Filed 9/30/26 In re D.B. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re D.B., a Person Coming B339350
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KJ41667-
Plaintiff and Respondent, 100322)
v.
D.B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Steven E. Ipson, Judge. Dismissed.
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Defendant D.B.1 appeals the juvenile court’s order
transferring his case to criminal court. While this appeal was
pending, D.B. was released from prison on parole. We dismiss the
appeal as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1998, when D.B. was 16 years old, he and several
codefendants committed multiple crimes in Los Angeles. D.B. and
a fellow gang member provided the group with guns. They
carjacked one victim at gunpoint and stole her purse. The group
attempted another carjacking, during which D.B. shot at the car
before the group left the scene.2
The group later robbed Gilbert Rivas and three other
pedestrians at gunpoint. A codefendant punched a female
pedestrian when she resisted, and Rivas told that codefendant
not to hurt her or disrespect them. D.B. shot Rivas in the
stomach. After Rivas fell to the ground, another codefendant shot
him in the back and head. Rivas died of his injuries.
Shortly thereafter, a Welfare and Institutions Code
section 602 petition was filed against D.B. in juvenile court. The
juvenile court transferred D.B. to criminal court to stand trial.
(See § 707.)
D.B. was convicted by jury of one count of murder with
robbery and attempted robbery special circumstances, two counts
of second degree robbery, three counts of attempted second
degree robbery, and one count of carjacking. Various gang and
1 We refer to Defendant by his initials. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.401(a)(2).)
2 D.B. was not charged in this incident, but the evidence was
admitted at trial to establish intent and motive.
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firearm enhancements were found true, and D.B. was sentenced
to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP), plus
29 years four months. In 2001, the judgment was affirmed on
direct appeal, as modified to stay the sentence imposed for one
robbery count. (Case No. B135322.)
In 2015, the criminal court granted D.B.’s petition for a
writ of habeas corpus to recall and resentence him. (See Miller v.
Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 477, 479–480 [court must consider
certain factors before imposing a LWOP sentence on a juvenile
offender].)
In September 2022, the criminal court conditionally
recalled D.B.’s sentence and granted his motion to
transfer/remand his case to juvenile court pursuant to
Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016.
(People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303–304.)
It asked the juvenile court to decide “if it would have transferred
the case to adult criminal court had it originally been filed in
juvenile court in accordance with the current law.”
In October 2022, the People filed a new Welfare and
Institutions Code section 602 petition, essentially realleging the
crimes of which D.B. had been convicted. That same day, the
People moved to transfer D.B. to criminal court. (See § 707,
subds. (a)(1) & (b).) D.B. opposed transfer.
By the time the transfer hearing was held in 2024, D.B.
was 42 years old. After a multi-day hearing in which many
witnesses testified for both sides, the juvenile court found “by
clear and convincing evidence that [D.B.] is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
Among its findings were that housing in the juvenile system was
not available for D.B. because the juvenile facility houses youth
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in their teens and 20’s, not men in their 40’s; thus, D.B. would
likely be immediately released if he remained in the juvenile
system. It dismissed the 2022 petition without prejudice and
returned the case to criminal court.
D.B. timely appealed. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.770(g)(1).)
According to D.B., the criminal court then re-imposed his
LWOP sentence. But both parties agree D.B. was thereafter
found suitable for parole on March 5, 2025, under the youth
offender parole statute. (See Pen. Code, § 3051.) D.B.’s previous
appellate counsel informed us he was released from prison on
August 8, 2025.
DISCUSSION
D.B. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in
transferring his case to criminal court by applying an incorrect
standard, and in the alternative, because its order was not
supported by substantial evidence. He acknowledges, however,
his release from prison may have mooted his appeal. We agree
this appeal is moot, and we decline to exercise our discretion to
consider the merits.
Courts are “ ‘ “not to give opinions upon moot questions or
. . . declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) “ ‘[A]
case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical
effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.’ ” (People
v. Armas (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 350, 353; see also People v.
DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 645 (DeLeon).) In order “[f]or relief
to be ‘effective,’ ” there must be “an ongoing harm” that is
“redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the
[party] seeks.” (In re D.P., at p. 276.)
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In light of his release from prison, D.B. has not pointed to
any ongoing harm, let alone a practical impact of a potential
ruling in his favor. On the contrary, D.B. concedes his “[c]laim is
[n]o [l]onger [a]ctive” because “there may be no direct impact on
[him] or his incarceration status.” Because D.B. has not shown “a
specific legal or practical consequence that will be averted upon
reversal,” his appeal is moot. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 283; see also Pfeifer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1282.) Without diminishing the serious
repercussions of a transfer to criminal court, D.B. has already
obtained a better result in his release from incarceration than he
sought at his transfer hearing.
In his reply brief, D.B. argues “ ‘the appeal affords the
opportunity to erase’ certain stigmas associated with his case.”
(Quoting People v. Nolan (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1213.) Not
only is the argument forfeited (People v. Bryant, Smith and
Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 408), but also D.B. has not
specified such stigmas, let alone explained how they “support the
conclusion that a legally sufficient controversy exists.” (DeLeon,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 646, fn. 2; see also In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 277 [in dependency court, “complaining of
‘stigma’ alone is insufficient to sustain an appeal”].)
Nonetheless, even when an appeal is moot, we retain
discretion to consider the merits in certain circumstances. (See,
e.g., Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of
Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473, 479–480.) D.B.
argues we should exercise our discretion here because his issues
are “likely to recur” and are “of general public concern.” We
decline his request.
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First, even if D.B.’s challenge to the standard applied by
the juvenile court may recur in future cases, we do not agree it is
appropriate to review now. D.B. does not argue—and we do not
perceive—that issue will regularly evade review. (Cf. Southern
Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911) 219
U.S. 498, 515 [issues on appeal were “continuing” and should not
be “defeated . . . by short term orders, capable of repetition, yet
evading review,” affording the parties no chance of redress];
Moore v. Ogilvie (1969) 394 U.S. 814, 816 [challenge to election
procedure was “ ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ ”].) The
severity of D.B.’s charged crimes and the length of his sentence
indeed point to the opposite conclusion. Thus, the issue can be
appropriately considered in a nonmoot appeal. (See Cerletti v.
Newsom (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 760, 767 [declining to exercise
discretion where issue would not regularly evade review].)
Second, D.B. argues his appeal involves an issue of general
public concern, relying upon cases involving due process
violations. (See, e.g., In re Sodersten (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1163,
1217–1219 [prosecution’s suppression of material evidence
favorable to the defense “compromise[d] the core of [the justice]
system”]; John A. v. San Bernardino City Unified School Dist.
(1982) 33 Cal.3d 301, 307–308 [student facing expulsion from
public school based on written declarations instead of oral
testimony].) But while D.B. conclusorily asserts the transfer
implicates due process, he has not argued the transfer hearing
lacked “hallmarks of due process [such] as the assistance of
counsel” or the right to review and present evidence. (People v.
Cardona (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 516, 527.) Nor has he argued his
unspecified due process “concerns” are comparable to those
identified in the cases upon which he relies.
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In light of these circumstances and the parties’ consensus
the appeal is moot, we decline to exercise our discretion to
consider D.B.’s appeal.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
LUI, P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
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