote: “we conclude that public
policy generally precludes enforcement of an agreement that would remove an obligation
to adhere to even a minimal standard of care. Applying that general rule here, we hold
that an agreement purporting to release liability for future gross negligence committed
against a developmentally disabled child who participates in a recreational camp
designed for the needs of such children violates public policy and is unenforceable.”
(Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 777, fns. omitted.)
In New England Country Foods v. VanLaw Food Products (2025) 17 Cal.5th 703,
our Supreme Court interpreted Santa Barbara as holding “that attempts to eliminate
liability for gross negligence are categorically unenforceable,” that the court had
“declined to apply ‘Tunkl’s public interest analysis … ,’ … to releases for gross
negligence,” and “[i]nstead, … said a categorical rule is justified by the ‘degree or extent
of the misconduct’ inherent to gross negligence and the public policy of discouraging
aggravated wrongs.” (Id. at p. 711.)
CPM seeks to limit the application of Santa Barbara in the case at bar by arguing
the “public policy concerns that drove the Santa Barbara ruling are absent here.” CPM
further argues that VanLaw “improperly expanded the Santa Barbara ruling from a
general rule that permitted exceptions, to one that improperly did not permit for such
exculpation.” CPM does not cite to any particular language in Santa Barbara that
expressly permitted exceptions and we have not found any such language.
41.
Disclaimers of gross negligence are not enforceable under California law.
B. Pennsylvania law.
In Degliomini v. ESM Productions, Inc. (Pa. 2021) 253 A.3d 226 (Degliomini), the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania wrote: “This Court has observed that pre-injury
exculpatory clauses releasing a party from ordinary negligence generally are not against
public policy [citations]; however, we have also held that pre-injury exculpatory releases
immunizing parties from liability for their reckless or grossly negligent conduct firmly
violate public policy—and are therefore not enforceable—because ‘such releases would
jeopardize the health, safety, and welfare of the people by removing any incentive for
parties to adhere to minimal standards of safe conduct.’ ” (Id. at p. 239; see Feleccia v.
Lackawanna College (Pa. 2019) 215 A.3d 3, 21 [holding a waiver signed by student
athletes “is not enforceable to preclude liability arising from appellees’ claims of gross
negligence”].)
CPM observes that Degliomini and Feleccia involved participation in athletic or
recreational events and argues that their prohibition against waivers of gross negligence
“have not been applied to commercially negotiated sales terms,” citing Canters Deli Las
Vegas, LLC v. FreedomPay, Inc. (E.D.Pa. 2020) 460 F.Supp.3d 560, 573 (Canters).
Notably, Canters involved a limitation of liability for provision and not a
provision exculpating a party from liability for gross negligence. (Canters, supra, 460
F.Supp.3d at p. 574, fn. 6.) “Exculpatory clauses immunize a party from the
consequences of his or her negligence. [Citations.] In contrast, limitation of liability
clauses do not immunize a party from liability; rather, they merely place a limit, or a cap,
upon such liability.” (Id. at p. 571.) Notably, the Canters court acknowledged the
holding in Feleccia and distinguished it from the case before it on grounds Feleccia
involved an exculpatory clause “which is held to a more stringent standard for
enforcement.” (Id. at p. 574, fn. 6.)
42.
CPM relies on Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P. (Pa. 2010) 2 A.3d 1174
wherein it was stated that “an exculpatory clause is valid where three conditions are met.
First, the clause must not contravene public policy. Secondly, the contract must be
between persons relating entirely to their own private affairs and thirdly, each party must
be a free bargaining agent to the agreement so that the contract is not one of adhesion.”
(Id. at p. 1189.) Degliomini considered these same criteria (Degliomini, supra, 253 A.3d
at p. 238) and determined that attempts to immunize a party “from liability for their
reckless or grossly negligent conduct firmly violate public policy” (id. at p. 239).
C. Conclusion.
Given the holdings in Degliomini and Feleccia, we conclude Pennsylvania law,
like California law, prohibits a party from disclaiming all liability for gross negligence.
The exclusion of damages provision is unenforceable to the extent it disclaims
liability for gross negligence.
VI. CPM Is Entitled to Summary Adjudication of the Ordinary Negligence
Causes of Action Because They Are Subject to the Exclusion of Damages
Provision of the Purchase Agreement
A. California law.
In Santa Barbara, a developmentally disabled 14 year old drowned while
attending a city run summer camp. (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 750.) In
defending against a lawsuit filed by the child’s parents, the city relied on an application
form signed by the child’s mother that purported to release city “from liability for ‘any
negligent act’ ” related to the child’s participation in the summer program. (Ibid.) The
Court of Appeal agreed that the release was enforceable to the extent the plaintiffs
alleged ordinary negligence against the city but unenforceable to the extent the release
encompassed gross negligence. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court granted review on
the limited question of “whether a release of liability relating to recreational activities
43.
generally is effective as to gross negligence.” (Ibid.) In doing so, the court discussed at
length the law regarding disclaimers of both ordinary and gross negligence.
The high court defined ordinary negligence as “an unintentional tort” (Santa
Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 753) that “consists of a failure to exercise the degree of
care in a given situation that a reasonable person under similar circumstances would
employ to protect others from harm” (id. at pp. 753–754) and gross negligence as “either
a ‘ “ ‘want of even scant care’ ” ’ or ‘ “ ‘an extreme departure from the ordinary standard
of conduct’ ” ’ ” (id. at p. 754).
The Santa Barbara court observed that in Tunkl v. Regents of University of
California (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92 (Tunkl), the court “recogniz[ed] a general rule that an
‘exculpatory clause which affects the public interest cannot stand.’ ” (Santa Barbara,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 755, italics omitted.) By the same token, it observed that
“considerations of public policy did not bar all contracts releasing future liability for
negligence.” (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 756, citing Tunkl, at p. 101.) The
court discussed “the ‘factors or characteristics’ that underlie the concept of ‘public
interest’ in the context of an agreement releasing liability for future ordinary negligence.”
(Santa Barbara, at p. 755.)
Although “ ‘[n]o definition of the concept of public interest can be contained
within the four corners of a formula’ ” (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 756), the
court wrote: “ ‘[t]he attempted but invalid exemption involves a transaction which
exhibits some or all of the following characteristics. It concerns a business of a type
generally thought suitable for public regulation. The party seeking exculpation is
engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter
of practical necessity for some members of the public. The party holds himself out as
willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for
any member coming within certain established standards. As a result of the essential
nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking
44.
exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of
the public who seeks his services. In exercising a superior bargaining power the party
confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no
provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection
against negligence. Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the
purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by
the seller or his agents.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 98–101, fns.
omitted.) “[W]hen certain of these characteristics are present, the transaction is such that
‘the releasing party does not really acquiesce voluntarily in the contractual shifting of the
risk,’ and further that when the ‘service is one which each member of the public,
presently or potentially, may find essential to him,’ the releasor ‘faces, despite his
economic inability to do so, the prospect of a compulsory assumption of the risk of
another’s negligence.’ ” (Santa Barbara, at pp. 756–757.)
Here, the transaction does not affect the public interest within the meaning of
Santa Barbara and Tunkl. The service CPM provides is not of great importance and not
a matter of practical necessity for members of the public. CPM’s industrial almond
roasters are not the type of product that is generally purchased by large segments of the
buying public. Both parties are commercial entities. Treehouse was making a purchase
of at least $557,000. Treehouse could have taken its business elsewhere and cannot be
considered a captive consumer. There was no “compulsory assumption of the risk” of
CPM’s negligence. (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 756–757, italics added.)
California public policy does not preclude the enforcement of the exclusion of
damages provision to the extent it disclaimed liability for ordinary negligence.
B. Pennsylvania law.
Plaintiffs contend that “[u]nder Pennsylvania law, an exculpatory clause is only
valid if it ‘does not contravene public policy, is between parties relating entirely to their
private affairs, and where each party is a free bargaining agent so that the contract is not
45.
one of adhesion,” citing Degliomini, supra, 253 A.3d at page 238. Our prior discussion
of the factors discussed in Santa Barbara and Tunkl as applied to the facts of this case
demonstrates that the Purchase Agreement was between parties in the conduct of their
private affairs and Treehouse was a free bargaining agent. Under such circumstances, the
contract is not considered adhesive.
Plaintiffs contend, broadly, that the exclusion of damages provision “contravenes
public policy by attempting to exculpate CPM from strict products liability, gross
negligence, and future statutory violations.” However, courts have the ability to sever
and/or restrict the application of unconscionable and unlawful provisions of a contract.
(Civ. Code, §§ 1599 [“Where a contract has several distinct objects, of which one at least
is lawful, and one at least is unlawful, in whole or in part, the contract is void as to the
latter and valid as to the rest.”], 1670.5, subd. (a) [“If the court as a matter of law finds
the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made the court … may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.”].) Pennsylvania law is similar. (13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann., § 2302
[same as Civ. Code, § 1670.5].)
C. Conclusion.
The exclusion of damages provision is enforceable to the extent that it disclaims
any liability of CPM for ordinary negligence. Consequently, CPM is entitled to summary
adjudication of plaintiffs’ ordinary negligence cause of action.
DISPOSITION
The order granting CPM’s motion for summary judgment is reversed. The matter
is remanded to the trial court to vacate its judgment, enter summary adjudication as to
plaintiffs’ causes of action for ordinary negligence, and otherwise engage in further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
46.
In the interest of justice, each party is to bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
FRANSON, J.
HARRELL, J.
47.