Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Gonzalez v. Bd. of Trustees of the Cerritos Community College CA2/2

Filed 11/6/26 Gonzalez v. Bd. of Trustees of the Cerritos Community College CA2/2
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/6/26 Gonzalez v. Bd. of Trustees of the Cerritos Community College CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

RUBEN GONZALEZ, B344342

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCP03807)
v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
THE CERRITOS COMMUNITY
COLLEGE DISTRICT,

Defendant and
Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.
Trygstad, Schwab & Trygstad and Daniel J. Kolodziej for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Best Best & Krieger, Michael T. Travis and Dana Lui for
Defendant and Respondent.
Ruben Gonzalez (appellant) appeals from a judgment
denying his petition for writ of administrative mandamus filed
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 (petition)
challenging his dismissal as an academic employee from Cerritos
Community College. Though the trial court reversed the
Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) determination that appellant
had engaged in immoral conduct, the trial court upheld the ALJ’s
determination that appellant was unfit for service and denied his
petition.
As substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision,
we affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND
I. Charges
On January 20, 2021, the Board of Trustees of the Cerritos
Community College District (district) voted to terminate
appellant under Education Code section 87732.1 The same day,
the district served appellant with the required statutory notice of
the district’s intent to suspend his pay and proceed with his
termination. The district’s second amended statement of charges
was filed on October 5, 2021. The second amended statement of
charges included allegations that cause existed to dismiss
appellant on the grounds of (1) immoral conduct within the
meaning of section 87732, subdivision (a); (2) dishonesty within
the meaning of section 87732, subdivision (b); (3) evident
unfitness for service within the meaning of section 87732,
subdivision (d); and (4) persistent violation of, or refusal to obey,
the school laws of the state or reasonable regulations prescribed

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Education Code.

2
for the government of the community colleges by the board of
governors or by the governing board of the community college
district employing him under section 87732, subdivision (f).
II. Administrative hearing
Beginning September 27, 2021, an 11-day hearing was held
before an ALJ.
At the commencement of the proceedings, appellant’s
counsel objected to several of the district’s witnesses, arguing
their testimony was inadmissible under section 87680, which
provides, in part, “No testimony shall be given or evidence
introduced relating to matters which occurred more than four
years prior to the date of the filing of the notice.…[N]o decision
relating to the dismissal or suspension of any employee shall be
made based on charges or evidence of any nature relating to
matters occurring more than four years prior to the filing of the
notice.”
The allegations reached back over 10 years. The ALJ thus
excluded the testimony of witnesses MT, AW, LS1, LS2, and CR,
although some of CR’s testimony was admitted despite the four-
year rule set forth in section 87680. The district acknowledged
most of the charges against appellant involved allegations of
conduct occurring more than four years prior to the January 21,
2021 notice, but argued the evidence should be admitted under
the doctrine of equitable estoppel pursuant to Atwater
Elementary School Dist. v. California Dept. of General Services
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 227 (Atwater). Initially the ALJ permitted the
district to try to establish equitable estoppel but ultimately ruled

3
against the district as to most of the evidence from more than
four years prior to the district’s notice.2
The testimony of 10 witnesses was admitted and is
summarized below.
A. AZ
AZ attended Cerritos college from July 2017 until January
2020. She was a captain of the women’s soccer team in 2017 and
2019, but not in 2018 when she was injured. Appellant was the
head coach. When AZ first joined the team, appellant had a
conversation with AZ about her boyfriend. Appellant stated it
was not possible to remain faithful in a marriage and explained
he cheated on his wife.
In the summer of 2019, there was an investigation into
allegations that a player was partying and having sexual
relations with coaching staff during a team trip in 2018. During
a team practice, one of the players mentioned she got a call from
an investigator. Appellant became angry and defensive, raising
his voice and asking who else received a call from an investigator.
Appellant ordered, “Nobody from here on out is to speak to any
investigator.” The team was concerned.
Appellant pulled AZ and the other team captain aside and
said, “There’s no proof. Do they have photos? What do they want

2 The ALJ noted AW testified she had reported her concerns
to the district administration in 2014. There was no evidence
that, despite such notice, the district investigated AW’s claims.
District witnesses LS1, LS2, and MT did not indicate they had
attempted to report any misconduct to the district or that they
had been prevented from reporting any misconduct to the
district. Thus, the ALJ found there was no reason to apply the
doctrine of equitable estoppel as to these witnesses.

4
me to do, fire my own brother?”3 Appellant also blamed female
students, saying players should not have been in the room where
coaches were drinking. AZ then witnessed appellant
interrogating each player individually, in an apparent attempt to
determine how the investigation arose.
It was clear to AZ there would be consequences, such as
loss of playing time, if a player did not do what the coaches
wanted. Appellant ordered AZ and her fellow captain to not
mention the investigation or any sexual harassment allegations
to any new players on the team, and if they heard players talking
about it, they were to “shut it down immediately.”
Appellant and Whitfield were the two main coaches and
had worked together for almost 10 years. AZ and her teammate
felt uncomfortable with Whitfield, who added players as friends
on social media, drank shots of alcohol with players, made
inappropriate comments, and threatened to cut playing time
when rejected.
On a 2019 summer soccer trip across the country, AZ
received inappropriate texts from Whitfield after he attempted to
get her to drink alcohol with him. The messages reflected that
Whitfield was drinking, and boundaries were being crossed. AZ
became fearful of saying anything about Whitfield. She felt she
could not report the inappropriate behavior to appellant due to
his response to the prior investigation.
AZ described the team environment as “toxic,” with coaches
demeaning players, mocking their weight, and using fitness as
punishment. Other teammates expressed feeling the same. AZ

3 The assistant coaches included appellant’s brother,
Guillermo Gonzalez (known as Memo), Brent Whitfield, Ana
Ramirez, and Jose Escorsia, among others.

5
and her teammates did not report anything due to their fear that
the coaches would retaliate and diminish their opportunity to
transfer to a four-year college.
AZ did report to the Title IX office, including Title IX
coordinator Valyncia Raphael-Woodward (Raphael). Though she
said she wanted to remain anonymous, Raphael could not
guarantee that. AZ then sought out the other Title IX officer,
who said AZ should try to get other teammates to report with
her. This upset AZ because the Title IX office was where she was
supposed to go for help.
AZ then decided to report to athletic director Maria Castro
(Castro). AZ was able to obtain Castro’s guarantee of anonymity
and spoke to Castro about the inappropriate and toxic behavior
on the team. On October 10, 2019, Castro had a meeting with the
team about the allegations being investigated.
Following the meeting, AZ’s teammate MC screamed at AZ,
accusing her of reporting to Castro. MC threatened to “beat …
up” AZ, yelling, “I know it was you who fucking told [Castro] and
I will beat your fucking ass.” Other teammates held MC back.
Under her breath, MC added, “stupid fucking bitch.” The whole
team was present. Everyone was quiet and did not know what to
say. AZ was shocked by the encounter and did not know how to
respond.
Appellant was 10 to 15 feet away when MC began yelling
and was two to three feet away at a later point during the
confrontation. Appellant did nothing to stop MC from attacking
AZ or correct what she said. It was clear to AZ he knew what
was happening.
After the confrontation, AZ went straight to Castro’s office
without making any effort to talk to appellant. AZ told Castro

6
exactly what happened, including that appellant had declined to
protect her. AZ was informed Whitfield would be suspended.
AZ felt she had no option but to withdraw from the soccer
team and that had she continued, coaches and players would
have made her life difficult and uncomfortable.
AZ recalled seeing social media posts from former Cerritos
College soccer player Ashley Webb in 2020 about inappropriate
text messages and players being treated like dogs. This was
consistent with AZ’s experience on the team.
B. AJ
AJ participated in the women’s soccer program in 2018 and
2019. Appellant was the coach.
AJ went on a road trip with the soccer team during which
the coaches were intoxicated and appellant was present. AJ was
accosted by Whitfield who put his hand on her leg under a table
while they were drinking. AJ was uncomfortable, but she did not
report it because she had heard nothing would happen and she
would lose playing time in retaliation. AJ did not know if
appellant was aware of the incident. AJ’s father was planning to
report the incident, but AJ was injured and stopped playing.
AJ was aware of a chat “app” accusing a player of sleeping
with one of the coaches. That player’s mother spoke with
appellant, who told the players they needed to own up to sending
the app. If not, the police would be called, and there would be an
investigation. Appellant then asked for the players’ phones to see
if they had downloaded the app.
Assistant coach Ana Ramirez flirted with players during
practice. Appellant was around but did not appear to think
anything of it.

7
AJ was never directly discouraged from reporting or
threatened with loss of playing time.
C. CR
CR attended Cerritos College from 2013 to 2015 where she
played on the soccer team.4 Appellant was the head coach.
During a December 2013 soccer trip CR witnessed behavior
she found to be wrong and felt she should report to an authority.
She did not feel she could report to appellant. CR was “deeply
disturbed” and reported to athletic dean Dan Smith what she had
observed and heard on the trip. When she got to practice three
minutes after she left dean Smith’s office, appellant knew she
had reported the sexual misconduct. Appellant angrily
confronted her in front of the entire team, yelling she should not
have reported anything to dean Smith and instead should have
come to him first.
After CR reported the misconduct, the demeanor of the
coaches towards her changed, and they stopped communicating
with her. CR continued to witness coaches laughing and flirting
with the players, but she felt the behavior was being deliberately
hidden from her.
CR believed appellant cut her playing time in half and did
not assist her in transferring to a four-year university because

4 Although the evidence presented by CR fell outside the
four-year time limit of section 87680, the trial court agreed with
the ALJ’s decision that CR’s testimony could be considered in
part under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Although the
misconduct witnessed by CR prior to her report to athletic dean
Dan Smith was excluded under section 87680, the trial court
noted, “[T]he ALJ was entitled to consider CR’s testimony about
the repercussions CR felt from reporting.”

8
she reported to dean Smith. She eventually transferred to a four-
year university in Louisiana to play soccer despite the coach
having received a reference from appellant that was “not
positive.”
D. Ana Ramirez
Ramirez was an assistant coach at Cerritos College when
appellant became head coach in 2006. In 2013 through 2014,
Ramirez did not witness appellant discouraging players from
reporting anything. She did not have the impression players
were afraid or intimidated to report misconduct. She never
observed appellant yelling at CR in front of the team for
reporting misconduct.
Ramirez attended all practices from July 2019 through the
end of the 2019 season and did not observe appellant doing
anything to discourage players from reporting any misconduct.
She did not witness appellant telling the team not to participate
in an investigation or that incoming freshmen should not be told
about the investigation or any other alleged misconduct.
Ramirez did not hear from any player that appellant said or did
anything to discourage players from reporting misconduct.
In 2019, Ramirez was not of the impression players were
intimidated by appellant or other coaches. On the contrary,
appellant encouraged the players to come to him or the other
coaches with any problems.
E. Maria Castro
Castro has been the athletic director at Cerritos College
since 2019 and was previously the soccer team trainer.
In September 2019, AZ reported drinking and improper
texts by assistant coaches after a team trip to New York.
Afterwards, AZ reported an incident in which MC blamed AZ for

9
reporting the misconduct. MC blamed AZ for ruining their
season through the investigation and for Whitfield’s suspension.
AZ told Castro the team was surrounding them during the
altercation and appellant was on the outskirts of the group,
unlocking the gate for practice.
Castro summoned MC to her office through a text to
appellant. Castro told MC to “trust the process,” and directed her
to return to practice and apologize to the team for her outburst.
Thereafter, appellant reported to Castro that MC had done as
instructed.
Castro investigated AZ’s report along with the Title IX
coordinator. Castro interviewed about 15 student athletes, as
well as Whitfield and appellant. The investigation did not yield
any evidence that Whitfield and another coach were drinking in a
bar but did find evidence of inappropriate texts from coaches to
athletes. Appellant claimed he was unaware of any alleged
texting or drinking. The investigation determined there was
insufficient evidence to fire Whitfield, and no evidence appellant
had anything to do with MC instigating the altercation with AZ.
The result of the investigation was an agreement among
Whitfield, appellant, and Castro to “keep them in check” and
make sure Whitfield knew how to behave going forward.
During her time as a trainer for the team and as athletic
director, Castro had no knowledge of any conduct by appellant or
any other coach that seemed to condone misconduct. Castro
never observed any conduct that should have been reported.
F. Adriana Flores-Church
Adriana Flores-Church was the director of human
resources since 2006 and vice president since 2016. After the
September 2019 Title IX investigation of AZ’s report, including

10
MC’s retaliation and appellant’s lack of acknowledgment of it, the
district determined no disciplinary action was warranted against
appellant. Whitfield was placed on suspension during the
investigation but was reinstated once it was complete.
G. Valyncia Raphael-Woodward
Raphael was director of diversity, compliance, and Title IX
coordinator from July 2016 through September 2020. During her
Title IX investigation in 2019, no one reported to her that
appellant said or did anything to discourage reporting.
If a player, after reporting improper conduct, is confronted
by her teammates, the head coach has a duty to take action.
Raphael instructed head coaches to report retaliation for Title IX
reporting to her, but also coached them not to intervene in any
altercation as it may make things worse. Intervention is an
option, but she did not want head coaches to be “deputized” to
handle the issue on their own without letting her know. If Castro
told appellant she would handle a situation, appellant would be
correct to follow Castro’s instruction.
H. Octavio Marquez
Octavio Marquez was an assistant soccer coach from 2009
through 2019.
CR was a very good player but presented some issues with
her attitude about not coming out of games and not starting.
Marquez was not aware of CR ever reporting any misconduct by
anyone and never observed appellant scolding or admonishing
her. He believed he would have heard if it happened.
Appellant was not a coach who would admonish players in
front of other players. Marquez never observed appellant tell
players not to report anything. In fact, appellant encouraged

11
players to talk to Castro or one of the deans if there was an issue
they did not feel comfortable discussing with a coach.
Marquez never observed a culture of fear preventing
players from reporting concerns. He never heard appellant
discourage AZ, or any other players from reporting anything to
anyone, or from participating in an investigation, or talking to
incoming freshmen about allegations. If appellant had said any
of that, Marquez believed he would have heard about it.
I. OL
OL started as a soccer player in summer 2019. AZ was not
practicing because she was recovering from an injury. Appellant
never mentioned an investigation or that players should not talk
to investigators. OL was unaware of any investigation during
summer 2019. She never witnessed any coach flirting with any
player.
OL never saw appellant do or say anything to discourage
players from reporting anything about which they had concerns.
There was not an environment of fear where players were afraid
to raise concerns or problems. OL felt comfortable talking to
appellant if she had an issue or concern. She and other players
completed a three-hour course on Title IX. OL did not fear losing
playing time if she reported an incident and was unaware of
other players being afraid.
Two to three weeks after the trip to New York in summer
2019, OL saw MC argue with AZ. Castro had told the team about
an investigation but did not say what it was about. On the day of
the altercation, the team started in the weight room and then
walked to the field. Castro was not present. AZ and MC raised
their voices to each other, and the players stood in between them
to prevent any further altercation. AZ then grabbed her stuff and

12
left. OL learned from other players that MC was blaming AZ for
the team losing an assistant coach but did not understand why
MC was blaming AZ.
Before the argument, appellant left the weight room and
drove around to go to the other side of the field and park. The
team waited by the back gate for appellant to unlock it.
Appellant was walking to the gate on the other side and did not
witness the fight. OL knew appellant did not see the fight
because she was looking around for coaches as she did not want
her teammates to get in trouble for fighting. OL was certain
appellant arrived after AZ had left.
After the argument, during practice, appellant told MC to
see Castro. MC returned to practice and apologized to the team.
OL later learned that AZ made the report. Neither OL, nor any
other players OL was aware of, were mad at AZ. MC is usually
loud and an instigator.
J. Appellant
Appellant had been the head coach of the women’s soccer
team since 2006. He also taught classes in health, sports
psychology, sports management, soccer, soccer and fitness
technique, and weight training, beginning and advanced.
Appellant told players he had an open-door policy, and they
could also talk to other coaches, Castro, human resources, the
Title IX office, or with whomever they felt comfortable.
When assistant coach Escorsia tried to blackmail him by
threatening to make misconduct allegations, appellant promptly
reported it to Title IX coordinator Raphael. The ensuing
investigation ended by June 20, 2019, before the team’s 2019
summer session. Thus, contrary to AZ’s testimony, appellant did
not tell anyone in summer 2019 not to talk to investigators.

13
Appellant testified he did not have a confrontation with CR
about reporting to dean Smith in 2013. Neither Dean Smith, CR,
nor anyone else, ever told appellant about any such report.
Based on the school game statistics, CR played and started
in most games. Appellant gave an honest assessment of CR to
the Lafayette coach: CR was talented, could be lazy at times and
uncoachable, and had an attitude, but appellant thought she
would do a good job at the next level. Appellant recommended
CR to be a coach at Bishop Amat High School in 2014, both
because she had won a championship there and he wanted to
motivate her as a player with a coach’s perspective on player
expectations. Appellant also mentored CR as a coach.
On October 10, 2019, at 7:00 a.m., in the weight room,
Castro told the team she was conducting an investigation of
allegations of misconduct. Appellant was not present during the
meeting because Castro told him she wanted to meet alone with
the players. Appellant waited outside the weight room. The
meeting lasted five to 10 minutes, then the players started
walking towards the field.
Appellant waited until all the players were out of the
weight room and made sure the door was closed. He walked to
his car to drive to the gate that the coaches usually use. He then
unlocked the gate, unlocked and opened the bin containing the
practice equipment needed for that day, and carried it 20 yards to
the bench. Then he walked to open the gate for the student
athletes on the other side of the field.
When appellant was about 50 yards away from the players’
gate, he heard what sounded like horseplay. As he got closer, it
went silent within 10 seconds. That was unusual, but at the time
he did not question anyone about it. Later, during practice,

14
Castro texted him that she wanted to see MC. He asked MC
what was going on, and MC said she did not know. Appellant
told MC to see Castro.
At the end of practice, MC asked to speak to the team.
Appellant agreed, and MC apologized for yelling at AZ.
Appellant inquired as to the reason, but MC said she did not
want to talk about it. Appellant then visited Castro who said MC
yelled at AZ because MC believed AZ caused the investigation.
Appellant asked Castro if he should reach out to AZ, but Castro
said she would handle the follow up. Appellant had no further
contact with AZ. Later, Castro suspended AZ for playing in an
outside league, which was not permitted. Appellant was not
involved in that decision.
Though appellant claimed to have never received reports of
players and coaches flirting, he said he would have reported it to
the Title IX coordinator and the dean if he had that information.
Appellant had never been disciplined for any misconduct or given
progressive discipline. If he returned to coaching the soccer
team, he would do a better job of communicating with students
and coaches and would have them sign a contract to reinforce
rules of reporting.
III. ALJ’s decision
The ALJ found the complaining witnesses (AZ, AJ, and
CR), were credible and convincing. AZ had no discernible motive
to fabricate her testimony. While AZ and AJ were on the team
together for a period of time in 2019, and knew each other, they
were not friends. The ALJ noted “[t]heir testimonies regarding
the environment at Cerritos Women’s College were consistent
and established that: (1) coaching staff would routinely flirt and
romantically pursue the players; (2) players believed that if they

15
did anything that made the coaches unhappy, they would lose
playing time which would, in turn, affect their ability to be
recruited to other schools; and (3) [appellant] discouraged players
from reporting any complaints to District administration.”
The ALJ did not find appellant’s testimony credible to the
extent he testified he did not treat CR differently after her report.
In particular, appellant described CR as “lazy” to a recruiting
coach. That assessment was inconsistent with appellant’s
decision to recommend CR as a coach for the team at Bishop
Amat, and appellant had not provided any explanation for this
inconsistency.
On August 22, 2022, the ALJ issued a written decision
sustaining the district’s decision to terminate appellant. The
ALJ concluded there was cause to dismiss appellant for immoral
or unprofessional conduct pursuant to section 87732, subdivision
(a) and evident unfitness for service pursuant to section 87732,
subdivision (d). The ALJ found the district failed to establish
cause to dismiss appellant on the grounds of dishonesty (§ 87732,
subd. (b)) or persistent refusal to obey the school laws or
reasonable regulations (§ 87732, subd. (f)).
IV. Petitions for writ of mandate
On October 19, 2022, appellant filed a writ of
administrative mandamus to vacate the ALJ’s decision. On
October 24, 2022, the district filed its own petition seeking to
overturn the ALJ’s exclusion of witness testimony and finding on
the claim for dishonesty. On November 8, the petitions were
deemed related.
The parties’ petitions were heard on November 14, 2024.
The court took the matter under submission.

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V. Trial court decision
The trial court issued an order on November 15, 2024,
adopting its written tentative decision denying both petitions as
its final decision.
The trial court concluded the ALJ properly excluded the
testimony and exhibits regarding the district’s witnesses AW,
MT, LS1, LS2, and CR (in part) under section 87680. The court
concluded neither equitable estoppel nor the delayed discovery
rule applied because the district was under actual notice of
sexual harassment and inquiry notice of all other complaints.
The exclusion of evidence left only AZ, AJ, and to some extent CR
as the district’s witnesses.
After considering the factors set forth in Morrison v. State
Board of Education (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214, 229, 235 (Morrison), the
trial court concluded the ALJ properly found appellant unfit for
service under section 87732, subdivision (d). Appellant permitted
a toxic environment where players were subjected to flirtatious
and abusive behavior and were afraid to report misconduct for
fear of retaliation. In upholding the ALJ’s decision on this count,
the court credited the testimony of AZ, AJ, and the admissible
testimony of CR. The court agreed appellant’s “conduct reveals a
fixed character trait of disregard for the well-being and safety of
student athletes under his supervision,” and appellant’s “pattern
of allowing inappropriate sexual behavior and discouraging
reporting meets [the definition of unfitness for service] in that it
harmed students and the community.”
The court noted appellant’s failure to take responsibility for
his actions further supported the finding that he is unfit for
service. Appellant not only denied any wrongdoing but deflected
responsibility to his players and coaching staff. The court agreed

17
with the district that this lack of accountability demonstrated
appellant is unable to adhere to the standards required of an
educator and coach. The court noted appellant’s conduct spanned
the four-year period prior to the filing of the notice, which was an
aggravating factor. The court concluded, “[h]is retaliation
towards those who reported abuse reflects an unfitness for
service that cannot be remedied through disciplinary warnings or
lesser measures.”
Although the trial court upheld appellant’s dismissal on the
ground of evident unfitness for service, the trial court held the
ALJ’s decision was not supported by the evidence as to its finding
of immoral conduct under section 87732, subdivision (a).
VI. Notice of appeal
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on February 5, 2025.

DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law and standard of review
This is an appeal from a judgment denying a writ of
administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section
1094.5 challenging a community college employee dismissal.
Pursuant to section 87682, the trial court was required to
“exercise its independent judgment on the evidence.”
When the trial court reviews an administrative decision
under the independent judgment standard, “we determine
whether the record provides substantial evidence supporting the
trial court’s factual findings.” (Breslin v. City and County of San
Francisco (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1077–1078). “Applying
the substantial evidence [standard] on appeal, we may not
reweigh the evidence, but consider that evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court, indulging in every reasonable
inference in favor of the trial court’s findings and resolving all

18
conflicts in its favor.” (Id. at p. 1078.) “The question on appeal is
whether the evidence reveals … support—contradicted or
uncontradicted—for the trial court’s conclusion that the weight of
the evidence supports the [ALJ’s] findings of fact.” (Ibid.)
II. Substantial evidence claims
Appellant makes two claims based on lack of substantial
evidence. First, he challenges the trial court’s finding that he is
unfit, claiming the trial court’s ruling was self-contradictory as
well as unsupported by the evidence. Next, he claims the trial
court erred in finding appellant exhibited a “pattern” of
disregarding the safety or well-being of his students. We discuss
each claim separately below and find the evidence supports the
trial court’s factual findings.
A. Section 87732, subdivision (d)
Section 87732 authorizes dismissal of a permanent college
employee for various reasons, including evident unfitness for
service. (§ 87732, subd. (d).) “‘[E]vident unfitness for service’ …
properly means ‘clearly not fit, not adapted to or unsuitable for
teaching, ordinarily by reason of temperamental defects or
inadequacies.’” (Woodland Joint Unified School Dist. v.
Commission on Professional Competence (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th
1429, 1444 (Woodland).)
The Supreme Court has indicated various factors may be
considered in determining whether a teacher is unfit for service.
(Morrison, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 229.) The factors are “the
likelihood that the conduct may have adversely affected students
or fellow teachers, the degree of such adversity anticipated, the
proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct, the type of
teaching certificate held by the party involved, the extenuating or
aggravating circumstances, if any, surrounding the conduct, the

19
praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the motives resulting in
the conduct, the likelihood of the recurrence of the questioned
conduct, and the extent to which disciplinary action may inflict
an adverse impact or chilling effect upon the constitutional rights
of the teacher involved or other teachers.” (Ibid.) These factors
are relevant to the extent they assist the educational institution
in determining “whether the teacher’s future classroom
performance and overall impact on his students are likely to
meet” the institution’s standards. (Ibid.) Only the relevant
Morrison factors need be addressed. (West Valley-Mission
Community College Dist. v. Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th
1766, 1777.)
The criteria set forth in Morrison must be considered to
determine, “as a threshold matter, whether the cited conduct
indicates unfitness for service.” (Woodland, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1445.)5 “If the Morrison criteria are satisfied, the next step
is to determine whether the ‘unfitness’ is ‘evident’; i.e., whether
the offensive conduct is caused by a defect in temperament.”
(Ibid.) In order to warrant an inference that a teacher is unfit to
teach, it is necessary to show “a relationship between [the
charged] conduct and the functioning of [the appellant] as a
teacher.” (Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Olicker (1972) 25
Cal.App.3d 1098, 1109.)

5 Contrary to appellant’s arguments, the trial court expressly
acknowledged consideration of the Morrison factors was
necessary in determining appellant was unfit for service. Bevli v.
Brisco (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 986, 992, is distinguishable, as in
that case “there [was] no indication whatsoever that the trial
court considered any criteria other than the remediability of the
plaintiff’s behavior.”

20
Here, the trial court determined appellant exhibited
unfitness for service in permitting a toxic environment, where
players were subjected to flirtatious and abusive behavior and
were afraid to report misconduct for fear of retaliation. The court
found appellant’s “conduct reveals a fixed character trait of
disregard for the well-being and safety of student athletes under
his supervision,” and appellant’s “pattern of allowing
inappropriate sexual behavior and discouraging reporting meets
[the definition of unfitness for service] in that it harmed students
and the community.”
B. Evidence of unfitness
Appellant first argues the trial court’s finding that he is
evidently unfit to teach was self-contradictory and not supported
by the evidence. Appellant highlights various sentences from the
trial court decision, claiming each statement was unsupported by
the evidence. As set forth below, we disagree.
1. Awareness of toxic environment
Appellant first argues there was no substantial evidence
appellant was aware of a toxic environment or sexual behavior
between players and coaches. He claims his awareness of any
misconduct by the coaches towards the players was speculative.
The testimony supports the trial court’s conclusion that
appellant was aware of a toxic environment that was harmful to
the students. The court specifically noted that “the ALJ’s
conclusion about a toxic atmosphere was clearly based on AZ’s
testimony….” In AZ’s testimony, AZ described a district
investigation based on a player who was alleged to be partying
and having sexual relationships with staff. Appellant ordered
that no one speak to any investigator, and pulled AZ and the
other team captain aside, saying, “There’s no proof. Do they have

21
photos? What do they want me to do, fire my own brother?” AZ’s
testimony was unequivocal that appellant had knowledge of the
alleged misconduct and made it clear appellant wanted to cover
up any misconduct, ordering AZ and her fellow captain to “shut it
down immediately” if they heard any discussion of the
investigation.
AZ herself reported inappropriate behavior by Whitfield
consisting of inappropriate texts and attempts to get AZ to drink
alcohol with him. The text messages from Whitfield reflected
that he was drinking alcohol and boundaries were being crossed.
Castro testified the result of the investigation was an agreement
among Whitfield, appellant, and Castro to “keep them in check”
and make sure Whitfield behaved appropriately going forward.
AZ’s testimony, along with Castro’s testimony, undermine
appellant’s claim he was unaware of a toxic environment or
inappropriate behavior towards players.
Appellant failed to take action when MC screamed at and
threatened AZ. AZ testified it was clear appellant knew what
was going on. Instead of ensuring the well-being of his athletes
following this altercation and AZ’s abrupt exit from practice,
appellant chose to ignore the situation.
As the trial court correctly noted, “AZ testified to two
instances of misconduct by [appellant], one in which [appellant]
affirmatively prevented players from speaking to an investigator
and one where he failed to take action in response to MC’s threat
to AZ for reporting.”
Finally, AZ described the team environment as “toxic,” with
coaches demeaning players, mocking their weight, and using
fitness as punishment. Because he was head coach, it is fair to
infer appellant was aware of this environment.

22
AJ also described an environment on a team trip in which
the coaches were intoxicated, and appellant was present.
Appellant’s presence during an incident in which coaches were
intoxicated around players, creates a reasonable inference that
appellant had knowledge of this inappropriate conduct.
Further, AJ described an incident during which appellant
was aware of a chat app that accused a player of sleeping with
one of the coaches. Appellant spoke with the players about this
incident, telling them they needed to “own up” to sending the app
or the police would be called, and there would be an
investigation. Appellant asked to see the players’ phones. He
told the team the allegations were false.6 In addition, AJ
reported coach Ramirez flirted with players during practice, and
appellant was around but seemingly thought nothing of it.
The evidence described above constitutes substantial
evidence appellant was aware of a toxic environment and
inappropriate flirtatious behavior involving players and coaches.
2. Purported misunderstanding of evidence
Appellant next accuses the trial court of misunderstanding
the evidence. In rejecting the dishonesty charge, the trial court
referred to specific incidents of sexual harassment testified to by
CR and AZ, and as to those incidents, found “the contention
[appellant] knew of sexual harassment and falsely denied it is
speculative.” The court was not addressing the incidents of

6 The trial court made an “inference that [appellant] made
this statement to discourage reporting.” Appellant disputes the
trial court’s summary of AJ’s testimony, claiming AJ never said
appellant said the claim was false. Appellant also disputes the
inference made. This argument is discussed further below in
part II.B.3.

23
inappropriate behavior described above in part II.B.1., regarding
which appellant’s knowledge is fully supported by the evidence.
Appellant has failed to show a contradiction or misunderstanding
of evidence resulting in the finding of unfitness.
Appellant next highlights a portion of the record
constituting a discussion between counsel and the court
regarding appellant’s knowledge of sexual allegations. Counsel
framed the evidence as showing “the only allegation is—that he
was aware of is the Escorsia allegation, which I’ll get to in a
minute, but he reported that himself and then the District found
it to be unfounded.” Counsel’s statement is not a correct
summary of the evidence, and while the court may have been
confused by counsel’s misstatement, the exchange between
counsel and the court does not undermine the court’s final,
comprehensive, and thoughtful opinion issued after review of all
the evidence before the court.
3. Testimony regarding chat app
Appellant next argues the trial court made a “false
inference” appellant was trying to suppress reporting when he
investigated the incident during which it was reported, on an
anonymous chat app, a player was sleeping with a coach.
Appellant argues AJ did not testify that appellant told the team
the allegation was false, although that is what student “AO”
said.7
The trial court’s inference that appellant’s statement to the
players that the allegation was false was made to discourage

7 Appellant identified “AO” as the player accused of having
sexual relations with coaches. Appellant does not provide a
citation to the record where AO said appellant told the team the
allegation was false.

24
reporting was not necessary to the court’s overall finding that
appellant exhibited a pattern of discouraging reporting.8 The
court found AZ testified to two instances in which appellant
affirmatively discouraged reporting, “one in which [appellant]
affirmatively prevented players from speaking to an investigator
and one where he failed to take action in response to MC’s threat
to AZ for reporting.” In addition, CR’s admitted testimony
showed he angrily berated her for reporting misconduct, in front
of the entire team. The court’s purported mistake in attributing
the disputed statement to AJ does not undermine the court’s
determination that appellant was unfit for teaching due to his
pattern of discouraging reporting.
4. Incident involving MC’s threat to AZ
Appellant argues the trial court’s ruling regarding the
altercation during which MC threatened AZ for reporting
misconduct was inherently contradictory. The trial court
interpreted the evidence as falling short of that required to form
the basis of a charge of immoral conduct, yet found it could be
used as the basis of the charge of unfitness to teach.
To properly address appellant’s argument, we review the
trial court’s findings.
As to immoral conduct, the trial court noted the ALJ
sustained the cause of immoral conduct based on a single
incident, “[Appellant] engaged in immoral conduct when he failed
to stop MC from threatening AZ after AZ reported the
inappropriate behavior of coaching staff to Director Castro.” The

8 We decline to find the trial court made an improper
inference from the evidence, but conclude the inference was not
material to the court’s overall finding that appellant was unfit for
service.

25
court agreed with appellant that “it has not been proven that
[appellant] heard the details of the confrontation between MC
and AZ—an particular, MC’s threat against AZ for reporting.”
However, the court noted “[t]his fact does not absolve
[appellant], … because he clearly heard something.” Appellant
“admitted that what sounded like horseplay … got silent within
ten seconds as he grew closer, which was unusual. Yet, he did
not question anyone about it at the time.”
The trial court noted appellant was “wrong” to argue
Raphael had “coached him to do nothing in this situation.”
Instead, Raphael provided him a variety of options, and appellant
had a “duty to take action.” Appellant should have at least
inquired as to what was occurring and informed Raphael.
The trial court noted, “In sum, [appellant] failed to handle
the matter appropriately. Was his failure immoral conduct?
[Appellant] is correct that the answer is no.”
However, the court later cited the incident between MC and
AZ as support for its finding of unfitness to teach. In discussing
the testimony in support of its finding of unfitness, the court
relied on the testimony of AZ. First, the court described in detail
AZ’s account of appellant’s reaction to the district investigation in
the summer of 2019. This included appellant’s direction that no
one speak to any investigator, that the team captains shut down
any discussion of the allegations, and his act of blaming the
players for the incident. The court also quoted AZ’s testimony
that the team environment was “toxic,” with “coaches demeaning
players, mocking their weight, and using fitness as punishment.”
In addition to this testimony, the court referenced its prior
discussion during which appellant “failed to take action when MC
screamed at and accused AZ of reporting to Castro and

26
threatened to beat her up.” The court noted, “It was clear
[appellant] knew what was going on.”
Although the court found it had not been proven that
appellant heard “the details of the confrontation between MC and
AZ, the court also found “it was clear [appellant] knew what was
going on.” These two factual findings do not create a
contradiction. Despite not necessarily hearing the details,
appellant knew there was some sort of rowdiness going on that
went silent as he grew closer, which was “unusual.” The trial
court found appellant knew something unusual was going on—
something that involved hostility among players. The court
found appellant “had a duty to take action,” should have
“inquired about what was happening,” and should have informed
Raphael as to what he learned.9
Appellant’s choice to ignore the incident between MC and
AZ was not the only thing that led the trial court to find he was
unfit for service. As set forth above, AZ provided other credible
testimony that appellant tried to shut down an investigation into
coach misconduct and permitted a toxic environment on the
team. The trial court also mentioned the testimony of AJ, who
testified appellant was present when the coaches were
intoxicated around players, ignored flirtation between coaches
and players, and was aware of accusations directed at a player of
sleeping with a coach. CR’s admissible testimony further

9 This is particularly true since two witnesses—AZ and OL—
reported AZ left practice immediately following the confrontation.
Because he was aware of the incident and must have been aware
of AZ’s sudden departure from practice, it seems particularly
egregious that appellant did not, at a minimum, inquire as to
what happened.

27
supported the accusations of unfitness for service, as appellant
angrily confronted CR in front of the team when she reported
misconduct to dean Smith, and subsequently retaliated against
her for making the report.
We reject appellant’s argument that the trial court ignored
compelling evidence contrary to the court’s findings. The
substantial evidence standard does not permit us to reweigh
evidence or redetermine the credibility of the witnesses. (Breslin
v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1077–1078.) Instead, we determine only “whether the
evidence reveals … support—contradicted or uncontradicted—for
the trial court’s conclusion.” (Ibid.) The evidence supports the
trial court’s conclusion that appellant’s failure to act upon
observing the incident between MC and AZ was one of several
factors showing a pattern of unfitness for service.
C. Pattern of disregarding the safety and well-
being of students
Appellant next challenges the trial court’s conclusion that
the evidence showed a pattern of (1) appellant allowing coaching
staff to routinely flirt and romantically pursue the players; (2)
players believing that if they did anything to make the coaches
unhappy, they would lose playing time; and (3) appellant
discouraging players from reporting complaints to district
administration. Again, appellant presents his interpretation of
the facts, arguing there was no evidence appellant allowed
flirtatious behavior when he was not aware of it; there was no
evidence of a pattern of disallowing reporting; and the trial court
“ignored” countervailing evidence that appellant did not
discourage reporting, cared for his athletes’ safety and well-being,
and would not likely repeat his perceived neglect of his students.

28
The trial court’s finding that appellant exhibited a pattern
of behavior that allowed sexual harassment of players and
disregarded the safety and well-being of his players is supported
by the admissible evidence. In concluding such a pattern existed,
the trial court relied heavily on the testimony of AZ, AJ, and the
admissible testimony of CR, which showed a “pattern of allowing
inappropriate sexual behavior and discouraging reporting.”
The trial court found appellant’s failure to take
responsibility for his actions further supported the finding of
unfitness for service, because appellant “not only denied any
wrongdoing but also deflected responsibility onto his players and
coaching staff.” The court found appellant’s misconduct spanned
the four-year period predating the district’s notice.
Appellant first argues there was a lack of substantial
evidence of a pattern of allowing sexual behavior when there was
no evidence appellant was aware of such behavior. On the
contrary, the evidence showed appellant was aware of at least
three investigations of inappropriate behavior on the part of
coaches towards players (CR’s report in summer of 2013, a report
in summer of 2019 regarding behavior in 2018, and AZ’s report in
September 2019)—two of which he actively tried to shut down—
and was also aware of flirting among coaches and players. One
investigation confirmed inappropriate texts between coaching
staff and a player and resulted in an agreement with appellant to
keep the coaches in check. Appellant was also aware of at least
one allegation that a player slept with a coach. This evidence is
sufficient to show a pattern of allowing inappropriate behavior
between coaches and players without taking action. At a
minimum, appellant was aware of flirtation, sexual innuendo,
and serious allegations of sexual activity.

29
The court was not required to accept appellant’s insistence
that he was unaware of inappropriate conduct given his role, the
admitted testimony of AZ, AJ, and CR, and the number of reports
made over the years. Appellant’s hostile attitude towards the
investigations further highlights his preference for ignoring such
conduct rather than taking steps to improve the situation.
Appellant next argues there is no evidence of a pattern of
appellant discouraging reporting, when there was only evidence
of “a mere two occasions” of such discouragement. First, these
two occasions were significant incidents of appellant actively
showing anger concerning reports of misconduct and were
sufficient for the players to understand that they could not report
misconduct without consequences. There was evidence
appellant’s two outbursts were not isolated incidents but
permeated the team environment. AJ testified she was accosted
by coach Whitfield while on a road trip with the team. Although
this made her uncomfortable, “she did not report it because she
had heard nothing would happen and she would be retaliated
against, such as loss of playing time.” It was fair to infer
appellant’s attitude of anger towards any reports of misconduct
was known among the players. The trial court did not err in
putting this testimony together to find a pattern by appellant of
discouraging reporting.10
We decline to address appellant’s arguments that the trial
court ignored contrary evidence. As set forth above, we do not
reweigh evidence or redetermine the credibility of the

10 Further, appellant’s act of passively allowing MC to accost
AZ after reporting, and failing to intervene or determine the
source of the conflict, could be interpreted as acquiescing in MC’s
retaliation.

30
witnesses.11 (Breslin v. City and County of San Francisco, supra,
146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1077–1078.) Evidence in the record
supports the trial court’s finding of a pattern of behavior that
disregarded the safety and well-being of students, and the trial
court was entitled to reject the contrary evidence below.12
III. Use of time-barred evidence
A. Applicable law
Section 87680 prohibits the introduction of testimony or
evidence at a dismissal hearing “relating to matters which
occurred more than four years prior to the date of the filing of the
notice.” However, in Atwater, supra, 41 Cal.4th 277, 232233, the
Supreme Court interpreted a similar provision found in section
44944 and concluded the time limitation is not an absolute shield,

11 Throughout his brief, appellant objects that the trial court
ignored the absence of evidence that his supervision of his
regular classes outside of coaching soccer showed any disregard
for his students’ safety or well-being. Appellant points out that
there is no concern when he is the only instructor managing or
interacting with his students. Appellant argues this absence of
evidence underscores his fitness to teach and unlikelihood of
repeating any behavior in the future. We do not reweigh the
evidence and decline to give this absence of evidence any greater
weight than the trial court did. (Breslin v. City and County of
San Francisco, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1077–1078.)
12 Appellant also faults the trial court for citing only the
district’s opposition in concluding appellant failed to take
responsibility for his actions and denied wrongdoing. We note
the court was pointing out a lack of evidence in the record, as
appellant never took responsibility for his actions or admitted
wrongdoing. Under the circumstances, the trial court could reach
the same conclusion as the district without citing specific
testimony in the record.

31
particularly where the injured party “‘“has been induced to
refrain from using such means or taking such action as lay in his
power”’” to address the wrongdoing. The Atwater court reasoned
that equitable estoppel is “‘wholly independent’” of the limitations
period and applies where a defendant’s conduct induces delay.
(Id. at p. 232.) Under the high court’s analysis, “if the district
were able to meet the requirements of equitable estoppel, it could
have been allowed to introduce evidence of, and base its dismissal
proceedings on, incidents falling outside the four-year window.”
(Id. at p. 233.)
B. The trial court did not improperly rely on
evidence barred by section 87680
Appellant argues the trial court committed error by
factoring in evidence that was time-barred in concluding
appellant was unfit for service. Specifically, appellant argues the
trial court should not have considered any of CR’s evidence, since
she testified she did not observe any further misconduct after her
report to Dean Smith. Nevertheless, appellant argues, CR’s
testimony factored directly into the trial court’s determination
that appellant engaged in a pattern of disregarding his players’
safety and well-being. Appellant cites several cases in support of
his position that the trial court abused its discretion because it
based its decision on impermissible factors or an incorrect legal
standard. (Citing People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156;
People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 912.)
The trial court excluded CR’s testimony regarding
misconduct occurring prior to CR’s report to dean Smith in
December 2013. The trial court rejected the district’s arguments

32
that such evidence was admissible under equitable estoppel or
the delayed discovery rule.13
However, the trial court found the ALJ properly admitted
and relied on some of CR’s testimony because appellant was
“estopped from asserting the four-year limit on evidence of
misconduct observed by CR after her report to dean Smith.”
Appellant is incorrect that no misconduct occurred after CR’s
report to dean Smith. On the contrary, CR provided testimony
there were severe repercussions for her decision to report the
misconduct. “This included the fact that the demeanor of all
coaches towards her changed, and they stopped communicating
with her. [Appellant] cut her playing time in half and did not
fulfill his promise to assist her in transferring to a four-year
university. CR transferred to a university in Louisiana to play
soccer after the coach received a reference from [appellant] that
was ‘not positive.’”14
The negative consequences of CR’s report to Dean Smith
constituted improper retaliation. CR was prevented from
reporting such retaliation, as she suffered severe consequences
from her prior report of misconduct.15 Thus, we find no error in

13 The court also excluded damaging evidence sought to be
introduced by the district from MT, AW, LS1, and LS2.
14 We decline to address appellant’s argument the trial court
ignored or misconstrued substantial testimony that contradicted
AZ’s testimony regarding the repercussions she suffered. We do
not reevaluate testimony or undermine the trial court’s
credibility determinations. (Breslin v. City and County of San
Francisco, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1077–1078).
15 CR also reported she continued to witness coaches flirting
with players after her report to dean Smith but felt such behavior
was deliberately being hidden from her. She was also prevented

33
the trial court’s determination that CR’s testimony regarding the
consequences of her report to Dean Smith were admissible under
Atwater.
Further, as the trial court noted, CR was not the only
player to observe appellant’s negative reaction to any reports of
misconduct. AZ reported appellant ordered the team: “Nobody
from here on out is to speak to any investigator.” If she and her
fellow captain heard any players talking about an investigation,
they were to “shut it down immediately.” Appellant blamed the
players involved for the misconduct at issue in the investigation.
When AZ was later harassed by a drunk assistant coach, she felt
she could not report the inappropriate behavior because of
appellant’s earlier response to an investigation.
When AZ was verbally attacked and threatened by MC,
appellant did nothing to stop MC or intervene in any way.
AJ also reported being accosted by an assistant coach and
declining to report the conduct because she knew she would
experience retaliation against.
Thus, although CR’s testimony fell outside the four-year
window, there was sufficient recent evidence that appellant
discouraged reporting and failed to protect players from
retaliation during the relevant four-year period. Under the
circumstances, appellant has failed to show he was prejudiced by
the partial admission of CR’s testimony. The testimony of AZ
and AJ was sufficient to permit a finding that appellant
improperly discouraged reporting and failed to protect players
from misconduct. Reversal is not permitted absent a miscarriage

from reporting this misconduct due to appellant’s reaction to her
prior report.

34
of justice (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475), and
appellant has failed to show the outcome would have been
different absent CR’s admitted testimony.
IV. Back pay
Appellant argues regardless of whether he is dismissed, he
is entitled to back pay because he was improperly placed on
unpaid leave due to the charge of immoral conduct, which was
reversed by the trial court.
A. Relevant law and background
Section 87735 permits immediate suspension of an
employee without pay for charges of immoral conduct, conviction
of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, incompetency due
to mental disability, or willful refusal to perform regular
assignments. “Unfitness for service is not a basis that supports a
compulsory leave without pay.” (West Valley-Mission College v.
Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1780.)
In Von Durjais v. Board of Trustees (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d
681, the court interpreted a similar provision to require back pay
for the period of suspension when the charge warranting
suspension without pay is found to be unsupported by the
evidence—even if the employee is dismissed on other grounds.
The Von Durjais court explained, “‘if an employee is suspended
[on a charge permitting suspension without pay], then, upon
being cleared of such charge, the employee shall be paid full
salary for the period of the suspension. The fact that the
employee may be dismissed for charges other than [the charge
warranting suspension without pay] … is immaterial ….’” (Id. at
p. 686.) The Von Durjais court followed this interpretation
because “[a] contrary conclusion could conceivably result in a
subversion of the statutory scheme through the simple expedient

35
of superficially joining a charge authorizing suspension without
pay with a substantive dismissal charge for which neither
suspension nor compulsory leave is authorized.” (Ibid.)
In this case, the charge of immoral conduct authorized the
district to immediately suspend appellant’s employment without
pay. (§ 87735.) The ALJ upheld appellant’s dismissal on the
charge of immoral conduct, among other things. However, the
trial court reversed the ALJ’s finding of immoral conduct,
determining appellant’s dismissal was authorized only on the
basis of unfitness for service. Because the charge of unfitness for
service did not authorize appellant’s suspension without pay,
appellant argues under Von Durjais, he is entitled to back pay for
the period of his suspension.
B. Forfeiture
In his opening brief, appellant does not provide a citation to
the record showing he raised this issue before the trial court. The
district contends the issue is forfeited.
Appellant disagrees. In his first amended petition for writ
of mandate appellant alleged the district committed a prejudicial
abuse of discretion by, among other things, “putting [appellant]
on unpaid suspension without proper cause,” and “terminating
[appellant’s] employment without cause.” In addition, in his
petition, appellant sought “relief in the form of back pay and
reimbursement of the value of lost benefits,” and expressly
requested restoration of “all backpay and benefits that he would
have received” until the date of his reinstatement.16 ~(CT 2420

16 Appellant filed a motion to augment the record with the
first amended petition for writ of mandate one day after he filed
his reply brief on appeal. Thus, the district has not had the

36
[see augmentation granted 5/19/26]) ~ Appellant argues based on
these statements in his petition, the issue was plainly presented
to the trial court.
While appellant alleged generally in his petition that he
was owed back pay, he did not address the specific issue of
whether back pay should be granted under the circumstances of
this case. Here, appellant was suspended without pay in
January 2021 due to the charge of immoral conduct. In
August 2022, the ALJ upheld appellant’s dismissal based on
immoral conduct. In November 2024, the trial court reversed the
ALJ on the immoral conduct charge yet upheld appellant’s
dismissal on an alternate charge.
Appellant did not object to the trial court’s written decision
on the ground that it did not provide for back pay during his
period of unpaid suspension. He was required to do so in order to
preserve this issue for appeal.17 (People v. Braxton (2004) 34
Cal.4th 798, 813 [“‘“[W]here the court, through inadvertence or
neglect, neither rules nor reserves its ruling … the [objecting
party] must make some effort to have the court actually rule. If
the point is not pressed and is forgotten, [the party] may be
deemed to have waived or abandoned it.”’”].)

opportunity to address appellant’s claim that this issue was not
forfeited due to these statements in his petition.
17 We note the trial court ordered the district to prepare a
proposed judgment and wait 10 days after service for any
objections before submitting. Neither party has informed this
court of any objections made to the judgment. (People v. Ashford
University, LLC (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 485, 525 [party claiming
omissions or ambiguities in a written decision must bring such
omissions or ambiguities to the court’s attention].)

37
Generally, we will not consider an argument raised for the
first time on appeal. (Dowling v. Farmers Ins. Exch. (2012) 208
Cal.App.4th 685, 696.) “Although we have discretion to consider
for the first time on appeal an issue of law based on undisputed
facts, we will not consider a new issue where the failure to raise
the issue in the trial court deprived an opposing party of an
opportunity to present relevant evidence that, if considered by
the trial court, might have affected its ruling.” (Ibid.) Here,
appellant’s failure to press this issue below deprived the district
of the opportunity to make both legal and factual arguments
concerning appellant’s present request for back pay. Appellant is
thus precluded from obtaining appellate review of this issue, and
we decline to consider it.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The respondent is awarded its
costs of appeal.

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

We concur:

RICHARDSON, J.

GOORVITCH, J.

38

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