Filed 9/24/26 Searles v. Kemmerling CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
QUEEN SEARLES, B345812
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24STRO08875)
LISA KEMMERLING,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Christmas Brookens, Judge. Affirmed.
Queen Searles in propria persona.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
_________________________________________
Queen Searles appeals the denial of her request for a civil
harassment restraining order against her neighbor. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant is a “spiritual work[er]” who lives in the same
housing complex as Lisa Kimmerling (respondent). According to
appellant, respondent has threatened to call the police and the
landlord about her without good cause and has “defam[ed]” her
character by telling others that appellant has “a lot of evil” in her
house and that she “throw[s] trash and makeup down the toilet.”
Respondent also calls appellant “crazy” and a “bitch,” says
appellant is “going to drop dead,” and turns “other tenants”
against her. Respondent also “disrespects” and “talks bad about
all the neighbors.”
In December 2024, appellant filed a request for a
restraining order against respondent on the basis that “[s]he
threatened [her], stalked [her], and disturbed [her] peace.”
Appellant requested that respondent be ordered to stay 100 yards
away from her, and at least 10 yards away from her “while
entering, exiting, or residing in [their] respective apartments.”
On February 14, 2025, the trial court convened the hearing,
and appellant and her neighbor, Forrest Mitchell, both testified.
The hearing had been continued twice to allow appellant to serve
respondent, but respondent did not appear to testify. After
considering the evidence, the court denied appellant’s request for
a restraining order.
DISCUSSION
Section 527.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure1 provides
injunctive relief to a person who has suffered harassment.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
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(§ 527.6, subd. (a)(1); Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th
399, 401.) “Harassment” is defined as “unlawful violence, a
credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of
conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms,
annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate
purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and
must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the
petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) At a hearing on a restraining
order request, “the judge shall receive any testimony that is
relevant, and may make an independent inquiry. If the judge
finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment
exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” (§ 527.6,
subd. (i)(1).)
We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
restraining order for an abuse of discretion. (Jan F. v. Natalie F.
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 583, 593; Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 156
Cal.App.4th 413, 420.) The party seeking a restraining order
bears the burden of showing the circumstances that justify the
order. (Jan F., at p. 593.) Where the trier of fact has concluded
that the party has failed to meet her burden of proof, the question
for the reviewing court is whether the evidence compels a finding
in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. (Ibid.) The trial
court’s ruling is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s
burden to provide an adequate record demonstrating error.
(Defend Bayview Hunters Point Com. v. City and County of San
Francisco (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 846, 859–860.)
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by discounting
the video that she played for the court and the fact that
respondent did not attend the hearing. We have granted
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appellant’s motion to augment the record on appeal to include
various videos that were apparently shown or made available to
the trial court. We agree with the trial court’s characterization of
the footage: “It’s hard to hear what’s going on. But more
concerning . . . was that there was a narrative over the video. In
other words, things were being written and placed over the video.
So regardless [of] if I could hear or see, I’m already given a story
about what’s happening and I don’t know if the story is true or
not.” The trial court properly “discounted” the video on these
bases. Other videos submitted with appellant’s motion to
augment show her speaking with the witness on the telephone,
giving a tour of her apartment complex and describing what
respondent does to harass her, and arguing with a neighbor who
is not a party to this action. Nothing in these videos, or any other
part of the record, entitles appellant to a restraining order as a
matter of law. (See Jan F., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 593.)
As to the lack of testimony from respondent, the trial
court’s statement that appellant still bore the burden of proof was
correct, and respondent’s absence from the hearing did not
require the trial court to grant appellant the restraining order.
(See People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela) (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th
485, 498 [“ ‘No finding can be predicated on the absence of
evidence’ ”].)
Appellant also argues that the trial court “Applied an
Incorrect Legal Framework by Invoking Inapplicable Burdens of
Proof.” The trial court was explicit in its understanding that “for
civil harassment the burden is clear and convincing.” This was
correct. (§ 527.6, subd. (i)(1).) Appellant cites the trial court’s
statement, “[T]he way it works is the highest burden in the land
is beyond a reasonable doubt. Then it’s clear and convincing.
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And then it’s preponderance. [¶] And based on the evidence that
was provided to me today, the court is going to rule that you did
not meet that burden . . . .” This statement does not negate that
the court applied the correct legal standard. It merely shows
that, in the trial court’s view, appellant did not meet her burden
even under a less stringent standard.
Next, appellant charges the trial court with making an
improper accusation of witness tampering and discriminating
against the witness for being “ ‘on the spectrum.’ ” This
mischaracterizes the record, which shows that the witness
brought up on his own that he was on the spectrum to explain to
the trial court that he has “some trouble communicating.”
Nothing the trial court said shows that it discounted the
witness’s testimony based on this information. While appellant is
correct that the trial court interrupted to ask questions of its own
and to stop the witness from testifying about irrelevant topics,
this was well within its discretion. When the trial court asked
the witness whether there was “anything else” he had to say, the
witness asked appellant whether he was “missing anything.”
This prompted the trial court to inquire of the witness why he
asked that question. The court’s inquiry was reasonable, and it
does not suggest any improper bias against the witness or
appellant.
Finally, appellant argues that the trial court improperly
“truncate[d] the hearing” to exclude appellant’s material
witnesses. We disagree that it was outside the bounds of reason
for the trial court to decline to continue the hearing in the
afternoon for other witnesses to testify remotely.
The trial court reasonably concluded on the record before it
that although “[respondent] may be an unpleasant person” who
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“may be out there . . . saying things,” the conduct complained of
did not justify a civil harassment restraining order.
Because our review of the record has revealed no error or
misconduct, we also reject appellant’s claims of cumulative error
and of violations of due process and judicial ethics rules.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, J.
RICHARDSON, J.
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