Filed 8/31/26 Pacifica San Juan Community Assn. v. City of San Juan Capistrano CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
PACIFICA SAN JUAN
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION,
G065661
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
v. 01358551)
CITY OF SAN JUAN OPINION
CAPISTRANO,
Defendant and Respondent;
ARSALAN DARMAL et al.,
Real Parties in Interest and
Respondents.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Layne H. Melzer, Judge. Affirmed. Request for judicial notice. Granted in
part.
Briggs Law Corporation and Cory J. Briggs for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis, Paige H. Gosney,
Jacob E. Aronson; Best Best & Krieger, Alisha M. Winterswyk for Real
Parties in Interest and Respondents.
* * *
Plaintiff Pacifica San Juan Community Association appeals from
the denial of its petition for a writ of mandate challenging respondent the
City of San Juan Capistrano’s approval of a real estate project. The
Association contends (1) the project was subject to environmental review,
which the City did not do, and (2) the City wrongly gave the project merely
ministerial review.
We conclude the Association failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies for its environmental review contention. We further conclude the
municipal code vested the City with discretion to choose the appropriate
review procedure. Because an ordinance set objective parameters for
approving the project, choosing ministerial review was not an abuse of
discretion. We affirm.
FACTS
I.
THE PLAN, THE ORDINANCE, AND THE PROJECT
The Forster Canyon Planned Community comprises residential
neighborhoods, office parcels, public amenities, and open space occupying
nearly 400 acres of southern San Juan Capistrano east of the San Diego
Freeway. It is one of several planned communities specified in the City’s
general plan. (See Gov. Code, § 65300 et seq.)
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Pursuant to its municipal code, the City adopted a “zone
document” that “sets forth the concepts, guidelines, and regulations”
governing development of the community—the Comprehensive Development
Plan 81-01 (Plan 81-01).1
Plan 81-01 provides: “The development review procedures
contained in Chapter 9-2, Article 3 of the Land Use Code shall apply to all
development plans for projects proposed.” (Plan 81-01, ch. V, § C.) The plan’s
“Residential Development Procedures” states: “Development plans, for all
residential projects shall be reviewed and approved pursuant to Title 9,
Chapter 2, Article 3, entitled Development Review Procedures of the Land
Use Code . . . .” (Plan 81-01, ch. V, § C, subd. (1).)
These references to “Article 3” refer to the City’s municipal code.
(San Juan Capistrano Mun. Code, tit. 9, ch. 2, art. 3 (Article 3).)
In turn, Article 3’s “Development Review Procedures” give great
discretion to the City. They explain: “The exact review procedures, if any,
that apply to a specific project will be determined on a case-by-case basis by
the Planning Director based on an understanding of the project specifics.”
(Article 3, § 9-2.301, subd. (a).)
But Plan 81-01 modifies the review and approval process for
construction pursuant to “Area Plans,” an undefined term. Plan 81-01 states
1 Respondents request judicial notice of three matters: (1) Plan
81-01; (2) “Title 9 of the” City’s “‘Land Use Code’”; and (3) “[t]he fact that
Interstate 5 in the vicinity” of the owner’s property “is not an officially
designated state scenic highway.” We grant the request as to the first two
matters. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (b).) We deny the request as to the third
matter as unnecessary. (See Planning & Conservation League v. Department
of Water Resources (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 726, 774 [denying request “as
immaterial”].)
3
“Submission requirements for Area Plans shall be as follows: [¶] . . . [¶] For
custom homes: architectural design concepts indicating general building
types, form and scale, materials, colors, textures, outdoor lighting,
architectural details and graphics.” (Plan 81-01, ch. V, § C, subd. (1)(c)(2).)
Subsequently, the City rezoned land owned by respondent
Arsalan Darmal (owner) by enacting “Ordinance No. 986.” (Ordinance 986.) It
created the “Hillside Estate Residential District,” (the District), which
consists solely of the owner’s land. (Ord. No. 986.) And it authorized a “Single
family residence, detached (final approval shall be by the Design Review
Committee (DRC).” (Ibid.)
Ordinance 986 stated its “Purpose and Intent” was to “provide[ ]
regulations to establish the framework for developing” the owner’s house:
“Land designated for [the District] is intended for the development of a
single-family detached home on an irregular shaped hillside lot. The
[District] provides regulations to establish the framework for developing a
low-density detached custom home designed in close harmony with the site
and surrounding area and that is located to maximize views and respond to
site opportunities and constraints.” (Ord. No. 986, Ex. A, adding ch. V, § D,
subd. (4)(c) to Plan 81-01.)
Ordinance 986 also specified objective limits or requirements for
the District’s “Accessory Uses,” “Structures Permitted,” and “Lot
Development Standards.” The standards included specific measurements
such as “Minimum Setbacks: [¶] Front: Average 10 feet from front property
line but in no case less than 5 feet. [¶] Side: One-story (maximum height of 10
feet); 5 feet [¶] Two-story (maximum height over 10 feet); 10 feet [¶] Rear: 5
feet [¶] To Accessory Bldg: 6 feet.” (Ord. No. 986, Ex. A.) The owner “pursued
approval” to grade his land, which the City approved in 2013.
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II.
THE APPROVALS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS, AND THE WRIT PETITION
The owner sought approval of “grading modifications” labeled
“GPM 19-023,” which the City approved in April 2022. The City found no
environmental impact report was required because the project fell within
exemptions to the California Environmental Quality Act. (Pub. Resources
Code, § 21000 et seq.; CEQA.)2 One of them was “Class 32” (Exemption 32),
which exempts projects that fit certain conditions and are “consistent with
the applicable general plan,” “plan policies,” “zoning designation and
regulations” for that location. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15332.)
The City affirmed its application of Exemption 32 when it denied
the Association’s3 administrative appeal from GPM 19-023 in June 2022. The
Association did not file a writ petition challenging this decision.
The City applied Exemption 32 again in 2023, when it approved
the owner’s “request to extend the approval of GPM 19-023 for an additional
year.”
Within five weeks of the extension request, the owner also sought
approvals to build his home through “development plans associated with
Building Permit B23-0700” (the permit application).
The City’s principal planner reviewed “the unique nature” of
Ordinance 986 and “determined that the DRC is to conduct a ministerial
2 All undesignated statutory references are to this code.
3 According to its petition, the Association is “a non-profit
organization formed and operating under the laws of the State of California.
At least one of Petitioner’s members resides in the City of San Juan
Capistrano and has an interest in, among other things, ensuring compliance
with environmental laws and protecting the region’s environment and quality
of life and in protecting taxpayers.”
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review” of the permit application for conformance with “all codified objective
development standards contained in” Plan 81-01. The DRC then conducted a
ministerial review, in July 2023, and approved the permit application
“thereby allowing the Applicant to proceed through the permit review process
with the City’s Building Division.”
The Association filed two administrative appeals in August 2023,
challenging both the extension of the GPM 19-023 grading approval as well
as the City’s ministerial review of the permit application.
On the grading CEQA exemption, the Association asserted four
issues: (1) the time to grant a time extension had expired; (2) there was
insufficient evidence of compliance with grading modification requirements;
(3) the City had not examined potential environmental impacts of the
proposed modifications; and (4) the owner had indicated the addition of a
basement to his home for the first time. Not included in the raised issues was
the scenic highway exception to Exemption 32 that the Association now
asserts on appeal. (§ 21804, subd. (c); Scenic Highway exception.)
On the ministerial review issue, the Association asserted the
City’s DRC should have conducted a more “comprehensive review,” to “help
guarantee that the development aligns with the established architectural
guidelines.”
The City denied both administrative appeals and the Association
filed a petition for a writ of mandate. On the CEQA issue, the Association
quoted the Scenic Highway exception when claiming the project would
“‘result in damage to scenic resources, including, but not limited to, trees,
historic buildings, rock outcroppings, or similar resources, within a highway
designated as an official state scenic highway.’” (§ 21804, subd. (c).) On the
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ministerial review issue, the Association alleged the City failed “to ensure
that the project harmonized with the surrounding area.”
The trial court issued a 30-page tentative ruling denying the
petition.
On the CEQA issue, the trial court concluded the Association had
not shown Exemption 32 was wrongly applied. The court more fundamentally
found the Association failed to exhaust its administrative remedies because it
did not assert in its administrative appeal that Exemption 32 did not apply
due to the Scenic Highway exception.
On the ministerial review issue, the trial court found the City
complied “with all applicable provisions of” Article 3 through a “ministerial
review and approval of” the permit application. The court found the City’s
decision for “only a ministerial review was not arbitrary or capricious.” The
“Planning Director had the authority to determine that [the permit
application] would undergo [a] ministerial review.” The court reasoned the
City did not need to implement Plan 81-01’s “architectural review provisions”
for undefined “‘Area Plans’” because such “‘Plans’ seem to pertain to larger
residential projects that involve the review and approval of tract maps—not a
project involving just one home.” The court noted that “nowhere does [Plan]
81-01 ‘require’ an Area Plan for development within the” District.
The parties submitted on the tentative ruling.4 The court entered
judgment accordingly.
4 We disagree with the City that the Association “has forfeited
any arguments on appeal because it submitted on, and did not object to, the
Superior Court’s tentative ruling.” “A party’s ‘[s]ubmission on a tentative
ruling is neutral; it conveys neither agreement nor disagreement with the
analysis.’” (Parkford Owners for a Better Community v. Windeshausen (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 216, 226.)
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DISCUSSION
The Association presents two grounds for reversal. First, it
contends the application of Exemption 32 “is not supported (and is indeed
contradicted) by substantial evidence in the record,” because of the Scenic
Highway exception. Second, the Association contends the City’s “DRC
arbitrarily and unreasonably limited its review of the Project and [the permit
application] to a ‘ministerial review’ of setback and height requirements,”
which “completely and intentionally ignore[d] the development standards and
requirements in [Plan] 81-01.”
First, we agree with the City the Association failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies for its claim that the owner’s project falls within the
Scenic Highway exception to Exemption 32.
“A challenge to an agency’s findings that a project is categorically
exempt from CEQA under the CEQA Guidelines is subject to the exhaustion”
of administrative remedies doctrine, which “is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
maintaining an action alleging a lead agency’s noncompliance with CEQA.”
(Arcadians for Environmental Preservation v. City of Arcadia (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 418, 430 (Arcadians).) A party seeking judicial relief must show
the issues it raised in the trial court were properly presented in the
underlying administrative proceedings. (§ 21177; Arcadians, at p. 431.) “To
achieve [the doctrine’s] purpose ‘the exact issue’ must be presented to the
agency.” (Arcadians, at p. 431.) On the Exemption 32 issue, we review
questions of exhaustion of administrative remedies de novo. (Ibid.)
Here, the administrative record shows the Scenic Highway
exception was not “‘the exact issue’” raised in the Association’s ensuing
August 2023 administrative appeal. (Arcadians, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at
p. 431.) The Association’s only stated basis for challenging application of
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Exemption 32 at that time was that “the proposed development will add a
basement and thereby increase the intensity of the use and the size of the
residence.” The Association contends in its reply brief that it exhausted its
available administrative remedies because its “former board member Doug
Main spoke in opposition to the Project at the Planning Commission’s
meeting on April 13, 2022.” The oral objection is not in the record and we
decline the Association’s invitation to verify it using a website. In any event,
any oral objection would not help because the Association filed its writ
petition here more than 180 days after its administrative appeal arising from
the April 13, 2022 meeting was denied in June 2022. (§ 21167, subd. (a) & (d)
[180-day outer limit to seek judicial relief].)
Second, we agree the trial court correctly decided the ministerial
review issue. We review whether the City’s decision “was arbitrary,
capricious” or “entirely lacking in evidentiary support.” (Associated Builders
and Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352,
361.) “We exercise independent judgment, however,” on the construction of
state and local laws (ibid.), and “we may give deference to an agency’s
interpretation” (Sustainability, Parks, Recycling & Wildlife Defense Fund v.
Department of Resources Recycling & Recovery (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 676,
701).
Article 3 gives discretion to the City’s planning director to
determine “[t]he exact review procedures” “on a case-by-case basis.” (Article
3, § 9-2.301, subd. (a).) The Land Use Code defines a “ministerial” decision as
a “[d]ecision on a permit application that is approved by a reviewing
authority based upon a given set of facts in a prescribed manner in obedience
to the mandate of legal authority, in which the decision is limited to finding
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whether the permit application complies with applicable statutes, codes, or
regulations.” (Article 3, § 9 attachment, appen. A, 2:22.)
In this case, ministerial review was a reasonable review
procedure for the reviewing authority (the planning director) because his
approval was based upon finding compliance with Ordinance 986’s objective
limits and requirements.
We disagree with the Association that the owner’s “Project itself
is effectively an ‘Area Plan,’” which would trigger certain Plan 81-01 review
and approval processes. “Area Plan” is undefined and the Association does
not offer a definition. Thus we have no standard to apply.
We also disagree the project must comply with what the
Association asserts is Plan 81-01’s default requirement for “discretionary
review of ‘architectural design concepts” for “custom homes.”5 Ordinance 986
amended Plan 81-01 to impose the specific “Regulations applicable” to the
owner’s home. (Plan 81-01, ch. V, § D, subd. (4)(c); see Ross v. California
Coastal Com. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 900, 928 [“‘specific statute controls and
takes priority over a general statute’”].) The Ordinance does not compel the
owner to submit architectural design concepts. If the City wished to apply
certain Plan 81-01 provisions to the owner’s land, it could have
straightforwardly done so, as it did when it specified “Architectural control
review” protocols for certain project categories, as the trial court aptly noted.6
5 The Land Use Code also defines “Decision, discretionary:
Decision on a development application that requires the exercise of judgment,
deliberation, or decision on the part of the reviewing authority in the process
of approving or disapproving a particular activity.” (Article 3, § 9 attachment,
appen. A, 2:22.)
6 The three categories are: (1) “Residential projects with a gross
density of eight units per acre and/or that propose new construction of three
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And while Ordinance 986 uses the words “close harmony with
the . . . surrounding area,” it does not require the City to review for harmony
or make any such finding. The words were simply a statement of the purpose
and intent underlying the ordinance that do not impose any particular
requirement.
The Association also fails to show the City could not enact
Ordinance 986 to treat the owner’s property as (in the Association’s words) an
“island.” The Land Use Code itself specifies “case-by-case” discretion—i.e., for
the “Planning Director” to determine “exact review procedures, if any, that
apply to a specific project . . . based on an understanding of the project
specifics.”7 The Association does not show the City was barred from
considering the project as a special case.
or more dwelling units on a lot, parcel, or development site;” (2) “residential
projects approved by tentative tract map;” and (3) “project[s] proposing” “Area
plans, when required by a Comprehensive Development plan or Specific
Plan.” (Article 3, § 9-2.313, subds. (a)(2),(6) & (7).) The parties do not dispute
the property is “1.4 acres” and that the owner seeks to build a “single-family
residence” on the land.
7 The Association does not dispute the City’s “principal planner”
could exercise this discretion.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs
on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
GOODING, J.
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