Filed 9/24/26 P. v. Bolton CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B346796
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. BA503907)
v.
FRAMEL LAWAYNE BOLTON, SR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
Christina Vanarelli, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Framel Lawayne Bolton, Senior, appeals from
judgment following his conviction for voluntary manslaughter.
Defendant testified that he killed the victim to defend himself
and others. To support this argument, he offered evidence of the
victim’s propensity for violence (Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (a)). In
rebuttal, the prosecutor recalled defendant and inquired into his
own prior acts of violence.
Defendant challenges the admission of his testimony. He
contends (1) his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance
by failing to object to the compelled examination; and (2) the
court erred by overruling a motion for mistrial raised during his
testimony. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution Evidence
Around noon on February 17, 2022, several witnesses
noticed people fighting at a local park. An unhoused man, later
identified as Jerry Johnson, was being attacked by three people.
Two of the attackers were later identified as defendant and
defendant’s common law wife, Shayla Tatum. The fight spilled
over onto an adjoining sidewalk, where Tatum struck Johnson
over the head with a 16-inch combination taser/flashlight.
Defendant then shot Johnson. The group struck Johnson several
more times and ran away.
Johnson died from a single gunshot wound to the torso. He
had marijuana and methamphetamine in his blood. The jury
viewed video footage of the fight obtained from nearby security
cameras. No weapons were found in the park or on the sidewalk.
2
B. Defense Evidence
Defendant testified that he shot Johnson to defend himself
and others. The facts set forth below are drawn from defendant’s
testimony on direct and cross-examination.
As defendant, Tatum, defendant’s cousin, and a female
friend were barbecuing in the park, they were aggressively
approached by Johnson, who appeared to be under the influence
of drugs.1 Johnson told the group he was gang-affiliated and
threatened to kill them. “Frightened” and in “fear,” defendant
asked Johnson to leave, but Johnson refused.
To lure Johnson away, defendant ran from the park and
across the street to his apartment. After exiting an elevator onto
an upper floor, defendant heard Tatum and their friend
screaming across the street. From an outdoor landing, defendant
watched Johnson chase, lunge, and swing at both women.
Defendant went inside his apartment, where he took “a couple of
minutes” to change into a hooded sweatshirt, put on sneakers,
and find a weapon. After grabbing a gun, defendant returned to
the park.
To scare Johnson away from Tatum and their friend,
defendant raised his gun and told Johnson to leave. Unfazed,
Johnson turned around and attacked defendant. Defendant
pocketed his gun and fought back. During the skirmish, Johnson
appeared to hold a sharp object. As the fight moved to the
sidewalk, Johnson bent over and grabbed a knife or weapon.
1 Bolton (5’ 8”) is shorter and slighter in build than Johnson
(6’ 2”).
3
Fearing for his life, defendant pulled his gun and fired one shot
at Johnson’s legs.
Following his testimony, and after being placed on recall
for potential rebuttal,2 defendant called security guards to testify
about prior, violent encounters with Johnson. In one incident
occurring in April 2019, Johnson threw trash at guards and
swung a sharpened fence post at them. In another incident a
year later, Johnson threatened to kill a guard while holding a
machete.
C. Rebuttal Evidence
The prosecutor recalled defendant to the stand in her
rebuttal case. Defendant admitted pleading guilty in 2010 and
2012 to making criminal threats against the mother of his child.3
When asked about the incidents giving rise to each guilty plea,
defendant denied committing any act of violence. He further
denied that other criminal charges were dismissed pursuant to
his plea agreements.
The prosecutor also examined a police officer who had
knowledge concerning the incident underlying defendant’s 2010
guilty plea. The officer testified he responded to a domestic
2 “In a criminal action, evidence of the defendant’s character for
violence . . . is not made inadmissible . . . if the evidence is offered by
the prosecution to prove conduct of the defendant in conformity with
the character . . . and is offered after evidence that the victim had a
character for violence . . . tending to show violence has been adduced
by the defendant under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a).” (Evid. Code,
§ 1103, subd. (b).)
3 Defendant admitted suffering these prior convictions during his
testimony in defense.
4
violence call and witnessed several injuries to the victim’s face
and leg.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
An amended information charged defendant with Johnson’s
murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))4 and alleged a firearm
enhancement allegation (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), two prior serious
or violent felony convictions for making criminal threats under
the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j), 1170.12), and
several aggravating sentencing factors (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(1)–(b)(5)).
Following trial, the jury acquitted defendant of murder,
convicted him of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter,
and found the firearm enhancement allegation true. At a
bifurcated trial, the court found the prior conviction allegations
and several aggravating sentencing factors true. After striking
one prior strike conviction (see People v. Superior Court (Romero)
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497), the court sentenced defendant to 11 years
for manslaughter, doubled under the Three Strikes law, plus
10 years for the firearm enhancement.
DISCUSSION
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to object when he was recalled to testify in
4 Subsequent unspecified references to statutes are to the Penal
Code. The information additionally charged Tatum with assault with
a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). She was tried alongside
defendant and convicted of this offense. Tatum is not a party to this
appeal.
5
the prosecutor’s rebuttal case. To establish such claim, defendant
must demonstrate (1) defense counsel’s representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) prejudice.
(People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 695 (Jasso); Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 693–694.) Defendant has
established neither ground.
As defendant admits, “the prosecutor was entitled to
present evidence of [defendant’s] character for violence once
[defendant] presented evidence of Mr. Johnson’s character for
violence.” (Citing Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (b).) Indeed, “if ‘a
defendant offers evidence to establish that the victim was a
violent person, thereby inviting the jury to infer that the victim
acted violently during the events in question, then the
prosecution is permitted to introduce evidence demonstrating
that . . . the defendant was a violent person, from which the jury
might infer it was the defendant who acted violently.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897, 953 (Barrett); see also
Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (a)(1)–(2).)
Defendant further admits his examination in rebuttal was,
“in substance,” cross-examination. Defendant sought to
characterize Johnson’s shooting as necessary to defend himself
and others. To do so, defendant testified that (1) Johnson was
the violent aggressor, and (2) defendant feared Johnson. Both
subjects of testimony were rebuttable by “evidence of defendant’s
own violent character.” (Barrett, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 954
[victim aggression and self-defense]; see People v. Fuiava (2012)
53 Cal.4th 622, 696 [“victim was a violent person”]; People v.
Schader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, 771–777 [“motives, intent and
state of mind”].) When asked about his prior convictions,
defendant explained them away, denying every factual basis on
6
which they were based. Such minimization, or casting “a
favorable light on the circumstances of his prior conviction[s],”
allowed the prosecutor to “cross-examine him regarding all of the
circumstances” giving rise to the convictions for the additional
purpose of impeachment. (People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1,
52.)
Notwithstanding his agreement on the substantive
admissibility of his rebuttal testimony, defendant argues the
testimony “was still, procedurally,” compelled direct examination.
We disagree.
By testifying in his own defense, “defendant relinquished
his privilege against compelled self-incrimination with respect to
cross-examination on matters within the scope of the narrative
testimony he provided on direct examination, as well as on
matters that impeached his credibility as a witness.” (People v.
Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1227, fn. 3 (Barnum).)
In light of defendant’s voluntary testimony in defense, his
testimony in rebuttal did not constitute compelled direct
examination. “It is true that the People called defendant as a
witness in their rebuttal. But in the People’s rebuttal, the
prosecutor, in effect, merely subjected defendant to reopened
cross-examination [citations] . . . , doing little more than what
[s]he properly did on the initial cross-examination of defendant in
the course of the defense, which was to impeach defendant’s
credibility by probing into prior incidents . . . .” (Barnum, supra,
29 Cal.4th at p. 1227, fn. 3.) Numerous cases recognize this type
of reopened cross-examination in rebuttal. (E.g., People v. Rosoto
(1962) 58 Cal.2d 304, 351–352 [approving recall for further
examination “even though [defendant] had already rested his
case”], limited on another ground in People v. Haston (1968) 69
7
Cal.2d 233, 250, fn. 22; People v. La Vers (1933) 130 Cal.App. 708,
710–713 [same]; Ching v. United States (9th. Cir. 1920) 264 F.
639, 642–643 [same].)5 Defense counsel was not ineffective in
failing to object to defendant’s rebuttal examination. (See People
v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122 [counsel is “not ineffective
for failing to make frivolous or futile motions”].)
Defendant has also failed to establish prejudice. He argues
the rebuttal questions “elicit[ed] testimony from him about the
specific facts giving rise to his prior convictions.” The only
testimony defendant offered in response to these questions were
denials. Those denials did not transform the prosecutor’s
questions into evidence or suggest that whatever was asked was
true.6 Further, evidence of defendant’s actions in connection with
Mr. Johnson’s death was clear. Defendant admittedly shot an
outnumbered victim after spending several minutes obtaining a
weapon. Despite his testimony that Johnson wielded a weapon
and was reaching for one at the moment he fired a shot, no such
5 The authority on which defendant relies found any procedural
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because, “[i]n practical
effect, the erroneous procedure accomplished nothing more than could
have been done had the trial court granted a request to recall the
defendant for further cross-examination.” (People v. Mack (1977) 66
Cal.App.3d 839, 861.)
6 The jury was twice instructed on this principle: “Nothing that
the attorneys say is evidence. . . . Their questions are not evidence.
Only the witnesses’ answers are evidence. The attorneys’ questions
are significant only if they helped you to understand the witnesses’
answers. Do not assume that something is true just because one of the
attorneys asked a question that suggested it was true.” (CALCRIM
Nos. 104, 222.) We presume the jury followed these instructions.
(Jasso, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 683–684.)
8
weapon was located at the scene or in the park where the fight
began. Defendant received the lowest possible conviction for
Johnson’s killing because, to echo the trial court, defense counsel
“did a great” and “very good job” highlighting defendant’s honest
but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense. Because
defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the alleged
deficiencies in defense counsel’s representation, his ineffective
assistance claim fails.
B. Motion for Mistrial
Defendant also argues the trial court erred by denying his
motion for mistrial during the prosecutor’s rebuttal case. That
motion, he contends, was based on the prosecutor’s improper
examination into the length of his prior prison terms and the
“specific instances” of his conduct. We disagree that the trial
court erred.
1. Relevant Background
Near the end of her rebuttal case, the prosecutor requested
a sidebar conference, where she asked to inquire into one of
defendant’s prior prison sentences. The prosecutor argued
defendant’s seven-year sentence was relevant because “he’s
denying the underlying facts that led to the conviction. [¶] It’s
unreasonable to believe that a person is going to voluntarily enter
into a plea resulting in that much time if he, in fact, did not
commit . . . the underlying offense . . . .” Defense counsel
objected, “[I]t’s 352.”7
7 Evidence Code section 352 provides: “The court in its discretion
may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
9
After initially sustaining counsel’s objection, the court
quickly changed its mind. The court found the proposed
questioning relevant to defendant’s veracity because he was
“denying everything.” Defense counsel objected and “move[d] for
a mistrial on the basis of that decision.” Defense counsel argued,
“[I]t’s 352 for the jury to hear that he’s sentenced to a 92-month
prison sentence. The People can prove up the priors through
alternative witnesses, but to allow them to hear about a long
prison sentence will wildly prejudice us in [defendant’s] case.”
Rather than having the prosecutor inquire into defendant’s prior
sentence, defense counsel requested to cross-examine his client to
address defendant’s insistent denial of any wrongdoing in his
prior case. Defense counsel suggested he could ask if defendant
“committed an act of criminal threats that led him to plead, [and]
he could say, ‘yes’; the jury would hear that, without having to
hear about a 92-month sentence.” The court granted defense
counsel’s request but held off ruling on the prosecutor’s request to
question defendant about the lengthy prior prison term. The
court indicated its ruling on the prosecutor’s request would
depend upon “what [defendant] says.”
On cross-examination, counsel asked defendant if he
committed acts of criminal threats in 2009 and 2012 “that led
[him] to plead” in both cases. Defendant replied, “Yes.” During
the prosecutor’s follow-up examination, however, defendant
testified that he “didn’t commit [any] criminal acts” in the prior
cases. In light of these responses, the prosecutor asked if
defendant pleaded guilty in 2012 in exchange for seven years
eight months imprisonment. Defendant admitted a court
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
10
document reflected this sentence but stated he “pled to six years”
for “something [he] didn’t do.” No objections were interposed to
this line of questioning.8
2. Analysis
The Attorney General contends defendant forfeited this
claim. We partially agree. “‘“[A] defendant may not complain on
appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion—
and on the same ground—the defendant made an assignment of
misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to
disregard the impropriety. . . .”’” (People v. Collins (2010) 49
Cal.4th 175, 198 (Collins), citations omitted.) When moving for
mistrial below, defendant challenged the prosecutor’s requested
question about his prior seven-year sentence. He did not
challenge the “specific instances of prior conduct.” Defendant has
forfeited this portion of his claim on appeal. (Ibid.)
Defendant has not established impropriety in the question
underlying his mistrial motion or an abuse in the court’s
discretion declining to consider the motion under the
circumstances before it. (See Collins, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 198;
People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 574.) Throughout his
testimony, defendant acknowledged his prior guilty pleas but
denied actually committing the underlying offenses. As
recognized by the parties and court below, defendant’s agreement
to serve a lengthy sentence in exchange for one of those pleas
tended to refute his testimony that he “didn’t commit [any]
criminal acts.” (See People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344,
382 [prosecutor may introduce evidence in cross-examination
8 The court noted that defense counsel “actually has no objection
to the line of questioning [the prosecutor] wanted to get into.”
11
refuting defendant’s “‘statements or the inference which may
necessarily be drawn from them’”].) We discern no misconduct in
this examination and no error denying the motion for mistrial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, Acting P. J.
We concur:
TAMZARIAN, J.
DAUM, J.
12