Filed 10/8/26 P. v. Ceja CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B337385
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA069917)
v.
JOSE ROBERTO CEJA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Debra A. Cole, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Jose Roberto Ceja appeals the trial court’s postconviction
order, striking his prior prison term enhancement under Penal
Code section 667.5, subdivision (b)1 and resentencing him under
section 1172.75. Appellate counsel filed an opening brief that
raised no issues and requested that we follow the procedures in
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Ceja filed
a supplemental brief, in propria persona, raising no issues of
merit. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On February 14, 2008, a jury convicted Ceja of first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) and found a gang enhancement
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)) true.
On March 25, 2008, the trial court found true a prior prison
term enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The
court sentenced Ceja to a term of 36 years to life in state prison,
calculated as 25 years to life for the murder in count 1, plus 10
years for the gang enhancement and one year for the prior prison
term enhancement.
Ceja appealed.
On April 28, 2009, another panel of this division affirmed
the judgment,2 and modified Ceja’s sentence to strike the 10
years imposed under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C). The
trial court was directed to impose the “15-year minimum parole
eligibility term” required by section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5).
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2 People v. Ceja (Apr. 28, 2009, B206860) (nonpub. opn.).
2
On September 4, 2009, the trial court struck the 10-year
term for the gang enhancement and imposed the 15-year
minimum parole eligibility term.
In 2022, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
notified the trial court that Ceja was potentially eligible for relief
under Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) because he was
currently serving a term for a judgment that included an invalid
enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court
appointed counsel for Ceja to represent him at the resentencing
hearing.
On May 2, 2023, under section 1172.75, the trial court
struck the invalid prior prison term enhancement. Ceja’s
sentence was reduced to 25 to years to life in state prison. On
March 21, 2024, the trial court confirmed that the 10-year term
for the gang enhancement was previously stricken and the 15-
year minimum parole eligibility term was imposed.
On March 28, 2024, Ceja filed a timely notice of appeal.
Appellate counsel filed an opening brief stating she had
reviewed the entire record and found no arguable issues to raise
on appeal. Counsel requested that we follow the procedures in
Delgadillo and exercise our discretion to conduct an independent
review of the record. Counsel stated she advised Ceja that he
could submit a supplemental brief. Counsel also stated she
would send a copy of her brief and the transcripts of the record on
appeal to Ceja.
On July 29, 2026, Ceja filed a supplemental brief.
3
DISCUSSION
Ceja is not entitled to our independent review of the record
under People v. Wende (1976) 25 Cal.3d 436 or Anders v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 because he appeals an order
addressing postconviction relief, rather than his underlying
criminal conviction. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 221–
222.) We decline the requests by Ceja and his appellate counsel
to exercise our discretion to conduct an independent review of the
record. (Id. at p. 232.) Nothing otherwise suggests that an
exercise of independent review is necessary. Ceja is entitled to
our consideration of the contentions raised in this supplemental
brief. (Ibid.) But he raises no issues of merit.
4
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
ADAMS, P. J.
KARNOW, J.*
* Retired Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.