Bell v. Louie CA2/7

Filed 9/11/26 Bell v. Louie CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

B343209
SANDRA BELL,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No.
23STCV15396)
v.

NETANEL LOUIE et al.,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Rupert A. Byrdsong, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Pease & Ijadi, Bryan W. Pease; Law Offices of G. David
Tenenbaum and G. David Tenenbaum, for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
First Liberty Institute, Stephanie N. Taub; Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr and Leah M. Fugere, for Defendants
and Respondents.
Dechert, Jay Bhimani and Gary Dreyer for The Jewish
Coalition for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Defendants and Respondents.
________________________

INTRODUCTION

Sandra Bell appeals from a judgment of dismissal after the
trial court sustained a demurrer by Rabbi Netanel Louie and the
Hebrew Discovery Center (HDC) to her second amended
complaint without leave to amend. Bell sued Rabbi Louie and
HDC for civil rights violations and several torts after Rabbi Louie
allegedly destroyed Bell’s protest signs to prevent her from
peacefully protesting Kapparot, an Orthodox Jewish atonement
ritual that involves slaughtering a chicken. We conclude the trial
court erred in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend to
Bell’s causes of action under the Bane Civil Rights Act, Civil
Code section 52.1,1 and the Ralph Civil Rights Act, section 51.7.
We also conclude that, while the trial court did not err in
sustaining the demurrer to Bell’s cause of action for civil
conspiracy, the court should have given Bell leave to amend to
allege her conspiracy allegations in an appropriate cause of
action. Therefore, we reverse.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Bell Protests HDC’s Kapparot Ritual
In October 2022, when Bell was 77 years old, she protested
HDC’s Kapparot ritual on the sidewalk in front of HDC.2 Rabbi
Louie runs HDC and organized the Kapparot ritual. Bell
protested with signs that stated: “CHICKENS Cannot Atone for
YOUR Sins—Primitive, Cruel Nonsense” and “bloody cruel
senseless useless—ANIMAL SACRIFICE done here!”
Bell alleged that, when she put her signs down on a bush
beside her, Rabbi Louie came outside, saw the signs, went behind
Bell, and ripped up her signs, rendering them unusable. Bell
alleged that, when Rabbi Louie destroyed her signs, he intended
to intimidate and coerce her, interfere with her First Amendment

2 While Bell’s second amended complaint describes the
practice as a “chicken killing ritual,” Kapparot is a Jewish ritual
practiced by some orthodox communities in the days immediately
preceding Yom Kippur. Adherents of Kapparot believe that it is
“required by religious law and that it brings atonement and
redemption. The ritual entails grasping a live chicken and
swinging the bird three times overhead while saying a prayer
that symbolically asks God to transfer the practitioners’ sins to
the birds.” (Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos v. New York
City Police Dept. (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) 152 A.D.3d 113, 115; see
United Poultry Concerns v. Chabad of Irvine (9th Cir. 2018)
743 Fed.Appx. 130, fn. 1 [“Kapparot is an atonement ritual that
involves recitation of prayer and results in the Kosher killing of
chickens.”].) When the prayer is complete, “the chicken is killed
in accordance with the kosher dietary laws, by slitting the
chicken’s throat. Its meat is . . . donated to the poor and others in
the community.” (Alliance, at p. 115.)

3
right to protest, and destroy the medium on which Bell displayed
her “message of compassion.”
Bell alleged Israel Shamoni (who is not a party to this
appeal), an employee of HDC and Rabbi Louie, approached her,
screamed at her, and spat saliva and mucus on her face and
sweater. Bell alleged Shamoni worked with Rabbi Louie to
“intimidate, threaten, ridicule, and interfere with [Bell] and other
protesters’ . . . rights to peaceful[ly] protest.” Bell alleged
Shamoni, rather than joining the other Kapparot participants,
stood next to Rabbi Louie, “laughing at and mocking the
protesters.”
Bell also alleged that Rabbi Louie employed and supervised
Shamoni and was thus vicariously liable for Shamoni’s actions
and that HDC was vicariously liable for Shamoni’s and
Rabbi Louie’s actions because they were acting in the “course and
scope of their employment when they engaged in these violent
acts.” Bell also alleged Shamoni and Rabbi Louie acted in concert
as “accomplices” to “disrupt and antagonize” Bell and other
protesters.

B. Bell Files This Action, and the Trial Court Sustains a
Demurrer by Rabbi Louie and HDC Without Leave
To Amend
Bell sued Rabbi Louie, HDC, and Shamoni, alleging in her
operative second amended complaint five causes of action:
(1) violation of the Bane Act, (2) violation of the Ralph Act,
(3) assault and battery, (4) abuse of an elder person in violation of
Welfare & Institutions Code section 15610.63, and (5) civil
conspiracy to commit a tort. Rabbi Louie and HDC demurred,
arguing Bell did not state causes of action for violation of the

4
Bane Act, violation of the Ralph Act, assault and battery against
HDC, or conspiracy against Rabbi Louie. They also argued Bell
could not attribute Shamoni’s conduct to Rabbi Louie or HDC
under a vicarious liability or accomplice theory.3
The trial court sustained the demurrer to the second
amended complaint without leave to amend, and Bell timely
appealed from the ensuing judgment. Bell challenges the court’s
order sustaining the demurrer to her causes of action for violation
of the Bane Act, violation of the Ralph Act, and conspiracy. She
does not challenge the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer
to her causes of action for assault and battery and for elder
abuse.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“‘We independently review the ruling on a demurrer and
determine de novo whether the pleading alleges facts sufficient to
state a cause of action.’” (Association for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 776;
see Allied Anesthesia Medical Group, Inc. v. Inland Empire
Health Plan (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 794, 801-802.) “On appeal,
‘[w]hen a demurrer [has been] sustained, we determine whether
the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. [Citation.] And when it is sustained without leave to

3 Rabbi Louie and HDC apparently also filed a motion to
strike, but the record on appeal does not include that motion.
The trial court took a motion to strike off calendar, and the
court’s order does not indicate what allegations Rabbi Louie and
HDC moved to strike.

5
amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that
the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court
has abused its discretion and we reverse.’ [Citations.] We follow
the well-settled rule that ‘[w]hen reviewing a judgment
dismissing a complaint after the granting of a demurrer without
leave to amend, courts must assume the truth of the complaint’s
properly pleaded or implied factual allegations.’ [Citation.] On
the other hand, the reviewing court ‘does not . . . assume the
truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.’” (Loeffler
v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1100; see Schifando v.
City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081; City of Norwalk
v. City of Cerritos (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 977, 985.)

B. Bell Is Entitled To Amend Her Bane Act
Cause of Action To Cure a Defect Rabbi Louie and
HDC Assert for the First Time on Appeal
Section 52.1, known as the Bane Civil Rights Act, provides:
“Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured
by the Constitution or laws of this state, has been interfered
with, or attempted to be interfered with, as described in
subdivision (b), may institute and prosecute in their own name
and on their own behalf a civil action for damages . . . .” (§ 52.1,
subd. (c).) “To plead a cause of action under the Bane Act, the
plaintiff must show ‘(1) intentional interference or attempted
interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right,
and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by threats,
intimidation or coercion.’” (Wiley v. Kern High School Dist.
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 765, 774; see Animal Protection & Rescue

6
League, Inc. v. County of Riverside (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 914,
920; Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 67.)
Bell alleged Rabbi Louie intentionally interfered with her
First Amendment right to protest, satisfying the first element of
a cause of action under the Bane Act. Bell alleged Rabbi Louie
intended to render her signs unusable when he destroyed them.
Bell also alleged that Rabbi Louie’s “coercive, destructive act”
physically prevented her from “using the protest signs for the rest
of the night” and that Rabbi Louie’s actions had “the effect of
physically preventing [Bell] and similarly situated individuals
from using the protest signs to continue protesting animal cruelty
on a public sidewalk.” Assuming, as we must on demurrer, these
allegations are true (Morgan v. Ygrene Energy Fund, Inc. (2025)
18 Cal.5th 1061, 1071), Bell sufficiently alleged the first element
of a cause of action for violation of the Bane Act. (See Doe v. City
of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550 [“the complaint
ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than
evidentiary facts”]; Yalung v. State of California (2023)
98 Cal.App.5th 71, 80 [California’s “fact-pleading requirement
requires the plaintiff to allege ultimate facts that apprise the
defendant of the claim’s factual basis”].)
Bell also sufficiently alleged the second element, that Rabbi
Louie interfered with her rights through coercion. Bell alleged:
“Louie’s act of ripping up [her] protest signs was . . . coercion
carried out . . . to directly interfere with [her] First Amendment
rights to peacefully protest, as she was literally using the signs at
the time . . . Louie ripped them up in front of her.” At the
pleading stage, Bell’s allegation Rabbi Louie’s act was coercive
was sufficient. (See Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc.
v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1098

7
[plaintiff is “only required to plead ultimate facts”; whether the
plaintiff “can produce at trial, or in response to a motion for
summary judgment, evidence that will in fact support all or any
of” the plaintiff’s allegations “is another matter”].)
Rabbi Louie and HDC assert Bell did not “allege, for
example, that Louie attempted to touch her, that he threatened
Bell either verbally or otherwise, that he intimidated her, that he
knew the signs belonged to Bell, or that he even communicated
with her at all.” The word “otherwise,” however, is doing a lot of
work in their argument. Bell alleged violent physical conduct
directed at her and at personal property in her possession.
A reasonable person could find that kind of conduct threatening,
intimidating, or coercive. Moreover, “speech alone” may
constitute coercion if it threatens violence against persons “or
their property.” (§ 52.1, subd. (k).) If a verbal threat to destroy
property may constitute actionable coercion, so too does the
actual, physical destruction of that property. Nor does the Bane
Act require that the defendant physically touch or attempt to
touch the plaintiff or that the plaintiff fear violence. (See § 52.1,
subd. (b) [plaintiff may bring a cause of action under the Bane
Act if the defendant “interferes by threat, intimidation, or
coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or
coercion” with the exercise or enjoyment of constitutional or legal
rights].)
Rabbi Louie and HDC also argue that Bell did not
sufficiently allege the signs were her property at the time
Rabbi Louie tore them up and that her allegation she owned the
signed was a “conclusion of law.” On demurrer, the court
assumes the truth of all properly pleaded ultimate facts. (See
C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012)

8
53 Cal.4th 861, 872 [“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need
only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each
evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s
proof need not be alleged.”].) Bell alleged the sign was hers; that
was enough. (See Peninsula Properties Co. v. County of
Santa Cruz (1950) 34 Cal.2d 626, 629 [“[t]he allegation that [the
plaintiff] is the owner of the described property pleads an
ultimate fact, good against a general demurrer”]; Robinson v. City
of Glendale (1920) 182 Cal. 211, 214 [“a general allegation of
ownership is always recognized as an allegation of the ultimate
fact, and a complaint containing it sufficiently pleads plaintiff’s
ownership”]; Hughes v. Hughes (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 327, 329
[“An allegation of ownership of property is not a conclusion of law
but is an averment of an ultimate fact.”].)
Next, citing section 52.1, subdivision (k), Rabbi Louie and
HDC argue that, to state a Bane Act cause of action based on the
destruction of property, Bell had to allege Rabbi Louie engaged in
“threatening speech.” (Italics omitted.) Section 52.1,
subdivision (k), provides: “Speech alone is not sufficient to
support an action [under the Bane Act], except upon a showing
that the speech itself threatens violence against a specific person
or group of persons; and the person or group of persons against
whom the threat is directed reasonably fears that, because of the
speech, violence will be committed against them or their property
and that the person threatening violence had the apparent ability
to carry out the threat.” (See, e.g., Animal Protection & Rescue
League, Inc. v. County of Riverside, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at
p. 921 [plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for violation of the
Bane Act where “the complaint allege[d] only a spoken threat,”
and the defendant did not use “force of any kind”]; Wiley v. Kern

9
High School Dist., supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 777 [plaintiff
failed to state a cause of action for violation of the Bane Act
where she did not allege the defendant engaged in violence, but
alleged only that the defendant painted her in an “uncharitable”
light]; Julian v. Mission Community Hospital (2017)
11 Cal.App.5th 360, 395 [“[s]peech is insufficient to establish the
requisite threat unless it includes threat of violence”].) But Bell
alleged Rabbi Louie committed a physical act of violence against
her property; the alleged coercion did not involve “speech alone.”
Section 52.1, subdivision (k), does not apply.
Finally, Rabbi Louie and HDC argue that the First
Amendment protects individuals only against state action and
that Bell did not allege Rabbi Louie was a state actor or acted in
concert with the state. Therefore, Rabbi Louie and HDC contend,
Rabbi Louie could not have interfered with Bell’s First
Amendment rights. Rabbi Louie and HDC, however, did not
demur on this ground and, by not raising it in the trial court,
forfeited the argument. (See Leeper v. Beltrami (1959) 53 Cal.2d
195, 203 [grounds not asserted in a demurrer are forfeited];
Roman v. County of Los Angeles (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 316, 322,
fn. 2 [defendant’s failure to assert contentions in its demurrer
forfeited those contentions on appeal].) But as Rabbi Louie and
HDC correctly point out, though “an issue not raised in the trial
court is typically forfeited, we can reach a ground for demurrer
not raised below if it presents a pure question of law and the
parties have been given an opportunity to address it.” (Ivanoff v.
Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 732, fn. 2; see
Tukes v. Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1, 19 [“we have discretion
to consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal”].)

10
We hesitate to exercise our discretion here. Though the
parties had an opportunity to brief the state action issue on
appeal, it would be unfair to Bell to affirm the dismissal of Bell’s
Bane Act cause of action on the pleadings without allowing the
trial court in the first instance to consider the merits of the
argument and whether to grant Bell leave to amend. (See Jogani
v. Jogani (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 823, 840 [“‘Appellate courts are
loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party
did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not
have an opportunity to consider.’”]; Wittenberg v. Bornstein (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 556, 567 [same]; City of Scotts Valley v. County of
Santa Cruz (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1, 28 [“theories not raised in
the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,”
a rule that is “a matter of fundamental fairness to both the trial
court and opposing parties”].)
Rabbi Louie and HDC’s new argument, however, has some
merit. A cause of action for violation of the Bane Act requires
interference with a right or law, and Bell alleges Rabbi Louie and
HDC interfered with her right under the First Amendment.
Because the First Amendment protects only against government
intrusion, and Bell did not allege Rabbi Louie was a state actor or
acting in concert with the state, Rabbi Louie could not interfere
with Bell’s First Amendment right. (See Jones v. Kmart
Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 337 [the Bane Act does not provide a
remedy “for a private actor’s putative ‘violation’ of rights that
apply only against the state or its agents”]; O’Toole v. Superior
Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 488, 504 [“by saying the Bane Act
applies to all persons whether or not acting under color of law,
the Legislature intended to apply its provisions to private actors
as well as public officials (at least to the extent the alleged

11
constitutional violation does not have a state action requirement).”
(Italics added.)]; see also Animal Protection and Rescue League v.
City of Los Angeles (C.D.Cal., Jan. 30, 2018, No. 8:17-cv-01581-
AB(GJSx)) 2018 WL 11314968, p. 5 [“Hebrew Discovery Center
presumably is privately owned.”].) But Bell may be able to state
a cause of action under the Bane Act if she can allege that
Rabbi Louie was acting at the direction of the state or that
Rabbi Louie or HDC violated a right or law that (unlike the First
Amendment’s guaranty of free speech) does not require state
action.
In any event, though Bell did not allege state action (mostly
because Rabbi Louie and HDC never argued in the trial court
that she needed to), she is entitled to leave to amend her
complaint, either to allege “the state played [a] role in causing”
her injuries (Jones v. Kmart Corp., supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 333)
under the First Amendment or to allege interference with a
federal or state right or law that does not require state action.
This is true even if (because Rabbi Louie and HDC did not raise
this issue before) she did not ask the trial court or even this court
for leave to make such an allegation. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 472c, subd. (a) [“When any court makes an order sustaining a
demurrer without leave to amend the question as to whether or
not such court abused its discretion in making such an order is
open on appeal even though no request to amend such pleading
was made.”]; City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th
730, 746-747 [“The issue of leave to amend is always open on
appeal, even if not raised by the plaintiff,” and if “the plaintiff
has not had an opportunity to amend the complaint in response
to the demurrer, leave to amend is liberally allowed as a matter
of fairness, unless the complaint shows on its face that it is

12
incapable of amendment.”]; Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital
Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 970-971 [“‘Where the complaint is
defective, “[i]n the furtherance of justice great liberality should be
exercised in permitting a plaintiff to amend his complaint, and it
ordinarily constitutes an abuse of discretion to sustain a
demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable
possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.”’”]; City of
Torrance v. Southern California Edison Co. (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 1071, 1091 [“A court’s denial of leave to amend is
reviewable on appeal, ‘“even in the absence of a request for leave
to amend” [citations], and even if the plaintiff does not claim on
appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining a
demurrer without leave to amend’”].)

C. Bell Alleged Sufficient Facts To Constitute a Cause of
Action for Violation of the Ralph Act
The Ralph Act provides that all persons in California “have
the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of
violence, committed against their persons or property because of
political affiliation . . .” (§ 51.7, subd. (b)(1).) To state a cause of
action under the Ralph Act, the plaintiff must allege that “the
defendant threatened or committed violent acts against the
plaintiff or their property, and a motivating reason for doing so
was a prohibited discriminatory motive, or that the defendant
aided, incited, or conspired in the denial of a protected right.”
(Gabrielle A. v. County of Orange (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1268,
1291; see Ramirez v. Wong (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1486
[section 51.7 requires “violence or a threat of violence”].)
“‘[T]here is no requirement that the violence be extreme or
motivated by hate in the plain language of the sections, or in the

13
cases construing them; there is also no requirement that the act
constitute a crime.’” (Ventura v. ABM Industries Inc. (2012)
212 Cal.App.4th 258, 270.)
Bell sufficiently alleged Rabbi Louie committed a violent,
destructive act by tearing apart her signs so that she could not
use them to protest. The allegedly intentional, physical
destruction of Bell’s personal property constituted a violent act
within the meaning of the Ralph Act. (See § 51.7, subd. (b)(1)
[prohibiting violence “committed against . . . property”].)
Bell also alleged Rabbi Louie’s “motivating reason for doing
so was a prohibited discriminatory motive.” (Gabrielle A. v.
County of Orange, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1291.) Bell alleged
that Rabbi Louie “targeted” her because of her “identification as
an animal rights activist who was opposed to the chicken killing
ritual” and that he targeted her “due to her political beliefs stated
on the signs.” (See Campbell v. Feld Entertainment, Inc.
(N.D.Cal. 2014) 75 F.Supp.3d 1193, 1210 [animal rights activism
constitutes a “‘political affiliation’” under the Ralph Act]; Ennis v.
City of Daly City (N.D. Cal., Feb. 16, 2011, No. C-09-05318-MHP)
2011 WL 672655, p. 8 [same].) Assuming Bell’s allegations are
true, again as we must (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High
School Dist., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 866), we conclude Bell
sufficiently pleaded Rabbi Louie’s motivating reason for ripping
up her signs was her political affiliation as an animal rights
activist.
Finally, to state a cause of action under the Ralph Act
claim, Bell had to allege that she suffered harm and that the
conduct of Rabbi Louie and HDC was a substantial factor in
causing it. Bell alleged that, by “physically ripping up the signs
so they could not be used to protest any longer,” Rabbi Louie

14
“committed a destructive act against [her] property.” That
allegation was sufficient.
Citing Ramirez v. Wong, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th 1480,
Rabbi Louie and HDC argue Bell did not allege sufficient facts to
constitute a cause of action under the Ralph Act because she did
not allege Rabbi Louie and HDC committed a verbal or physical
threat intended to injure her. Rabbi Louie and HDC misread
Ramirez. In Ramirez the defendant, on duty as resident
manager, entered the plaintiffs’ apartment, opened a dresser
drawer, and sniffed their underwear without their permission or
knowledge. (Id. at p. 1483.) The court held this conduct did not
violate the plaintiffs’ right “‘to be free from any violence, or
intimidation by threat of violence’” because the defendant did not
express any intention, either by words or conduct, to inflict injury
on the plaintiffs or their property. (Id. at pp. 1486-1487.)
Significantly, the plaintiffs in Ramirez did not allege any actual
violence or threat of violence against their persons or property.
(Id. at p. 1486.) Unlike the plaintiffs in Ramirez, Bell alleged a
destructive act against her property. Because the Ralph Act
protects against “violence . . . or intimidation by threat of
violence” (§ 51.7, subd. (b)(1), italics added), a plaintiff who
alleges physical violence against property need not also allege a
threat of violence.
Rabbi Louie and HDC also assert that, even if Bell can
state a cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act based on
violence to personal property, the “intent to injure or intimidate
must be directed to the plaintiff.” (Italics omitted.) Bell,
however, alleged Rabbi Louie ripped up her sign and targeted her
because she (not her sign) was an animal rights activist. That
allegation was sufficient at the pleading stage, even if, at trial or

15
on summary judgment, the evidence shows Rabbi Louie did not
intend to injure Bell when he destroyed her signs. (See
Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa, Inc. v. 32nd Dist. Agricultural
Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 929, 936 [“‘a general demurrer admits the
truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint
[citation]; . . . the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove these
allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does
not concern the reviewing court’”]; Perdue v. Crocker National
Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913, 922 [same]; Panterra GP, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 697, 709 [“‘“A demurrer is
simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of
disputed facts.”’”]

D. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sustaining the
Demurrer to Bell’s Conspiracy Cause of Action, but
the Court Should Have Given Her Leave To Amend
Civil conspiracy is a doctrine of liability, not a cause of
action. (Spencer v. Mowat (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1024, 1036.)
“‘There is no separate tort of civil conspiracy and no action for
conspiracy to commit a tort unless the underlying tort is
committed and damage results therefrom.’” (Julian v. Mission
Community Hospital, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 390; see
Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994)
7 Cal.4th 503, 511 [“[s]tanding alone, a conspiracy does no harm
and engenders no tort liability”; it “must be activated by the
commission of an actual tort”]; Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Com. v. Insomniac, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 803, 833 [same].)
Conspiracy is “a form of vicarious liability by which one
defendant can be held liable for the acts of another.”

16
(IIG Wireless, Inc. v. Yi (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 630, 652;
see Spencer v. Mowat, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1036.)
Because civil conspiracy is not an independent cause of
action, the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer by
Rabbi Louie and HDC to Bell’s cause of action for conspiracy.
But Bell can easily cure the defect by amending her complaint to
include her conspiracy allegations, if appropriate, in her
remaining cause(s) of action. (See Loeffler v. Target Corp., supra,
58 Cal.4th at p. 1100.)

E. The Trial Court Erred in Sustaining Demurrers by
Rabbi Louie and HDC to Causes of Action Against
Them Based on Vicarious and Accomplice Liability
As stated, Bell alleged that Rabbi Louie, as Shamoni’s
“employer and superior,” was variously liable under the Bane Act
and the Ralph Act for Shamoni’s actions and that HDC was
vicariously liable for the actions of Rabbi Louie and Shamoni,
who Bell alleged “were acting in the course and scope of their
employment when they engaged in [the] violent acts.” Bell also
alleged that Rabbi Louie and Shamoni “were acting as
accomplices to each other, providing encouragement and
assistance to each others’ [sic] actions” and that they “were
working together, acting in concert to disrupt and antagonize
[Bell] and other peaceful protesters at the time each engaged in
the actions that they did.”
In their demurrer, Rabbi Louie and HDC argued Bell had
not adequately alleged, in support of her vicarious liability claim
against HDC, an employer-employee relationship or, in support
of her accomplice liability claim against Rabbi Louie, that Rabbi
Louie was Shamoni’s accomplice. Rabbi Louie and HDC argued

17
that Bell had not alleged “the specific employer-employee
relationship” or “what kind of employee Shamoni” was and that
Bell alleged nothing more than a “personal dispute arising during
the contentious circumstances during her protest outside HDC.”
And regarding accomplice liability, they argued they were
“unaware of reported authority showing that accomplice liability
is available for the civil causes of action alleged here” where,
“after investigating the alleged spitting, the police found no
supporting evidence and the State brought no criminal charges.”
All fine arguments on summary judgment or at trial. The
plaintiff, however, does not need to plead claims of vicarious or
accomplice (or aiding and abetting) liability with specificity or
particularity. Where the plaintiff alleges a conspiracy to commit
fraud, the plaintiff must plead a conspiracy claim with
particularity, because the plaintiff must plead fraud with
particularity. (Favila v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 189, 210-212.) But there is no particularity or
specificity requirement for pleading vicarious or accomplice
liability for the causes of action here. Bell alleged that Shamoni
was Rabbi Louie’s employee and was acting in the course and
scope of his employment and that Rabbi Louie and Shamoni were
HDC’s employees and were acting in the course and scope of their
employment. That was sufficient. (See Patterson v. Domino’s
Pizza, LLC (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474, 491 [“the venerable respondeat
superior rule provides that ‘an employer may be held vicariously
liable for torts committed by an employee within the scope of
employment’”]; Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial
Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296 [“The rule of respondeat
superior is familiar and simply stated: an employer is vicariously
liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of

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the employment.”]; Dones v. Life Ins. Co. of North America (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 665, 685 [“‘[a]n allegation of agency is an
allegation of ultimate fact that must be accepted as true for
purposes of ruling on a demurrer’”]; City of Industry v. City of
Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 212 [same].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to
vacate its order sustaining the demurrer to Bell’s second
amended complaint without leave to amend. The court is
directed to enter a new order (1) overruling the demurrer to Bell’s
cause of action under the Ralph Act; (2) sustaining the demurrer
to Bell’s causes of action under the Bane Act and for conspiracy
with leave to amend; and (3) sustaining the demurrer to Bell’s
causes of action for assault and battery and for elder abuse
without leave to amend. Bell is to recover her costs on appeal.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

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