Filed 9/24/26 P. v. Raridon CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
THE PEOPLE, C103196
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. STK-CR-FE-
v. 1998-0005366)
JONATHAN MAURIC RARIDON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Jonathan Mauric Raridon appeals the denial of his Penal Code section
1172.6 petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage. (Further undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.) He argues the record of conviction does not establish
that he is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. On the record before us, we
agree.
In 1998, defendant pled guilty to manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and admitted he
used a firearm in the commission of the crime (§ 969f). Prior to entering into the plea
agreement, the People amended the charging document by removing a personal firearm
enhancement allegation (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and adding an allegation that defendant
personally used a firearm pursuant to section 969f. On the record before us, we cannot
conclude that the record of conviction establishes he was the actual killer. We therefore
reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings under section 1172.6.
1
BACKGROUND
I. The Underlying Crime
Soon after midnight on November 4, 1997, San Joaquin County sheriff deputies
found the body of the victim Richard Devita lying in the street with multiple gunshot
wounds. An autopsy later revealed the victim died from gunshot wounds to the head,
chest, and trunk.
Steven, defendant’s cousin, was in the garage of his home around this time when
defendant and codefendants Robert Perry and Darrell Gibson arrived in a white car.
Defendant, Perry, and Gibson entered the garage; defendant had a gun in his hand.
Defendant turned off the lights by unscrewing the light bulbs because the men could see
police cars going by on the freeway with their emergency lights on. After a couple of
minutes Perry left the garage, and later defendant left with Gibson. Prior to leaving,
defendant instructed Steven to hide the car in the garage or cover it with a tarp. Steven
looked inside the car and saw a lot of blood.
A few hours later, Christopher, an acquaintance of defendant, met up with the
codefendants. Defendant gave Christopher a handgun and told him to “get rid of it.”
Defendant also gave Christopher clothes and asked him to throw them away. Later Tracy
police officers stopped and arrested Christopher for possession of the handgun defendant
gave to him. At the preliminary hearing, Christopher testified that he had no personal
knowledge of who shot the victim and none of the codefendant’s admitted to him that
they shot the victim.
Two days later, sheriff deputies arrived at Steven’s home and seized the car for
evidence. Deputies collected blood samples from the car, which matched the victim’s
blood. Fingerprints taken from the car matched all three codefendants.
II. Trial
In February 1998, the People charged defendant with murder. (§ 187.) The
People further alleged defendant personally used a firearm in commission of the murder
2
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and had a prior
strike conviction (§§ 1170.12, subd. (b), 667). In April 1999, defendant entered into a
negotiated plea agreement. Pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant pled no contest to
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)), admitted he personally used a firearm (§ 969f), admitted
two prior strike convictions, and agreed to serve a prison sentence of 25 years to life
(§ 1170.12, subd. (b)). In exchange, the People amended the murder charge to
manslaughter, the personal firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) to a personal
firearm use admission (§ 969f), dismissed the prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5,
subd. (b)), and added a second prior strike conviction allegation. The court sentenced
defendant to 25 years to life pursuant to the plea agreement.
III. Resentencing
In May 2023, defendant petitioned the trial court for resentencing. The People
opposed defendant’s petition arguing he was the actual killer. Defendant replied that his
admission to personally using a firearm in the commission of the crime did not disqualify
him for resentencing as a matter of law and the charging document did not contain the
prosecution’s theory of liability.
The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage finding the record of
conviction indicated defendant was the actual killer. The court noted that at the plea
hearing defendant admitted he personally used a firearm pursuant to section 969f in the
commission of the manslaughter charge.
Defendant timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
I.
Applicable Law
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill No. 1437) amended “the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
3
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was
not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 959 (Lewis).) Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a procedural mechanism in section
1172.6 for those convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law
as amended. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015; Lewis, at p. 957.) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) later expanded the statute to apply to attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequence doctrine and manslaughter. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
In its current form, section 1172.6, subdivision (a) applies to those convicted of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime or a person convicted of attempted murder based on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. To be eligible for relief, the petitioner must make a
prima facie showing that he could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted
murder under changes to these theories of murder liability made effective on January 1,
2019, by Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) If the petitioner makes a prima
facie showing, the trial court must issue an order to show cause and conduct an
evidentiary hearing where the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant could still be convicted of murder under current law.
(§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d).)
At the prima facie stage, the court may deny a resentencing petition only if the
petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. That is, the petition and the record of
conviction must “establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief.”
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) This is a pure question of law we review
de novo. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.)
4
While the trial court may look to the record of conviction after appointing defense
counsel, the prima facie inquiry is limited. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The
court takes the petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if those factual allegations
were proved. (Ibid.) If so, the court must issue an order to show cause. (Ibid.) At that
early stage, the trial court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on
credibility grounds or engage in factfinding that involves the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion. (Id. at p. 972.) But if the record “ ‘ “contain[s] facts refuting the
allegations in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 971.)
II.
Analysis
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his petition at the prima facie
stage because nothing in the record of conviction conclusively established that he was
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The People claim defendant was prosecuted under
the sole theory that he was the actual killer. They further claim that the preliminary
hearing transcript and defendant’s admission that he personally used a firearm to commit
manslaughter (§ 969f) confirm he was the actual killer. We disagree with the People and
note, despite their opposition, the People ultimately concede we should remand the matter
to the trial court for the court to consider an amended petition. On the record before us,
there are no facts in the record of conviction that establish as a matter of law that
defendant was the actual killer.
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution argued “three ... people took [the
victim] out and executed” him and implied defendant was the actual killer because he
“was seen with a firearm right after the murder” and tried to “get rid of” the gun. This
inference does not prove as a matter of law that defendant was the actual killer because
5
there are no facts in the record that identify defendant as the person who shot the victim.
The witness testimony and evidence from the preliminary hearing only established
defendant was one of three people who was present when the victim died and that
defendant possessed the gun used to kill the victim after the killing. There are no facts in
the preliminary hearing transcript that recount the shooting. We conclude that to find
defendant was the actual killer because he was seen with and attempted to dispose of the
gun used to kill the victim could only have been made by the trial court if it engaged in
impermissible factfinding. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.)
The amended manslaughter charge did not identify defendant as the shooter either,
nor did the People indicate they were pursuing a theory that did not involve imputed
malice when they orally amended the charges from murder to manslaughter at the outset
of defendant’s change of plea hearing. A generic allegation of manslaughter was
sufficient to allow prosecution for manslaughter under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 712 [discussing
felony murder and murder].) When entering his plea to the manslaughter charge,
defendant did not stipulate to a particular theory of liability and nothing in the record of
conviction conclusively establishes that defendant admitted his guilt on a direct aiding
and abetting theory, rather than a natural and probable consequences theory.
Defendant’s admission that he personally used a firearm under section 969f does
not refute the allegations in defendant’s section 1172.6 petition. Defendant’s admission
under section 969f merely admitted that the manslaughter charge was a serious felony
under section 1192.7, subdivision (c). (§ 969f, subd. (a); People v. Jones (2005) 30 Cal.
4th 1084, 1120 [the finding of personal use does not in itself prove defendant was the
actual killer].) The People’s citations to People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 and
People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735 are also unavailing. In Patton, the
defendant admitted he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm pursuant to
section 1202.53, subdivision (c). (Patton, at p. 563.) Here, defendant’s admission that he
6
used a firearm under section 969f does not necessarily mean he discharged the firearm.
Garrison also is distinguishable because there, the defendant successfully made a prima
facie case and the trial court subsequently found he was a major participant who acted
with reckless indifference to human life at the evidentiary hearing. (Garrison, at p. 741.)
The trial court’s finding that defendant’s admission under 969f barred him from an
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6 because he was the actual killer was prejudicial
error because the court engaged in “ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or
the exercise of discretion’ ” that is not permitted at the prima facie stage under section
1172.6. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal. 5th at p. 972.)
DISPOSTION
The order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage is
reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings under section 1172.6.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/s/
WISEMAN, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
7