Filed 9/30/26 HTL Automotive v. 1351 Orizaba Avenue CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
HTL AUTOMOTIVE INC. et al., B342350
Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants Los Angeles County
and Appellants, Super. Ct. No. BC651307
v.
1351 ORIZABA AVENUE, LLC,
Defendant, Cross-complainant
and Respondent;
INVENZ, INC., as Receiver, etc.,
Respondent.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Anne Richardson, Judge. Affirmed.
Velasco Law Group, VZ Law, Richard J. Radcliffe and
Laura N. Zolnekoff for Appellants.
No appearance for Respondent 1351 Orizaba Avenue, LLC.
Buchalter, Robert M. Dato, Richard P. Ormond and
Danielle M. Mayer for Respondent Invenz, Inc.
____________________
The trial court appointed a receiver to enforce the judgment
in this case. Within a few months, the judgment debtors settled
with the creditor. The court approved payment of the receiver
from funds held by the receiver. The judgment debtors attack
this approval. We affirm.
I
Appellants and judgment debtors Hooman Michael Nissani
and HTL Automotive Inc. sued judgment creditor 1351 Orizaba
Avenue, LLC (Orizaba) in 2017 over a commercial lease dispute.
We refer to the appellants collectively as Nissani.
Orizaba counterclaimed. The case went to trial in 2019,
and the trial court awarded Orizaba roughly $750,000. We
upheld this award in our 2022 decision, 1351 Orizaba Avenue,
LLC v. Nissani (Nov. 15, 2022, B305765) [nonpub. opn.].
Nissani did not pay, and over time the total judgment grew
to exceed $1 million.
In January 2022, the trial court issued charging orders
(liens) against twelve limited liability companies (LLCs) in which
Nissani held interests, ordering any distributions to Nissani be
directed to Orizaba until the judgment was satisfied. (See Code
Civ. Proc., § 708.310; Corp. Code, § 17705.03, subd. (a) [“A
charging order constitutes a lien on a judgment debtor’s
transferable interest and requires the limited liability company
to pay over to the person to which the charging order was issued
any distribution that would otherwise be paid to the judgment
debtor”].) These orders are not in our record.
Nissani still did not pay.
In October 2023, Orizaba sought the appointment of a
receiver to help collect its judgment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 564,
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subd. (b)(3) [court may appoint a receiver after judgment “to
carry the judgment into effect”].) Nissani opposed the motion.
The trial court ruled in December 2023 that a receiver was
appropriate. The court noted the ordered distributions had not
occurred and “Nissani has impeded discovery efforts as to
whether the LLCs have paid any distributions to him.” The court
requested supplemental briefing on the scope of the receiver’s
powers, which the parties provided. There was a hearing on the
motion, which was not memorialized in a transcript in our record.
In March 2024, the court entered its order appointing a
receiver (the Appointment Order). The Appointment Order is
broad. It appoints Invenz, Inc. as receiver over Nissani’s
interests in nine listed LLCs. The order cites both Code of Civil
Procedure section 567 and Corporations Code section 17705.03 as
authority. It requires Nissani immediately to turn over to the
Receiver control of accounts holding receivership property and
money generated from this property, and it prohibits Nissani
from transferring assets of the receivership property. The order
states the court is providing the Receiver “additional powers to
effectuate the charging orders” and lists 11 broad powers,
encompassing things like seizing all assets of the specified LLCs,
taking possession of their bank accounts, and demanding all
payments owed to them. The order also has a catchall provision
permitting the Receiver to “do such other things as may be
necessary or incidental to the foregoing specific powers and
general authority.”
Four days after Invenz’s appointment, its chief executive
officer filed the oath required under the Code of Civil Procedure.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 567.) Invenz accepted the appointment
and provided contact information for itself and “Receiver’s
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Counsel.” Counsel immediately set to work by providing notice of
the posting of bond.
The Receiver began collection efforts. The record contains
evidence that Nissani did not turn over access to accounts and
records, as required. Nissani evaded the Receiver’s requests to
meet and to provide information. He seemingly transferred
receivership property to others, including his wife, and took other
evasive obstructions.
At one point, the Receiver received money connected to two
LLCs who objected and sought to claw back the funds: 3399
Willow Sr LLC (Willow) and Cielo S Holdings LLC (Cielo). The
charging orders and the Appointment Order list both companies.
The Receiver and these entities disagreed whether Nissani in fact
had any interest in them. The Receiver emphasized the
“Charging Orders and Order Appointing a Receiver are the direct
result of evidence provided to this Court that Mr. Nissani has, or
had, an interest in both [Cielo and Willow] at the time of the
judgment.” The parties ultimately stipulated to carve out these
LLCs from the Appointment Order pending a noticed motion to
vacate, and the court ordered the Receiver to return the money it
had received.
In July 2024, after extensive research, the Receiver sought
to expand the receivership to reach other entities and property
connected to Nissani. The court granted the requests and
expanded the receivership in two orders, pending an evidentiary
hearing later that month.
Later in July, Nissani and Orizaba reached a confidential
settlement. The Receiver was not a party to the settlement.
(According to the Receiver, the parties settled pending a hearing
in which the Receiver would show that various third parties in
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fact were associated with Nissani.) The trial court ordered the
Receiver to stop collection efforts. And Nissani agreed to pay the
Receiver’s approved expenses.
In early August, Nissani and Orizaba filed a stipulation
seeking to wind down the receivership. Later that month, an
acknowledgement of full satisfaction of the judgment was filed.
Neither filing ended the matter.
Nissani and his counsel bombarded the Receiver in August.
They filed ex parte papers to end the receivership. They opposed
the Receiver’s fourth and fifth interim reports, and later its final
report. Separately, they filed a motion to surcharge the Receiver
and a motion to seal receivership documents. (Apparently, the
settlement agreement was “conditioned upon” sealing certain
documents.) They served subpoenas and sent a letter to the
Receiver pressing for an explanation about its use of information
gleaned from the receivership.
In September, the court ruled against Nissani on his
motion to seal after the Receiver agreed to redact employer
identification numbers. The court noted Nissani “misconstrue[d]
the high bar under California to seal documents” and previously
had filed the documents he now sought to protect. Nissani
appealed that ruling and then abandoned that appeal.
In October, the Receiver filed the required final account
and report and petition for discharge. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1184.) There, the Receiver sought payment of receivership
fees and expenses totaling $100,435.50, and attorney fees and
expenses totaling $311,676.94. The report and supporting papers
discussed the Receiver’s actions concerning the receivership
estate, Nissani’s obstructive acts, and his post-settlement efforts
to “bury the Receiver with pleadings and requests that required
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active responses.” The Receiver’s attorneys defended their fees,
explaining “much of the time spent from mid-July through the
present was attempting to defend the Receiver against Judgment
Debtor’s attacks and unnecessary filings.”
The trial court approved the final account and report in
November 2024. It found the Receiver’s fees and costs were
reasonable and further found the Receiver had performed its
duties diligently, in good faith, and in compliance with the
Appointment Order. The court discharged the Receiver and
terminated the receivership.
Nissani appealed this order as well.
II
Nissani gives three reasons for vacating the court’s final
order: 1) it exceeds the limited scope of the Appointment Order,
2) there should be no award of fees where the Receiver exceeded
its authority, and 3) attorney fees should not be payable at all
because the Receiver did not get the required approval to retain
counsel. We combine the first two points into one discussion
below and explain why they all fail.
To the extent these challenges require us to construe the
law, a court rule, or an order, our review is independent.
Otherwise, we defer to the trial court’s findings. (See City of
Santa Monica v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 905, 931 (Gonzalez)
[appellate courts typically afford “considerable deference” to
receivership rulings; “[s]uch deference is the rule, even where the
court confirms extraordinary action by the receiver”]; Southern
Cal. Sunbelt Developers, Inc. v. Banyan Limited Partnership
(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 910, 923 (Sunbelt Developers) [independent
review of pure legal issues].)
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A
Nissani argues that the Receiver exceeded the scope of the
Appointment Order, and that fees for these services are not
compensable. He points to two main instances of supposed
overreach: 1) the Receiver collected money from Willow and Cielo
that ultimately had to be returned, and 2) the Receiver sought
compensation for fees incurred after the court’s “wind-down”
instruction and the satisfaction of judgment.
Nissani has not shown error. (See County of Sacramento v.
Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 858, 867 (Singh) [we presume court
orders are correct and require appellants to show error]; see also
Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 (Jameson).)
Receivers are agents of the appointing court, and
receivership property remains under the court’s control and
supervision. (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 930.) “Generally,
the functions and powers of a receiver are controlled by statute,
by the order of appointment, and by the court's subsequent
orders.” (Ibid.) With court authorization, a receiver may take
possession of property, receive rents, collect debts, and the like.
(City of Sierra Madre v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. (2019) 32
Cal.App.5th 648, 656, citing Code Civ. Proc., §§ 568, 568.5.)
Nissani claims the Appointment Order and Corporations
Code section 17705.03, subdivision (b), authorized only a narrow
receivership over the distributions of specified LLCs and only for
Nissani’s interest in these LLCs. The Receiver exceeded this
authorization and improperly functioned as a “general purpose
receiver,” he argues, including by collecting Willow’s and Cielo’s
funds.
7
Neither the statute nor the Appointment Order confine the
Receiver’s authority as Nissani maintains. Indeed, both have
express catchall provisions.
Corporations Code section 17705.03, subdivision (b),
provides that a court may, to the extent necessary to effectuate
collections under a charging order, appoint a receiver of the
distributions “with the power to make all inquiries the judgment
debtor might have made” and “[m]ake all other orders necessary
to give effect to the charging order.”
Orizaba sought a receivership under this provision. But it
also relied on California’s general statutes governing receivers,
emphasizing the expansive powers and wide discretion they
afford receivers. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 564, 568.) Orizaba thus
sought more than a narrow receivership tied to charging orders
in attempting to recover from Nissani.
The court adopted the expansive Appointment Order
Orizaba proposed, explicitly granting the Receiver “additional
powers” beyond those listed in section 17705.03, and pursuant to
that statute’s catchall provision. The court recognized “Nissani’s
lack of forthcoming discovery as to distributions from the
Charging Orders LLCs” justified these broad powers. The order
accordingly lists a dozen or so broad powers over Nissani and the
specified companies. Among other things, the order gives the
Receiver the power to collect the assets of and monies due Willow
and Cielo. The order further authorizes the Receiver to do such
things “as may be necessary or incidental to the foregoing specific
powers and general authority[.]”
The Receiver and its agents thus acted within their
authority in pursuing rent or other money due Willow and Cielo.
The Receiver correctly maintained at the trial court that it had “a
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determinative order that gives the Receiver the authority to take
the actions which [Cielo and Willow] now complain about.”
Nissani does not try to demonstrate these entities were included
in the 2022 charging orders improperly; indeed, he did not
include filings from that period in our record.
Nissani provides glimpses of what he says is additional
overreach. He briefly highlights the Receiver’s pursuit of rent
payments of “tenant ALC.” Nissani devotes only a few sentences
to ALC and does not discuss the Receiver’s evidence concerning
this entity or the court’s amended order expanding the
receivership to cover the underlying property and “all rents.”
Nissani forfeits this point. (See Fernandes v. Singh (2017) 16
Cal.App.5th 932, 940–941, 943, 944 [appellants must state the
facts fairly or risk forfeiture].)
Nissani similarly forfeited his one-sentence complaint
about the Receiver’s post-judgment deposition subpoenas, which
he supports with a single citation to a single page of our 5,700+
page record. As we noted in our 2022 opinion in this case, an
appellant cannot recruit us to scour the record for support for its
arguments. (See United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies,
LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 156.)
Nissani appears to argue that everything the Receiver did
after the judgment was satisfied exceeded its authority. Nissani
concludes the court should have rejected all related fees. This
argument is mistaken.
After the parties announced their settlement, the court
directed the Receiver to stop collection efforts. Nissani did not
demonstrate the Receiver sought collection-related fees after this
point. Instead, the record shows fees and costs were related to
Nissani’s post-settlement conduct.
9
Recall the flurry of activity Nissani initiated. He filed ex
parte papers to end the receivership, despite the court rule
requiring the Receiver to present a noticed motion or stipulation.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1184(a).) He objected to the
Receiver’s fourth, fifth, and final reports and separately filed a
motion to surcharge the Receiver. He sought to seal receivership
documents based on a misunderstanding of the law. He served
subpoenas and confronted the Receiver about its use of
receivership information. As the Receiver’s counsel told the court
at a hearing in August 2024, “we’ve been dealing with just a
multitude of letters, demands, e-mails, et cetera.” The court
aptly warned then that this conduct required a response and was
making the process more time-consuming and expensive.
Nissani’s reply brief appropriately appreciates that his
conduct increased the cost of the proceeding and that “[s]ome
response work may have been necessary to complete the
receivership and protect the Receiver’s ability to obtain
discharge.” But this brief fails to take the necessary step of
identifying the services he views as improper. This was his
burden on appeal as the appellant. (See Singh, supra, 65
Cal.App.5th at p. 867; see also People v. Riverside Univ. (1973) 35
Cal.App.3d 572, 587 (Riverside) [“It is settled that fees awarded
to receivers are in the sound discretion of the trial court and in
the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion, a
reviewing court is not justified in setting aside an order fixing
fees”].)
Receivers are entitled to compensation for their work and
their attorneys’ services. Trial courts have broad discretion to
decide who will pay, and appellate courts must uphold this
decision absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. (Sunbelt
10
Developers, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at pp. 922 & 930.) “[T]he
decision often focuses on equitable circumstances presented in
the underlying dispute or factors that require completion of the
litigation.” (Id. at p. 927.)
The equities here ran against Nissani because of his
conduct throughout the case.
The trial court appropriately credited the Receiver with the
fast settlement reached by the parties. As the court explained:
The “judgment had stood without collection for nearly four years
prior to the appointment of the Receiver, . . . and within
approximately five months after such appointment, the matter
was resolved. The Receiver has fulfilled its responsibilities and
obligations in this matter expeditiously and effectively.” “The
Receiver did not exceed its authority by retaining counsel and
otherwise investigating assets it reasonably believed were
connected to the Judgment Debtors.” “[T]he court finds that it
was not the Receiver that delayed and unreasonably increased
the litigation in this case, but the conduct of the Judgment
Debtors, both in failing to meet to resolve this matter early on,
and then by filing motions and ex partes attacking the diligent
work of the Receiver.”
Nissani has not shown that the Receiver exceeded its
authority or that the court abused its discretion in approving the
final accounting, including the payment of fees.
B
In a separate attack, Nissani argues we must reverse the
award of attorney fees because the Receiver did not get the
court’s approval to hire counsel at the outset of the receivership
and did not comply with the requirements of California Rules of
Court, rule 3.1180 (the Rule) for attorney retention applications.
11
Moreover, he maintains, the court could not cure these problems
with a nunc pro tunc notation.
This attack is amiss in many respects.
Before the Receiver’s appointment, Invenz’s chief executive
officer Richard Munro told the court and the parties he would
retain counsel to assist in the receivership, if necessary. In his
oath accepting the appointment, filed four days after the court
issued the Appointment Order, Munro alerted the parties and the
court he was retaining counsel. This oath listed the firm and
attorney names. These attorneys appeared in court and on
filings throughout the receivership.
The Receiver laid out the attorney fees it had incurred in
interim reports. No one objected to the first three reports, and
the trial court approved them. Nissani did not start objecting
until the fourth report, and he did not raise noncompliance with
the Rule until August 22, 2024—five months after the Receiver’s
counsel entered the case.
The trial court rightly found Nissani knew the Receiver had
engaged counsel at the outset and regarded his conduct as
waiving strict compliance with the Rule.
The Receiver presented the information required by the
Rule in writing before the court approved the Receiver’s final
report, and the court expressly ratified the Receiver’s retention of
counsel. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1180 [application must
list the attorney’s name and state it is necessary to employ
counsel, who are not associated with any party’s attorney].)
Nissani argues in his reply brief that we must remand the
matter for the trial court to undertake a “real ratification
analysis.” The trial court, however, properly ratified the matter
and demonstrated its approval of counsel’s engagement
12
throughout the case. The court’s nunc pro tunc notation at the
end of the receivership was not the first time the court
demonstrated its approval.
Nissani cannot complain about insufficient findings on
ratification or waiver, moreover, because he omitted the universe
of potentially relevant oral statements from our record. (See
Foust v. San Jose Construction Co. Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th
181, 186–187 [listing cases where appellate courts refused to
reach the merits of appellants’ claims absent a reporter's
transcript of the pertinent proceeding or a suitable substitute];
see also Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609 [appellants have the
burden of providing an adequate record].)
For instance, our record does not contain a transcript for
the February 2024 hearing on the motion to appoint a receiver.
Neither is there a transcript of the October 2024 hearing, where
the court considered the Receiver’s final report and account, as
well as Nissani’s surcharge motion and his complaints about
counsel. The three transcripts our record does contain—from
July to September 2024—all show the Receiver’s counsel
consistently appeared without objection.
Nissani cites inapposite and unpublished decisions in
arguing the remedy for not complying with the Rule should be
disallowing recovery of attorney fees.
He discusses published California cases, but they
emphasize the wide discretion of trial courts when it comes to
receiverships, including ratifying receiver actions that lack prior
court approval and ordering a party to pay the receiver’s fees.
(See, e.g., Maggiora v. Palo Alto Inn, Inc. (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d
706, 710–711, 713 (Maggiora); Riverside, supra, 35 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 581–583.)
13
None of these cases holds that an emergency must have
existed to excuse a receiver’s failure to apply for appointment of
counsel at the outset of the receivership. (See, e.g., Maggiora,
supra, 249 Cal.App.2d at p. 713.)
The Riverside decision is particularly unhelpful for Nissani.
It recognizes that “[w]here a receiver has acted in good faith and
when what he has done has been beneficial to the interested
parties, his acts, though taken without court authorization,
should be subsequently approved.” (Riverside, supra, 35
Cal.App.3d at p. 582.)
Finally, the Rules of Court signal what should happen
when there is noncompliance with a court rule: the complaining
party should file a noticed motion seeking sanctions. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 2.30(a)–(c).) Nissani did not cite this
pertinent rule and did not file a sanctions motion.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the challenged order and award costs to
respondent Invenz, Inc.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
SCHERB, J.
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