Filed 9/10/26 Marriage of Hinton CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re the Marriage of JOHN and B348329
KIMBERLY HINTON.
(Los Angeles County
JOHN HINTON, Super. Ct. No.
20STFL07080)
Appellant,
v.
KIMBERLY HINTON,
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County
of Los Angeles, William E. Weinberger, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of William W. Oxley, William Oxley; Jeff Lewis
Law, Jeffrey Lewis, Kyla Dayton, Tim Cotter, for Appellant.
Law Offices of Melissa B. Buchman, Melissa B. Buchman
for Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
John Hinton appeals from an order denying a domestic
violence restraining order he had requested against his former
wife, Kimberly Hinton1. We affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
John and Kimberly were married with two minor children
when John filed a petition for dissolution on July 27, 2020.
In May 2021, John and Kimberly each filed a request for a
domestic violence restraining order against the other under the
Domestic Violence Prevention Act2 (the Act).
In January 2022, the parties withdrew their requests after
they executed a dissolution agreement and a conduct agreement.
On May 8, 2023, Kimberly filed another request for a
restraining order against John, seeking protection for herself and
the parties’ two minor children. Kimberly then filed an amended
request on May 10, 2023.
On July 17, 2023, John filed his request for a restraining
order against Kimberly.3
1 Because the parties share the same last name, we will refer
to them by their first names for ease of reference.
2 Family Code section 6200, et seq. Further statutory
references are to the Family Code.
3 Initially, the trial court granted John a temporary
restraining order but vacated it the following day when Kimberly
2
On July 19, 2023, trial commenced on the parties’
respective requests and continued for 19 months, over a dozen
hearing dates.4 The parties requested a written statement of
decision.
B. Proposed Statement of Decision
On February 10, 2025, the trial court issued a written
tentative decision and proposed statement of decision denying
John’s request for an order restraining Kimberly and granting
Kimberly a five-year restraining order against John. The court
also considered but declined to issue mutual restraining orders
under section 6305 based on its express finding that John was
the primary aggressor. (§ 6305, subd. (a).)
In the section of the statement of decision titled “The Law
Governing the Court’s Decision,” the trial court recognized that
“[a]buse is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or
assault.” It then explained that section 6320, subdivision (a)
authorizes a protective order to enjoin a party from stalking,
threatening, harassing, and disturbing the peace of a party, and
further recognized that under subdivision (c), disturbing the
peace encompasses a variety of behavior that “‘destroys the
mental or emotional calm’” of the other party, including “‘coercive
control’” such as “‘monitoring the other party’s …
communications … .’”
objected that the request had specified the wrong party to be
restrained. After John filed a corrected request on July 21, 2023,
the court declined to grant him a temporary restraining order.
4 Because John does not challenge any of the trial court’s
factual findings, we do not summarize the trial evidence.
3
The trial court first addressed Kimberly’s claims against
John. It listed numerous instances of abuse it found John
committed against Kimberly, both before they entered into the
conduct agreement and afterward.5 The court’s recitation of
abuse included derogatory comments made in text messages that
included the children, “derogatory, demeaning, snide, and
disrespectful comments about [Kimberly]” on a parental
communications application, and at least one text that provided
evidence that John was “stalking” Kimberly after he executed the
conduct agreement. The court also found John violated the
temporary restraining order issued in May 2023 by sending
Kimberly text messages that did not involve custodial exchanges.
The court concluded that “[Kimberly] sustained her burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [John] engaged in
acts of abuse against her, in particular, disturbing her peace, as
provided in the [Act].”
The trial court next addressed John’s claims against
Kimberly. The court rejected John’s argument that Kimberly
was “the most significant aggressor” and denied his request for a
restraining order against her. “[T]he [c]ourt found that [John]
was less than credible in his testimony seeking to refute
[Kimberly]’s claims, and that lack of credibility impacted his
credibility in general.” The court explained its decision as
follows:
“In regard to his claims that [Kimberly] continuously
showed up at his house when court orders required her to drop
5 The conduct agreement provided that if one party violated
the agreement, the other party could move for a domestic violence
restraining order under the Act and revive claims of abuse that
would ordinarily be time-barred.
4
the boys off down the street, at [the intersection of] Dilling and
Beck, [Kimberly] presented credible testimony that on some of
those occasions, she was at the Dilling and Beck location and on
others, she was dropping materials, clothes or athletic equipment
off for one or both of the boys at their request and, on at least one
occasion, with [John]’s knowledge and consent. [Citation.] The
evidence of another claim by [John] of abuse by [Kimberly], that,
on January 1, 2023, she approached him at a restaurant in
Catalina, where parents of the lacrosse team players were
gathering after a game, in violation of the parties[’] [c]ode of
[c]onduct [citation], was not convincing. [Kimberly] presented
credible evidence that their son had suffered a concussion at the
game, she had taken him to urgent care, and she was providing
[John] an update and the discharge papers. In another incident
involving an encounter between [John] and [Kimberly] at a
lacrosse game in which one of their sons was playing, the
evidence presented did not support a finding that [Kimberly] was
an aggressor or engaged in an act of abuse. [Kimberly]
acknowledged some communications toward [John] and at least
one woman that he was seeing that was less than appropriate,
but the [c]ourt does not find that those comments amounted to
abuse or that this evidence would support a finding that
[Kimberly] was the most significant aggressor.”
The trial court considered whether section 6305 allowed it
to issue a mutual restraining order and concluded it did not
because, it found, John was the primary aggressor. The court
issued a domestic violence restraining order protecting Kimberly
against John for a period of five years.
5
C. John’s Objections to the Proposed Statement of Decision
On February 20, 2025, John filed objections to the trial
court’s proposed statement of decision (Rules of Court, rule
3.1590(g)), arguing that it “[did] not address significant,
undisputed evidence of domestic violence, harassment, disturbing
the peace, and coercion perpetrated by [Kimberly]” and thus
“raise[d] concerns” that the court had not “fully considered the
evidence presented” at trial and properly applied the law.
The evidence John highlighted included behavior that
occurred prior to the conduct agreement, allegations he had made
and dismissed in his 2021 petition for a domestic violence
restraining order. Specifically, Kimberly sent a sexually explicit
photo to John in November 2020 stating, “Show [your girlfriend]
this.” John replied, “That is awesome.”
John also listed the allegation that, in May 2020, two
months before he filed for dissolution, Kimberly sent a picture of
“a sex toy” to one of John’s female co-workers.6 John complained
that the trial court failed to mention this behavior in its
statement of decision.
John argued that Kimberly had admitted that in August
2020, a month after John filed for dissolution, she spent about
ten minutes viewing a history of text messages between John and
his girlfriend that popped up on the “family iPad” that John gave
Kimberly to use while assisting the children with their
schoolwork. John described this as “[u]ncontroverted” evidence.
6 Kimberly testified that the co-worker was a mutual friend
and explained that they “would send each other silly little [GIF]s,
and things like that, through messages or through Facebook.”
6
John requested the trial court amend its decision to “make
explicit findings” regarding each of these allegations of abuse
(seemingly all from 2020 except for alleged trespassing at his
home), and “clarify why it did not restrain [Kimberly] on the
evidence presented.”
On February 25, 2025, Kimberly filed a request to strike
John’s objections, arguing they were a procedurally improper
attempt to obtain reconsideration, and that many of the issues
raised were not set forth in his original request for a restraining
order.
D. Ruling
On June 16, 2025, the trial court issued a minute order
overruling John’s objections and making its proposed statement
of decision final.
John filed a timely notice of appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
John asserts that the trial court applied the wrong legal
standard to his petition for a domestic violence restraining order
when it “employed an overly narrow view of what conduct
constitutes abuse.” He also argues that the court erroneously
omitted undisputed evidence of Kimberly’s abuse from its
statement of decision and failed to properly consider a mutual
restraining order. We disagree.
7
A. Legal Principles
1. The Domestic Violence Prevention Act
“Under the [Act], a court is authorized to issue a protective
order ‘“‘to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a
recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of
separation of the persons involved’ upon ‘reasonable proof of a
past act or acts of abuse.’”’” (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th
1, 11 (Curcio).) “Abuse is not limited to the actual infliction of
physical injury or assault.” (§ 6203, subd. (b).) The Act defines
“abuse” to include “to engage in any behavior that has been or
could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320.” (Id., subd. (a)(4).)
Such behavior includes “disturbing the peace of the other party.”
(§ 6320, subd. (a).) As used in the Act, “‘disturbing the peace of
the other party’ refers to conduct that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the
other party.” (Id., subd. (c).) “Courts of Appeal have found
conduct involving communications such as text messages, e-mail,
and social media constitutes abuse under the [Act] for disturbing
the petitioner’s peace.” (Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.)
The Act requires a showing of past abuse by a
preponderance of the evidence. (In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226; see also Cooper v. Bettinger
(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 77, 90, fn. 14.) “The court shall consider
the totality of the circumstances in determining whether to grant
or deny a petition for relief.” (§ 6301, subd. (d).)
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2. Standard of Review
We review the denial of a protective order for abuse of
discretion. (In re Marriage of Fregoso & Hernandez (2016) 5
Cal.App.5th 698, 702.) “‘If the court’s decision is influenced by an
erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an
unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the court has not
properly exercised its discretion under the law. [Citation.]’”
(Rodriguez v. Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, 820–821,
quoting Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2013) 218
Cal.App.4th 96, 106.) Whether a trial court applied the correct
legal standard to an issue in exercising its discretion is a question
of law, requiring de novo review. (R.R. v. C.R. (2026) 117
Cal.App.5th 1262, 1272.)
B. Analysis
John contends that the trial court failed to apply the proper
legal standard by failing to recognize as domestic abuse any
conduct that was not physical violence. We reject this argument
as it is squarely refuted by the court’s written statement of
decision.
In its statement of decision, the trial court recited the
governing law, which recognizes disturbing the peace through
communications as a form of domestic abuse. Further, the court
demonstrated it understood how to apply this principle when it
found that John abused Kimberly based on his “ongoing
derogatory, demeaning and harassing communications” that
disturbed her peace.
Contrary to John’s argument, the trial court did not rely
solely on John’s past acts of physical abuse when it decided to
9
grant Kimberly’s request to restrain him. The court described
three instances of John’s physical abuse in just one of the eight
paragraphs it used to describe numerous instances of primarily
mental abuse that John perpetrated against Kimberly prior to
the parties entering into the conduct agreement. But the court
also described multiple instances of non-physical abuse that John
perpetrated after the parties executed the conduct agreement
under a separate subheading “[Kimberly’s] Claims of More
Recent Verbal, Emotional and Mental Abuse.” Because the court
demonstrated that it did not have an overly restrictive view of
abuse when it granted Kimberly a restraining order based on a
“series of texts and other communications that the [c]ourt [found]
constituted abuse,” we reject John’s argument that the court
failed to apply the proper legal standard when adjudicating the
parties’ requests for domestic violence restraining orders.
John next contends the trial court committed reversible
error when it “failed to address or make findings on”
“overwhelming and undisputed evidence of Kimberly’s abusive
conduct … .” According to John, “by omitting discussion of the
issues central to [his] petition from the statement of decision, the
… court prevented [him] from obtaining effective appellate
review.”
John’s contention is meritless. “The trial court is not
required to respond point by point to the issues posed in a
request for statement of decision. The court’s statement of
decision is sufficient if it fairly discloses the court’s determination
as to the ultimate facts and material issues in the case.” (Golden
Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1372,
1379–1380; accord, In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32
Cal.App.5th 83, 94; Nunes Turfgrass v. Vaughan-Jacklin Seed
10
Co. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1518, 1525 [“In issuing a statement of
decision, the trial court need not address each question listed in a
party’s request”].) An ultimate fact is a core fact, such as an
essential element of a claim, and is distinguishable from an
evidentiary fact and a legal conclusion. (Central Valley General
Hospital v. Smith (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 501, 513.) Here, the
ultimate fact was whether Kimberly committed acts of abuse that
would support issuance of a restraining order against her; and
the trial court concluded that she did not. That is sufficient.
Finally, section 6305 prohibits a court from issuing mutual
restraining orders if it determines there is a dominant aggressor.
(Id., subd. (a); Salmon v. Salmon (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1047,
1059 [“the plain words of the statute clearly contemplate the trial
court will: weigh the acts of the parties; determine whether one
of the parties should be considered the primary or dominant
aggressor; and issue a mutual restraining order only in the event
neither party can fairly be characterized as the primary
aggressor”].) Because the trial court found that John was the
dominant aggressor, we conclude it did not abuse its discretion
when it declined to issue a mutual restraining order.
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IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to Kimberly.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
MOOR, J.
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