Filed 10/30/26 In re Brianna S. CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re BRIANNA S. et al., B354859
Persons Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 19LJJP00518)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
TRENT S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Debra L. Gonzales, Judge Pro Tempore. Vacated in part,
affirmed in part, and remanded with directions.
Pamela Deavours, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
The juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over
Brianna S. and Abigail S., who at that time were 13 and eight
years old, respectively, based on K.N.’s (mother’s) history of
mental and emotional problems and her inability to care for the
children. The court removed the children from mother and Trent
S. (father) and ordered the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS or the agency) to provide
reunification services to the family. At a review hearing held
approximately six months later pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 366.21, subdivision (e), the court (1)
found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the agency provided
reasonable reunification services and (2) decided not to return the
children to father’s custody based on the court’s finding that
doing so would present a substantial risk of detriment to the
girls’ emotional well-being. Father appeals from the orders
issued at the review hearing.2
We vacate the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding
because the record does not show the agency undertook
reasonable efforts to: (1) ensure father received nine hours of
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 Mother is not a party to this appeal.
2
weekly monitored visitation, (2) facilitate Abigail S.’s regular
attendance at individual therapy sessions, and (3) notify father of
Abigail’s psychiatric appointments. On the other hand,
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
returning the two girls to father’s custody at the review hearing
would expose them to a substantial risk of emotional harm.
Accordingly, we affirm the remainder of the court’s orders from
the review hearing.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition
of this appeal. We describe additional facts relevant to our
analysis in our Discussion, parts A–C, post.
Mother and father have two daughters together: Abigail S.
(born in November 2016) and Brianna S. (born in June 2012). In
September 2022, a juvenile court in a prior dependency case
declared Abigail and Brianna dependents in part because the
court found that father endangered both children by: (1) allowing
Abigail to fondle his penis over his clothing, and (2) violating a
prior order barring him from sharing a bed with either of the
girls. Dependency jurisdiction was later terminated with an
order that awarded mother sole legal and physical custody of the
two children and granted father monitored visitation. Although
3 In describing the procedural history and evidence
relevant to this appeal, we rely in part on admissions made by
the parties in their appellate briefing and assertions made by
DCFS that father does not dispute in his reply. (See Association
for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 764, 772, fn. 2, 773–774 (Association for
Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs) [employing this approach].)
3
father appealed from the orders declaring the children
dependents and awarding custody to mother, both appeals were
dismissed after his appellate counsel filed a no-issue brief.
On June 18, 2025, DCFS initiated the instant case by filing
a dependency petition as to Abigail S. and Brianna S. As
sustained by the juvenile court on August 13, 2025, the petition
alleged mother was unable to provide the children with ongoing
care and supervision and had a history of mental and emotional
problems. The court found that father was not an offending
parent.
At the disposition hearing held on August 26, 2025, the
juvenile court declared Abigail S. and Brianna S. dependents,
removed them from parental custody, and ordered DCFS to
provide family reunification services. Among other things, the
court ordered father to attend individual counseling, obligated
DCFS to provide age-appropriate counseling to Abigail and
Brianna, required father to attend conjoint counseling with the
children if and when recommended by a therapist, and
authorized father to have nine hours per week of monitored
visitation, although DCFS had discretion to liberalize father’s
visits.
On March 19, 2026, the juvenile court held the six-month
review hearing pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (e). The
court found that “father [was] not yet in substantial compliance”
with his case plan and that “it would be detrimental to the
children to be returned to the parents.” The court also found, by
clear and convincing evidence, that DCFS provided reasonable
services to return the children to a safe home. The court ordered
the agency to continue to provide reunification services to the
parents because it found “there is a substantial probability that
4
the children may be returned to either . . . mother or . . . father
within the next six months.”
Father timely appealed from the rulings made at the
six-month review hearing.
At a section 366.21, subdivision (f) review hearing held on
October 27, 2026, the juvenile court found the parents were in
partial compliance with their case plans, determined DCFS
provided reasonable services to the family, ruled that returning
the children to their parents’ custody would create a substantial
risk of detriment to them, scheduled a section 366.22 review
hearing for December 15, 2026, and ordered the agency to
continue to provide reunification services to the family.4
APPLICABLE LAW
Section 366.21, subdivision (e)(1) provides in pertinent
part: “At the review hearing held 6 months after the initial
dispositional hearing, . . . after considering the admissible and
relevant evidence, the court shall order the return of the child to
the physical custody of their parent . . . unless the court finds, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to
their parent . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to
the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the
child. The social worker shall have the burden of establishing
that detriment. . . . In making its determination, the court
shall . . . consider the efforts or progress, or both, demonstrated
by the parent . . . and the extent to which they availed
themselves of services provided . . . .” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).)
4 We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of the minute orders
from the October 27, 2026 hearing. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d),
459.)
5
“If the child is not returned to their parent . . . , the court
shall determine by clear and convincing evidence whether
reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent . . . in
overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the
continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to
the parent . . . . The court shall order that those services be
initiated, continued, or terminated.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(8).)
DISCUSSION
A. Father Fails To Demonstrate the Juvenile Court’s
Finding of Detriment Is Not Supported by
Substantial Evidence
We review for substantial evidence the juvenile court’s
determination that “the dependent children will suffer detriment
if returned to the physical custody of the parent.” (See Angela S.
v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 763.) This appellate
standard imposes an “ ‘enormous burden’ ” on father. (See
Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581–582
(Schmidt).) “When reviewing for substantial evidence, ‘ “ ‘we
draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the
findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record
in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we
note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.’ [Citation.] ‘We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.
[Citations.] . . . [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(In re A.P. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1142 (A.P.).) “[W]e [also]
completely disregard” evidence that is “contrary” to the detriment
finding. (See Schmidt, supra, at p. 581.)
6
At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court
remarked, “I am pleased that there is a good amount of visitation
and that the minors are becoming more willing to increase the
visitation with . . . father, but I do believe that there is continuing
risk to the emotional well-being of the minors.” The court found
that “the emotional harm that would be inflicted upon the minors
should the court [order their return] when the minors are not
ready” counseled against “return[ing] the children to . . . father at
th[at] time.” Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding
that returning Abigail S. and Brianna S. to their father at the
six-month review hearing would have created a substantial risk
of detriment to their emotional well-being.
First, in September 2022, the juvenile court in the prior
case declared Abigail S. and Brianna S. dependents based in part
on its findings that father allowed Abigail to fondle father’s penis
over his clothing and father violated an order barring him from
sharing a bed with either of his daughters. (See Procedural
Background, ante.) Although that prior ruling was issued several
years before the six-month review hearing, they nonetheless
support the instant juvenile court’s finding that returning the
children to father would have created a substantial risk of
emotional harm to them.
Second, in a last minute information report filed on
March 17, 2026, DCFS informed the juvenile court, “[B]oth
Abigail and Brianna stated that they do not wish to reside with
their father. The children reported that their father has used a
belt as a form of discipline and has threatened to do so when they
are misbehaving. They indicated that these experiences have
negatively impacted them, with Brianna reporting feelings of
paranoia and Abigail reporting increased anxiety. Abigail
7
further shared that her father has discouraged her from taking
her prescribed medication, despite her report that the
medi[cation] is helpful in managing her anxiety and sleep.” From
this evidence, the juvenile court reasonably could have inferred
there existed a substantial risk that returning the children to
father would cause them to experience a great deal of fear and
anxiety.5
Third, although the juvenile court ordered father to
participate in individual counseling at the disposition hearing
(see Procedural Background, ante), the agency stated in the last
minute information report filed on March 16, 2026 that DCFS
“ha[d] not yet received the progress letter from . . . father
confirming his participation in individual therapy services.” At
the six-month review hearing held three days later, the court
found that father needed to release information concerning his
individual therapy sessions to the agency to enable the children’s
therapist to “properly assess when conjoint counseling can safely
begin.” Father does not contest the court’s finding that his
failure to release this information prevented the children’s
therapist from assessing his suitability for conjoint counseling
with his daughters. Because father could not yet participate in
conjoint therapy with his daughters, substantial evidence
supported the court’s finding that father had not yet mitigated
the risk of emotional harm he presented to them.
5 The juvenile court reasonably could have found the risk
of emotional harm to Abigail S. was particularly acute because
the jurisdiction and disposition report filed on July 29, 2025
indicates Abigail had been placed on an “Involuntary Mental
Health hold” at a behavioral center from June 25 to July 8, 2025.
8
Father raises several factual challenges to the juvenile
court’s detriment finding. Among other things, father argues
DCFS stated in its status review report filed on February 5, 2026
that the children should be reunified with father; the agency
noted in the last minute information report filed on
March 17, 2026 that “no concerns ha[d] been reported” at the
children’s unmonitored visits with father that occurred in the
presence of the girls’ adult brother; DCFS gave father “credit for
completing the bulk of his case plan three months into the
reunification period”; father “participate[d] in as much visitation
as he could get with his children”; no “expert qualified by the
court . . . provided evidence . . . that the children would
experience emotional harm if they were returned to their father”;
and “[f]ather had unmonitored visitation with the children for
almost a year before [the initiation of the instant dependency
proceedings] and had been permitted to go to school events
without a monitor by the family court . . . .” Because we have
already found substantial evidence supports the court’s finding of
detriment, father’s arguments to the contrary fall short under the
deferential appellate standard that governs our review of that
finding.6
6 (See A.P., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1142 [noting an
appellate court does not “ ‘ “ ‘reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment’ ” ’ ” under the substantial evidence
standard]; Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th p. 582 [“[T]he
appellate court’s power begins and ends with a determination of
whether there is any substantial evidence — contradicted or
uncontradicted — to support the trial court findings.”].)
9
B. Assuming Arguendo Our Affirmance of the
Detriment Finding Moots Father’s Challenge to the
Reasonable Services Finding, We Nonetheless
Exercise Our Discretion To Address the Latter Issue
“A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.” ’ [Citation.] A case becomes
moot when events ‘ “render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it
should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any
effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two
requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of
an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.”
(In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) “Even when a case is
moot, courts may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the
merits of the dispute. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 282.)
In the portion of father’s opening brief in which he
challenges the juvenile court’s finding that DCFS provided
reasonable reunification services, he raises several issues, many
of which have no apparent bearing on the adequacy of the
services provided by the agency.7 Nevertheless, it is apparent
7 For instance, father complains the juvenile court “took
away his ability to have unmonitored contact with the children at
school” at the detention hearing. Another example is father’s
assertion that one of the children’s foster parents opined at one
point that she did not think the children would want visits with
father if he had indeed molested them, meaning the foster parent
10
from father’s briefing that he is claiming the agency’s
reunification services were deficient in the following respects:
(1) DCFS did not provide father with at least nine hours of
monitored visitation with the children each week; (2) the agency
did not ensure that Abigail S. consistently attended individual
counseling, thereby potentially delaying her participation in
court-ordered conjoint counseling with Brianna S. and father; and
(3) DCFS did not notify father of Abigail’s psychiatric
appointments.8
As we noted in our Applicable Law, ante, section 366.21,
subdivision (e)(1) provides that the juvenile court shall order the
return of a child to his or her parent at a six-month review
hearing “unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the return of the child . . . would create a
substantial risk of detriment to . . . the child.” (See § 366.21,
subd. (e)(1).) Accordingly, our rejection of father’s challenge to
apparently did not believe that father had sexually abused
Abigail S.
8 Additionally, father argues, “[B]ack on August 13, 2025,
the court authorized father to be advised of all educational and
medical appointments for Abigail so that he could attend, and
this just never happened.” (Italics added.) In the portion of the
opening brief in which he analyzes the juvenile court’s reasonable
services finding, however, father does not identify any instances
during the reunification period in which he was not informed of
one of Abigail’s educational appointments. Accordingly, we
do not address that issue further. (See County of Los Angeles v.
Niblett (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 454, 466 [“ ‘ “[W]e may disregard
conclusory arguments that . . . fail to disclose the reasoning by
which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to
adopt.” ’ ”].)
11
the juvenile court’s detriment finding leaves undisturbed the
court’s decision not to return Abigail S. and Brianna S. to father.
Furthermore, at the six-month review hearing and at the
subsequent review hearing held on October 27, 2026, the court
ordered the agency to continue providing reunification services to
the parents despite its finding DCFS had already provided
reasonable services. (See Procedural Background, ante.) Given
that the court did not err in declining to return the children to
father’s custody at the six-month review hearing, the court’s
orders requiring DCFS to continue the agency’s efforts at
reunification, and the possibility the agency’s alleged failure to
provide reasonable services during the six-month review period
may have no impact on whether DCFS offers adequate services to
father during subsequent review periods, father’s contest to the
reasonable services finding at the six-month review hearing is
arguably moot.9
Assuming arguendo father’s objections to the reasonable
services finding are moot, we exercise our inherent discretion to
reach the merits in “an abundance of caution” “to avoid any
possible collateral prejudice” to him. (See In re C.C. (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1483, 1488–1489.) This is because the
9 We do note, however, that father could colorably argue
that his challenge to the reasonable services finding is not
rendered moot by our affirmance of the detriment finding because
“any request [he] makes for more services at [a subsequent
review hearing] could be hindered by the appealed [reasonable
services] finding.” (See In re A.O. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1048,
1061, fn. 7.) We need not resolve whether father’s challenge to
the reasonable services finding is moot because, as explained
later in this section, we would exercise our discretion to reach the
merits even if that appellate claim were moot.
12
juvenile court’s finding the agency discharged its obligation to
provide the family with reasonable services may impact future
dependency or family law proceedings. For instance, if we agree
with father that DCFS failed to demonstrate it had undertaken
reasonable efforts to provide him with nine hours of monitored
visitation each week during the review period, the agency may
thereafter continue to fail to address adequately that visitation
issue, thereby potentially imperiling father’s prospects of
reunifying with his daughters. To avert any such prejudice to
father, we turn to his claim the court erred in finding the agency
provided reasonable reunification services.
C. The Juvenile Court Erred In Finding DCFS Provided
Reasonable Reunification Services
To reiterate, section 366.21, subdivision (e)(8) provides, “If
the child is not returned to their parent” at the six-month review
hearing, “the court shall determine by clear and convincing
evidence whether reasonable services that were designed to aid
the parent . . . in overcoming the problems that led to the initial
removal and continued custody of the child have been provided or
offered to the parent . . . .” (See § 366.21, subd. (e)(8).) “[T]he
Courts of Appeal have generally held that, to support a finding
that services were reasonable, ‘the record should show that the
supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of
custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems,
maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the
course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist
the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . .’
[Citation.]” (See Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th
609, 625, fn. 6 (Michael G.).)
13
“ ‘[W]hen reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by
clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate
court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that the fact was true. Consistent with well-
established principles governing review for sufficiency of the
evidence, in making this assessment the appellate court must
view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have
evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the
evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.’
[Citation.]” (In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 155 (V.L.).) In
assessing whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s reasonable services finding, we bear in mind that
although father bears the burden of showing the juvenile court
erred in rendering that finding, DCFS, as the respondent, has a
corresponding duty to aid us in sustaining that finding, and we
are not “obligate[d] . . . to scour the record” to search for evidence
supporting it. (See Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs,
supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 777, 787, fn. 19, 802; see also id. at
p. 787, fn. 19 [“ ‘ “ ‘Although it is the appellant’s task to show
error, there is a corresponding obligation on the part of the
respondent to aid the appellate court in sustaining the judgment.
“[I]t is as much the duty of the respondent to assist the
[appellate] court upon the appeal as it is to properly present a
case in the first instance, in the court below.” ’ ” ’ ”].)
As we mentioned in our Discussion, part B, ante, father
maintains the juvenile court erred in finding DCFS provided
reasonable reunification services because the agency did not
ensure that: (1) father had nine hours of monitored visitation on
14
a weekly basis, (2) Abigail S. consistently attended individual
counseling, and (3) father was notified of Abigail’s psychiatric
appointments. As explained below, we agree with father that
substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding, by clear
and convincing evidence, that DCFS undertook reasonable efforts
vis-à-vis father’s visitation, Abigail’s individual counseling, and
notification to father of Abigail’s psychiatric appointments.
First, DCFS stated the following in both its last minute
information report filed on November 12, 2025 and its status
review report filed on February 5, 2026: “Father continues to
have monitored visitation with the children on Mondays and
Thursdays from 5-8pm. Per the caregiver, family time is going
well. Father continues to be consistent and wanting more time
with his children. Father and caregiver have been able to work
together to ensure father maintains contact with his children.
Father also has monitored phone calls and video calls with the
girls. At this time, the girls wish to continue having monitored
family time with their father.” The November 2025 last minute
information report further stated: “[The social worker] will
continue working with . . . father on increasing his family time
with the children.”
Given that these passages from the November 2025 last
minute information and February 2026 status review reports
do not indicate that father had at least three hours of video and
telephone calls with his daughters each week during the review
period, these reports do not constitute substantial evidence
establishing a high degree of probability that father was
receiving all nine hours of weekly monitored visitation to which
he was entitled. (See Procedural Background, ante [describing
the visitation order from the disposition hearing].) On appeal,
15
DCFS does not direct us to any evidence detailing the measures
the agency employed between the August 26, 2025 disposition
hearing and the March 19, 2026 six-month review hearing to
provide father with nine hours of visitation each week. Instead,
the agency simply cites the November 2025 last minute
information report for the proposition that “the agency was
working with father to increase his time.” Although the juvenile
court was entitled to credit DCFS’s November 2025
representation that its personnel were “working with . . . father
on increasing his family time with the children,” we do not
believe this vague assurance was a sufficient basis for the court
to have found it highly probable that DCFS undertook reasonable
efforts to comply with the visitation order.
Next, at a hearing held on February 24, 2026, the children’s
counsel told the juvenile court the following: “I would ask for
[DCFS] to just assess [the possibility of conjoint counseling] with
the minors’ therapists. I do note that Brianna has weekly
therapy, but I believe Abigail, after being referred to outpatient
[therapy], has not had consistent therapy appointments. So
perhaps that’s not a possibility for her. But I would still ask for
[DCFS] to make efforts to contact both of their therapists.”
(Italics added.)
On appeal, DCFS acknowledges — but does not dispute —
the children’s attorney’s representation that Abigail S. was not
consistently attending individual therapy sessions. The agency
asserts that “the record does not reflect how inconsistent the
child’s appointments were, the cause of any inconsistency, or that
any problem with her attendance was known to the agency,
within its control, or reflected . . . a lack of services.” Assuming
for the sake of argument DCFS is correct that the record does not
16
shed further light on the extent of the inconsistency of Abigail’s
individual counseling sessions and whether DCFS was aware of
that issue, Abigail’s counsel’s uncontroverted representation from
the February 24, 2026 hearing still undermines the juvenile
court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the agency
had in fact made reasonable efforts to facilitate Abigail’s
participation in individual counseling during the review period.
Importantly, DCFS does not cite any part of the record to
show what efforts, if any, the agency made to facilitate
Abigail S.’s regular attendance at individual counseling sessions.
Whereas the status review report filed on February 5, 2026 states
under the heading “Mental & Emotional Status” that Brianna S.
was receiving “weekly individual therapy,” the “Mental &
Emotional Status” section of the report for Abigail does not
specify the frequency of her therapy sessions. (Boldface omitted
from first & third quotations.) On this record, the juvenile court
could not reasonably infer to a high degree of probability the
agency made reasonable efforts to adhere to the court’s order that
Abigail participate in counseling. (See Procedural Background,
ante [noting that age-appropriate counseling was part of Abigail’s
case plan].) We also conclude, based on the children’s counsel’s
undisputed representation at the February 24, 2026 hearing, that
the agency’s failure to ensure Abigail received individual
counseling on a regular basis may have prevented her from being
ready for conjoint counseling with her sister and father at an
earlier date.
We note father also disputes the children’s therapist’s
opinion included in the last minute information report filed on
March 16, 2026 that although Brianna S. and Abigail S. had two
therapy sessions together, “[T]he children [were] not yet ready to
17
have their father participate in conjoint sessions; however, . . . his
participation may be appropriate in the near future.” Father
contends, “DCFS d[id] not provide any explanation from [this
therapist] as to why she . . . had not initiated conjoint therapy
with father.” He further argues, “[I]f these children could have
unmonitored visits with father when father’s eighteen year old
son was present, then they could have conjoint therapy with
father with a licensed professional.”
We disagree. Even taking into account the heightened
clear and convincing evidence standard of proof, we cannot
disturb the juvenile court’s decision to credit the children’s
therapist’s opinion that the girls were not yet ready for, and
DCFS therefore was not yet obligated to provide, conjoint therapy
sessions for father and his two daughters. (See V.L., supra,
54 Cal.App.5th at p. 155 [noting that in reviewing a finding made
under the clear and convincing evidence standard, an appellate
court still “ ‘give[s] due deference to how the trier of fact may
have evaluated the credibility of witnesses[ and] resolved
conflicts in the evidence’ ”].) Indeed, as we explained in our
Discussion, part A, ante, father does not controvert the court’s
finding that his failure to release information to DCFS
concerning his counseling sessions prevented the children’s
therapist from determining when conjoint counseling could safely
begin.
Lastly, on November 21, 2025, the juvenile court ordered
DCFS to ensure father was informed of Abigail S.’s and
Brianna S.’s medical, psychological, and psychiatric
appointments. Shortly before the court issued this ruling,
DCFS’s counsel informed the court of her intention to ask the
agency whether it could use a “group text regarding the children’s
18
medical appointments” to “make things easier for all parties
involved.” Yet, at the psychotropic medication review hearing for
Abigail held on March 19, 2026, father’s counsel stated, “The last
time we were in court . . . , . . . I think the court actually made . . .
an order . . . that my client be notified and be able to participate
in these appointments and apparently that hasn’t happened.”
We do not suggest the juvenile court had to credit father’s
counsel’s intimation the agency did not notify his client of
Abigail S.’s psychiatric appointments. Nevertheless, whether
DCFS provided reasonable reunification services hinges in part
on whether the agency undertook adequate measures to comply
with the court’s prior order to ensure father was apprised of those
appointments. (See Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 625, fn. 6
[noting the Courts of Appeal have generally held that to find a
child welfare agency offered reasonable services, the record must
show, inter alia, that the agency “ ‘maintained reasonable contact
with the parents during the course of the service plan’ ”].) We
further note that in the last minute information report filed on
March 17, 2026, the agency stated, “Abigail . . . shared that her
father has discouraged her from taking her prescribed
medication, despite her report that the medi[cation] is helpful in
managing her anxiety and sleep.” Further, the children’s counsel
stated at the psychotropic medication hearing on March 19, 2026
that allowing father to participate in Abigail’s psychiatric
appointments “may alleviate some of the concerns of his child
being overmedicated.” It thus appears that informing father of
Abigail’s psychiatric appointments may have mitigated the risk
he would encourage Abigail not to take her medication should she
be returned to his care. In any event, although DCFS
acknowledges “[f]ather argues he was not provided notice for the
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children’s medical appointments,” the agency does not contend
that its failure to notify father of Abigail’s psychiatric
appointments has no bearing on whether DCFS provided
reasonable reunification services to father.
The agency does not cite any record evidence showing it
deployed such efforts, for instance, by including father in a group
text message chain concerning Abigail’s appointments. Rather,
the agency cites (1) an excerpt from the reporter’s transcript of an
October 31, 2025 proceeding for the proposition that “father had
spoken with the child’s psychiatrist about the child’s medication,”
and (2) an excerpt from the reporter’s transcript of the
November 21, 2025 hearing to show that “father’s attorney noted
father went to the hospital when Abigail had a medical
emergency.” Neither of these citations demonstrates that after
the juvenile court ordered DCFS on November 21, 2025 to ensure
father was notified of Abigail’s psychiatric appointments, the
agency made any attempt to comply with that order.
Given our conclusion the juvenile court erred in finding
DCFS afforded the family reasonable reunification services, we
vacate that finding and direct the court to issue a new finding
that the agency failed to provide reasonable services during the
review period. (See § 366.21, subd. (e)(8) [obligating the juvenile
court to “determine by clear and convincing evidence whether
reasonable services” were provided]; see also In re Taylor J.
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1448, 1453 [remedying a juvenile
court’s erroneous reasonable services finding by vacating it and
directing the court on remand to enter a new order that
reasonable services had not been provided].)
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DISPOSITION
We vacate the juvenile court’s finding at the six-month
review hearing that respondent Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services provided reasonable services to
reunify minors Brianna S. and Abigail S. with their father,
appellant Trent S. On remand, the court shall issue a new order
finding the agency failed to provide reasonable reunification
services. In all other respects, the orders from the six-month
review hearing are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
M. KIM, J.
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