Filed 9/29/26 P. v. Amaya CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D087802
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF1801418)
JOSE LUIS AMAYA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Brian S. McCarville, Judge. Affirmed.
Carl Fabian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier, Supervising Deputy Attorney General and James H.
Flaherty III, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Jose Luis Amaya of sex crimes against two different
victims: lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a);
counts 1-2, against victim J.P.); oral copulation with a child under the age of
10 (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b); count 3, against victim G.D.); attempted oral
copulation with a child under the age of 10 (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 288.7, subd.
(b); count 4, against victim G.D.); and lewd acts by force or fear on a child
under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b); counts 5-8, against victim
G.D.). Amaya waived a jury trial as to aggravating factors, and the trial
court found as to counts 1, 2, and 5 through 8 that he committed a qualifying
sex offense against more than one victim within the meaning of Penal Code
section 667.61, subdivision (e)(4). It also found that Amaya violated a
position of trust and the victims were vulnerable within the meaning of
California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3) and (a)(11). The court sentenced
Amaya to a midterm of seven years plus 105 years to life in state prison
(seven 15-year-to-life terms).
Amaya contends the court prejudicially erred by instructing the jury
with CALCRIM No. 1193, which he says permitted the jury to use expert
testimony concerning Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
(CSAAS) to conclude the victims were believable over him, and to find him
guilty in violation of his rights to due process and a fair trial. We reject the
contentions and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because Amaya does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of his
convictions, we do not recount his actions in detail. It is enough to say that
during a weekend in 2017, Amaya inappropriately touched his daughter’s
friend J.P., who was then nine years old. J.P. called her mother to pick her
up and eventually told her some of what had happened. She was 15 years old
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at the time of trial. Amaya also inappropriately touched his then eight-year-
old niece, G.D., at times forcing her to put his penis in her mouth, orally
copulating her, or making her touch his penis, oftentimes threatening her
that if she told anyone he would do the same to her younger sister. G.D.
initially did not tell anyone because she was embarrassed and scared. She
eventually told a school friend and an older cousin. G.D. was 17 years old at
the time of trial; she testified that she still had not told her mother
everything that had happened with Amaya.
Amaya testified that he never touched J.P. or G.D. inappropriately or
did any of the bad acts they described.
The prosecution presented psychologist Veronica Thomas as a child
sexual assault expert. Dr. Thomas explained that abusers and victims are
not easily recognizable, and that most child sexual abuse victims do not talk
about their abuse until many years later, some not at all. She testified that
research showed the abuser and victim generally know each other, and the
abuse occurs in the course of a relationship. Thus, the alleged victim can
hold positive feelings about the abuser: “[o]ne of the most problematic parts
of child sex abuse treatment is the child feeling guilty and responsible
because somebody they love very much got in trouble for loving them.”
When asked about “accommodation” as a general concept, Dr. Thomas
explained it pertained to how people become accustomed to a certain kind of
treatment. She explained the term was coined by a doctor who developed
CSAAS as a “therapy treatment.” Dr. Thomas testified the “accommodation
is that a child victim becomes acclimated to the sexual abuse that’s going on
and it becomes a part of their daily functioning with that person, that family,
or that day care.” She testified that because most child abuse is by persons
loved by the victim, it is confusing and problematic for children to decide
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whether they should or should not talk about it, which explains why they do
not run, fight or scream in response to the abuse. She testified that for the
most part, because the child is close to their molester, to protect that person
they may not report the abuse. They also may not report the abuse because
they might feel guilty, embarrassed or ashamed. Dr. Thomas also explained
that the victim’s disclosure to another person is usually not immediate or
entirely complete when it first happens, but it might happen incrementally
and depend on the other person’s response. According to Dr. Thomas, most
victims of sexual abuse never tell anybody due to the lingering effects of
going through sexual abuse.
Dr. Thomas explained she had not met the victims, read any of the
police reports, or reviewed any recordings. She stated her testimony was “not
. . . to say molestation has actually occurred” or give any sort of diagnosis to
J.P. or G.D., but to talk about victims sexually assaulted by someone they
know, as a class. When asked the purpose of her testimony, Thomas told the
jury it was “to explain how and why it is that kids do and don’t talk about
being sexually abused. And when they are sexually abused by somebody they
know, there’s a relationship there. And in that relationship are other people
and needs. It’s not unusual that a child, even very young, could understand
the consequences if so-and-so was no longer around. Perhaps income at home
has changed. Perhaps mom has become depressed and despondent. Kids at
almost any age can understand that ‘maybe what I did and said caused all
this trauma in my family.’ ”
At the close of Dr. Thomas’s testimony on redirect, the following
colloquy occurred:
“[Prosecutor:] Were you called in here to talk about CSAAS?
“[Dr. Thomas:] No.
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“[Prosecutor:] Did we go through each of the five components of CSAAS
and discuss them?
“[Dr. Thomas:] We did not.
“[Prosecutor:] So your role in coming here today is not to talk about
CSAAS?
“[Dr. Thomas:] No. But I can.
“[Prosecutor:] And the inappropriate use that counsel referred to,
that’s when it was actually being used in court as a diagnostic tool; is that
right?
“[Dr. Thomas:] That’s right.
“[Prosecutor:] When they . . . didn’t know the victims and were doing
treatment and were using it to diagnosis [sic] whether or not the abuse
happened?
“[Dr. Thomas:] That’s right.
“[Prosecutor:] And that’s not what you’re here to do?
“[Dr. Thomas:] Not at all.
“[Prosecutor:] What you talked to us about, and educating us about
behaviors and disclosure patterns and whatnot, what is that testimony based
upon?
“[Dr. Thomas:] It’s based upon a hundred years of psychological
science, rat studies, human studies, the nature of relationships,
understanding developmental levels for children, what a human brain is
capable of doing before the age of five and after the age of five, how memory
can be complicated by emotions, how talking about experiences that were bad
become difficult when you’re talking to people that you love and respect and
you don’t know how they’re going to take it. . . . So the basis of a relationship
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and the power and strength of the parties will determine whether or not they
can talk about what’s happened to them.”
The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1193 as follows: “You
have heard testimony from Dr. Thomas regarding child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome and the behavior of alleged child molestation
victims. [¶] Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome relates to a
pattern of behavior that may be present in child sexual abuse cases.
Testimony as to the accommodation syndrome is offered only to explain
certain behavior of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse. [¶] Dr. Thomas’s
testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome and the
behavior of alleged child molestation victims is not evidence that the
defendant committed any of the crimes charged against him. [¶] You may
consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not [J.P.] and [G.D.]’s
conduct was consistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested,
and in evaluating the believability of their testimony.” Defense counsel did
not object to the instruction either when the court indicated it would be
given1 or when the court read it to the jury.
The prosecutor’s sole mention of Dr. Thomas in closing and rebuttal
argument was to say that Dr. Thomas did not know the victims or the case,
and was there only to talk about the research and studies as well as her years
of experience. The prosecutor said: “And despite that, she describes [the
victims] to a T. Incremental disclosures, delayed disclosures. Typically,
when there is a disclosure, it’s made to a motherly figure who’s in a position
1 When the court mentioned CALCRIM No. 1193, the prosecutor
explained that he had let defense counsel know that “because [Dr. Thomas’s]
testimony was not strictly CSAAS, I just added in ‘behavior of alleged child
molestation victims.’ ” The court noted Amaya’s counsel did not object to Dr.
Thomas’s testimony, and stated the modified instruction would be given.
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of trust, like [J.P.’s mother]. [¶] But sometimes there’s test disclosure like
[G.D.] did. Where kids put out feelers to see how people will react, and then
pull back. [¶] And that there are memory issues for constant abuse.”
DISCUSSION
Amaya contends CALCRIM No. 1193 improperly allowed the jury to
conclude J.P. and G.D. were victims of sexual abuse based on the consistency
between their behaviors and those identified by Dr. Thomas with regard to
CSAAS. Citing People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, he asserts testimony
on CSAAS “is proper when confined to ‘disabusing the jury of some widely
held misconceptions about rape and rape victims, so that it may evaluate the
evidence free of the constraints of popular myths.’ ” According to Amaya, the
prior version of CALCRIM No. 1193—which told jurors they may consider
CSAAS evidence only in deciding whether or not the alleged victim’s conduct
was “not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested”—
properly was restricted to rehabilitate a victim’s credibility, but the current
version “now instructs the jury to compare the reporting behaviors of the
complainant with those of known victims of abuse, and if they are match,
then the jury can consider that consistency in assessing the minors’s [sic]
believability.” Amaya maintains the instruction prejudiced him: that the
CSAAS testimony “provided a roadmap for the jury to follow under
CALCRIM No. 1193, which led the jury directly to the conclusion the minors
were credible, [he] was not, therefore he was guilty of the charged offenses.”
He argues the instruction “enhanced” the victim’s credibility because they did
not promptly report it or could not recall details, “[bringing them] into
alignment with the behavior of confirmed abuse victims” and undermined his
attempt to question their credibility. Amaya argues the combination of
CSAAS testimony mirroring the trial evidence and CALCRIM No. 1193
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created an impermissible inference of guilt in violation of the federal
constitution, causing an unfair trial and requiring reversal of his convictions.
I. Standard of Review
“ ‘We review a claim of instructional error de novo.’ ” (People v. Frazier
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 814, 839; see also People v. Lewis (2023) 14 Cal.5th 876,
900; People v. Page (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1028.) “We consider the
challenged instruction in the context of the instructions as a whole and the
trial record to determine whether it is reasonably likely the jury applied the
instruction in an impermissible manner. [Citations.] We presume the jurors
understood and followed the court’s instructions.” (Page, at pp. 1028–1029;
see also People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 441.)
II. The Court Did Not Err by Instructing the Jury with CALCRIM No. 1193
We first address Amaya’s failure to object to the giving of the modified
version of CALCRIM No. 1193. He does not expressly argue the instruction
is legally incorrect. His contentions—limited to the last clause of the
instruction—suggest he would not find CALCRIM No. 1193 objectionable if it
was phrased with the double negative as in the prior version. If that is his
claim, Amaya has forfeited the claim of instructional error. (People v. Aguirre
(2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 677–678 [failure to request clarification of an
otherwise correct instruction in the trial court forfeits the claim of error for
purposes of appeal]; People v. Martinez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 686, 728
[same].)
Setting aside forfeiture, we would still affirm. Dr. Thomas did not
purport to discuss or apply CSAAS, she did not mention “misconceptions”
about child sexual abuse, and thus Amaya’s claim about the supposed
interaction between CSAAS testimony and CALCRIM No. 1193 is
unsupported by the record. Nevertheless, Amaya argues the CSAAS
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testimony in this case, assertedly accomplished through questioning Dr.
Thomas via “hypothetical questions that addressed the inconsistencies in the
[minors’] testimony,” was intended by the prosecution “to negate [his] sole
defense” of challenging J.P.’s and G.D.’s credibility. Amaya does not provide
a record citation for the place where this testimony or hypothetical
questioning took place, much less summarize Dr. Thomas’s testimony. For
this reason, we cannot evaluate the merits of the claim and it is forfeited as a
result.2 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); People v. Hoyt (2020) 8
Cal.5th 892, 939 [“by failing to support his appellate arguments with record
citations, defendant has forfeited any claim of error on appeal”].)
Finally, assuming Dr. Thomas’s testimony could be viewed as touching
on elements of CSAAS, we addressed and rejected similar claims about the
use of the present version of CALCRIM No. 1193 in People v. Page, supra, 114
Cal.App.5th 1022. We see no reason to disregard the conclusions we reached
there. In Page, the defendant, as Amaya does here, claimed the instruction
violated his right to a fair trial by creating an impermissible inference of
guilt. (Id. at p. 1028.) More specifically, he argued CALCRIM No. 1193
allowed the jury to use CSAAS testimony as evidence of guilt, as it did “not
tell the jury that such testimony ‘is not intended and should not be used to
2 Elsewhere in his brief, Amaya says: “The CSAAS testimony essentially
assured the jury that every inconsistency in the testimony of the two minors
was not evidence of impeachment, but the very opposite, viz., delayed and
incremental reporting was consistent with a minor who has been abused.”
He also says, “The CSAAS expert witness testimony was indistinguishable
from other types of behavioral expert witness testimony, describing conduct
consistent with a charged offense, such as an expert on criminal street gangs.
The hypothetical questions posed to the CSAAS expert witness closely
tracked the evidence adduced at trial through the testimony of J.P. and G.D.”
(Some punctuation added.) Neither of these statements is accompanied by a
citation to the reporter’s transcript where the testimony assertedly took
place.
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determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true’ [citation] and
permits the jury to consider the testimony ‘in evaluating the believability of
the alleged victim.’ ” (Page, at p. 1029.) He argued “allowing the jury to use
CSAAS to conclude the victim did not lie ‘unavoidably allows the jury to
consider CSAAS evidence to prove [the defendant’s] guilt,’ because if the
victim did not lie, she told the truth, and if she told the truth, the defendant
was necessarily guilty.” (Ibid.)
We rejected the contentions, upholding CALCRIM NO. 1193 as an
accurate instruction on the limited use of CSAAS evidence. (People v. Page,
supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1031, 1032–1033.) We discussed the concern of
prior case law that without a proper limiting instruction a jury might use
CSAAS evidence as a predictor of sexual abuse, that is, leap from the premise
that a child exhibits some of the signs of CSAAS to the conclusion that the
child was sexually abused. (Id. at p. 1031.)3 We said: “The current version
of CALCRIM No. 1193 adequately addresses that concern by advising the
jury that testimony on CSAAS: (1) ‘is not evidence that the defendant
committed any of the crimes charged against him’; (2) ‘is offered only to
explain certain behavior of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse’; and (3)
may be considered ‘only in deciding whether or not [the alleged victim’s]
conduct was consistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested,
and in evaluating the believability of the alleged victim.’ . . . An instruction
3 This was the case involving a different context in People v. Bledsoe,
supra, 36 Cal.3d 236, relied upon by Amaya. (Id. at pp. 248 [“[I]n this case,
the prosecution introduced the rape trauma syndrome testimony, not to rebut
misconceptions about the presumed behavior of rape victims, but rather as a
means of proving—from the alleged victim’s post-incident trauma—that a
rape in the legal sense had, in fact, occurred”], 251 [expert testimony that a
complaining witness suffers from rape trauma syndrome is not admissible to
prove that the witness was raped].)
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that the jury may consider CSAAS evidence to decide whether or not the
alleged victim’s conduct was ‘consistent with’ that of a child who has been
sexually abused does not permit any use of the evidence not also permitted by
an instruction that the jury may consider the evidence to decide whether or
not such conduct was ‘not inconsistent with’ that of a sexually abused child.
The quoted phrases have the same meaning. [Citations.] Whichever phrase
is used, ‘the last sentence of the instruction contains a direction with specific
and general aspects. Specifically, the jury is to use the expert testimony to
help ground its analysis of the consistency of the complaining witness’s
conduct (by using a more informed reference point). The jury is then to use
this “consistency” analysis in its general evaluation of the believability of the
complaining witness’s testimony . . . . Reasonable jurors would not
understand the instruction to mean that if they find the characteristics of
[CSAAS] to be satisfied, this indicates that [the complaining witness] was
necessarily telling the truth.’ ” (Page, at pp. 1031–1032.)
We further pointed out that the defendant’s trial did not involve misuse
of CSAAS evidence. (People v. Page, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 1032.) In
Page, the victim testified the defendant sexually abused her, she delayed
reporting the abuse, and, as Dr. Thomas did here, the expert testified delayed
disclosure is common in cases of child sexual abuse. (Ibid.) The prosecutor in
Page did not argue the delayed disclosure was evidence of abuse, but that the
victim was credible in response to the defendants’ counsel’s attack on the
expert’s testimony and argument that the victim was suggestible and her
disclosure had been contaminated by her mother. In rebuttal argument, the
prosecutor briefly alluded to the expert’s testimony and argued the victim’s
delayed disclosure was consistent with the behavior of sexually abused
children, who might not report the abuse right away because they worry
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about getting in trouble or getting the person they love in trouble. (Ibid.) We
stated that this “was a permissible use of the CSAAS testimony.” (Ibid.)
We concluded in Page that “the current version of CALCRIM No. 1193
(which uses the ‘consistent with’ phrasing), like the prior version (which used
the ‘not inconsistent with’ phrasing), ‘accurately instructs the jury on the
limited use of CSAAS evidence, but does not: (a) improperly allow an alleged
minor victim of sexual abuse to corroborate her own testimony; (b) violate due
process; or (c) misapply the burden of proof.’ ” (People v. Page, supra, 114
Cal.App.5th at p. 1032; see also People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494,
503–504 [rejecting argument that it was “impossible” to use CSAAS
testimony to evaluate the believability of the victim’s testimony without
using it as proof of guilt].) Our conclusions in Page apply here. Dr. Thomas’s
testimony was not used by the prosecutor as evidence that the victims were
abused, and the instruction did not permit the jury to reach impermissible
inferences of Amaya’s guilt.
Finally, viewed in context with the other instructions, CALCRIM No.
1193 did not create an impermissible or prejudicial inference of guilt. The
court instructed that the jurors “alone must judge the credibility or
believability of the witnesses,” and they may believe “all, part, or none of any
witness’s testimony.” They were instructed that they were not required to
accept expert testimony as true or correct. The instructions as a whole gave
the jury the option to disbelieve the victims as well as Dr. Thomas, including
her references to CSAAS. We presume the jury followed them.
In sum, the trial court did not err or violate Amaya’s constitutional
rights by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 1193. Having found no
error in the instruction, we do not reach prejudice. (People v. Page, supra,
114 Cal.App.5th at p. 1033.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O’ROURKE, J.
I CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
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Dato, J., Concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion and in most
of its reasoning. But with regard to the phrasing of the current version of
CALCRIM No. 1193—which instructs the jury on the proper use of expert
testimony concerning Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
(CSAAS)—I disagree with its reliance on the majority opinion in People v.
Page (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1022 (Page), finding persuasive the contrary
views expressed in Justice Kelety’s separate opinion in that case (id. at
pp. 1035–1036 (conc. opn. of Kelety, J.)). As this court explained nearly 40
years ago in the seminal case of People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385,
the only permissible purpose of CSAAS expert testimony is to maintain a
level playing field by disabusing the jury of misconceptions about abuse
victims that may be suggested by the evidence. (Id. at pp. 393–394; People v.
McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1301 [“ ‘expert testimony is needed to
disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse,
and to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-
impeaching behavior’ ”]; People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744
(Patino) [“CSAAS testimony has been held admissible for the limited purpose
of disabusing a jury of misconceptions it might hold about how a child reacts
to a molestation”].) Bowker expressly provides that CSAAS evidence “is
admissible solely for the purpose of showing that the victim’s reactions as
demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been
molested.” (Bowker, at p. 394, italics added.)
The legitimate concern prompting testimony concerning CSAAS is
that a jury may focus on some counterintuitive aspect of the alleged victim’s
behavior and incorrectly assume this fact makes it less likely that abuse
occurred. CSAAS expert testimony debunks this erroneous assumption by
explaining that certain behaviors like delayed disclosure are common and do
not make it more likely that the victim is lying. Under these circumstances it
is appropriate to instruct the jury that CSAAS evidence may be considered in
deciding whether the victim’s conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct
of someone who has been molested.
At the same time, however, these behaviors do not make it more likely
that the victim is telling the truth. (Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1744
[“The particular aspects of CSAAS are as consistent with false testimony as
with true testimony”].) An instruction that jurors can use CSAAS testimony
in deciding whether the victim’s conduct was consistent with the behavior of
an abuse victim validates precisely the wrong inference. It suggests the
victim is more credible (i.e., more likely to be telling the truth) because their
behavior is consistent with the expected behavior of child abuse victims. This
is as factually inaccurate from a psychological perspective as it is legally
erroneous.
Like Justice Kelety in Page, I nonetheless conclude that the
instructional error in this case was harmless. (Page, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1036 (conc. opn. of Kelety, J.).) Dr. Thomas’s testimony itself made very
clear she was not in court to say who was telling the truth or whether
molestation had actually occurred. She knew nothing about the particular
facts of the case. When combined with other instructions that emphasized
the limited role of CSAAS testimony, the specific nature of Dr. Thomas’s
testimony makes it unlikely that any error in the revised language of
CALCRIM No. 1193 affected the ultimate result.
DATO, J.
2