Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Marriage of Ghazi and Richard CA4/1

Filed 10/21/26 Marriage of Ghazi and Richard CA4/1
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 10/21/26 Marriage of Ghazi and Richard CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re the Marriage of RENEE GHAZI and
DAMIAN RICHARD.

RENEE GHAZI, D086782

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No.
22FL000811N)
v.

DAMIAN RICHARD,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Renee Stackhouse, Judge. Affirmed.
Janice R. Mazur for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Damian Richard, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Damian Richard and Renee Ghazi are engaged in a contentious marital
dissolution that involves custody disputes over their minor children. Richard
describes the dissolution as “a vexatious and malicious scheme.” In this
appeal, Richard challenges an order directing him to pay attorney fees to

Ghazi pursuant to Family Code1 section 2030 and asks us to reassign this

dissolution.2 Finding no merit in his contention and no reason to disqualify
the trial judge, we affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Given the nature of this appeal, a lengthy recitation of the facts is not

necessary.3 The parties married in 2003 and Ghazi filed for dissolution in
2022. That same year, the trial court denied Ghazi’s request for attorney
fees, finding the parties did not have disparate access to funds despite their
disparate incomes. Nevertheless, the court imposed requirements on money
withdrawn in excess of $1000 from shared accounts. In 2024, Ghazi again

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

2 Richard unsuccessfully moved to disqualify the trial judge twice below.
“The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an
appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d).) Indeed, Richard sought such writ relief from this
court four times. He has also previously attempted to appeal the judicial
assignment. Undeterred, Richard renews his allegations in this appeal. To
the extent Richard challenges the court’s denial of his disqualification
request, we lack jurisdiction over such a claim.

3 Both parties have submitted requests for judicial notice. “[B]ecause the
proffered documents are not ‘necessary, helpful, or relevant’ to the resolution
of the appeal, [the] motion[s] for judicial notice of these documents [are]
denied.” (Atempa v. Pedrazzani (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 809, 819.)

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sought attorney fees under section 2030 following two years of contentious
proceedings.
In October 2024, Richard opposed the request, arguing that Ghazi
should instead pay his attorney fees and costs, as well as the entirety of fees
owed to Minor’s Counsel.
Despite being personally present when the court set the hearing and
filing responsive pleadings, Richard did not attend the March 6, 2025
unreported hearing on Ghazi’s request for attorney fees. The trial court
compared Ghazi’s then current financial declaration with Richard’s stale
financial declaration, determining “there [was] an income disparity between
the parties.” The declarations indicate Richard outearned Ghazi more than
two to one. After considering the income disparity, access to funds, increased
litigation expenditures, and increase in work due to Richard’s “plethora of
filings,” the court reallocated responsibility for Minor’s Counsel’s fees and
ordered Richard to pay Ghazi $7500, or half of the requested fees.
II.
DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Ghazi’s Request for Fees
Pursuant to Section 2030.
Richard misclassifies the award of attorney fees pursuant to section
2030 as a sanction, alleging the trial court ordered the fees due to animus
and bias. He admits that Ghazi’s attorney fee request addressed at the
March 6, 2025 hearing did not request sanctions, but endeavors nevertheless
to label the award of attorney fees as a section 271 sanction. However, the
record is clear that Ghazi requested, and the court ordered, fees under section
2030 in the appealed from order. Confusingly, Richard contends he did not
have “sufficient notice of on what grounds the requests for attorney’s fees was
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based.” He makes this assertion before our court even though he filed a
responsive declaration to Ghazi’s request for order, indicating under section
6, “ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS,” that he did not consent to the order
requested. We observe that he filed that opposition five months before the
court issued the order he now challenges.
Consistent with the requirements of section 2030, the court conducted a
review of the financial positions of each party with the best information
available to it and ordered Richard to pay a portion of Ghazi’s attorney fees.
Richard offers extensive argument regarding community property still at
issue in the dissolution but does nothing to undermine the facts of their
income disparity.
Section 2030 requires the trial court to ensure that each party in a
dissolution proceeding has access to legal representation “by ordering, if
necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party . . . to pay
to the other party, or to the other party’s attorney, whatever amount is
reasonably necessary for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or
defending the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding.” (§ 2030,
subd. (a)(1).)
We review a trial court’s decision to award fees under section 2030 for
abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Nakamoto & Hsu (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 457, 469 (Nakamoto).) “ ‘ “The appropriate test for an abuse
of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.” ’ ” (In
re Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780.) “When reviewing for
substantial evidence, ‘ “the power of an appellate court begins and ends with
the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial
evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the [trial court’s]
determination.” ’ ” (Nakamoto, at p. 473.)

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Given the plain earning disparity, conditions on accessing community
funds, and the variety of filings Richard makes that require a response, we
conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s award of attorney
fees. While Richard contends bias and animus motivated the trial court to
order the attorney fees, the order was for half of the requested fees and the
$7,500 constitutes less than ten percent of what Ghazi spent on litigating this
dissolution prior to the hearing. Such a modest award would seem to suggest
it is not motivated by personal animus or gender bias, as Richard alleges.
Richard also alleges that the trial court erred in “reversing a prior
order of another judge.” This characterization is inaccurate. Section 2030
allows the court to order a party to contribute financially to the opposing
party’s legal representation. (§ 2030, subd. (a).) The award may be made
before or after the proceedings begin and can be modified throughout the
matter’s pendency. (Id. at subds. (b), (c).) To the extent Richard argues the
decision made at the start of the litigation, which was based on the financial
realities at that point in time, is somehow binding on the remainder of the
dissolution, he is incorrect. Such an interpretation flies in the face of the
plain language of the section, which permits the court to modify the order as
needed. (§ 2030, subd. (c).) “The only reasonable interpretation of the . . .
language is that application to augment or modify an attorney’s fees award in
a family law matter may be brought at any time.” (In re Marriage of Hobdy
(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 360, 367.) We therefore conclude that Richard’s
argument that the trial court improperly modified a previous order lacks
merit.
B. Richard’s Unsupported Claims are Insufficient to Merit
Reassignment

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Richard renews his complaints regarding the trial judge. He accuses
her of “animus, bias, conflict of interest, and [violation of] Richard’s due
process rights.” He alleges that the trial judge falsified the record, attempted
to suppress evidence, improperly “overturn[ed]” a previous ruling in the case,
and retaliated against him for exercising his appellate rights. Citing Code of
Civil Procedure, section 170.1, subdivision (c), he requests that we reassign
further proceedings to a different trial judge. That section requires us to
consider if the interests of justice favor such replacement, but the power is to
be used sparingly. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. (c), People v. Gulbrandsen
(1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1547, 1562.)
Richard’s allegations regarding the trial judge are serious, but
unsupported. “ ‘[T]o demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and
citation to the record.’ ” (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277.) Instead of developing his argument with legal
analysis and citations to the record, he references his previous statements of
disqualification. The statements of disqualification are lengthy recitations of
alleged behavior by Ghazi, remaining trial issues, descriptions of the judge’s
husband’s work, displeasure with the decisions made by the court, and claims
of gender bias due, in part, to the judge’s clarification of her proper pronouns.
Relevant to his displeasure with decisions made by the court, “[n]umerous
and continuous rulings against a party are not grounds for a finding of bias.”
(Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 589.) We have
considered Richard’s repeated bare claims of animus, bias, conflicts of
interest and purported due process violations and we conclude reassignment
is not warranted.

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C. Sanctions
Attendant to this appeal, Ghazi filed a motion for sanctions in the
amount of $10,124.97 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 907.
Richard declined to highlight any possible merit to his appeal and opted to
utilize his opposition to the request for sanctions to reiterate his appellate
arguments. Richard contends the motion for sanctions before us is a
“retaliatory, bad-faith attempt to punish [him] for pursuing this meritorious
appeal which exposes severe, reversible legal errors, a complete breakdown of
constitutional due process, and alarming attorney and judicial misconduct.”
Richard admits that his appeal focuses on “a fee order,” yet continues to
advance an unsupported argument that the fee order was a section 271
sanction. There is simply no evidence that the discrete issue of attorney fees
addressed at the March 5, 2026 hearing are sanctions. He also seizes upon
the opportunity to make additional allegations of bias and misconduct
regarding the trial judge. Our court has rejected Richard’s claims regarding
the trial judge no less than five times since August 2024.
Despite repeatedly losing on the issue, Richard continues to ask our
court to reassign or otherwise disqualify the trial judge. This appeal
constitutes a sixth attempt. Richard relies upon increasingly hostile rhetoric
and frenetic rehashing of his discontent to urge us to conclude reassignment
is appropriate. However, he fails to develop any legal argument supported by
facts regarding the judge that might lead us to conclude reassignment is
merited.
An appeal is objectively frivolous “when it indisputably has no
merit―when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally
and completely without merit.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d
637, 650 (Flaherty).) It is subjectively frivolous “when it is prosecuted for an

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improper motive―to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse
judgment.” (Ibid.) While the two standards are often used together, “[a]
finding of frivolousness may be based on either standard by itself.” (Malek
Media Group, LLC. V. AXQG Corp. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 817, 834 (Malek).)
In evaluating whether Richard’s appeal is objectively frivolous, “[w]e
look to the merits of the appeal from a reasonable person’s perspective” and
ask whether “any reasonable person [would] agree that the appeal is
completely devoid of merit.” (Malek, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at 834.) Richard’s
challenge to the judge has failed five times in our court and he offers no
evidence of bias or animus or fresh legal argument. We therefore conclude
his appeal is objectively frivolous because it lacks factual or legal support.
(Malek, at p. 835.)
We also conclude the portion of his appeal that focuses on the trial
court judge is subjectively frivolous. “[T]he total lack of merit of an appeal is
viewed as evidence that appellant must have intended it only for delay.”
(Flaherty, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 649.) As discussed above, Richard devotes
much of his briefing regarding the trial court to “rehashing issues raised and
decided in the prior appeal, a totally inappropriate exercise.” (Hummel v.
First National Bank (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 489, 495.)
Because his appeal is both objectively and subjectively frivolous, we
conclude Richard’s appeal regarding the trial court judge “has as its object to
delay, vex, or harass the opposing party or the court” and “is based upon
wholly sham or frivolous grounds.” (Ferguson v. Keays (1971) 4 Cal.3d 649,
658.)
A reviewing court may impose monetary sanctions on an appellant
when an “appeal was frivolous or taken solely for delay.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 907; accord, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(1).) We may award as

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sanctions “such damages as may be just” (Code Civ. Proc., § 907), including
sums to compensate the respondent for the attorney fees incurred in
defending against the appeal and to discourage future frivolous litigation.
(Morales v. City and County of San Francisco (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 43, 53;
Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 189;
Summers v. Cathedral City (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1047, 1079.)
As compensation for defending against this appeal, Ghazi asks us to
award as sanctions $9,652.50 in attorney fees and $472.47 in costs. The
amount of attorney fees requested is based on the time counsel spent
addressing this appeal in its entirety, not just the portion concerning the trial
judge. “Sanctions for an appeal which is partially frivolous are appropriate if
the frivolous claims are a significant and material part of the appeal.” (Maple
Properties v. Harris (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 997, 1010.) Richard devoted a
great deal, but not all, of his argument below, his briefing before our court,
and his opposition to the sanctions motion to his baseless complaints
regarding the trial court. Based on the delay resulting from this repetitive
filing and the need to deter this sort of conduct in the future (id. at p. 1011),
we find $7,500, a portion of the attorney fees Ghazi has requested, is a
reasonable amount of sanctions for Richard to pay her. We do not impose
costs incurred on appeal as sanctions because Ghazi is entitled to those costs
as a matter of right. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
This opinion shall constitute the written statement of our reasons for
imposing monetary sanctions against Richard. (Flaherty, supra, 31 Cal.3d at
p. 654; Banks v. Dominican College (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1558.)

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III.
DISPOSITION

The order of the trial court is affirmed. Ghazi is entitled to costs.

MCCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

CASTILLO, J.

RUBIN, J.

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