Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Ducor Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission CA5

Filed 11/3/26 Ducor Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission CA5
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/3/26 Ducor Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DUCOR TELEPHONE COMPANY,
F091283
Petitioner,
(Dec. Nos. 25-08-010 &
v. 26-02-028)

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, OPINION

Respondent;

PUBLIC ADVOCATES OFFICE OF THE
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Real Party in Interest.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of review.
BRB Law, Patrick M. Rosvall, Chan Q. Vu and Grace A. Amato for Petitioner.
Christine Hammond, Sophia J. Park and Tovah Trimming for Respondent.
No appearance for Real Party in Interest.
-ooOoo-
Petitioner Ducor Telephone Company (Ducor) filed this original proceeding to
obtain judicial review of the final decision by the Public Utilities Commission
(Commission) on its 2023 general rate case application. Ducor contends the Commission
committed several legal errors when it used an original cost methodology, rather than a
fair market value methodology, to determine the value of the assets in Ducor’s rate base.
Rate base is a component used in determining Ducor’s annual intrastate “revenue
requirement.” (Pub. Util. Code, § 275.6, subd. (b)(5).) 1 Ducor contends the
understatement of its rate based caused a $129,627 shortfall in its revenue and that
shortfall should be offset by increased subsidies from the California High Cost Fund A
program (A-Fund).
The Commission argues the original cost methodology was appropriate under the
circumstances because the fair market value methodology artificially increased the value
of the assets included in the rate base. The Commission regards the increase as artificial
because it is due solely to accounting adjustments made after a transfer of the control and
ownership of Ducor and not a change in the plant or other assets dedicated to public use.
We conclude the Commission’s use of the original cost methodology did not (1)
violate its own rules, (2) misinterpret or misapply the applicable statutory provisions, or
(3) take Ducor’s property in violation of its constitutional rights. Also, the Commission
did not act contrary to the weight of the record evidence.
We therefore deny Ducor’s petition for a writ directing the Commission to nullify
its decision in Ducor’s general rate case.
BACKGROUND
Ducor does business as Varcomm and serves approximately 650 access lines in its
three telephone exchanges: Ducor (Tulare County), Rancho Tehama (Tehama County),
and Kennedy Meadows (Tulare County). Ducor’s internet service provider affiliate,
Varcomm Broadband, Inc., supplies retail broadband service throughout Ducor’s territory

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Public Utilities Code.

2.
and other areas within California. 2 Ducor, Varcomm Broadband, Inc., and five other
companies are owned by the same holding company.
Ducor is a “telephone corporation” as that term is defined in section 234 and, thus,
is a “public utility” (§ 216, subd. (a)(1)) subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of the
Commission. As a carrier of last resort, Ducor “is required to fulfill all reasonable
requests for service within its service territory.” (§ 275.6, subds. (b)(1).) In addition,
Ducor is one of 10 “small incumbent local exchange carriers or small ILECs” (Calaveras
Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 972, 976 (Calaveras ‘19))
that participate in the A-Fund.
The A-Fund is a state subsidy program developed to defray some of the cost of
providing affordable telephone service in rural and sparsely populated areas. (See
Calaveras Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 793, 797, 799
(Calaveras ‘22); § 275.6.) The program’s purpose is “to promote the goals of universal
telephone service and to reduce any disparity in the rates charged by those companies.”
(Stats. 2008, ch. 342, § 2, p. 2646.) California’s universal service goal is to provide
affordable, safe, and reliable basic telephone service to at least 95 percent of all
households in the state. (Calaveras ’19, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 976.) The money in
the A-Fund is from surcharges authorized by the Commission and assessed to all
California telephone customers. (§ 275, subd. (b); Calaveras ’22, supra, at p. 797.)
Change of Ownership
In 2021, Ducor submitted an application to the Commission requesting approval of
a transfer of ownership and control. In November 2021, the Commission approved the
transfer, stating it “will retain the same regulatory authority over [Ducor’s parent
corporation] and Ducor that it currently possesses.” In December 2021, the transaction

2 This proceeding addresses issues relating to Ducor’s intrastate telephone service
and does not involve issues relating to the broadband service provided by its affiliate.

3.
was completed, and Eric N. Votaw, Ducor’s chief executive officer, and Jenifer Vellucci,
its chief financial officer, became Ducor’s new owners. They controlled 55 percent and
45 percent of the parent corporation, respectively. The Commission’s approval of the
transfer made no determination regarding the ratemaking treatment of Ducor’s rate base.
The transfer of control changed how Ducor’s federal regulator, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), valued the assets in Ducor’s rate base, which
affected the amount of Ducor’s federal subsidy. In its role of regulating interstate
telecommunications carriers, the FCC has adopted a Uniform System of Accounts
(USOA), which is contained in part 32 of title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations. In
2017, the FCC made significant revisions to the USOA to align its asset accounting rules
with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). (See 82 Fed.Reg. 20833–20843
(May 4, 2017).) The revisions significantly streamlined the requirements applied to
ILEC’s and reduced their accounting burdens. The FCC stated it did “not anticipate any
significant rate effects resulting from these efforts to further align the USOA with GAAP
principles.” (82 Fed.Reg., supra, at p. 20837.) The USOA provision of interest in this
case states:

“Property, plant and equipment acquired from an entity, whether or
not affiliated with the accounting company, shall be accounted for at
original cost, except that property, plant and equipment acquired
from a nonaffiliated entity through an acquisition or merger may be
accounted for at market value at the time of the acquisition or
merger.” (47 C.F.R. § 32.2000(b)(1), italics added.)
Accordingly, as a result of the transfer of control, the exception in the foregoing
regulation permitted—but did not require—Ducor to revalue its assets using the fair
market value methodology. Ducor elected to use that methodology in the rate base

4.
calculations for its 2021, 2022, and 2023 National Exchange Carrier Association’s
(NECA) 3 cost studies and the NECA accepted that election.
The financial statements prepared by Ducor’s independent accountants for the
years ended December 31, 2022, and 2021, included a note describing the change of
control and the accounting election made by Ducor. Note 2 to the financial statements
reads in part: “Upon the change in control of [Ducor’s] Parent, [Ducor] elected to apply
pushdown accounting as a wholly owned subsidiary, establishing a new basis of
accounting using the Parent’s basis under the acquisition method of accounting. A
bargain purchase was recorded in connection with the transaction as Additional Paid in
Capital and represents the fair value of assets and liabilities in excess of the fair value of
the Parent’s investment in [Ducor].” A table in “Note 2” listed the fair value of the
parent company’s investment in Ducor ($10,544,616) and the fair value (assets acquired
minus liabilities assumed) of Ducor at the acquisition date ($12,014,070). The difference
between the two—that is, the resulting bargain purchase—was $1,469,454.
Ducor’s General Rate Case Application
The Commission’s basic approach to rate making takes a test year and estimates
the revenues, expenses, and investment for that year. (Calaveras ’19, supra, 39
Cal.App.5th at p. 977.) In accordance with the Commission’s rules, a small ILEC’s
general rate case (GRC) application is filed two years before the test year. (Ibid.) Rate

3 The NECA is an independent organization established by the FCC “ ‘to prepare
and file access charge tariffs on behalf of all telephone companies that do not file
separate tariffs.’ ” (National Exchanges Carrier Association, Inc. v. F.C.C. (D.C.Cir.
2001) 253 F.3d 1, 2, quoting 47 C.F.R. § 69.601(a).) The Commission describes the
NECA as “an independent association that performs certain administrative, tariffing, and
interstate ratemaking functions on behalf of the Federal Communications Commission.
[Citations.] Among other duties, NECA collects cost information from rural telephone
companies for use in computing interstate revenue requirements and determining the
extent of a company’s needs for federal high-cost support. (See 47 C.F.R. § 54.1305;
GRC Matters at 33-34.)”

5.
cases are submitted every five years. (Volcano Telephone Co. v. Pub. Utilities Com.
(2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 701, 710.) The term “general rate case application” may suggest
that a small ILEC’s most important income source is the rates the Commission authorizes
it to charge its customers. However, in Ducor’s case, the much larger sources of income
(almost 90 percent) are its federal and A-Fund subsidies. (See fn. 8, post.)
In October 2023, Ducor filed a GRC application with a 2025 test year
(Application). The Application asked the Commission to review and adjust Ducor’s
intrastate revenue requirement and rate design. In November 2023, the Public Advocates
Office (Cal Advocates), an independent organization within the Commission, filed a
protest raising a variety of issues. 4
Administrative proceedings on a GRC application and protest are overseen by the
commissioner assigned to lead the case (including setting its scope and schedule) and by
an administrative law judge, who serves as the hearing officer for the formal proceedings
and prepares a draft decision. Here, the administrative law judge held a prehearing
conference in January 2024, the assigned commissioner issued a scoping memo and
ruling in March 2024, and the public participation hearing was held later that month.
After a further exchange of information, the assigned commissioner released an amended
scoping memo and ruling that enumerated 12 issues. One issue was the level of revenue
requirement necessary to provide Ducor with sufficient revenue and earnings allowing its
operations to deliver safe, reliable, high-quality voice communication services.
Components of the revenue requirement included corporate and operating expenses, tax
liabilities, depreciation expenses, and a reasonable return on the rate base. Other issues
involved the sources of income for meeting the revenue requirement (i.e., covering the

4 Cal Advocates’ responsibilities are set forth in section 309.5, which directs it “to
represent and advocate on behalf of the interests of public utility customers and
subscribers” and states Cal Advocates’ goal “shall be to obtain the lowest possible rate
for service consistent with reliable and safe service levels.” (Id., subd. (a).)

6.
business’s costs and providing a reasonable return on its investment). The income-source
issues included the rates Ducor would be authorized to charge its customers and the
amount of Ducor’s A-Fund subsidy.
After the amended scoping memo and ruling was issued, the proceedings included
evidentiary hearings before the administrative law judge, rulings on Ducor’s motions to
strike testimony of Cal Advocate’s witnesses, and the submission of opening and reply
briefs. Ducor’s 76-page opening brief argued, among other things, that the value of the
assets in its rate base must reflect the updated fair market value from its recent bargain
purchase, consistent with Financial Accounting Standards Board Accounting Standard
Codification (ASC) 805. Ducor asserted (1) the 2021 transfer of control was between
nonaffiliates at a mutually agreed price; (2) the transfer triggered a revaluation of assets
and corresponding bargain purchase adjustment; (3) two accounting firms had
acknowledged these updates in asset valuation were appropriate under ASC 805; and (4)
the NECA had accepted the valuation updates. Ducor argued that to ensure compliance
with D.21-06-004, which mandated the use of the NECA rate base amount, “the
Commission must recognize the impact of the ASC 805 update in its rate base,
depreciation, and tax calculations for Ducor’s 2025 test year.” Ducor’s opening brief
described testimony and documents supporting the ASC 805 update and referred to a
particular provision in ASC 805 that permitted an acquired entity “to ‘apply pushdown
accounting in its separate financial statements’ to reflect the updated market value of the
assets, which Ducor did.”
In September 2024, the Commission issued a decision establishing a new cost of
capital (i.e., rate of return) to be applied GRC applications of all small ILEC’s for test
years 2023 through 2025. The new rate of return was 7.16 percent, down from the
previously authorized rate of return of 9.09 percent. As a result, the parties filed updated
papers incorporating the new rate of return into their ratemaking calculations. Ducor has
not challenged the use of the 7.16 percent rate of return.

7.
In July 2025, the Commission issued a proposed decision (1) rejecting Ducor’s
proposal to adjust its assets to their fair market value following the 2021 transfer of
control and (2) adopting the original value approach for determining the value of Ducor’s
assets within its rate base. After the parties submitted comments, the Commission issued
a revised proposed decision.
On August 22, 2025, the Commission formally issued Decision Approving
Revenue Requirement, Rate Design and Selected Rates for Ducor Telephone Company
for Test Year 2025 (Aug. 14, 2025) Cal.P.U.C. Decision No. 25-08-010 (D.25-08-010).
It determined Ducor needed $2,544,993 in revenue to recover its operating expenses and
taxes ($2,431,713) and to receive a reasonable return ($113,280) on its investment.
Restated in statutory terms, the Commission determined Ducor’s reasonable operating
“expenses and tax liabilities” were $2,431,713 and “a reasonable rate of return on its rate
base” was $113,280. (§ 275.6, subd. (b)(5).) These amounts, when added together,
established Ducor’s “ ‘revenue requirement’ ” was $2,544,993. (Ibid.)
One component of operating expenses is depreciation of the assets constituting the
telephone plant-in-service. The Commission noted the parties agreed on the
methodology for calculating depreciation expense but disagreed on the value of the
telephone plant-in-service. Ducor used fair market value, with a bargain purchase
adjustment,5 for its proposed rate base value and to calculate its proposed depreciation
expense.
The Commission determined the original cost methodology “more appropriate”
than Ducor’s fair market value methodology and valued Ducor’s rate base at $1,582,124,
not the approximately $6.2 million proposed by Ducor. The Commission multiplied its
rate base figure by the authorized rate of return of 7.16 percent, which generated the

5 Ducor asserts the bargain purchase adjustment ensures the assets were valued at
the level they were purchased, not higher, and notes a market study showed the assets
were worth more.

8.
return on rate base of $113,280. Based on this and other calculations, the Commission
concluded Ducor’s A-Fund “subsidy should be $1,661.087.”
In September 2025, Ducor applied for a rehearing of D.25-08-010. In February
2026, the Commission issued Order Modifying Decision 25-08-010 and Denying
Rehearing of the Decision, as Modified (Feb. 5, 2026) Cal.P.U.C. Decision No. 26-02-
028 (D.26-02-028). The Commission made minor modifications to D.25-08-010 and
confirmed its use of the original value methodology to determine the value of Ducor’s
rate base.
Writ Petition
In March 2026, Ducor initiated this original proceeding by filing a petition for writ
review of D.25-08-010 and D.26-02-028. The petition requested a writ directing the
Commission to annul the decisions and properly calculate the rate base governing
Ducor’s going forward rates and subsidies. After the Commission filed an answer and
Ducor filed its reply, we issued a writ of review stating the decisions would be reviewed
by this court and a hearing would be set in a later order. The hearing was held and the
matter submitted on October 14, 2026.
DISCUSSION
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF COMMISSION DECISIONS
The Commission is a state agency of constitutional origin with far-reaching duties,
functions and powers. (Cal. Const., art. XII, §§ 1–6; Center for Biological Diversity, Inc.
v. Public Utilities Com. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 293, 301 (Center for Biological Diversity).)
The Commission’s primary purpose is to supervise and regulate every public utility in
California. (§ 701.) To perform this function, the Constitution has given the
Commission broad authority, which includes the power to establish rules and procedures,
fix rates, hold various types of hearings, and award reparations. (Center for Biological
Diversity, supra, at p. 301; Cal. Const., art. XII, §§ 2, 4, 6.) The Legislature may grant
the Commission “additional authority and jurisdiction” and may “establish the manner

9.
and scope of review of commission action in a court of record.” (Cal. Const., art. XII,
§ 5; Center for Biological Diversity, supra, at p. 301.)
A party aggrieved by the Commission’s final decision “may petition for a writ of
review in the court of appeal or the Supreme Court” to have the lawfulness of the
decision determined. (§ 1756, subd. (a).) Such a petition is the only means of obtaining
judicial review of a decision by the Commission. (Pacific Bell Wireless, LLC v. Public
Utilities Com. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 718, 728.)
Before seeking judicial review, the aggrieved party must complete the
administrative process by filing an application for rehearing and obtaining a final
decision. (§ 1756, subd. (a).) The application for rehearing must raise each issue that the
party intends to raise in its writ petition. (§ 1732.) In other words, the aggrieved party
must exhaust its administrative remedies.
Because the Commission is a constitutional body with broad legislative and
judicial powers, its decisions are presumed valid. (The Ponderosa Telephone Co. v.
Public Utilities Com. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 999, 1012 (Ponderosa).) This presumption
of correctness means a petitioner challenging a Commission decision has the burden of
establishing the existence of both an error and prejudice. 6 (Ponderosa, supra, at p. 1013;
City and County of San Francisco v. Public Utilities Com. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 22,
53; Securus Technologies, LLC v. Public Utilities Com. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 787, 798.)
The presumption of correctness and related burden of demonstrating prejudicial error is
similar to that applied to trial court decisions. (See Tulare Medical Center Property

6 We note the parties’ petition, answer, and reply do not use the word “prejudice”
and the word “prejudicial” appears only in the petition’s quote of Southern California
Edison v. Public Utilities Com. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1085. There, the court stated that
the Commission’s “failure to comply with its own rules concerning the scope of issues to
be addressed in the proceedings … was prejudicial.” (Id. at p. 1106.) Prompted by a
focus letter from the court, the oral arguments presented by counsel addressed whether
prejudice resulted from one of the errors claimed by Ducor.

10.
Owners Assn. v. Valdivia (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 967, 981 [appellant challenging a trial
court order or judgment “has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating prejudicial
error”].)
The scope of judicial review of the ratemaking decisions challenged in this
proceeding is set forth in section 1757. (See Center for Biological Diversity, supra, 18
Cal.5th at p. 301.) A court’s review “shall not extend further than to determine,” based
on the entire certified record, whether the Commission (1) acted without, or in excess of,
its jurisdiction; (2) did not proceed in the manner required by law; (3) issued a decision
not supported by the findings; (4) made findings not supported by substantial evidence in
light of the whole record; (5) abused its discretion; or (6) violated a constitutional right.
(§ 1757, subd. (a).) 7 Given the statute’s phrase “shall not extend further than,” courts
recognize “the scope of our review is ‘limited.’ ” (City and County of San Francisco v.
Public Utilities Com., supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 52, citing City and County of San
Francisco v. Public Utilities Com. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 523, 530.)
The issues raised in Ducor’s writ petition include (1) the interpretation of the rules
set forth in Commission decisions, (2) the interpretation of the statute governing the A-
Fund—namely, section 257.6, (3) the application of constitutional standards, (4) and
whether the Commission abused its discretion. Accordingly, we set forth the principles
governing judicial review of these issues.
A. Interpretation of Rules and Statutes
As a general principle, the Commission’s interpretation of its own regulations and
decisions is entitled to consideration and respect by the reviewing court. Courts are more

7 This scope of review is familiar because it “parallels the inquiry prescribed under
the general administrative mandamus statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.”
(Center for Biological Diversity, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 304.) In other words, section
1757 “borrows from the standard applicable to the decisions of other agencies.” (Center
for Biological Diversity, supra, at p. 307.)

11.
likely to defer to the Commission’s interpretation of its own regulations and decisions
than to its interpretation of a statute because the Commission is likely to be intimately
familiar with regulations and decisions it authored and sensitive to the practical
implication of one interpretation over another. (Clean Energy Fuels Corp. v. Public
Utilities Com. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 641, 649; Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Public
Utilities Com. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1086, 1096.) Nonetheless, courts recognize that the
interpretation of a regulation remains a question of law subject to independent judicial
review. (Ibid.)
In 2025, the Supreme Court clarified the deference or weight to be given the
Commission’s statutory interpretations. The issue addressed was whether the
Commission’s interpretation of the Public Utilities Code remained subject to “the highly
deferential approach” set forth in Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com. (1968)
68 Cal.2d 406 after the legislative changes adopted in 1996 and 2000. (Center for
Biological Diversity, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 299.) The court concluded that approach did
not survive the Legislature’s revisions expanding judicial review of most Commission
decisions. (Ibid.) The high court recognized that, generally, the Commission’s
“ ‘interpretation of the meaning and legal effect of a statute is entitled to consideration
and respect by the courts.’ ” (Id. at p. 305, quoting Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd.
of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7.) However, the level of the deference afforded the
Commission’s “ ‘interpretation of a statute or regulation is contextual: Its power to
persuade is both circumstantial and dependent on the presence or absence of factors that
support the merit of the interpretation.’ ” (Center for Biological Diversity, supra, at p.
305.) The factors relevant to a court’s evaluation of the weight given the Commission’s
interpretation can be placed in two broad categories—those indicating the Commission
has a comparative interpretive advantage over the courts and those indicating the
interpretation is probably correct. (See Yamaha, supra, at p. 12.) In sum, the level of

12.
deference “may vary depending on the circumstances” and “courts remain the final
arbiters of statutory meaning.” (Center for Biological Diversity, supra, at p. 303.)
B. Constitutional Issues
In a proceeding challenging a Commission decision on the ground it violated a
constitutional right, the reviewing court “shall exercise independent judgment on the law
and facts, and the findings or conclusions of the [C]ommission material to the
constitutional question shall not be final.” (§ 1760.) However, a reviewing court “may
not substitute [its] own judgment ‘as to the weight to be accorded evidence before the
Commission or the purely factual findings made by it.’ ” (SFPP, L.P. v. Public Utilities
Com. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 784, 794.)
C. Abuse of Discretion
When considering the Commission’s exercise of discretion, the scope of judicial
review is limited out of deference to the Commission’s authority and presumed expertise.
(California Community Choice Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
845, 861.) Accordingly, courts do not reweigh the evidence or substitute their judgment
for that of the Commission. The judicial inquiry generally is limited to whether the
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support. Courts,
however, must ensure the Commission has adequately considered all relevant factors and
has demonstrated a rational connection between those factors and the choice made.
(Ibid.) Under the abuse of discretion standard, the Commission may choose its own
criteria or method of arriving at its decision, even if irregular, unless the
unreasonableness of its criteria or method is clearly established. (Ponderosa, supra, 36
Cal.App.5th at p. 1019.)
II. SELECTION OF PROPER METHODOLOGY FOR RATE BASE VALUATION
Ducor’s claims of Commission error focus on the “rate base” component of its
“revenue requirement.” (§ 275.6, subds. (b)(2), (b)(5).) Specifically, it contends the
Commission incorrectly valued the assets constituting its “rate base,” which understated

13.
its “revenue requirement” by approximately $130,000 and that shortfall should be offset
by an increase in Ducor’s A-Fund subsidy.
A. A-Fund and the Statutory Text
The Commission’s responsibilities in maintaining and administering the A-Fund, a
state subsidy program addressing intrastate telephone service, are set forth in section
275.6. Subdivision (a) of section 275.6 provides: “The commission shall exercise its
regulatory authority to maintain the [A-Fund program] to provide universal service rate
support to small independent telephone corporations in amounts sufficient to meet the
revenue requirements established by the commission through rate-of-return regulation in
furtherance of the state’s universal service commitment to the continued affordability and
widespread availability of safe, reliable, high-quality communications services in rural
areas of the state.” (Italics added.) The italicized terms along with the terms “rate
design” and “rate base” are defined in subdivision (b) of section 275.6.
“ ‘Rate-of-return regulation’ means a regulatory structure whereby the
commission establishes a telephone corporation’s revenue requirement, and then fashions
a rate design to provide the company a fair opportunity to meet the revenue
requirement.” (§ 275.6, subd. (b)(4), italics added.)
“ ‘Rate design’ means the mix of end user rates, high-cost support, and other
revenue sources that are targeted to provide a fair opportunity to meet the revenue
requirement of the telephone corporation.” 8 (§ 275.6, subd. (b)(3), italics added.)

8 The term “high-cost support” encompasses both the state subsidies provided under
the A-Fund for intrastate service and the federal subsidies provided for interstate service.
(See Calaveras ’22, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 798 [as directed by Congress, the FCC
established a Universal Service Fund to subsidize services provided, and infrastructure
built, in rural, high-cost areas; the fund and its successor are financed by mandatory
contributions from entities that provide interstate telecommunications to the public].) In
2018, 46 percent of total small ILEC revenues were from the A-Fund and 25 percent
were from federal high-cost support.

14.
“ ‘Revenue requirement’ means the amount that is necessary for a telephone
corporation to recover its reasonable expenses and tax liabilities and earn a reasonable
rate of return on its rate base.” (§ 275.6, subd. (b)(5), italics added.)
“ ‘Rate base’ means the value of a telephone corporation’s plant and equipment
that is reasonably necessary to provide regulated voice services and access to advanced
services, and upon which the telephone corporation is entitled to a fair opportunity to
earn a reasonable rate of return.” (§ 275.6, subd. (b)(2).) The rate of return, also referred
to as the cost of capital, used by the Commission in this general rate case was 7.16
percent. One way to calculate the rate base is to add up the original cost of the telephone
corporation’s physical assets and subtract accumulated depreciation and deferred income
tax.
The revenue requirement of a small ILEC (i.e., its cost of doing business—
specifically, the amount needed to pay its operating expenses and tax liabilities and also
provide a reasonable return on its investment in assets) can be expressed in an equation
with mathematical notation as follows: Revenue requirement = reasonable expenses +
tax liabilities + (rate base x .0716). In this case, the disputed component of the revenue
requirement is the rate base amount.
Once the Commission has calculated a small ILEC’s revenue requirement, it
proceeds to determine the rates the small ILEC is authorized to charge its customer.
Those rates are used to predict the company’s local revenue. The predicted local
revenue, federal subsidy, and few other items are subtracted from the company’s revenue
requirement, and the difference is the amount of the A-Fund subsidy.
Additional directives are set forth in subdivision (c) of section 275.6:

“In administering the [A-Fund] program the [C]omission shall do all
of the following:

15.
“(1) Continue to set rates to be charged by the small independent
telephone corporations in accordance with Sections 451, 454,
455, and 728.

“(2) Employ rate-of-return regulation to determine a small
independent telephone corporation’s revenue requirement in a
manner that provides revenues and earnings sufficient to allow
the telephone corporation to deliver safe, reliable, high-quality
voice communication service and fulfill its obligations as a
carrier of last resort in its service territory, and to afford the
telephone corporation a fair opportunity to earn a reasonable
return on its investments, attract capital for investment on
reasonable terms, and ensure the financial integrity of the
telephone corporation.

“(3) Ensure that rates charged to customers of small independent
telephone corporations are just and reasonable and are reasonably
comparable to rates charged to customers of urban telephone
corporations.

“(4) Provide universal service rate support from the [A-Fund]
Program to small independent telephone corporations in an
amount sufficient to supply the portion of the revenue
requirement that cannot reasonably be provided by the customers
of each small independent telephone corporation after receipt of
federal universal service rate support.

“(5) Promote customer access to advanced services and
deployment of broadband-capable facilities in rural areas that is
reasonably comparable to that in urban areas, consistent with
national communications policy.

“(6) Include all reasonable investments necessary to provide for
the delivery of high-quality voice communication services and
the deployment of broadband-capable facilities in the rate base of
small independent telephone corporations.

“(7) Ensure that support is not excessive so that the burden on all
contributors to the [A-Fund] program is limited.”
B. Ratemaking Rules
In 2011, the Commission issued Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding
California High Cost Fund-A Program (Nov. 18, 2011) rulemaking 11-11-007, to begin a

16.
detailed review of the A-Fund program. (Calaveras ’22, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p.
799.) In 2012, the Legislature amended section 275.6, declaring its intent to preserve the
Commission’s discretion “in open Rulemaking 11-11-007 to establish the regulatory
requirements for the [A-Fund] Program within the policy framework provided by this
act.” (Stats. 2012, ch. 729, § 1, subd. (c), p. 5990.) “In December 2014, the Commission
concluded phase I of the rulemaking proceeding and issued Decision Adopting Rules and
Regulations in Phase 1 of the Rulemaking for the California High Cost Fund-A Program
(Dec. 18, 2014) Cal.P.U.C. Decision No. 14-12-084.” (Calaveras ’22, supra, at p. 800.)
In 2021, the Commission issued further A-Fund rulemaking in Decision
Addressing Select General Rate Case-Related Matters of the Small Incumbent Local
Exchange Carriers (June 3, 2021) Cal.P.U.C. Decision No 21-06-004 (D.21-06-004 or
GRC Matters). The rules established by D.21-06-004 for determining the rate base
amount are the subject of Ducor’s primary claim of Commission error. The relevant
rules are expressed in two conclusions of law and one ordering paragraph. Conclusion of
law (COL) 9 and 10 state:

“9. NECA’s most recent cost study is a reasonable starting point for
forecasting [General Rate Case (GRC)] Test Year rate base, subject
to adjustments for new additions, closure of plants, or other changes
that have occurred since the year of the NECA cost study and the
Commission will review these adjustments for reasonableness and
approval.

“10. The Small ILECs should use (with adjustments made for new
additions, plant closures and similar expenses) the rate base amount
from NECA’s most recent cost study as a proposed rate base for
each GRC Test Year.” (D.21-06-004, p. 40, italics added.)
Ordering paragraph 10 of D.21-06-004 (OP 10) uses language similar to COL 10,
except its verb phrase is “shall use” rather than “should use.” OP 10 states:

“[The small ILECs, including] Ducor Telephone Company, … shall
use the rate base amount from the National Exchange Carrier

17.
Association’s most recent cost study as a proposed rate base for each
General Rate Case Test Year.” (D.21-06-004, p. 44.)
Ducor contends the foregoing rules require the Commission to use the rate base
amount in the most recent NECA cost study, subject only to reasonable adjustments for
post-study changes in the applicant’s plant. We disagree.
1. Mandatory Language and Its Scope
OP 10’s single sentence adopts the familiar structure of subject-verb-object. The
subject is the small ILEC’s. The verb phrase is “shall use.” The object is the NECA’s
rate base amount. The Commission’s choice of “shall” in OP 10 plainly signals an intent
to establish a mandatory directive. (§ 14 [shall is mandatory]; see generally, In re D.Y.
(2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1053 [“mandatory word ‘shall’ forms a verb phrase with the
verb ‘terminate’ ”].) Thus, a question presented is who is bound by the directive. The
answer is Ducor and the other small ILEC’s because they are the subject of the sentence.
Nowhere does the sentence mention the Commission. Consequently, OP 10 does not
explicitly require the Commission to adopt the NECA rate base amount (adjusted for
post-study changes) as the rate base when determining a small ILEC’s revenue
requirement.
A second question raised is the scope of D.21-06-004. In our view, that scope is
limited because D.21-06-004 does not set forth a complete framework explicitly
describing all the Commission’s mandatory responsibilities and all its discretionary
authority when determining the amount of the applicant’s rate base. For instance, the
rules do not explicitly require the Commission to use a specific method when determining
the rate base amount or to choose from a list of specified methods. The lack of a

18.
complete framework is further illustrated by the absence of a COL or OP in D.21-06-004
explicitly requiring the Commission to adopt a reasonable rate base. 9
To summarize, D.21-06-004 does not explicitly require the Commission to adopt
the NECA rate base amount (adjusted for post-study changes) or explicitly prohibit the
Commission from using other rate base amounts. Consequently, we next consider
whether the language in D.21-06-004 impliedly requires the Commission to adopt the
NECA rate base amount with adjustments for any post-study changes.
2. The Indefinite Article “A”
D.21-06-004 uses the indefinite article “a” in several places. That indefinite
article appears in COL 9’s phrase “a reasonable starting point” and in the phrase “as a
proposed rate base” contained in both COL 10 and OP 10. Generally, a legislature’s use
of an indefinite article or a definite article is significant. (People v. Walts (2025) 112
Cal.App.5th 127, 142; Rapanos v. United States (2006) 547 U.S. 715, 732–733; North
American Title Co. v. Superior Court (2024) 17 Cal.5th 155, 174–175; Pineda v. Bank of
America, N.A. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1389, 1396–1397 (Pineda).) Based on the principle that
the basic rules governing the interpretation of statutes also govern the interpretation of
administrative regulations (Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015) 60
Cal.4th 1086, 1097), we conclude the type of article used by the Commission—definite
or indefinite—is significant to determining the meaning of its rules.
“Use of the indefinite articles ‘a’ or ‘an’ signals a general reference.” (Pineda,
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1396.) In contrast, “use of the definite article ‘the’ … refers to a

9 The requirement that a reasonable rate base be adopted is derived from statutory
text. The Commission’s answer acknowledges it has a “statutory duty to approve only
just and reasonable charges and rates. (See, e.g., §§ 451, 275.6, subd. (c)(1)[.)]” Section
451 provides in part: “All charges … received by any public utility … shall be just and
reasonable.” Thus, the Commission’s answer interprets section 451 and subdivision (c)
of section 275.6 as imposing upon it an “obligation to approve a reasonable rate base.”
(Italics added.) We agree with this statutory interpretation.

19.
specific person, place, or thing.” (Ibid.) Stated another way, as a word of limitation,
“the” refers to something that exists only one at a time. (CD Investment Co. v. California
Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1421, citing Webster’s 3d New
Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 2368.)
Accordingly, the Commission’s use of the indefinite article “a” in COL 9 supports
the inference that the Commission realized there was no single “reasonable starting
point”—that is, there could be other “reasonable starting point[s].” Had the Commission
intended to identify the NECA rate base as the sole starting point, it would have used the
definite article “the.” Use of the definite article also would have allowed the
Commission to omit the modifier “reasonable” as surplusage.
Similarly, use of the indefinite article in the phrase “a proposed rate base”
indicates rate base amounts other than the NECA’s are allowed to be included (i.e.,
proposed) in the general rate case application. Had the Commission intended the
application to propose only the NECA rate base amount, it would have used the definite
article “the” before “proposed rate base.” Thus, under OP 10, a small ILEC must include
the NECA rate base amount in its application and may include alternate proposed rate
base amounts.
Consequently, the use of the indefinite article in the rules supports the inference
that the Commission did not intend the rules to impliedly require it to adopt the NECA
rate base amount. Stated another way, the Commission’s interpretation of D.21-06-004
adopts the plain (i.e., literal) meaning of the indefinite articles used in COL 9 and 10 and
OP 10.
3. Starting Point for Forecasting
The Commission refers to COL 9’s phrase “starting point for forecasting” and
argues these words must be given meaning. The Commission argues, in effect, that a
“starting point” is the opposite of an ending point (i.e., its determination of the rate base
amount) and “forecasting” is an educated estimation that is imprecise by its nature, which

20.
indicates that there are further analytical steps before making a final decision on the rate
base amount. In accordance with this interpretation of COL 9, the Commission
concluded in D.25-08-010 “that a NECA cost study is a reasonable starting point for
forecasting rate base for the test year, not a binding determination.”
Ducor contends the Commission’s flexible construction of “starting point” ignores
language in COL 9 confirming that, upon “receiving a company’s proposed rate base, the
Commission must ‘review these adjustments for reasonableness.’ ” Ducor argues COL
9’s reference to “these adjustments” signals an unambiguous intent to limit the
Commission’s reasonableness review of Ducor’s proposed rate base to the three
adjustments described in the preceding clause: new additions, plant closures, or other
changes occurring since the year of the NECA cost study. Ducor contends the
adjustments identified in COL 9 “preserves the Commission’s discretion to review these
deviations from the ‘starting point’ for ‘reasonableness and approval,’ [but] nothing in
D.21-06-004 suggests that the Commission can question the figures in the ‘starting
point,’ which remains the NECA cost study rate base figures.” Ducor argues, in effect,
that D.21-06-004 did not explicitly state the Commission retained the discretionary
authority to adopt a rate base other than the NECA rate base and, furthermore, it is not
reasonable to interpret D.21-06-004 as impliedly retaining any such discretionary
authority in determining the appropriate rate base. Thus, Ducor concludes the
Commission has refused to follow its own rules.
We recognize the use of the verb phrase “will review” in COL 9 obligates the
Commission to consider the three adjustments for “reasonableness and approval.”
However, the obligation to review the adjustments is not the equivalent of mandating the
adoption of the NECA rate base amount after such a review. In other words, once the
Commission has fulfilled its duty to review any adjustments for reasonableness and
approval, the wording of COL 9 does not prevent it from reviewing rate base amounts

21.
generated by alternate methodologies and, ultimately, choosing a different reasonable rate
base amount.
Consequently, we agree with the inferences the Commission has drawn from its
use of the phrase “starting point for forecasting.” That language is not the wording the
Commission would have used if it had intended the NECA cost study to always provide
the sole foundation for the final rate base amount. Thus, we disagree with Ducor’s
argument that “ ‘these adjustments’ therefore signals an unambiguous intent to limit the
Commission’s reasonableness review of Ducor’s proposed rate based to the three types of
adjustments that are described in the preceding clause.”
4. Proposed
In addition, the Commission contends Ducor’s arguments ignore the plain
meaning of the word “proposed” used in COL 10 and OP 10 and fails to acknowledge its
significance in the regulatory context. The plain and ordinary meaning of “propose” is
“to form or declare a plan or intention.” (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993) p.
1819.) In the utility ratemaking context, the Commission asserts that when it “orders
utility proposals, those proposals are inherently subject to Commission review for the
Commission to fulfill its statutory duty to approve only just and reasonable charges and
rates.” (See § 451.) The Commission argues Ducor’s conclusion that it must adopt the
rate base figure from the most recent NECA cost study contradicts both the plain
meaning of “proposed” and its particular meaning in the regulatory context.
Ducor argues the use of the term “ ‘proposed’ is properly viewed as the functional
mechanism for conducting the rate base analysis, which has temporal and conceptual
restrictions based on the full language of D.21-06-004.” Ducor argues the Commission’s
interpretation leads to absurd results that undermine the utility of the rate base rule itself.
In Ducor’s view, it is absurd to restrict company deviations from the NECA cost study to
the listed adjustments while giving the Commission carte blanche to attack any aspect of

22.
the NECA cost study because that result would undermine the streamlining or
transparency the rule was supposed to achieve.
Having considered the competing arguments, we reject Ducor’s view of the word
“proposed.” First, as explained above, the only obligation or restriction imposed on the
Commission by the full language of D.21-06-004 is the obligation to “review” the
adjustments to the NECA cost study. Second, contrary to Ducor’s view, the rules do not
restrict applicants to a single proposed rate base. The small ILEC’s are required to use
the NECA rate base amount, but the indefinite article in OP 10’s phrase “a proposed rate
base” signals applications are allowed to propose other rate base amounts. During oral
argument, counsel for the Commission acknowledged that small ILEC’s were allowed
this flexibility and, thus, were not restricted to proposing only an adjusted NECA rate
base amount. Accordingly, we conclude the claimed absurdity of restricting applicants
like Ducor to the NECA rate amount does not exist because D.21-06-004 imposes no
such restriction. Third, any attack on the NECA cost study is subject to the statutory
reasonableness requirement and, thus, the possibility of the Commission or the applicant
making such an attack is not absurd, especially in the context where the NECA rate base
amount reflects an accounting election by the telephone corporation. Use of the modifier
“proposed” is consistent with the Commission’s obligation to determine the reasonable
value of the applicant’s rate base without being bound by the NECA’s acceptance of the
accounting election for purposes of interstate ratemaking. Further, the Commission’s
decision on the general rate case application, as here, will explain why the Commission
chose a different rate base amount, thus providing the small ILEC with transparency as to
the Commission’s reasoning.
5. Summary of the Interpretation of the Rules
First, D.21-06-004 does not explicitly require the Commission to adopt the NECA
rate base amount (adjusted for post-study changes). Second, D.21-06-004 does not
explicitly prohibit the Commission from using the original cost methodology to

23.
determine the rate base’s value. Third, given the use of (1) indefinite articles, (2) the
phrase “starting point for forecasting,” and (3) the modifier “proposed,” we conclude the
Commission adopted a reasonable interpretation of D.21-06-004 by concluding it did not
impliedly require itself to use the NECA rate base amount, adjusted for post-study
changes. Under the circumstances of this case, the Commission’s interpretation is
reasonable and, thus, withstands the scrutiny of our independent judicial review. In
contrast, it is implausible that the Commission chose the language in COL 9 and 10 and
OP 10 to express an intention to bind itself to using the NECA rate base amount, adjusted
for post-study changes. Consequently, we need not rely on the principle of deference to
the Commission’s interpretation of its own rules that is invoked when the interpretations
proposed by the parties are nearly equal in their reasonableness. (See Clean Energy
Fuels Corp. v. Public Utilities Com., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 649 [deference given
Commission’s interpretation of its own rules]; Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Public
Utilities Com., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 1096 [same].)
C. Interpretation of Subdivision (b)(2) of Section 275.6
Subdivision (b)(2) of section 275.6 defines “ ‘rate base’ ” as “the value of a
telephone corporation’s plant and equipment that is reasonably necessary to provide
regulated voice services and access to advanced services.” (§ 275.6, subd. (b)(2), italics
added.) Ducor contends the Commission misinterpreted this provision when it rejected
the fair market value of Ducor’s assets as the rate base amount.
The Legislature used the word “value” without defining it or specifying the
method for determining the value of a telephone corporation’s plant and equipment. The
word “value” is used in many contexts, and its general definitions include “the amount of
a commodity, service, or medium of exchange that is the equivalent of something else : a
fair return in goods, services, or money” and “the monetary worth of something.”
(Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 2530; see Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024)
[“monetary worth or price of something”]; see also, Wasatch Property Management v.

24.
Degrate (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1111, 1121 [courts appropriately refer to dictionary definitions
when attempting to ascertain the ordinary, usual meaning of a word].) In a railroad
reorganization case, the United States Supreme Court stated that value is a word of many
meanings. (Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., S. P. & P.R. Co. (1941) 318
U.S. 523, 540.) “It gathers its meaning in a particular situation from the purpose for
which a valuation is being made. Thus the question in a valuation for rate making is how
much a utility will be allowed to earn. The basic question in a valuation for
reorganization purposes is how much the enterprise in all probability can earn.” (Ibid.)
Given the variety of meanings, we conclude the use of the word “value” in
subdivision (b)(2) of section 275.6 does not mandate or prohibit the use of the original
cost methodology applied by the Commission or the fair market value methodology
applied in the NECA cost study to determine the rate base amount. Consequently, the
Commission’s use of the original cost methodology did not violate the express terms of
the statute.
With that foundation, we turn to the arguments presented in Ducor’s writ petition.
First, Ducor asserts that the “rate base” definition “does not include any references to
‘original value,’ and, indeed, the Commission concedes that Section 275.6(b)(2) does not
mandate ‘any particular revaluation methodology.’ ” We conclude the absence of a
specific mandate does not mean the Commission is required to use the fair market
methodology. The more reasonable inference is that the choice of methodology is
committed to the Commission’s discretion. This inference is supported by another
provision of the Public Utilities Code that demonstrates the Legislature is quite capable
of expressing itself clearly when it intends to mandate the Commission’s use of a
particular method or standard for valuation. Section 2720, subdivision (a) provides:
“The commission shall use the standard of fair market value when establishing the rate
base value for the distribution system of a public water system acquired by a water
corporation. This standard shall be used for ratesetting.” (Italics added.; see Code Civ.

25.
Proc., § 1263.320 [definition of fair market value].) Accordingly, we conclude the
Legislature committed the choice of methodology to the Commission’s discretion.
Second, Ducor argues it was improper for the Commission to rely on a general
practice of recognizing the original value of a utility’s assets when D.21-06-004
specifically addresses ratemaking standards for small ILEC’s such as Ducor. Ducor
further argues the ratemaking standard in D.21-06-004 “does not permit the Commission
to adjust the value of Ducor’s assets to the original value merely because its day-to-day
operations were not impacted by the transfer of control that triggered the revaluation and
push-down accounting.” Ducor concludes this argument by stating the Commission’s
decisions on the Application cite no authority to justify the “departure from the plain
language of D.21-06-004, and doing so is an abuse of discretion.” This argument lacks
merit because it is based on an interpretation of D.21-06-004 that we rejected in part
II.B.5. of this opinion. Thus, the argument does not establish the Commission erred in its
interpretation of the word “value” or any other language in subdivision (b)(2) of section
275.6.
To summarize, we conclude section 275.6, subdivision (b)(2) did not require the
Commission to adopt the rate base amount in the NECA cost study or to use a fair market
value methodology to determine the value of Ducor’s rate base. Rather, the Commission
was given discretionary authority to choose the methodology for valuing the rate base of
a small ILEC. In exercising that discretion when it formulated the rules in D.21-06-004,
the Commission did not lock itself into using the NECA rate base amount (adjusted for
post-study changes), but retained the flexibility to use original cost adjusted for
depreciation.
D. Interpretation of Subdivision (c)(7) of Section 275.6
Section 275.6, subdivision (c) delineates the Commission’s responsibilities by
specifying certain tasks the Commission “shall do” in administering the A-Fund.
“ ‘Shall’ is mandatory.” (§ 14; see § 5 [statutory definitions “shall govern the

26.
construction of the [Public Utilities C]ode” unless “the context otherwise requires”].)
Subdivision (c)(7) requires the Commission to “[e]nsure that support is not excessive so
that the burden on all contributors to the [A-Fund] program is limited.”
1. Commission’s Statutory Analysis
In D.26-02-028, the Commission discussed the application of subdivision (c)(7) of
section 275.6 by stating:

“[D.25-08-010] concludes that Ducor’s proposed increase to its rate
base using the fair market value methodology is inconsistent with
section 275.6(c)(7) because it ‘is the artificial result of fluctuations
in the assets’ value from a transfer of control and ownership due to
the accounting practices,’ not from a change in its plant dedicated to
public use. [Citation.] Ducor claims that [D.25-08-010]’s
conclusion is incorrect because its methodology would result in a
nominal increase of 0.26% to the $50 million A-Fund, or two
hundredths of a penny per A-Fund contributor. [Citation.] Ducor’s
claim lacks merit.

“Section 275.6(c)(7) mandates that we administer the A-Fund in
a manner that ensures subsidies are ‘not excessive so that the burden
on all contributors … is limited.’ This statutory imperative is part of
our obligation to set just and reasonable rates that balance the
interests of the Small ILECs, their customers, and A-Fund
contributors. (See § 275.6, subd. (c); Order Denying Rehearing of
Decision 21-04-005, D.21-08-042 (2021) at 4-6.) Approving a rate
base amount that is greater than the reasonable value of a utility’s
assets, for which the utility earns a rate of return, is neither just nor
reasonable because it results in excessive profits for the utility and
unreasonably high prices for ratepayers. (§ 451 [requiring utilities to
show that all requested charges are ‘just and reasonable’ in order to
be recovered in rates]; see Order Denying Rehearing of Decision 24-
09-021, D.25-05-031 (2025) at 10.)

“Accordingly, Ducor’s artificially inflated rate base figure
inherently leads to an excessive A-Fund draw contrary to section
275.6(c)(7), regardless of how excessive (dollars, pennies, fractions
of pennies, etc.) –– a determination well within our discretion to
make. (Calaveras [’22, supra,] 87 Cal.App.5th [at p.] 809 [the
Commission has discretion under section 275.6(c)(7) to determine

27.
what factors make the subsidy excessive].) As a result, [D.25-08-
010] correctly relied on section 275.6(c)(7).”
2. The Commission’s Approach Was Not Prejudicial
For purposes of this original proceeding, we assume without deciding that the
Commission erred in its interpretation and application of section 275.6, subdivision (c)(7)
to the facts of this case. Based on this assumption, we address whether Ducor has
demonstrated the error was prejudicial. In the civil context, the test for prejudice is
whether there is a reasonable probability that a result more favorable to the aggrieved
party would have been obtained in the absence of the error. (Soule v. General Motors
Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 570.)
At oral argument, the Commission’s counsel argued there was no prejudice to
Ducor because the analysis of whether Ducor’s proposed subsidy was excessive could be
removed from the decision and there would still be adequate grounds for upholding the
decision. In comparison, Ducor’s argument of prejudicial error appears to assert (1) the
Commission misapplied the rules set forth in D.21-06-004 and (2) the Commission’s
analysis of section 275.6, subdivision (c)(7) does not provide an independent ground for
affirming the Commission’s decision to use the original cost methodology. In other
words, Ducor does not contend that even if the rules in D.21-06-004 were properly
applied, the Commission’s decision must be vacated because of the error in determining
Ducor’s proposed rate base resulted in an excessive subsidy.
We conclude there is no reasonable probability that Ducor would have received a
more favorable result if the assumed erroneous application of section 275.6, subdivision
(c)(7) had not occurred because the Commission’s determination of the rate base amount
correctly applied the rules in D.21-06-004 and complied with subdivision (b)(2) of
section 275.6. Consequently, the excessiveness determination under section 275.6,
subdivision (c)(7) did not adversely impact the outcome of Ducor’s 2023 general rate
case application.

28.
E. Interpretation of Federal Rules
Ducor’s reply states the Commission “seeks to buttress [its] departure from its
own rules through citation to FCC accounting regulations.” Ducor contends the
Commission’s reference to federal regulations (47 C.F.R. § 32.2000 [USOA]) remain
irrelevant and unavailing because the regulations “do not change the straightforward
meaning of the rate base methodology established in D.21-06-004, which requires
adherence to the figures in the NECA cost study as the starting point for computing
Ducor’s rate base, subject only to adjustments for impacts that occur after the timeframe
covered by the cost study.” Ducor rephrases its argument by asserting: “The update to
rate base for fair market value was mandatory because of the Commission’s own rule in
D.21-06-004, not the FCC’s instructions or the underlying accounting treatment.”
Because we have determined that the rules established by the Commission in
D.21-06-004 do not expressly or impliedly require the Commission to adopt the NECA
rate base amount (adjusted for post-study changes), the Commission did not depart from
its rules when it rejected the NECA rate base amount. (See pt. II.B., ante.) Accordingly,
contrary to Ducor’s argument, the Commission did not attempt to justify a departure from
its own rules by relying on the federal regulations.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
A. Commission’s Decision to Apply the Original Cost Methodology
D.25-08-010 sets forth the Commission’s rationale for choosing the original cost
methodology to determine the value of Ducor’s rate base:

“Pub. Util. Code Section 275.6 (b)(2) defines rate base as ‘the
value of a telephone corporation’s plant and equipment that is
reasonably necessary to provide regulated voice services and access
to advanced services, and upon which the telephone corporation is
entitled to a fair opportunity to earn a reasonable rate of return.’ The
value of a telephone corporation’s plant and equipment should be
based on the original cost of the asset when it is first put into service.
An adjustment in the value of Telephone Plant-in-Service would be

29.
needed if a utility demonstrates there were changes in assets used to
provide service, such as new capital projects or retirement of
equipment.

“Ducor acknowledged in its transfer of control application that its
day-today operations were not impacted. As such, there were no
changes in the assets that Ducor used to provide service and thus
there is no justification for an adjustment to the Telephone Plant-in-
Service amount. Therefore, the value of the assets included in
Ducor’s Telephone Plant-in-Service should be based on the original
value of the asset when it was first put into service.” (Fns. omitted.)
After the rehearing, the Commission issued D.26-02-028, which referred to its
long-standing policy of applying the original cost methodology, quoted the foregoing
paragraphs, and concluded the application of the original cost methodology was
supported by substantial evidence.
B. Ducor’s Claim of Error
Ducor contends the Commission failed to make findings that are “supported by
substantial evidence in light of the whole record.” (§ 1757, subd. (a)(4).) In particular,
Ducor contends the Commission’s decisions “fail to identify any factual evidence to
support the rejection of Ducor’s rate base calculation,” which is founded on an
appropriate asset revaluation and ASC 805 push-down.
Ducor’s claim of Commission error is based on the Commission adopting an
incorrect interpretation of D.21-06-004, section 275.6, and the federal regulations. In
effect, Ducor is asserting that if the Commission had adopted Ducor’s interpretation of
D.21-06-004, the evidence in the record supports its proposed rate base and there is no
evidentiary basis for rejecting its proposed rate base. Ducor asserts: “Nothing in the
record suggests that the revaluation was impermissible under accounting standards, and
nothing suggests that the ‘fair market value’ or ‘bargain purchase’ adjustments were
inaccurate in any way.”

30.
Ducor’s argument, like its argument about the federal regulations, fails because its
foundation is legally incorrect. As described above, the Commission did not misinterpret
D.21-06-004 or section 275.6.
Furthermore, the evidence in the record is sufficient to support the Commission’s
application of the original value methodology. The evidence shows that (1) the increase
in rate base proposed by Ducor was due to permissive accounting practices related to the
transfer of control; (2) the transfer of control did not impact Ducor’s day-to-day
operations; and (3) proposed increase was not based on any changes in the assets used to
provide intrastate service. Based on these facts, the Commission’s use of the original
cost methodology was reasonable. Stated another way, Ducor has not demonstrated,
based on the evidence before the Commission, that a reasonable person could not reach
the same conclusion—that is, could not adopt and apply the original cost methodology in
the circumstances of this case. (Ponderosa, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 1013.)
IV. UNCONSTITUITONAL TAKING
Ducor contends the Commission’s rejection of the actual, current value of the
assets in Ducor’s rate base constitutes an unlawful taking of Ducor’s property through the
imposition of confiscatory rates structures that will cause revenue shortfalls over five,
perhaps seven, years. The Commission asserts that its application of the original cost
methodology was reasonable and, therefore, the total effect of its rate order cannot be
said to be unjust and unreasonable. In the Commission’s view, this reasonableness
determination marks the end of the constitutional inquiry. We agree.
A. Constitutional Principles
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Similarly, the
California Constitution declares that private property may be taken for public use only
when just compensation has been paid to the owner. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 19, subd. (a).)
Whether utility rate setting results in an unconstitutional taking of private property for

31.
public use is determined by applying the basic principles and standards set forth in three
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. (See Bluefield Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm.
(1923) 262 U.S. 679 (Bluefield); Power Comm’n v. Hope Gas Co. (1944) 320 U.S. 591
(Hope); Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch (1989) 488 U.S. 299 (Duquesne); see also,
Ponderosa, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 1014.) Stated in broad terms, “the Constitution
protects utilities from being limited to a charge for their property serving the public
which is so ‘unjust’ as to be confiscatory.” (Duquesne, supra, at p. 307.)
Over a century ago, the United States Supreme Court stated: “[Utility r]ates which
are not sufficient to yield a reasonable return on the value of the property used at the time
it is being used to render the service are unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, and their
enforcement” violates the constitution. (Bluefield, supra, 262 U.S. at p. 690.) The
“reasonable return” requirement was restated in the principle that a utility is entitled to
“ ‘a fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the public convenience.’ ”
(Ibid.) The court provided guidance for the application of this principle by stating the
determination of “ ‘value is not controlled by artificial rules. It is not a matter of
formulas, but there must be reasonable judgment having its basis in a proper
consideration of all relevant facts.’ ” (Ibid.) A fair or reasonable return is “equal to that
generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on
investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks
and uncertainties.” (Id. at p. 692.)
In Hope, the Supreme Court explained that fixing just and reasonable rates
“involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.” (Hope, supra, 320
U.S. at p. 603.) A legitimate investor interest is “the financial integrity of the company
whose rates are being regulated. From the investor or company point of view it is
important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the
capital costs of the business.… By that standard the return to the equity owner should be
commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding

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risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial
integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.” (Ibid.)
In Duquesne, the Supreme Court stated that, “[a]t one time, it was thought that the
Constitution required rates to be set according to the actual present value of the assets
employed in the public service. This method [is] known as the ‘fair value’ rule.”
(Duquesne, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 308, italics added.) The court stated that Hope, a
landmark case, “held that the ‘fair value’ rule is not the only constitutionally acceptable
method of fixing utility rates.” (Duquesne, supra, at p. 310.) The court explained:
“ ‘Rates which enable [a] company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial
integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risk assumed certainly
cannot be condemned as invalid, even though they might produce only a meager return
on the so called “fair value” rate base.’ ” (Ibid.)
To aid the constitutional inquiry into utility rate setting, the Supreme Court stated
that “an otherwise reasonable rate is not subject to constitutional attack by questioning
the theoretical consistency of the method that produced it.” (Duquesne, supra, 488 U.S. at
p. 314.) “ ‘[I]t is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total
effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unreasonable, judicial inquiry … is at an end.
The fact that the method employed to reach that result may contain infirmities is not then
important.’ ” (Id. at p. 310; quoting Hope, supra, 320 U.S. at p. 602.)
B. Application of Principles
First, the foregoing principles plainly establish that the fair market value
methodology proposed by Ducor is not constitutionally required. Therefore, we reject
Ducor’s argument that the Commission adopted a confiscatory rate structure “[b]y
refusing to acknowledge the current value of Ducor’s assets.”
Second, in accordance with Duquesne and Hope, our constitutional inquiry
considers whether “ ‘the total effect of the rate order … [is] … unreasonable.’ ”
(Duquesne, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 310.) Because the reasonableness standard has been

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incorporated into section 275.6, our earlier determination that the Commission did not
violate the statute’s requirements leads us to conclude the total effect of the rate order
was not unreasonable and, therefore, the Commission did not violate the federal or state
constitutions.
DISPOSITION
The petition for a writ directing the Commission to nullify Decision No. 25-08-
010 and Decision No. 26-02-028 is denied. The Commission shall recover its costs in
this original proceeding. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(A).)

FRANSON, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SNAUFFER, J.

GUERRA, J.

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