Filed 9/11/26 Lewis v. Reales CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
SARAH MARIE LEWIS,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A175430
v.
(City and County of San Francisco
ENA ROSARIO REALES, Super. Ct. No. FL CCH-25-
588179)
Defendant and Appellant.
Sarah Marie Lewis and Ena Rosario Reales are roommates; their living
situation is not harmonious. Reales obtained a civil harassment restraining
order against Lewis in 2024, and Lewis obtained a restraining order against
Reales the next year. Reales appeals from the order against her. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Lewis moved into an apartment in 2013, and Reales began residing
there in 2023.1 The parties agree the relationship is combative, but they cast
each other as the aggressor. Reales obtained a civil harassment restraining
order against Lewis in 2024, and Lewis sought her own order against Reales
in 2025. The trial court denied Lewis a temporary restraining order, but a
1 We ignore the statement of facts in Reales’s opening brief, which is
one-sided and provides no citation to the record. (Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor
America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 385, 408, fn. 14; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122
Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.)
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two-day hearing took place in October 2025 concerning her petition. Only
Lewis and Reales testified.
At the hearing, Lewis described Reales’s harassment. She testified
that, since Reales obtained a restraining order, she “calls the police in what
feels like every time I’m there.” She estimated Reales called the police “at
least 100 times,” police came to the home at least six times, and it escalated
“to the point where . . . I have been forced to live at friends’ houses
because . . . I literally live in fear of the police showing up.” “[S]he has called
them for me taking a shower, for me getting medication out of the fridge.”
Lewis — who is legally blind — takes various medications. Reales moved the
medicine throughout the apartment, making it hard to find. Lewis suffered
complications as a result, and Reales laughed as she watched Lewis look for
her medicine. Reales also moved a heavy vase onto the floor in front of
Lewis’s refrigerator, which contained medicine. Lewis was not supposed to
lift anything due to a recent major surgery, but she had to move the vase to
get to her items and thereafter suffered “heavy bleeding.”
On cross-examination, Reales’s counsel elicited testimony that Reales
injured her shoulder due to Lewis’s conduct, asked whether Lewis ever made
threats to Reales, and asked about the parties’ respective use of the home.
Counsel tried to elicit testimony indicating the dispute was really about rent
and use of the apartment.2
During her testimony, Reales admitted she called the police repeatedly
but said she did so because Lewis violated Reales’s restraining order. She
testified she feared Lewis because Lewis injured her shoulder. And she
2 Lewis testified she paid all the rent, and Reales refused to pay any,
resulting in small claims and judgments totaling over $30,000.
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testified Lewis would leave all the lights on in the home, which hurt Reales’s
eyes because Reales had cataracts.
On cross-examination, Reales acknowledged a judgment had been
issued against her for unpaid rent, and she admitted not paying rent but said
she was unable to work due to the injury caused by Lewis.
After closing arguments, the trial court noted both parties bore some
responsibility for their choices. But it determined Lewis satisfied her burden
and granted a restraining order. It denied her request for a stay-away order,
but it ordered Reales, among other things, not to harass, intimidate, molest,
abuse, destroy personal property, or disturb the peace of Lewis. It provided
the restraining order would expire on the same date as Reales’s order.
DISCUSSION
Reales alleges the trial court abused its discretion and committed legal
error. She fails to identify a basis to reverse the court’s order.
At the outset, we note “it is a fundamental principle of appellate
procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct
and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record
presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that
justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
608–609.) The appellant “ ‘has the burden of providing an adequate record.
[Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that
the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’ ” (Id., at p. 609.) Here, among
other things, Reales failed to provide Lewis’s petition for a restraining order
(which would have contained her sworn allegations), Reales’s response to the
petition, Lewis’s supplemental declaration and accompanying exhibits, the
exhibits presented at the hearing, and the 2024 order issued to Reales.
Moreover, when an appellant fails to provide virtually any discussion of the
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evidence and instead provides only those facts favorable to their version of
events, they forfeit any sufficiency of the evidence argument. (Schmidlin v.
City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 738.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 provides a person may obtain a
civil harassment restraining order if they prove unlawful harassment exists
by clear and convincing evidence. (Id., subds. (a), (i).) Harassment includes
“a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that
seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no
legitimate purpose.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).) Course of conduct means a “pattern
of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short,
evidencing a continuity of purpose.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).) “We review the trial
court’s decision to grant the restraining order for substantial evidence.”
(Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 497.) “We resolve all
factual conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing party.”
(Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.)
Reales argues Lewis impermissibly sought a restraining order to evict
her, and the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the order because it
concerned a rental dispute, not harassment. These claims are forfeited due to
Reales’s failure to provide almost any discussion of the evidence presented at
the hearing or an adequate record. (Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th
at p. 609; Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 738.)
Moreover, her characterization of the dispute as “a purely financial conflict”
is belied by the record.
Reales next contends the trial court committed reversible legal error by
refusing to order Lewis to stop leaving the lights on in the home. Reales
contends the court improperly denied the request due to her nonpayment of
rent and argues — without citation to legal authority — that it was a “clear
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error of law.” The claim fails. The court was ruling on Lewis’s petition so
there was no basis to address Reales’s request for orders. Also, the record
reflects the court found the parties were engaging in annoying conduct
towards each other, and it was not inclined to police every grievance. Before
it denied Reales’s request that it order Lewis to stop leaving lights on, it
denied Lewis’s request that it order Reales to stop touching her property.
Thus, the record indicates the court denied Reales’s request, not because she
was not paying rent, but because it was not going to try to resolve every
dispute between the roommates. No error appears.
Finally, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (i),
Reales contends the trial court abused its discretion by issuing a mutual
restraining order without making required findings. That provision says
nothing about mutual restraining orders. While the Family Code contains
standards governing the issuance of mutual domestic violence restraining
orders (Fam. Code, § 6305), Reales cites no authority suggesting those
standards apply to civil harassment restraining orders.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. In the interest of justice, the parties are to
bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
TUCHER, P. J.
_________________________
FUJISAKI, J.
A175430; Lewis v. Reales
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