Filed 9/8/26 In re G.P. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re G.P., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E086849
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2500250)
v. OPINION
C.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Malvina Ovanezova,
Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, §21.) Affirmed in part, remanded
with directions.
Mansi Thakkar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
1
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Chief Assistant County Counsel,
and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
C.C. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings
and orders as to her 10-year-old son G.P.1 Mother contends that the juvenile court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over G.P. and his removal from her care are not supported by
substantial evidence. Mother also argues a conditional reversal of the jurisdictional and
dispositional orders are required because the Riverside County Department of Public
Social Services (DPSS) failed to comply with its duty of initial inquiry imposed by state
statutory provisions implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq.) (ICWA).2 We conclude there was substantial evidence supporting the
jurisdiction and disposition orders, and affirm the orders and judgment, but order vacated
the finding that ICWA does not apply and remand for further proceedings.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The family came to the attention of DPSS on May 30, 2025, after an immediate
response referral was received from law enforcement. Mother was under the influence of
1 J.P. (Father) is not a party to this appeal.
2 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even
though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)
2
a central nervous system stimulant and Father had weapons in the house. There was no
electricity, food, water, and the family was in the process of being evicted. The parents
were arrested and taken to jail.
The social worker spoke with law enforcement who said they conducted a welfare
check due to a “mentally disturbed” patient (Mother) who was also a suspect in a theft
earlier that day. Law enforcement had been to the home on multiple occasions due to
domestic disturbances between the parents and between Mother and her neighbors. Law
enforcement stated Mother became erratic and irate as they approached her and that she
had rapid speech and did not make sense as she spoke. Law enforcement believed
mother was under the influence of a central nervous stimulant such as methamphetamine.
When law enforcement entered the family home, G.P. began to try and clean up
the home by covering up some of the animal waste in the home. The social worker
observed photographs of the home which showed it cluttered with the kitchen sink
overflowing with dirty dishes, the oven and stove appearing inoperable with items placed
on top of them, and a propane tank inside the refrigerator. A photo showed a small glass
pipe with black residue next to a plastic cup which had a small amount of a white
powdery substance inside, on a table in the living area, accessible to G.P. Law
enforcement also noticed a foul odor and flies throughout the home.
G.P. said his family has two dogs and 12 puppies, but he said his home is not
always in that present condition. He believed his parents “smoke” and use a “bong” and
that Mother “might” drink alcohol, but he denied knowing what they smoked or what
3
alcohol looked like. He denied witnessing the parents act odd or aggressive, and said he
felt safe in the home and noted that all their relatives lived out of state. G.P. was placed
in protective custody.
On May 31, 2025, the social worker interviewed Father at jail. Father said he and
Mother were in an “on again and off again” relationship, denied domestic violence, but
admitted Mother was previously arrested for domestic violence against him. Father
claimed that he had stopped using methamphetamines, but that he smoked marijuana. He
denied being aware of the conditions of the home and denied knowing that animal waste
was in the home. He stated normally the home was very clean. He denied knowing if
Mother was using methamphetamines. When the social worker informed Father about
the paraphernalia and suspected methamphetamine found in the home, Father said that he
was “sure it was just a little bit,” and then said he did not know if Mother was using
methamphetamine. Father agreed to participate in a drug test after his release from jail,
but denied needing any services. He provided the phone number of a paternal aunt who
he would like to be considered for placement as well as another paternal aunt.
The social worker also interviewed Mother at jail. She denied domestic violence
with Father but admitted to a physical altercation with Father in 2020 and being arrested
in 2020 for domestic violence. Mother was diagnosed with ADHD and was not in any
services. She denied exhibiting bizarre behaviors on May 30, 2025, and also denied
being under the influence of a controlled substance. She admitted to drinking alcohol
earlier in the day, and said that she was likely intoxicated from the alcohol. She claimed
4
that she spoke loud and fast normally. Mother denied using methamphetamine and
denied that any methamphetamine was found in the home. She also denied a pipe was
found in the home and suggested the white powder was planted by law enforcement. She
admitted to using methamphetamines “recreationally” with friends at parties, but not
recently. She could not say when the last time she used methamphetamines.
As to the condition of her home, Mother stated she had working utilities. She said
her electrical sockets were not working, so she connected hers to a neighbor’s outlets.
She claimed her home had working water in the home and denied that there was any
animal feces in the home or on G.P.’s bed. She claimed the animal feces were “planted”
in the home. Mother also said there was plenty of food inside the home. She agreed to
submit to a drug test upon her release. She then “admitted she may test positive for
amphetamines as she took an Adderall, she received from a friend 4 or 5 days prior.”
Mother was willing to participate in any services necessary and that the parents would
clean their home. Mother’s relatives lived in Oregon and the maternal grandmother
would be willing to care for the child in Oregon, but the maternal grandmother had a
significant criminal history.
On May 31, 2025, both parents denied Native American ancestry.
The parents had prior child welfare history for emotional abuse and general
neglect in 2020 and 2018. The general neglect allegation in 2020 was substantiated
against Mother.
5
On June 1, 2025, DPSS tried to contact a paternal aunt at the number provided by
the parents, however, a man answered and said it was the wrong number. DPSS also
attempted to contact the other paternal aunt, but there was no answer. DPSS left a
voicemail message for the paternal aunt.
On June 3, 2025, a petition was filed on behalf of the child pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code3 section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (no
provisions for support) due to drug paraphernalia and controlled substances accessible to
the child found in the home, Mother being found under the influence of a controlled
substance, the deplorable conditions of the home, the parents unresolved history of
abusing drugs, Father being found in possession of drug paraphernalia, and the parents
arrest.
At the June 4, 2025, detention hearing, the parents’ counsel requested a
continuance because the parents were not present. The juvenile court made temporary
detention findings against both parents.
On June 5, 2025, Father filed a Parental Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-020)
form indicating he had no Native American ancestry.
At the continued detention hearing on June 5, 2025, the parents were present in
custody with their counsel. At that time, the juvenile court asked Father if he had any
Native American ancestry and Father said he did not. The court also asked Mother if she
had Native American ancestry and Mother said “no.” The court found Father to be the
3 All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
6
presumed father of G.P. and that ICWA did not apply. G.P. was formally detained from
his parents. The court ordered supervised visitation for the parents twice per week upon
their release from custody and the parents were ordered to drug test prior to visitation.
On June 10, 2025, DPSS made telephone contact with the maternal grandmother
who stated she would like to be considered for placement. However, both parents
expressed concerns about placement with the maternal grandmother as she was a felon.
DPSS recommended that the court find true the allegations in the petition, that
G.P. be declared a dependent of the court, and that family reunification services be
offered to the parents. DPSS noted that ICWA did not apply. On June 11, 2025, Mother
again denied Native American ancestry, and on June 17, 2025, Father again denied Native
American ancestry.
On June 18, 2025, DPSS interviewed G.P. G.P. noted his home was in a bad state
when police completed a welfare check at his home and that his mother was “a little bit
drunk.” He denied there was a foul smell, but confirmed there were flees. He said his
father sometimes drank alcohol and had seen him drunk. He noted his parents drank
alcohol at home, “but not that bad.”
DPSS also interviewed Mother. Mother claimed the glass apparatus found in the
home had the residue of ash from marijuana. She also stated that that family home was
not deplorable and that there were no feces in the home. She claimed she was under the
influence of alcohol at the time of her arrest and denied using controlled substances. She
had never sought treatment. She did not consider her alcohol use a problem, as she drank
7
twice a week if she could afford it. She had completed a 52-week domestic violence
program and parenting classes following her 2020 conviction for domestic violence. She
nonetheless denied any form of domestic violence in the home. Mother noted she had a
strained relationship with her mother who had not seen G.P. in years. DPSS was denied
permission to interview Father as to the allegations. On June 17, 2025, Father said his
father passed away a few years ago and his mother resided in a senior facility.
G.P.’s last doctor visit was in 2023. G.P. could not recall the last time he visited a
doctor or dentist. His caregiver said the child was adjusting well to the home and that he
slept well at night.
On June 18, 2025, DPSS attempted to contact the maternal grandmother again, but
her phone was turned off. On June 19, 2025, the maternal grandmother provided her
information to DPSS and a resource family application was submitted for her to be
evaluated for placement. The parents remained incarcerated.
DPSS attached the police report of the May 30, 2025, incident to its jurisdiction
report. Law enforcement responded to a call regarding a mentally disturbed person who
was possibly under the influence of drugs. The officer identified Mother based on prior
contacts with her. Mother was barefoot at the front gate of her trailer park arguing with
employees and seemed agitated. Mother claimed she and her son were “living in
squalor” inside her trailer and they did not have any power in her trailer. A staff member
claimed Mother was going door to door yelling at other patrons. The officer asked
Mother to place her hands behind her back, pending the theft investigation, but Mother
8
refused. The officer observed Mother “was unable to control her motor functions to her
hands and she continued to involuntarily open and close her hands and thumbs.” In
addition, Mother’s pupils “looked constricted indicating to [the officer] she could be
under the influence of a central nervous system stimulant.” Law enforcement found two
outstanding “Dangerous Drug” warrants for Father out of San Bernardino County. Father
was seated near the main entrance and smoking a “THC pen.” The officer met with G.P.
inside the family residence to check if there were any indications of child endangerment
or abuse based on how Mother was behaving. Once the officer entered the interior of the
trailer, the officer could smell a strong odor of feces emanating from the trailer and
observed a large number of flies swarming inside the residence. The kitchen sink was
clogged and had several old moldy dishes in it and the refrigerator was unplugged and
had a large propane tank inside it. G.P. told the officer that the room was a mess and they
were not expecting people to come inside there. G.P. indicated he did not have any food
and denied having eaten. He claimed his mother had spent her food stamps allocation.
G.P.’s clothing had several stains on it, indicating that it had not been cleaned in a while.
The officer suspected the child was being neglected of basic needs. The officer walked
the interior of the residence and observed dog feces on the floor and dog vomit on the
child’s bed. Next to the vomit, the officer observed what looked like an old shrimp
covered in flies on top of the soiled foam mattress where the child indicated he slept. The
officer observed the main restroom had urine and feces in it and appeared to be clogged.
9
When the officer inquired of Father about the food situation, Father walked back
into the residence to show the officer the food they had. He opened a small freezer and
showed the officer “a stick of frozen meat.” The officer also observed “a large pack of
‘Natural Ice’ beer inside the refrigerator.” The officer expressed concern over the well-
being of the child and suspected Mother was under the influence of a narcotic. Father
began to make excuses, claiming he did not know what was going on. Father denied he
used any drugs “right now.” Father had several knives, razor blades, marijuana, and a
small marijuana pipe on his person.
When the officer attempted to speak with Mother about her residence and the
officer’s concerns for her child’s well-being, Mother began to argue with the officer,
claiming if there was beer in the refrigerator, she would be drinking it. She denied being
under the influence of drugs. Mother appeared to be jovial about the allegations made.
During the field sobriety tests, the officer noted Mother had a large amount of white paste
on her tongue. Based on the officer’s knowledge, experience and training, a common
symptom of methamphetamine use is its overall impact of saliva production and poor oral
hygiene. Following his investigation, Mother was placed under arrest. Father was placed
under arrest for the possession of a concealed knife. Father admitted to “it not being ok
for [G.P.] to be living in those conditions claiming, “No it needs to be cleaned up.”
On June 26, 2025, the parents, who were in custody, set the jurisdictional hearing
for contest. The court authorized telephone contact with the child at one time per week
supervised.
10
On July 30, 2025, at the contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the parents
were present with their counsel. DPSS submitted on its reports and recommendations.
Counsel for mother called Mother to testify. Mother testified that she was outside the
general store of the trailer park when she was arrested on May 30, 2025. She claimed
that law enforcement did not recover any illicit drugs on her property to her knowledge
and a social worker did not come to her house to inspect her property. She denied using
methamphetamine. She claimed she was tested the night she was arrested and twice
since then during the voluntary random drug screening and tested negative each time.
She was willing to continue to drug test if her child was placed in her custody and to
participate in services. The social worker had attempted to coordinate an inspection of
her house recently, but Mother said no, because it was her son’s birthday. Mother stated
she had 12 dogs, because she was poor and that some of the dogs had been euthanized.
She believed her home was perfectly fine. She had regular visits with her son and had
not missed any visits. She believed her son missed her. Mother said she was willing to
take an alcohol test as well and claimed she did a screening for an alcohol issue from
Riverside County and was told she did need services for alcohol.
On cross-examination by DPSS’s counsel, Mother testified that she was currently
at the same address when the case began. She was likely to be evicted from her trailer
park as she was not paying her rent. On the day of her arrest, she was drinking, claiming
the stress of the financials was a trigger for her to “be a little bit more emotional that day
than regularly.” The trailer park will have to take her to court to evict her. She noted she
11
owed back rent and thought she was being arrested for arguing with a neighbor. She
claimed she was under the influence of alcohol at the time of her arrest. She denied she
was so inebriated that she did not understand what was happening at the time. She
disagreed that she was belligerent toward the officers. She believed she did not exhibit
any reason for the police to think she was under the influence of methamphetamine.
Mother stated that she would test positive for amphetamines, because she took Adderall
about four or five days prior. Mother did not have a valid prescription for Adderall and
did not know if there are amphetamines in the Adderall medication she took. She denied
making the statement that she used methamphetamine recreationally with friends. She
also claimed she did not currently smoke marijuana.
On cross-examination by the child’s counsel, Mother testified that the child was
inside the home by himself at the time of mother’s arrest. G.P. did not like the dog that
Mother had given him and that he was embarrassed by the condition of the home.
Mother claimed the glass pipe with black residue was from marijuana and did not know
what the plastic cup with the small amount of white powdery substance inside was.
Mother said the officer placed the paraphernalia on the table accessible to the child as it
was actually in a cupboard. She used to smoke marijuana. She believed G.P. heard about
the bong smoking from conversations the parents had.
On cross-examination by Father’s counsel, Mother testified that her home was not
in a deplorable condition when she left it and that the refrigerator was operable, but she
used two smaller mini fridges instead. She claimed G.P. ate hours before the officers
12
arrived. She stated there were 14 dogs and 12 puppies that lived inside and outside their
trailer. Father lived in the trailer, but the parents were going through some stuff and saw
each other every day. She asserted that the trailer was normally kept clean without dog
feces, the toilets were not clogged, and that the glass pipe found belonged to Mother. She
was not charged with possession of methamphetamine.
On examination by the juvenile court, Mother testified that her criminal case was
still pending and her next court date was August 4, 2025. She stated she was arrested for
misdemeanor under the influence of a controlled substance, had not been smoking
marijuana since her arrest, and that she smoked marijuana five days prior to her recent
arrest. She acknowledged that she was not in a substance abuse program. She claimed
she was told in her drug screening that she did not need any other services, besides
random drug testing. She did not know what the white powdery substance was and
speculated it could be milk.
Following argument by the parties, the juvenile court found DPSS was allowed to
rely on law enforcement statements and police reports as part of the Evidence Code.4
The court found it concerning that Mother was taking Adderall without a prescription and
noted Mother was recently testing negative since her arrest and release from custody.
The court did not believe returning the child to the parents’ custody was appropriate at
that time. The court found DPSS had conducted an adequate investigation of Native
4 Mother’s counsel argued the police report was hearsay and that Mother was
being punished because she had low income. Mother’s and Father’s counsels asked the
court to dismiss the petition.
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American ancestry and that ICWA did not apply. By a preponderance of the evidence,
the court found true allegations b-1, b-2, b-3 and b-4 in the petition, declared G.P. a
dependent of the court, and provided the parents with reunification services and
supervised visitations. Physical custody was removed from the parents under
section 361, subdivision (c)(1). A six-month status review hearing was set.
On September 5, 2025, Mother filed a notice of appeal.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdictional Findings
Mother argues there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s
findings against her. Specifically, she asserts none of the required elements, such as
neglectful conduct, causation or current risk, was established with respect to the
allegations against her that G.P. was at a substantial risk of harm due to her purported
dirty home or unresolved substance abuse issues.
“ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to see if
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In
making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to
support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light
most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633
(R.T.); see In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.); In re Alexis E. (2009) 171
14
Cal.App.4th 438, 450-451.) “ ‘The parent has the burden on appeal of showing there is
insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order.’ ” (In re L.B. (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 402, 412 (L.B.).) We uphold the juvenile court’s findings unless they are
“ ‘ “so lacking in evidentiary support as to render them unreasonable.” ’ ” (Jamieson v.
City Council of the City of Carpinteria (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 755, 763.)
The primary purpose of a dependency proceeding is to protect the child. (In re
Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), authorizes
the juvenile court to assume jurisdiction when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the
failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the
child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately
supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has
been left, or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the
child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the
parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s
mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse. . . The child shall continue to
be a dependent child pursuant to this subdivision only so long as is necessary to protect
the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.” (§ 300,
subd. (b)(1)(D).) The department bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of
evidence: (1) the parent’s neglectful conduct or failure or inability to protect the child;
(2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious
15
physical harm or illness. (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601 (Cole L.); Los
Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 962, 967.) The statute permits jurisdiction under this subdivision “only so
long as is necessary to protect the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or
illness.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(3).) Thus, “[t]he relevant inquiry under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1), is whether circumstances at the time of the jurisdictional hearing
‘ “subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.” ’ ” (L.B., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at
p. 411.)
Nevertheless, “the court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured
to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child [citation]. The court
may consider past events in deciding whether a child presently needs the court’s
protection. [Citation.] A parent’s ‘ “[p]ast conduct may be probative of current
conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.’ ” (In re
Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1216 (Christopher R.), disapproved on
another ground in In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 560, fn. 18.) To do so, the
department “must establish a nexus between the parent’s past conduct and the current risk
of harm.” (In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 775.)
Here, the b-1 allegation as found true stated: “On May 30, 2025, law enforcement
conducted a welfare check of the family home, which yielded a small glass pipe with
black residue next to a plastic cup with small amount of white powdery substance inside,
all within reach of the child. Additionally, the home was found in deplorable conditions
16
and the mother was found to be under the influence of a controlled substance and the
father was found to be in possession of drug paraphernalia. Subsequently, the mother and
father were arrested, which resulted in the child being left without a caretaker.” There is
substantial evidence to support the b-1 allegation.
On May 30, 2025, law enforcement found Mother erratic and irate. In addition,
she had rapid speech and did not make sense when she spoke with the officers. Law
enforcement believed Mother was under the influence of a central nervous stimulant,
such as methamphetamine, and both parents were arrested. The social worker observed
photographs of the home which showed it in a deplorable condition, cluttered with the
kitchen sink overflowing with dirty dishes, the oven and stove appearing inoperable with
items placed on top of them, and a propane tank in the refrigerator without adequate
provisions for the child. Furthermore, a small glass pipe with black residue next to a
plastic cup which had a small amount of a white powdery substance inside, was found on
a table in the living area, accessible to G.P. The social worker asked Father about the
paraphernalia and the methamphetamine found in the home, and Father said that he was
“sure it was just a little bit.”
Mother initially denied a pipe was found in the home and suggested the white
powder was planted by law enforcement. Later, she claimed the pipe was for marijuana
use and the white powder was milk. Mother also claimed the animal feces were
“planted” in the home by law enforcement, although G.P. and Father both acknowledged
the deplorable conditions of the home. Mother admitted using methamphetamines
17
“recreationally” with friends at parties. Although she does not have a prescription for
Adderall, she also “admitted she may test positive for amphetamines as she took an
Adderall, she received from a friend 4 of 5 days prior.” The officer observed Mother
“was unable to control her motor functions to her hands and she continued to
involuntarily open and close her hands and thumbs.” Moreover, Mother’s pupils “looked
constricted indicating to [the officer] she could be under the influence of a central
nervous system stimulant.” Based on DPSS’s and law enforcement investigations,
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s true finding on allegation b-1.
The b-2 allegation as found true here stated: “The parents neglect the health and
safety of the child in that the home was found to be in deplorable conditions, with animal
feces on the floor and animal waste on [G.P.]’s bedding, a foul odor and flies throughout
the home, cluttered kitchen sink overflowing with dirty dishes and inoperable appliances.
Further, the fridge was empty and there was no food observed in the home.” Mother
argues that substantial evidence failed to support this finding because DPSS failed to
establish a current substantial risk of serious physical harm at the time of the
jurisdictional hearing. Similarly, she contends that substantial evidence failed to support
the jurisdictional finding involving Father, because the condition of the family home was
not an ongoing or chronic condition and the home did not pose a current risk at the time
of the jurisdictional hearing.
There is sufficient evidence to support the b-2 allegation. On May 30, 2025, law
enforcement observed the home in a deplorable condition, noting a strong odor of feces
18
emanating from the residence, a large number of flies swarming inside, the kitchen sink
clogged with moldy dishes, the refrigerator unplugged, the toilet clogged with urine and
feces, dog feces on the floor and dog vomit on G.P.’s bed. In addition, the home had no
electricity, food, water, and the family was in the process of being evicted. Upon law
enforcement entering the family home, G.P. began to try and clean up the home by
covering up some of the animal waste in the home. There were also drugs and drug
paraphernalia found in the home, accessible to G.P. G.P. said his parents smoke and use a
bong. Mother, however, denied the allegations in its entirety, despite G.P. stating his
home was in a bad state when police completed a welfare check. G.P. also said his
mother was “a little bit drunk.” Mother complained to staff that she and her son were
“living in squalor” inside her trailer and did not have any power in her trailer. Father
admitted to “it not being ok for [G.P.] to be living in those conditions.” By the time of
the jurisdictional hearing, there was no evidence that the home had been cleaned up.
Moreover, Mother admitted at the jurisdictional hearing that the parents were still facing
eviction proceedings.
These circumstances were sufficient to warrant an inference that there is a
“substantial risk” the child will suffer “serious physical harm” as a result of Mother’s
failure to “adequately supervise or protect the child,” or “the willful or negligent failure”
“to adequately supervise or protect the child,” or “to provide the child with adequate
food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment,” or by Mother’s inability “to provide regular
care for the child due to” her substance abuse issues. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).)
19
Mother argues that In re Roger S. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 572 (Roger S.) requires a
different result. There, the evidence presented against the mother at a jurisdictional
hearing showed that her son rarely attended his school classes; the school was unable to
contact his mother (id. at p. 575.); at school, his clothing stank (id. at p. 574); his mother
had failed to wash his clothes and provide him with soap and a toothbrush (id. at p. 580);
she had an old 10-year-history of drug use (id. at p. 578) and might have been currently
using (id. at p. 580); she had refused to drug test and cooperate with social workers (id. at
pp. 576, 579); she had told a social worker to go ahead and take her son (id. at pp. 575,
579); she was unemployed (id. at p. 580); she had frequent phone-number changes (id. at
p. 577); and she had old child-abuse referrals (id. at pp. 577-578). The Court of Appeal
reversed the jurisdictional order, concluding the evidence did not “show a nexus between
these circumstances and a substantial risk of physical harm or illness to Roger.” (Id. at
p. 583.)
The difference here is that Mother’s negligence or willful conduct did put G.P. in
harm’s way. In Roger S., the child smelled bad, was dirty, and had poor school
performance, but there was no evidence of a risk of substantial harm to him. In other
words, there was nothing comparable to the incidents of leaving the nine-year-old child
unattended in a deplorable home found with drug and drug paraphernalia accessible to
the child to establish a nexus between the negligent parenting and physical harm. Here,
there was. Further, Mother was found by law enforcement to be inebriated, out of
control, under the influence of a controlled substances, and had left the child alone with
20
inadequate provisions or supervision. Mother admitted to drinking alcohol earlier in the
day, and that she was likely intoxicated from the alcohol. She denied using
methamphetamine, but later admitted she would test positive for amphetamines.
Mother also argues that a dirty home did not justify the true finding of allegation
b-2, citing In re Paul E. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 996 (Paul E.). Paul E. involved a messy
house and minor hazardous conditions such as “a propeller protruding from a boat
located outside the house, a lamp socket with a short, and a small child’s plastic wading
pool in the backyard filled with dirty water.” (Id. at p. 1000.) Indeed, the Paul E. court
characterized the hazards as “trivial to the point of being pretextual.” (Id. at p. 1005.) In
Paul E., the initial disposition did not remove the child from the parents’ home and the
social worker filed a supplemental petition to have the children removed because of the
parents’ purported lack of progress and failure to comply with the case plan. (Id. at
pp. 999-1000.) The Paul E. court held that chronic messiness alone, apart from
unsanitary conditions, could not support removal. (Id. at p. 1005.)
In contrast, here, there was no initial determination that G.P. could safely remain
in the home and his removal was not based solely on the condition of the home. More
significantly, unlike the situation in Paul E., the unsafe conditions of Mother’s home
were not limited to messiness, dirtiness, and minor hazards. The police report noted a
strong odor of feces emanating from the residence, a large number of flies swarming
inside, the kitchen sink clogged with moldy dishes, the refrigerator unplugged, the toilet
clogged with urine and feces, dog feces on the floor and dog vomit on G.P.’s bed. Here,
21
no credible evidence suggested that the parents had meaningfully corrected the unsanitary
and filthy conditions. The home was not just messy and dirty; it was unsanitary and
hazardous. Mother’s arguments otherwise are unpersuasive or at most go to the weight of
the evidence, which we do not reweigh on appeal. (See R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633;
I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
Furthermore, the hazards in the parents’ home were not limited to messiness and
unsanitary conditions. The police report indicated that the officers found Mother under
the influence of a stimulant, her behavior was erratic, Father was found in possession of
drug paraphrenia and a concealed weapon, and the home was found with drug
paraphernalia and drug residue inside a cup accessible to the child.
The b-3 allegation as found true here stated: “The mother has an unresolved
history of abusing controlled substances, including but not limited to alcohol and
methamphetamine, while providing care to the child. Further, the mother minimizes the
significance of her drug use.” Mother contends this allegation is built on speculation and
unsupported inference. We disagree.
Mother acknowledged she was inebriated and under the influence of alcohol on
the day of her arrest. She also disclosed that she would test positive for amphetamines,
because she took Adderall without a valid prescription. G.P. said his mother was “a little
bit drunk.” Mother also admitted that she uses methamphetamine recreationally with
friends and could not remember the last time she last used the drug. Law enforcement
officers found Mother inebriated and acting erratically. They believed Mother was under
22
the influence of a central nervous stimulant, such as methamphetamine, on the day of her
arrest. The officer observed Mother “was unable to control her motor functions to her
hands and she continued to involuntarily open and close her hands and thumbs.” Her
pupils “looked constricted indicating to [the officer] she could be under the influence of a
central nervous system stimulant.” Law enforcement found drug residue and drug
paraphernalia in the family home accessible to G.P.
Despite the overwhelming evidence that Mother was abusing methamphetamine
and alcohol, Mother continues to deny any substance abuse issues or issues with alcohol.
She denied exhibiting unusual behavior at the time of her arrest. She denied drug use.
She stated law enforcement planted the drug paraphernalia, the drugs and animal feces in
her home. Mother insisted she did not have substance abuse issues and did not need
services to address this issue but continued to minimize the significance of her drug and
alcohol use. On this record, it is reasonable to infer Mother’s unresolved substance issues
would continue. Given Mother’s denial and apparent lack of insight, the court reasonably
could have concluded her substance abuse issues were likely to continue into the future.
(See In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 (Gabriel K.) [“One cannot correct
a problem one fails to acknowledge.”]; In re D.B. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 613, 622 (D.B.)
[“Realizing conduct needs improvement is a first step to improvement.”].)
The record also contains ample evidence that Mother’s unresolved issues rendered
her unable to provide G.P. with regular care and supervision. G.P. had no adequate food
in the home and was left unsupervised. Mother’s neglect also extended to the child’s
23
healthcare needs, something the child was undoubtedly too young to handle on his own.
He had not seen a dentist or doctor since 2023.
On this record, and considering all the circumstances, the juvenile court
reasonably could have found Mother’s unresolved substance abuse prevented her from
providing the child with regular care and supervision. The court also reasonably could
have found the deplorable, hazardous conditions in the home and Mother’s lack of care
and supervision placed the child at substantial risk of serious physical harm.
Accordingly, the court properly took jurisdiction over the child under section 300,
subdivision (b).
Mother contends “[t]he record contained no evidence of ongoing illicit substance
use by Mother or that any substance use rendered her unable to protect G.P. There was
no evidence that Mother was a current user of methamphetamines at all, much less in a
manner that impaired her ability to supervise or protect G.P..” It is true that there is no
evidence that Mother’s unresolved issues caused the child to suffer significant physical
harm in the past. However, a juvenile court need not wait to take jurisdiction until a child
is seriously abused or injured. (Christopher R., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1215-
1216.) It is enough that Mother’s lack of care and supervision placed the child at serious
risk of such harm. (See Ibid.; Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 601.)
Mother also points to the fact that no toxicology report was presented showing her
use of methamphetamine by DPSS and her repeated denials of drug use. However, those
24
arguments are unpersuasive or go to the weight of the evidence, which we do not reweigh
on appeal. (See R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633; I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
Mother cites to In re B.D. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 315 (B.D.) to support her
position. The mother in B.D. once took pain medication (“norco,” or hydrocodone and
acetaminophen) that had not been prescribed for her before giving birth to an infant who
was found to have the drug in his system when born. (Id. at 318-319.) The juvenile court
sustained a dependency petition alleging the child was at substantial risk of suffering
serious physical harm from the mother’s substance abuse. (Id. at 323.) The Court of
Appeal reversed, holding that even assuming there was evidence that mother abused
opiate pain medication, there was no substantial evidence that the abuse caused serious
physical harm to her son or put him at substantial risk of suffering the same. (Id. at 325,
329-330.) In so holding, the court emphasized “the drugs in [the mother’s] system, and
that showed up in [her son’s] meconium, were prescription drugs, not categorically illegal
narcotics.” (Id. at 326.) The B.D. court additionally noted the mother was forthcoming
about taking the “norco” pill for back pain before the child’s birth (id. at 319, 331), there
was no evidence that the child “was premature, underweight, or unhealthy in any way”
(id. at 326), there was “no evidence that mother was impaired when caring for the
children” (to the contrary, the mother was attentive to the child at birth, was caring for
him appropriately, and “[n]either the nurse nor the hospital social worker expressed any
concerns about [the] mother’s ability to care for [the child]”) (id. at 330), and there was
25
“no evidence that [the] mother had a prior child welfare history related to substance abuse
or inadequate care of the children” (id. at 330-331).
This case is distinguishable from B.D. Here, the abused substances in question are
methamphetamine, not prescription medication. Unlike the mother in B.D., Mother here
was far from being fully forthcoming about her use of illegal substances or issues with
drugs and alcohol. She repeatedly denied drug use and claimed she did not need services
for her alcohol and drug use. Furthermore, here, unlike in B.D., Mother had a prior
substantiated child welfare history for general neglect of the child. In addition, the child
here was found alone in the family trailer without proper supervision and with drugs and
drug paraphernalia within his reach.
Mother’s reliance on David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768
(David B.) also does not compel a contrary result. In David B., the juvenile court found
at the 18-month review hearing that a dependent should not be returned to the parent’s
care even though the parent had done “virtually everything [the agency] requested of him,
and then some.” (Id. at p. 772.) The juvenile court’s finding of detriment stemmed from
evidence of another adult living in the parent’s residence, the parent’s frequent
consultation with the foster parent and social worker regarding the child’s care, and the
court’s belief that the parent was “simply unprepared” for the child’s return. (Id. at
pp. 790-794.) On appeal, the David B. court concluded this evidence was insufficient to
establish detriment. (Id. at p. 798.) The court clarified that, in evaluating detriment, the
juvenile court should consider the parent’s “grasp of the important parenting concepts—
26
things such as a child’s need for security, adequate nutrition and shelter, freedom from
violence, proper sanitation, healthcare, and education.” (Id. at p. 790.)
In contrast, here, Mother had not done “virtually everything” DPSS requested of
her. Instead, she denied all the allegations against her, despite evidence to the contrary,
and claimed she did not need substance abuse services. DPSS did not remove G.P. from
Mother, because she was poor, but due to her inability to “grasp” “the important
parenting concepts—things such as a child’s need for security, adequate nutrition and
shelter, freedom from violence, proper sanitation, healthcare, and education.” (David B.,
supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 790.) Mother did not acknowledge the issues leading to the
dependency. She denied her substance and alcohol use. She denied using
methamphetamine. She denied she was inebriated at the time of her arrest. She
disagreed that she was belligerent toward the cops and believed she did not exhibit any
reason for law enforcement to determine she was under the influence of
methamphetamine. She accused law enforcement of planting drugs and animal feces in
her house. She denied that her home was in a deplorable condition. While the parents
were willing to complete services and promised to clean up their home, there was no
evidence that they completed or even participated in all their services. The parents were
still residing at the same address where the removal occurred and were facing eviction.
Based on the foregoing, we find substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
true jurisdictional findings against Mother.
27
B. Dispositional Findings
Mother argues the juvenile court erred by removing the child from her custody.
She contends there is no clear and convincing evidence that the child was in substantial
danger of harm under her care, or that there were no reasonable alternatives to removal.
To remove a child from parental custody, the juvenile court must have clear and
convincing evidence that there is or would be a substantial danger to the child’s physical
health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being if returned home, and there
are no reasonable means to protect the child’s physical health without removing the child
from the home. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Generally, a jurisdictional finding alone is not
prima facie evidence the child cannot remain in the parent’s physical custody. (In re E.E.
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 217-218.) In determining whether to remove the child, the
court may consider the parent’s past conduct and current circumstances, as well as the
parent’s response to the conditions that caused the juvenile court to intervene. (In re D.B.
(2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332.) The parent need not be dangerous, and the child need
not have suffered actual harm, before removal is appropriate. (Id. at p. 328.)
When reviewing findings that must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
“the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly
probable that the fact was true. Consistent with well-established principles governing
review for sufficiency of the evidence, in making this assessment the appellate court must
view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due
28
deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses,
resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995-996; see In re Jasmon O. (1994)
8 Cal.4th 398, 422-423.) The appellant has the burden of showing there is insufficient
evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings or orders. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98
Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
Here, the record shows Mother has substance abuse and alcohol issues that
remained unresolved as of the disposition hearing. Mother testified she was not in a
substance abuse program and did not consider her issues significant. She admitted to
being under the influence of alcohol at the time of her arrest, but denied the remaining
allegations against her, despite evidence to the contrary. Based on their training,
experience and observations, law enforcement opined Mother was under the influence of
a central nervous stimulant, such as methamphetamine. Law enforcement also found
Mother’s home to be in a deplorable condition and found G.P. to be in the home
unsupervised. Drugs and drug paraphernalia were also found in the family residence
within reach of the child. Mother initially denied that the drugs and drug paraphernalia
were hers and denied that she was arrested for a drug related crime, but she later
acknowledged that these allegations were true.
Mother was in denial of the issues leading to the removal of her child from
parental custody. She testified at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing of not needing
any substance abuse services. The juvenile court could have found Mother had yet to
29
demonstrate meaningful insight into the nature of her problems and the risks they posed
to her child. For example, despite law enforcements findings and observations, Mother
denied having used any illegal substance and claimed the officers had planted the drugs
and animal feces in the home. Given Mother’s refusal even to acknowledge the existence
and severity of her issues—let alone meaningfully address them—the juvenile court
reasonably could have concluded they are likely to continue in the future. (See Gabriel
K., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 197; D.B., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 622.)
The record also contains ample evidence that Mother’s substance abuse issues
posed an ongoing and substantial danger to the child’s health and well-being. As we
discussed above, the child was found unsupervised living in a home with deplorable
conditions and without adequate food. There were also drugs and drug paraphernalia
found in the home accessible to the child. Mother failed to ensure the child was
adequately fed and living in safe conditions. In addition, the child had not seen a doctor
or dentist since 2023.
Contrary to Mother’s claim, Mother’s drug and alcohol abuse was not a one-time
incident, but an ongoing issue. The condition of the family home was so deplorable that
it had no working utilities, no running water, the toilet was clogged, no food in the
refrigerator, the child was hungry, there was animal vomit on the child’s bed, 14 animals
were in their small trailer and feces all around. The condition of the home could not have
occurred suddenly. In addition, the trailer park had been trying to evict the parents for
30
some time, and she had been arguing with her neighbors and stealing their electricity for
some time.
On this record, the court reasonably could have found there was a significant risk
to the child’s physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being if
returned to Mother’s custody. The court also reasonably could have found no reasonable
means to protect the child absent removal. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the
court’s removal orders.
Mother contends there was no need to remove the child given she consistently
communicated to DPSS her desire to do whatever was necessary to reunify with G.P. She
claimed that she participated in drug and alcohol screening, tested negatively, and
testified that she had stopped using marijuana at the outset of the case. However, as of
the disposition hearing, it had been around two months since the child had been removed
from parental custody, and she had not yet demonstrated that she could maintain her
sobriety or demonstrate her ability to safely parent the child. There were no indication
Mother’s living conditions had improved. Rather, Mother was in the process of being
evicted from her home. Nor had Mother expressed to the court or DPSS any significant
insight into her substance abuse issues, or the risks they pose to her child.
Mother argues, in lieu of removal, the juvenile court could have returned the child
to her care under a family maintenance plan, ordered continued random drug and alcohol
testing, conducted unannounced home visits, implemented a safety plan, and required
ongoing monitoring and reporting. Mother contends such an arrangement would have
31
sufficiently protected the child. However, the juvenile court reasonably could have
concluded family maintenance was simply not feasible, given her repeated denials of the
issues leading to removal, refusal to accept responsibility, and prior child protection
history with a substantiated allegation for general neglect.
We must affirm the court’s dispositional orders unless Mother shows they lack the
support of substantial evidence. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude she has
not met that burden.
C. ICWA
Mother argues the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders must be
conditionally reversed and the matter remanded because the juvenile court failed to
ensure ICWA inquiry of the maternal grandmother of whether G.P. had any Native
American ancestry. DPSS acknowledges that an inquiry did not occur with the maternal
grandmother, but claims we need not vacate the finding ICWA did not apply because
ICWA obligations are continuing duties.
Congress enacted ICWA to address concerns regarding the separation of Indian
children from their tribes through adoption or foster care placement with non-Indian
families. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7 (Isaiah W.).) Under California law
adopted pursuant to ICWA, the juvenile court and agency have an “affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire” whether a child “is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (a); see Isaiah W., at p. 9; In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566 (D.F.).)
32
“This continuing duty can be divided into three phases: the initial duty to inquire,
the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.” (D.F., supra,
55 Cal.App.5th at p. 566; see In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052 (D.S.).) The
first duty—that of conducting an initial inquiry—requires the agency to “ask all involved
persons whether the child may be an Indian child.” (D.S., at p. 1052.) “If [the] child is
placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to
Section 306 or county probation department pursuant to Section 307,” this duty includes
“asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members,
others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect,
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child . . .” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) ICWA defines
“‘extended family member’” by “the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe” or, absent
such law or custom, as “a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the
Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law,
niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1,
subd. (c) [“‘extended family member’ . . . defined as provided in [§] 1903” of [ICWA]].)
When the initial inquiry gives the juvenile court or social worker “reason to
believe that an Indian child is involved” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)), the court and social worker
must conduct further inquiry to “determine whether there is reason to know a child is an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2).) The department “does not discharge their duty of
further inquiry until they make a ‘meaningful effort’ to locate and interview extended
33
family members and to contact [the Bureau of Indian Affairs] and the tribes.” (In re K.T.
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 732, 744.)
Here, Mother challenges only the sufficiency of DPSS’s initial inquiry of the
maternal grandmother. Because we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the
jurisdiction and disposition orders, as discussed in the preceding sections, “we need not
disturb the juvenile court’s jurisdiction/disposition order just because the duty of initial
ICWA inquiry has not yet been fully satisfied.” (In re S.H. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 166,
175 (S.H.).) As the court in S.H., supra, at pages 175, 179, concluded, there is no need to
conditionally reverse or conditionally affirm the juvenile court’s erroneous order finding
ICWA does not apply, because the ICWA duty of inquiry and notice will continue after
this appeal and remand, regardless of the previous ICWA finding.
In S.H., the court explained, “Instead of focusing on whether the same ICWA
finding would have been made absent error, we focus instead on whether the social
service agency acknowledges error and we thus have reason to believe that its duty of
inquiry will be satisfied. Where there is such an acknowledgement, we see no reason to
set aside the jurisdiction/disposition order—even conditionally.” (S.H., supra, 82
Cal.App.5th at p. 176.) This is because “the duty to inquire is a continuing one.
(§ 224.2, subd. (a); Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 6.) The Agency likewise has a duty
‘on an ongoing basis’ to report ‘a detailed description of all inquiries, and further
inquiries it has undertaken, and all information received pertaining to the child’s Indian
status.’ ([Cal. Rules of Court, rule] 5.481(a)(5).) The juvenile court, even after it
34
concludes that ICWA does not apply, retains the power (and duty) to reverse that
determination ‘if it subsequently receives information providing reason to believe that the
child is an Indian child.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); see Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.482(c)(2).)” (S.H., at p. 176.)
The S.H. court reasoned that “[t]he fact that the Agency here has acknowledged
error indicates that it understands its duty to ask the maternal relatives about possible
Native American ancestry. The Agency must satisfy this duty, if it has not done so
already, and report its findings to the juvenile court. . . . And should the Agency learn
additional information indicating a ‘reason to believe’ the minor is an Indian child, thus
triggering a duty of further inquiry, it must conduct additional interviews ‘as soon as
practicable.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (e) . . . .)” (S.H., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 176-177.)
Here, DPSS acknowledges it did not inquire of the maternal grandmother and that
it is aware that ICWA inquiry is a continuing duty. DPSS argues there is no need to
vacate any ICWA findings because ICWA obligations are continuing duties. As the court
in S.H. concluded, “It would make little sense to reverse the jurisdiction/disposition order
in order to direct the Agency and the juvenile court to do something they recognize they
must do anyway.” (S.H., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 175.)
We agree the ICWA inquiry and notice errors here do not require reversing or
vacating the juvenile court’s jurisdictional or dispositional findings and orders, other than
the premature finding itself that ICWA does not apply. (In re Dominick D. (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 560, 567.) We accordingly order vacated the finding that ICWA does not
35
apply, but we otherwise affirm and direct the juvenile court on remand to order DPSS to
comply with its inquiry and (if applicable) notice obligations under ICWA and related
California law. (Id. at pp. 567-568.)
IV.
DISPOSITION
The finding that ICWA does not apply is ordered vacated. The juvenile court and
DPSS are directed, upon remand, to comply with their ICWA inquiry and notice
obligations. In all other respects, the jurisdiction and disposition findings and orders are
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
MILLER
Acting P. J.
FIELDS
J.
36