Filed 9/11/26 In re Walter A.C. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re WALTER A.C., a Person
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
WALTER A.C., A174048
Defendant and Appellant;
(San Francisco City & County
Super. Ct. No. JW24-6247)
SHANNON COX,
Petitioner and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Defendant Walter A.C. appeals from the juvenile court’s order granting
Shannon Cox’s petition for access to Walter’s juvenile case file pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 827. We reverse.
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin.,
§ 8.1) and recite only those facts necessary to resolve the limited issue before
us (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851).
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
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Walter is the subject of section 602 juvenile wardship proceedings
initiated in 2024 when he was 17 years old. On June 5, 2025, the juvenile
court conducted a disposition hearing and made dispositional findings. Three
weeks later, Cox filed a form petition for access to Walter’s juvenile case file
pursuant to section 827. In identifying the records she wanted, Cox stated,
“Requesting records pertaining to sentencing and sentencing guidelines. [¶]
Walter was recently sentenced or seen in court 6/5/25 for his arrest in April
2025 by SFPD.” In the section of the form beginning “I need the records
because (describe in detail; attach more pages if you need more space),” Cox
wrote, “Records are being requested due to an ongoing FBI investigation.”3
She provided no further information. Walter, through his counsel, objected to
the release of records. His sister also objected.
On August 5, 2025, the juvenile court filed an order on Cox’s petition
stating it would review the juvenile case file and objections. On August 14,
the court filed an order granting the petition. The form order checked the box
stating, “The petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
access to records is necessary and that records have substantial relevance to
the legitimate needs of the petitioner. The court has balanced these needs
with the child’s best interest. The court finds that the need for access
outweighs the policy considerations favoring confidentiality of juvenile
records.” The court allowed only the following records to be disclosed: the
minutes of the disposition hearing conducted on June 5, 2025. Walter timely
3 In his opening brief, Walter states that Cox is an employee of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). We observe that nothing in the record
identifies who Cox is. In her petition, she provided a mailing address but did
not identify any employer/entity name. She did not state that she is an FBI
employee.
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appealed. We granted Walter’s petition for writ of supersedeas and stayed
enforcement of the juvenile court’s order pending resolution of the appeal.
Walter argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in granting Cox’s
petition for access under section 827. No respondent’s brief was filed,4
therefore we decide the appeal on the record and Walter’s opening brief. (Cal.
Rules of Court,5 rule 8.220(a)(2).)
The Legislature has expressly stated that “juvenile court records, in
general, should be confidential.” (§ 827, subd. (b)(1).) Section 827 sets forth
detailed provisions to protect this confidentiality. (J.E. v. Superior Court
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1337.) It specifies who is authorized to inspect
case files without a court order. (§ 827, subd. (a)(1); J.E., at p. 1337.)
“Section 827 also contains provisions that permit unauthorized persons to
directly petition the juvenile court for access to the confidential records.
(§ 827, subd. (a)[(3)]; . . . .) Under section 827 the juvenile court has
‘exclusive authority to determine whether and to what extent to grant access
to confidential juvenile records’ to unauthorized persons. [Citation.] This
statutory scheme reflects a legislative determination that the juvenile court
has ‘both the “ ‘sensitivity and expertise’ to make decisions about access to
juvenile records.” ’ ” (J.E., at p. 1337, fn. omitted.)
Rule 5.552 dictates the procedure for, and judicial review of, a request
to access a juvenile case file pursuant to section 827. The petitioner must
4 Cox did not file a respondent’s brief. Cox was served by mail at the
address she listed in her petition with Walter’s notice of appeal, his opening
brief, and this court’s July 8, 2026 correspondence notifying her that she had
not filed a respondent’s brief. The People filed a response to Walter’s petition
for writ of supersedeas stating they did not take a position on Cox’s petition
in the juvenile court and they decline to take a position in this court.
5 Further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
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identify the “specific file sought” and “describe in detail the reasons the file is
being sought and its relevance to the proceeding or other purpose for which
petitioner wishes to inspect or obtain the file.” (Rule 5.552(a)(1), (2).) The
petitioner bears the burden to show good cause justifying access to the
records. (Rule 5.552(c)(1), (2).) If the petitioner does not show good cause,
the court must deny the petition summarily. (Rule 5.552(c)(1).) If there is
good cause, whether the court conducts a hearing, if the court determines
that there may be information or documents in the records sought to which
the petitioner may be entitled, the court must conduct an in camera review of
the case file and any objections. (Rule 5.552(c)(2), (3).) In determining
whether to authorize disclosure, the court “must balance the interests of the
child . . ., the interests of the petitioner, and the interests of the public”
(rule 5.552(c)(4)) and may permit access “only insofar as is necessary, and
only if petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the records
requested are necessary and have substantial relevance to the legitimate
need of the petitioner” (rule 5.552(c)(6)). To grant the petition, “the court
must find that the need for access outweighs the policy considerations
favoring confidentiality of the juvenile . . . case file.” (Rule 5.552(c)(5).)
“Generally, a juvenile court has broad and exclusive authority to
determine whether and to what extent to grant access to confidential juvenile
records pursuant to section 827. [Citations.] Review of a juvenile court’s
decision to release juvenile records under section 827 is for abuse of
discretion.” (In re Elijah S. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1541.) “The abuse
of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for
varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial
court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions
of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is
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reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712, fns. omitted.) Here, the juvenile court
applied the law dictating petitions to access juvenile case files to undisputed
facts. Therefore, we review whether its decision was arbitrary and
capricious.
While taking into account the deferential standard of review, we
conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion in granting Cox’s petition.
The petition lacks any details demonstrating good cause to grant the request.
(See rule 5.552(c)(1).) It also fails to demonstrate that Cox showed “by a
preponderance of the evidence that the records requested are necessary and
have substantial relevance to the legitimate need of the petitioner.”
(Rule 5.552(c)(6), italics added.) In explaining the reason Cox needs the
records, the petition merely states, “Records are being requested due to an
ongoing FBI investigation.” The petition does not provide any information
about the FBI investigation. It does not indicate who is/are the subjects of
the investigation. It does not state that Walter is a subject of, or somehow
involved in, the investigation. Even assuming Cox is an FBI employee, it
does not explain why the requested records—“records pertaining to
sentencing and sentencing guidelines”—are necessary or have substantial
relevance to a legitimate need of Cox (or the FBI). It does not “describe in
detail the reasons the file is being sought and its relevance to the proceeding
or other purpose for which petitioner wishes to inspect or obtain the file.”
(Rule 5.552(a)(2).) We observe that section 827 authorizes a case file to be
inspected without a court order by the “attorneys for the parties, judges,
referees, other hearing officers, probation officers, and law enforcement
officers who are actively participating in criminal or juvenile proceedings
involving the minor.” (§ 827, subd. (a)(1)(E), italics added.) If Cox, as a law
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enforcement officer for the FBI, is actively participating in criminal or
juvenile proceedings involving Walter, she would have been authorized to
access the file without a court order and would not have needed to file a
petition. (See § 827, subd. (a)(1)(E), (3)(A); rule 5.552(a).)
We acknowledge that the juvenile court did not grant access to Walter’s
entire juvenile case file. Instead, it limited disclosure to the minutes of the
June 5, 2025 disposition hearing. (See rule 5.552(c)(6) [court may permit
access to the file “only insofar as is necessary”].) Still, this does not negate
the conclusions that Cox did not demonstrate good cause nor show that the
records are necessary and have substantial relevance to a legitimate need of
Cox’s. (See ibid.) Therefore, the juvenile court abused its discretion in
granting the petition.
DISPOSITION
The August 11, 2025 (filed August 14, 2025) order granting Cox’s
petition for access to juvenile case file pursuant to section 827 is reversed.
On remand, the juvenile court is directed to enter a new order denying the
petition.
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_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
HUMES, P. J.
_________________________
SMILEY, J.
In re Walter A.C. / A174048
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